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ABSTRACT
METAPHORS IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF THEORY:
Ramus, Peirce and the American Mind
by
Laurel Warren Trufant
University of New Hampshire, December,

1990

This study argues for the mutual impenetration of
logical, legal and scientific metaphors and attempts to
determine the role played by them in the construction of
theory.

Specifically it attempts to discover the impact

which the metaphors of topical logic may have had on the
construction of American ideology.
Chapter 1 offers a brief discussion of logical meta
phors and their relation to the social and intellectual
settings which generate them.

Chapter 2 extends that dis

cussion to principles of positive law and political order
as they developed in the unstable atmosphere of 16th
Century Europe.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt to relate the

metaphors defined in Chapters 1 and 2 to the development of
the scientific models which emerged during the "scientific
revolution" of the 17th Century.

These chapters proceed

n

the context of a discussion of the interaction of
Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms.
Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of topical
metaphors in the establishment of order in the American
colonies.

Chapters 7 and 8 carry the argument for a "New

England Mind" into a national setting and discuss how
Ramean metaphors contributed to the construction of
American conceptions of political order and physical law.
These chapters attempt to identify a controlling metaphor
of continuity which operated at the base of American
models.
Chapter 9 claims this metaphor of continuity as the
logical ground of pragmatic thought, transmitted to C . S.
Peirce through the German logical tradition via Leibniz and
Wolff.

Chapter 10 extends that discussion to a specific

investigation of Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of
Science, considered here as representative of a fundamental
commitment on Peirce’s part to a methodology which would
underwrite the rest of his thought.

Chapter 11 laments the

failure of James, Dewey and Royce to appreciate the power
of Peirce’s model and discusses the effect which their
fragmentation of his continuous reality had on American
phil osophy.

Peirce’s logic of science emerges as a funda

mental expression of an "American mind" with roots sunk
deep in a Ramean logical paradigm.

vi i

PROLOQUB

This is a germinal study, intended more to suggest than
to convince.

It skirts many fascinating issues and scans

the surface of others.

It offers no demographics, no

charts, no quantitative analyses -- in short, nothing to
gladden the heart of social historians or sober
statisticians.

Moreover it proceeds under a clear meth

odological bias to which I may as well confess at the
start.

It patently assumes that there are such things as

"characteristic German models," "a French intellectual
milieu," "English epistemolog.v" or "a New England Mind.”
think there are.

I

The question addressed here is why?

This study offers a possible answer grounded in
the positive role which metaphors play in the construction
of theory.

It argues for the mutual impenetration of logi

cal, legal and scientific metaphors embedded in diverse
intellectual settings and attempts to determine the role
played by those metaphors in generating characteristic
principles of order.

Specifically it attempts to discover

the impact which the peculiar metaphors of the topical
logical tradition may have had on the construction of
American ideology.
Chapter 1 offers a brief narrative of the
provenance of those metaphors and their relation to the
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social and intellectual settings which generated them.

It

establishes the topical logic of Peter Ramus as legitimate
heir to the tradition of Peter of Spain and explores the
effects which Ramean logic had on European models as it
interacted with existing forms of analysis.

Chapter 2

extends that discussion to questions of positive law and
political order as they developed in the unstable atmos
phere of 16th Century Europe.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 attempt

to relate the metaphors defined and described in Chapters 1
and 2 to the development of the scientific models which
emerged in England, France and Germany during the
"scientific revolution" of the 17th Century.

These chap

ters proceed in the context of a discussion of the interac
tion of Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean paradigms.
Chapter 6 argues for the crucial importance of
topical metaphors in the establishment of order in the
American colonies -- an argument already carefully explored
by Perry Miller but expanded here to include specifically
logical perspectives.

Chapters 7 and 8 carry the argument

for a "New England Mind" into a national setting and dis
cuss how Ramean metaphors and images contributed to the
construction of American conceptions of political order and
physical law -- conceptions unique by virtue of being an
amalgam of the three models defined in earlier chapters.
These discussions attempt to identify a controlling meta
phor of continuity which operated at the base of American
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political and scientific models.

The proposed metaphor of

continuity draws directly on the conceptual biases of topi
cal logic.
Chapter 9 claims the metaphor of continuity as the
logical ground of pragmatic thought, transmitted to C. S.
Peirce through the German logical tradition via Leibniz and
Wolff.

Chapter 10 extends that discussion to a specific

investigation of Peirce's Illustrations of the Logic of
Science, considered here as representative of a fundamental
commitment on Peirce’s part to a methodology which would
underwrite the rest of his thought.

Chapter 11 laments the

failure of James, Dewey and Royce to appreciate the power
of Peirce’s model and discusses the effect which their
fragmentation of his continuous reality had on American
ph ilosophy.
Throughout my bias is clear.

I see in Peirce’s

logic of science an expression of an "American mind" with
roots sunk deep in a Ramean logical paradigm.

The per

sistence of Peirce’s influence, the continuing impact of
his insights on the construction of theory and the enduring
ability of his often paradoxical thought to confound and
inspire all bear witness to the fundamentality of his
vision and its crucial importance for an understanding of
the American intellectual tradition.

Chapter 1
CHANQINQ PLACES;
Metaphors
in
The Construction of Theory

Greek logic had dealt with consciousness as a principle
of order, focusing its theories on an impersonal mind in
search of models and norms.

Christianity, on the other

hand, conceived of the individual as the protagonist in a
cosmic drama whose denouement described nothing less than
his own salvation.

Thus Christian eschatology required a

logic which could do more than define principles of order.
It required a logic which could provide the pilgrim with a
path to Truth.
The psychological immediacy of the Christian message
encouraged the construction of 'ogical metaphors which
portrayed cognition as a function of an "inner sense" and
consciousness as a world of inner meaning.

Under the

operation of these powerful metaphors, human events, as the
history of man's journey toward God, acquired a sig
nificance which extended beyond the immediate present to
encompass a collective past.

Christianity, in fact, made

human history cohere in a type of societas which trans
cended all previous formulations of the social order.1

5
Under its influence the medieval world developed as a
society based on interdependent relationships and communal
ideals -- a complex society in which ritual, politics and
custom all coalesced and re-emerged in an organic whole in
which cult and culture were joined.*

This total integra

tion of ritual with life in turn yielded a symbolic view of
the natural world which acquired an immense metaphysical
richness when overlaid with the physics of man-asmicrocosm.

Here events possessed archetypal meaning, time

reflected a moving image of eternity and nature itself
became a cipher.

"The ethic and aesthetic value of the

symbolic interpretation of the world was inestimable,"
Huizinga asserts.

"Embracing all nature and all history,

symbolism ."ave a conception of the world of a still more
rigorous unity than that which modern science can offer."*
But symbolism did little to advance the cause of objec
tive knowledge.4

Although medieval science achieved a

certain explanatory force through definition and clas
sification, it tended, due to its metaphysical assumptions,
to undervalue secondary causes and to view all phenomena
sub species aeternatis.

Its metaphoric base precluded any

notion of development in the realm of organisms and
rendered previous Greek insights into the application of
mathematics in physics irrelevant.

Indeed, the symbolist

mind viewed Unity as a non-numerical concept and pursued
mathematical analyses which were purely Pythagorean in
nature.

"Symbolism was like a second mirror held up to
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that of the phenomenal world itself," Huizinga points out.*
Laboring under its constraints, medieval science could con
struct no objective theory and pursue no truly experimental
course.
E. A. Moody stresses the crucial importance of the fact
that medieval logic "achieved its distinctive form of
development in almost complete isolation from scientific
applications."6

In a symbolic world, logic performed a

communal function.

It maintained the race's consistent set

of conceptions across time and brought the contingent facts
of existence into right relation with ethical and spiritual
ideals.

The metaphors which supported the tightly woven

fabric of medieval culture and symbolic thought expressed a
theory of knowledge wherein individual terms denoted com
plex structures understood through penetration into their
larger reality.7

Under analysis, each of these structures

yielded a series of forms -- formalitates -- which existed
independently of the mind as elements in that wider truth
which symbolism sought to express.

But since the symbolic

view of nature assumed a correspondence between the for
malities of thought and metaphysics, medieval logic had no
need to consider whether its forms reflected present
realities.
Symbolism in fact rendered logic a function of
metaphysics, removing it from the objective world of
science.
rhetoric.

Moreover, it effectively divorced logic from
In a symbolic world, truth is its own advocate.

It requires no exposition.
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So the logic which dominated

the Schools into the 12th Century developed in relative
isolation from both scientific and rhetorical metaphors.
Its dialectic evolved as a discipline primarily concerned
with the syntactic properties of language and the logical
form of propositions.*

The universal use of Learned Latin

in the Schools served to strengthen this orientation away
from contextual concerns and to anchor medieval logic
firmly in the formalist tradition.*

Late in the 12th

Century, however, the medieval corpus logics was augmented
by Aristotle’s Topics and Prior Analytics.

"Relatively

slight use was made of the Prior Analytics," Moody notes,
but the Topics exerted a profound influence on Scholastic
thought.10
The Topics outlined a system of logical order which
differed radically from the system of categories which
governed Aristotle’s logic.

Categories defined ideal

groupings which organized thought qualitatively.

Topics

functioned as headings, or key notions, which organized
experience quantitatively.

The topics thus expressed a

substantially more concrete system of order in that they
represented actual "places" in which to "store" the objects
of experience, rather than extramental constructs under
which to classify ideas.

For example, relation indicated a

category -- related things occupied a "place."

Similarity

indicated a category -- Similar things occupied a "place."

8
These differences between topical and categorical meta
phors carried profound methodological implications for the
construction of logical arguments.

Consider the construc

tion of a categorical argument:
Man is rational -- (an assertion)
What is rational is dialectical -- (a judgement)
Therefore, wan is dialectical -- (a conclusion drawn
from an assertion and
a judgement)
On the other hand, a topical argument would proceed quite
differently:
Is Man Dialectical? -- (a question which sends the
inquirer to examine the place
where dialectical things
res ide)
What is rational is dialectical -- (a discovery he
makes when he
examines the place
"dialectical")
But man is rational -- (a discovery he makes when he
examines the place "rational” )
Therefore man is dialectical — (a consequence of a
question and two
discoveries)
Note the crucial differences. The topical argument begins
with a question, not an assertion.

It proceeds by breaking

down the question rather than by further abstraction.

The

middle term "rational" is "discovered" in its "place,"
which is in turn searched for the term "man."

And finally,

all three terms are redistributed to form a statement.
Topical logic thus drew on a completely different set
of metaphors from those which governed categorical logic.1 1
The categories organized personalist assertions in abstract
configurations which in turn led to deductive conclusions.
The topics governed the spatial manipulation of concepts to
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arrive ultimately at inductive consequences.

The topical

argument expressed a diagrammatic rather than an abstract
order.

It treated concepts like objects which could be

"located" to supply predicates and "rearranged" to con
struct arguments.

Under a topical model predication

involved a search, not an assertion, and judgement involved
disposition, not deduction.
This shift in logical metaphors had profound con
sequences for late medieval logic.

For Aristotle,

categorical logic had aimed at defining truth with
metaphysical certainty, while the Topics had dealt rather
with the rhetorical art of communicating a perspective on
truth.

Topical arguments thus trafficked in probabilities.

But, whereas in the Hellenic world the Topics had been con
fined to the secular art of political discourse, in the
intensely religious atmosphere of 12th Century Europe this
art, grounded in probability and directed toward action,
entered the service of a Christian God whose objective was
to compel personal conviction.

When the rhetorical focus

of Aristotle's Topics converged with the controlling meta
phors of Christian logic, there emerged ar. essential cor
respondence between meaning and truth which influenced
Western thought in profound ways, shaping pedagogical prac
tices, encouraging humanist attitudes and underwriting
revolutionary ideologies.

Eventually this correspondence

acquired concrete expression in pragmatic thought.
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The exegetical function of medieval logic, which
required that it not only explicate the Book of Nature but
also construe authoritative texts in support of doctrine,
prepared it in a peculiar way to accept the message of
Aristotle’s Topics.1*

The logical metaphors of medieval

Christianity could easily extend themselves to incorporate
intensional contexts determined by verbs such as "believe",
"doubt” or "desire."

Indeed, the psychological immediacy

of Christianity carried a natural potential for blurring
the distinctions between formal and probable logic.

Under

the influence of Aristotle's Topics, this potential became
actual in the topical logic of Peter of Spain.

Known as

the logics moderns, this "new" logic formulated its
propositions metalinguistically, insisted on an extensional
approach to language analysis and concerned itself with
both syntactical and semantical issues.

It introduced

questions of meaning into a dialectic dominated by
certainty.

in short, it demanded relevance.13

Greek metaphysics could not have supported logical
metaphors like those which controlled topical logic.

It

lacked a sufficiently personal psychology to conceive of
truth as perspective.

Such a development required the

Christian doctrine of the logos - the Word made flesh - to
justify its implicit assumption that certainty could reside
within the natural language structures of men.

The topics

portrayed logic as a reflection of the natural world in the
structures of the mind.

Topical arguments procured their
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premises through the mind reaching back to the traditional
wisdom of the race and allowing that contact to induce a
flow of ideas from its loci or "places".

The mind then

arranged these ideas in patterns consistent, not only with
its own structures, but with those of nature.

The "places"

contained the common experience of all men, stored for
recall through inquiry.

In a sense, topical metaphors

manifested the drive in medieval culture to subordinate
individual to group motives and exemplified its communal
orientation.

Closely tied to images of structure, the

"places" provided a logical mechanism for investigating a
common past conceived as a racial present.

Thus, while

reorienting logic by incorporating into it the psychologi
cal constituents of rhetoric, Peter’s "place" or "topical"
logic continued to draw on the central metaphors of
medieval realism.

It reaffirmed the communal aspects of

knowledge.
Topical logic exerted a pervasive influence in the
Schools.14

118 ability to portray thought in concrete

images made it particularly useful in a pedagogical setting
where learning took place through indoctrination rather
than investigation.

The "arguments" peculiar to topical

logic focused on the extension of terms and had a curious
tendency to "fix" concepts in the external world.

More

over, the "places" themselves encouraged a constant traf
ficking in concrete images which in turn generated a con
ception of thought as a process whereby objects were some
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how lifted into the mind where they behaved in ways crudely
analogous to "things."18
By thus treating concepts as commodities which one
could "store" and "recall," topical logic served as an
ideal model for teaching.

Moreover, by equipping the logic

of the Schools with the tools of discourse, it provided
dialectic with an outward reference which made it easily
adaptible to pedagogy.

The need to communicate a body of

usable knowledge to large numbers of students required a
simple, concrete method capable of dealing with contextual
issues.

Peter of Spain supplied it, complete with a

delivery mechanism adequate to the task.

The phenomenal

growth of the Universities during the 12th Century can in
fact be seen as both cause and effect of the almost
universal acceptance of Peter’s model.1•
But the comfortable accommodation of topical logic to
the educational and conceptual landscape of the 12th
Century disintegrated rapidly with the full-scale assimila
tion of Aristotle's scientific works in the 13th.17

The

naive realism of the "places” simply could not absorb all
the analytical implications of peripatetic science.

The

Aristotelian scheme of the physical world differed radi
cally from the symbolic view.

Its incorporation under

Christian doctrine would have meant abandoning its entire
theory of natural substances and dismantling its cosmologi
cal framework.

Moreover, Aristotelian science reached the

West through Arabian and Jewish commentaries which them
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selves carried metaphysical assumptions that had to be
rationalized or discarded before the scientific knowledge
they contained could be isolated and merged with existing
doctrine.

These Semitic commentaries all tended toward a

concern for scientific demonstration rather than personal
conviction.

Yet the psychological focus of Christianity

continued to demand a relevance beyond the purely objective
requirements of science.
Confronted with a philosophical model which claimed
competence in metaphysics yet accepted no evidence other
than natural knowledge, the Schools at first attempted to
reconcile their revelatory faith with Aristotelian science.
But they soon discovered that no general theory of
reference could satisfy all the requirements of an objec
tive science without endangering Christian doctrine.

Since

they could not violate the articles of their faith, the
Schools turned instead to an internal critique of the
evidential criteria of the new knowledge -- a critique
which established a radical distinction between the proper
domains of physics and metaphysics.

But from the moment

the Scholastics chose to insulate their faith from the dis
solvent effects of Aristotelian science by challenging the
metaphysical competence of their logic, they ensured the
ultimate failure of their efforts at assimilation and began
a descent into philosophical empiricism which could only
end with the destruction of faith altogether.
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Aquinas stood at the apogee of this Scholastic effort.
With him, the metaphorical concreteness of the "places"
yielded to an uneasy alliance of matter and form in a logi
cal compositurn.1•

The fertile concept of "inner sense,"

grounded in the communal images of the topics, fell before
the more empirical intellectus agens which gained knowledge
through abstraction rather than penetration.

Thomas' logic

kept strictly to the Aristotelian view of matter as pure
potency and form as an anomaly which of itself existed nei
ther actually or potentially.

From this world of matter

and form, the mind abstracted the quidditates rerum
materialium, but could not penetrate to their essential
structure.

Still, Thomas’ theology demanded that the

intellect function as an independent personality with
access to metaphysical truth.

The impersonal pan-psychic

principles of the Arab commentaries clearly could not
satisfy the metaphoric demands of Christian soteriology.
For Peter of Spain, the problem simply had not existed.
Concrete objects and intellectual forms had functioned as
woof and warp of the same tightly woven logical fabric.
But for Thomas, encumbered with Aristotelian science, the
consoling metaphors of topical logic no longer proved apt,
while the Scholastic critique left him prey to the compet
ing claims of faith and reason.
Thomas’ logical compositum thus left Scholastic
philosophy curiously maladjusted, relegating the mind of
the pilgrim to a world where the present realities of sense
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experience no longer guaranteed inner perceptions.

Thomas

argued for a disjunctive model of human knowledge which,
unlike Christian doctrine, ascribed the principle of indi
viduation to matter alone.

Under the metaphors of his

logic, the objects of knowledge existed wholly in the per
ceptual order, the translation of the object from matter to
mind occurring through the mysterious process of abstract
ing forms from individuating material conditions.

But

since Thomas, like Aristotle, drew a radical distinction
between matter and form, his theory left the objects of
knowledge accessible only to the lower faculty of sensa
tion:

particulare sensitur; universale intelligitur.

Thus he ended by denying the possibility of direct knowl
edge of the material world and rejecting the possibility of
an objective science.
In reaction, Duns Scotus set out to rehabilitate objec
tive knowledge and restore the metaphorical foundations of
science.

Significantly, however, he did not attempt to

reclaim material facts by isolating them from their
abstract ground or raising them to a level of reality
inconsistent with their function.

Rather he chose to

reintegrate them into that wider symbolist truth which
assumed a manifold reality shared through cognition.1*
Against Aquinas, Scotus argued that the world of objects
derived from the successive imposition of logical forms on
a material principle which existed actually, not poten
tially.

Individuality, he claimed, resulted from the
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limitation of a common natura, of which it functioned only
as the most immediate expression.

The haecceitaa or "this-

ness" of a thing merely expressed a positive determination
existing formally within the object alongside its material
effects.

Both the formal determination and the material

effects, he claimed, remained accessible to the mind
through inquiry.
By thus investing matter with a positive actuality,
Scotus reinstated it as an element of shared experience.
Moreover, by substituting formal for real distinctions
between the elements in Thomas’ compoaitun, he endowed the
objects of nature with logical attributes which tied them
to formal truth.

Each material fact, he argued, expressed

a specifically determined grade of Being which affected the
mind as a concrete union of sensible and conceptual ele
ments.

The complexity of the process of cognition merely

reflected the complexity of the object, which existed as
neither matter, nor form, nor composition, but rather as a
determined unity constituted of the ultima realitas entis
of all three.

Thought and reality, he concluded, enjoyed a

correspondence based in the very nature of concepts which,
although arising in the mind, were occasioned by formal
principles enjoying an extra-mental status.

By thus

emphasizing the mutual impenetration of mind and matter,
Scotus revalidated the natural world as a source of common
experience and confirmed the possibility of an objective
science.
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Scotus upgraded the ontological status of Aquinas’
logical forms in order to bring the neutral potency of
Aristotelian matter within the conceptual boundaries of
Christian doctrine.

Significantly he did so in the context

of metaphors which acknowledged the shared aspects of human
experience.

Ockham, on the other hand, more concerned with

the logical than the spiritual implications of Aquinas’
model, passed beyond Scotus’ l'ealist posture in his own
critique to a new principle of logical order unrestricted
by common natures and bounded only by the laws of con
tradiction.

He subjected both Scotus’ and Aquinas’

theories of individuation to a long and searching critique
and ended by denying both their formal and their real dis
tinctions.20

In the process he pulled the logical ground

out from under Scotus’ world of common experience and cast
a new and deeper shadow over the possiblity of an objective
science.
Formal concepts, Ockham maintained, existed only by
virtue of being affirmed of individuals.

They represented

only abstract notions under which the mind grouped material
facts.

The problem of cognition, he argued, thus dissolved

into a purely syntactic problem relating to the referential
use of terms in propositions.

It required no logical

exposition since it referred to no formal ground.

Ockham’s

razor thereby trimmed all the contextual elements from
logic, leaving only those terms which could be dealt with
empirically through an analysis of language structures.

It
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reduced the species intelligibiles, which had given Scotus’
logic its contextual import, to environmentally dependent
"habita" which inclined individual minds through repeti
tion.

But where Scotus* "species” had tied the cognizing

individual to a collective past -- to that consistent set
of conceptions which had structured all medieval life and
thought -- Ockham’8 "habits" supplied only convenient men
tal fictions incapable of unifying human experience in a
common frame of reference.*1
knowledge thus disappeared.

All support of a community of
Ockham’s logic no longer

expressed a common cognitive process or a cultural ideal.
It expressed rather a set of "willed verbal relationships"
between an isolated mind and its extra-mental surround
ings.2*

Under the metaphors of this logic, each individual

mind entered into a contractual bond with formal reality by
"legislating" concepts as tools to manage its perceptions.
Concepts themselves regressed to the status of conventions
co-opted by the individual for use in controlling his
environment.
Ockham removed the entire realm of abstraction from the
field of logic by isolating and magnifying the quantitative
metaphors of the topical tradition.**

But in the wake of

his reformulation, the loci retained no independent sig
nificance.

They expressed either terms of second inten

tion, in which case they functioned as signs and belonged
to linguistic analysis; or else they expressed terms of
first intention, in which case they stood for real things

and belonged to physics.
insight into truth.
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In either case, they gave no

This shift in metaphors transformed

the world of nature from a symbolic universe informed by
essences to an infinitely various agglomeration of individ
uals intelligible in terms of their own movement and rela
tionships.

By thus encouraging the observation and

manipulation of terms as things, Ockham undoubtedly facili
tated an expansion of objective knowledge.2*
But Ockham's critique did not supply the logical tools
necessary to construct a scientific world-view.

Although

Ockham expanded logic’s ability to observe and express, he
sacrificed its ability to explain.

He defined a scientific

logic, but not a logic of science.

The controlling meta

phors of his logic, made explicit in his analysis of lan
guage, precluded hypotheses as cognitively meaningless and
reduced cause to an accidental relation perceived empiri
cally rather than an empirical connection conceived logi
cally.

By reducing Thomas’ real and Scotus’ formal dis

tinctions to a functional difference between evidential and
inevidential facts, Ockham in fact created a model of human
knowledge woefully ill-equipped to support a general theory
of science.29

He construed general propositions as condi

tional statements and denied the ability to infer from
experience anything that transcended it.

With no causal

inferences to link events, perceptions could not cohere in
rules or generate predictions and the possibility of for
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mulating the principles of a general science disappeared in
a crowd of self-sufficient particulars.
But if terminist logic failed to generate metaphors
which could support the growth of a theoretical science,
it carried a potent charge for social theory.*•

As a con

comitant of the general movement afoot in the 15th Century
to repudiate traditional authorities, Ockham’s search for a
new criterion of meaning coincided with a rejection of
social theories based in community.*7

Moreover, it encour

aged a moral scepticism which flourished on the disillu
sionment fostered by the dissolution of the medieval world.
As the tightly seamed metaphoric garment which had clothed
medieval society rent, so also the underlying collaboration
of custom, revelation and life began to crumble.

The rise

of territorial states and the creation of an international
commerce introduced a conception of society grounded in
competition, not community.**

With the Pope a puppet at

Avignon and the Conciliar Movement afoot in France, the
unity of Latin Christendom fell irrevocably assunder.

As

the Church regressed from a mystical to a political form,
the "body of the faithful" dissolved into a membership
governed by the rules of association rather than the tradi
tions of mutual participation.
The metaphors of nominalist logic perfectly expressed
this culture.

Preoccupied with change and focused on the

limits rather than the scope of human experience, they
could readily articulate the encroaching disorder.

But
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they could offer no reassurance to minds disoriented by
profound changes in their social, political and moral
environments.

In vain did the Council of Trent reassert

the authority of traditional forms. The nominalist pilgrim,
increasingly isolated from familiar and consoling com
munities, faltered on his journey, prey to deeply divided
perceptions about his role in the world -- until the via
moderna showed him the way.
Renaissance humanism pointed the way to new principles
of logical order.

It provided an escape from the limiting

metaphors of nominalist logic by explicitly recognizing the
normative powers of shared experience.

In reaction against

the nominalist tendency to isolate the individual from con
textual concerns, the humanists reasserted the need to
reach back to a common fund of knowledge and experience in
pursuit of truth.

At the core of their program lay the

need to communicate individual perceptions of a shared
reality.

Humanism thus established a new link with the

past by focusing on the possibilities of human history
rather than the limits of human knowledge.*•

It rejected

the isolation of the nominalist pilgrim in favor of an
ideal community achieved through communication.
This new ideal of communication, however, required
logical metaphors vastly different from those which had
controlled terminist logic.

In Ockham, the rhetorical

functions of logical discourse had all but disappeared.
The need to communicate shared knowledge which had sup-
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ported the introduction of rhetorical metaphors in the
topical tradition had no relevance in a logic where all
knowledge derived from the direct apprehension of individu
als by individuals.

The humanists, on the other hand,

tended to exploit the latent rhetorical and probabilistic
elements of topical logic and to make these metaphors more
explicit.

Although, ironically, they condemned the sum-

mulistas as the arch-villains of scholastic thought, the
humanists in fact based their entire logical program on the
"half-conscious blurring of probable argumentation and
scientific demonstration" typical of the topical logic of
Peter of Spain.*0

Rhetoric, as the grammar of thought,

allowed the humanists to grasp the shared structures of
reality expressed through language.

Its incorporation

under logic promised to draw together the fragmented ele
ments of experience left by the "narrow seive of contradic
tions" which nominalist logic had become.*1
In a metaphoric sense, humanism collapsed all
nominalist diversity into an absolute community by sub
ordinating general systems to personal perspectives.

As

such it expressed a movement of hope in the general atmos
phere of moral scepticism and decline endemic to 15th
Century Europe.

Humanism rejected all the harsh formalism

of the scholastics as well as the rigid limitations of the
terminists, finding neither sufficient to express the
mobility and infinite variety of the world of human experi
ence.

With rhetoric, the humanist set himself against his

23
fragmenting environment and attempted to impose a human
order and community on an open and discontinuous world.12
The individual himself took on the aspect of a constant
framework against which a changing reality unfolded.
But the humanist program created a crisis in the
Schools by challenging the primacy of dialectic and
championing the rhetorical arts.11

By demanding that all

logical demonstration be redirected toward shared dis
course, it undermined the curricular hierarchy and
threatened to engulf the entire educational canon in an
anomalous personalism.

In an attempt to mitigate the dis

solvent effects of humanist metaphors on the curriculum,
Rudolph Agricola, a Rhenish scholar well grounded in the
topical tradition, propounded a logic which revived the
loci and brought them once again into the academic
mainstream.

But while professing to purify and reclaim

logic by differentiating it emphatically from rhetoric,
Agricola in fact subsumed the rhetorical places under
logic.

He eliminated the distinction between probability

and demonstration altogether and gave all discourse one
simple, clear objective -- to teach.
With Agricola, logic became in fact what Peter of Spain
had purported it to be -- "the art of arts and the science
of sciences."

It spread itself ambiguously over the whole

field of discourse, expropriating all the primary functions
of rhetoric.

"There are no places of invention proper to

rhetoric," Agricola declared.12

They all dissolved into

24
his "dialectical places" which by definition contained all
the objects of human knowledge upon which discourse turned.
The Agricolan places had a tremendous impact on dialectical
theory.*8

They functioned in a manner substantially more

concrete than Aristotelian categories and encouraged
visualist analogies between the field of intellectual
activity and the objective world.

They actually "con

tained" ideas, conceived as objects susceptible of analysis
through spatial arrangement. Agricolan dialectic reflected
a simple process of locating ideas or concepts in their
places, drawing them out and arranging them methodically in
such a way as to convince.

Thinking became assimilable to

local motion, regulated by a logic which provided an actual
"map of the mind" to lead students through the successive
steps of invention and judgement which comprised learn
ing.**

Through the metaphoric mechanisms of the Agricolan

places, the entire realm of discourse was made over to doctrina.
Because of its peculiar emphasis on didactics,
Agricolan place logic had a natural affinity to
Protestantism.* *

The reformers identified themselves with

teaching in a very profound sense by focusing on the
related functions of preaching.**

They needed to convince,

to communicate the spirit under the letter which formed the
basis of their faith.

The vital principle of congregation,

which offered mutual reenforcement to a cause adrift in a
hostile world, implied the need for communication.**

Thus
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rhetoric became essential to the Protestant cause as a
means of persuasively transmitting its perspective on
truth.

But for the reformers, meaning lay at the instinc

tive level of life.

The empirical logic of Ockham could

not penetrate to the truths they sought.

They required a

logic that could give personal access to spiritual truth
and at the same time communicate that truth.

The metaphors

peculiar to place logic as it had developed in the environ
ment of the Schools proved uniquely suited to their needs.
Within the context of topical metaphors, doctrina was
acientia.

The "places" made revealed truth a teachable

commodi ty.
Phillip Melancthon adapted the metaphors of Agricolan
place logic to the ProteBtant cause in his treatise, the
Loci communes.40
truth."41

For Melancthon, "clarity was the text of

He claimed that the interior organization of any

science, including theology, described nothing less than
its ability to be taught.
private inquiry.

Logic did not govern thought as

It expressed the method by which the mind

identified and communicated truth.

It represented an

ordering process which terminated in teaching.

Logic

itself implied communication.
Melancthon used the loci as a means to define doctrina.
The "places" held the truths of the faith.

Man penetrated

these truths by extracting the essential elements, or
"arguments", from their proper places and arranging them
methodically in such a way as to make them susceptible of

communication.
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The method of arrangement provided

"a

straight or direct way or order of investigating and
explaining...[that] pulls out and ranges in order the
things pertaining to the matter proposed."41

In short,

method gave access to truth by rendering the "arguments"
intelligible -- that is to say, teachable.

When viewed

through the filter of Melancthon’s theological assumptions,
method became nothing less than a metaphoric road to
redemption.
Although the notion of method had a long history in law
and medicine, it first entered the Western logical tradi
tion through Protestant dialectical manuals.4*

Prior to

the 16th Century, the word "method” had had no independent
reference.

It had simply described an ordering activity

within the mind attached to other disciplines.

In the

Schools, method had focused on the organization of cur
ricular subjects, making it highly compatible with
Protestant paedeia.

But although the reformers required a

teachable catechism, they sought to convert, not merely to
educate.

They aimed at Truth, not just knowledge.

needed to extend the metaphors of

method to that realm

certainty ordinarily reserved for formal logic.
expanded Protestant conception of

So

they
of

When the

method joined forces

with

Agricola's objectified places, a powerful new notion of
dialectic emerged in which order guaranteed truth and argu
ment compelled conviction.

27
Peter Ramus expounded this new logic in a series of
dialectical manuals which provoked decades of con
troversy.44

Ramus carried the amalgamation of formal and

probable logics beyond the "half-conscious blurring" of the
humanists and deliberately redefined all discourse in
objective terms.

He removed the notion of method from its

para-logical setting, applied it to dialectic and redefined
it as procedure, thereby rendering all discourse a set of
formal operations.

He effectively neutralized the per-

sonalist metaphors of Humanism by occluding the psychologi
cal aspects of the rhetorical places and representing both
thought and communication as spatial manouevres with an
economy based in local motion.
Ramism borrowed metaphoric elements from all aspects of
the 16th Century intellectual milieu.

From the Schools it

took a preoccupation with didactics; from the humanists, a
concern for communication; from Agricola, an objective
theory of predication; and from the Protestants, an
expanded view of method.
arts scholasticism,

Well blended in the atmosphere of

this concoction yielded up a dialectic

which claimed to provide not only a transcript of the
processes of thought, but an actual description of the
image of God.4®

Ramism sought a "natural" dialectic which

reflected the structure of the mind and the world, a
dialectic capable of producing conviction without resorting
to psychological or epistemological techniques.

In a

sense, it sought the scholastics’ ideal curriculum —

one
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which could teach itself through the simple disposition of
its terms.
Like Peter of Spain, RamuB argued that categorical
logic arbitrarily imposed "artificial" structures on the
natural world of thought.

He declared these structures

commentitia and blamed them for the murky obscurity of
scholastic logic.

Although the sophistication of his

anaylsis did not prove adequate to his ambitions, Ramus had
stumbled here on a fundamental contradiction in scholastic
metaphors.«•

Categorical logic originated in a preliminary

act of assertion.

Its predicates functioned as enuncia

tions or accusations -- personalist, existential statements
about the nature of things.

Upon this foundation, the

scholastics had attempted to construct an abstract, formal
logic.

The entire realist/nominalist debate over the

status and priority of universals turned on issues of cor
respondence arising out of the attempt to reconcile
scientific metaphors of certainty with the assertoric
nature of predication.
But place logic originated in a preliminary act of
assent -- an unambiguous, shared recognition of "things" in
their "places".

It procured its premises through "inven

tion", a drawing out of "arguments" from a common body of
past experience.

Each premise thereby expressed the objec

tive content of a logical locus, not the subjective content
of a predicating mind.

These discrete concepts remained

psychologically neutral and functioned as the objective
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building blocks of all discourse.

All artificial issues of

correspondence disappeared since the metaphors of place
logic reduced all priority to the absolute priority in
nature itself.
Dialectic, under the opertion of topical metaphors,
promised to yield a true transcript of reality provided
only that the cognizing mind proceed methodically.

Ramean

dialectic,

in fact, operated soley through the machinery of

method.

Judgement, its second and controlling half, con

sisted simply in the methodical disposition of terms.
Through judgement the mind assembled or arranged cognitional units to reflect a structure which corresponded to
the natural structure of the mind and of the world.
process required no psychological explanation.
as a function justified through application.47
patrimony of the places is patent here.

The

It existed
The

But Peter of Spain

had deliberately finessed the extensional implications of
his logic, while Agricola had died leaving his treatment of
method open-ended and ambiguouB.

Ramus, on the other hand,

explicitly drew the metaphoric implications of topical
logic out to their ultimate conclusion.

He described a

method so comprehensive that logical operations could
almost proceed without the aid of thought.
Ramean metaphors clearly reached back to ideas of
structure.4®

Moreover they expressed a communal ideal in

their desire for an order totally within the ambit of the
conscious mind.4®

They encouraged no personal retreat into
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a private truth, but rather portrayed thought as a shared
progression toward a vast orderly arrangement of knowledge
which, in its farthest extension, expressed reality.

Each

cognitional unit, when placed in proper relation to other
units, led by minute steps to this perceptible order.

The

order itself underwrote the places as receptacles of shared
knowledge and experience.

Method organized that knowledge

into an "encyclopedia," a circle of learning embracing
human culture in all the richness of its racial past.*0
Moreover, it allowed for the persuasive transmission of
this lore to society as a whole.

By moving all the princi

ples of organization from rhetoric to dialectic and subsum
ing them there under method, Ramus tied all discourse to
shared experience and made reason virtually synonymous with
memory.* 1
This curious dialectic broke on the intellectual scene
at a crucial juncture.

The Wars of Religion had destroyed

all vestiges of a common ideology.

Europe now harbored two

distinct moralities, two distinct laws, each seeking its
own philosophical justification.

The invention of printing

had reoriented the flow of information and encouraged
unprecedented advances through the accumulation and trans
mission of knowledge.52
all fronts.

Aristotelean science suffered on

The new Copernican cosmology shook medieval

physics out of the cosy certainty of the crystalline
spheres and left it floating in neat but ambiguous orbit
around a desacralized nature.

By the end of the 16th
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Century, Brahe and Diggs had broken the bounds of even the
closed Copernican system.®*

By 1640, Kepler had overturned

theories of perception by discovering the inverted image of
the eye; Galileo had rearranged perspectives through his
revolutionary optical theories; and Harvey had reoriented
physiology by demonstrating the circulation of the blood.54
This mass of new data strained old metaphors to the
bursting point.

As the radical new cosmogony asserted

itself, it became more and more difficult to conceive of
the natural world as a symbolic scheme devised by the
aesthetic imagination.

The new sciences laid nature open

to plain view and revealed it as a penetrable and predict
able reality, subject to laws and susceptible of analysis.
This in turn demanded new principles of logical order
capable of guiding the mind in the construction of theory.
To minds dazzled by the rapid influx of raw scientific
knowledge, Ramean method offered a preliminary means of
control.

After all, what better tool to organize an anti-

Aristotelian science than an ostensibly anti-Aristotelean
logic?

Propelled by a burgeoning publishing industry,

Ramean method swept through Europe, refashioning everything
in its own diagrammatic image.

It exercised a controlling

influence on European thought well into the 17th Century.55
Ong even argues that Ramism "mirrors the history of the
whole intellectual epoch."5®

Poetry, art, medicine, educa

tion, history, law, theology, even the Bible became meth
odized according to the Ramist canon.57

The com
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prehensiveness of Ramean method encouraged a faith in the
ultimate intelligibility of the newly disclosed universe.
This faith generated the self-confidence necessary to
approach the unfamiliar cosmos tentatively and to explore
it scientifically.

Method provided that "straight or

direct way...of investigating and explaining" which could
bring untested data under manageable rubrics and make it
applicable to past experience.

It allowed for the

assimilation of scientific discoveries, yet maintained a
consoling contact with traditional wisdom through the
mediating role of the places.
But at the same time, Ramism pointed the way toward a
new means of conceptualization capable of processing the
vast new data.

Scholastic logic had never developed a sym

bolic system adequate to its formal ambitions.

It had no

language sufficiently abstract to formulate a general
theory of science.

The Ramist critique had revealed the

insecure semantical foundations of scholastic logic and
demonstrated the complete inadequacy of subject-predicate
syllogistics to serve as a warrant for science.**

By con

trast, the Ramist tendency to submerge questions of meaning
and reference in the places and to represent all logic as
spatial manoeuvres independent of psychology loosened up
the field of discourse in ways which prepared it to accept
a predicate logic of unrestricted generality.

Although

poorly articulated, Ramism in fact promoted a radical new
view of analysis based in the mind’s commerce with sensible

nature.
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Moreover, its naive emphasis on composite syl

logisms created a new, if somewhat ambiguous, role for
hypothesis in the construction of scientific models.
Ramism solved the disjunctive with the hypothetical -that is, it subsumed "either... or" statements and
"if...then" statements under the operation of a single com
posite form.

For example, take the disjunctive statement

"Either man is dialectical or he isn't."

A Ramean would

solve it thus:
Either man is dialectical or he isn’t. (disjunctive)
If man is dialectical, then he is rational, (hypothesis)
Man is rational (a discovery made when the place
"rational" is examined for the term
"man")
Therefore he is dialectical, (a consequence of a
discovery)
By thus employing a hypothetical to direct the mind in its
search through the "places," Ramism gave hypothesis an
active role in demonstration, something which traditional
syllogistics could not do.

Moreover, by linking disjunc

tives and hypothetical under the anomolous operation of
the composite syllogism, Ramism blurred the absolute dis
tinction between induction and hypothesis which categorical
logic drew, thereby providing a logical justification for
an analogical approach to the non-quantitative aspects of
reality.

This ultimately allowed for the extension of

mathematical expression across the entire field of dis
course .
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Ramism appears hopelessly inadequate to minds prepared
to reject it by modern mathematical logic.

Ong repeatedly

emphasizes the deficiencies of its simplistic approach to
supposition and its naive ability to confuse the comprehen
sion and the extension of terms.»•

But despite its

unsophisticated nature, Ramean logic had a catalytic effect
on minds intent on controlling a mass of new perceptions.
The spatial imagery of its places encouraged a drive toward
conceiving thought as an operation which took place in an
observable field.*0

Its characteristic diagrams reenforced

these visualist analogies.

They in fact encouraged the

development of a quantified medium of communication which
neutralized the personalist valence of all logical express
ion.

This drive toward quantification eventually issued in

the analytical geometry of Descartes and the abstract
matrices of Newtonian space.

Ultimately, it underwrote the

development of modern mathematical logic itself.

But these

later logics, however sophisticated, systematically ignored
the energizing insight which underwrote the Ramean places.
They ignored the Ramists’ profound belief in the essen
tially shared nature of the reality which logic sought to
express.
The "clarity" sought through the Ramean places had
derived its value from a set of shared conceptions deeply
rooted in a common past.

But the intellectual advances of

the 16th and early 17th Centuries all tended to divorce the
world of shared experience from the world of science.
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After all, despite what Kepler, Galileo and Harvey might
argue, one saw things right-side up; one felt the earth
stand still; and the mechanics of circulation rarely
intruded themselves in everyday life.

These startling new

perceptions had no metaphoric reference in that body of
common knowledge which underwrote Ramean logic.

Indeed,

the emerging physical sciences required a certain distance
from the psychosomatic roots of human consciousness in
order to establish the certainty of their abstract for
mulations.

The empathetic knowledge of the places could

only serve to contradict their non-experiential hypotheses.
As scientific advances gradually replaced the testimony of
the senses with abstractions which in many cases had no
external reference, consensual knowledge lost its ability
to serve as a metaphoric ground for truth.

The new man of

science, faced with explicating phenomena removed from the
world of common-sense, required logical metaphors which
could portray concepts not susceptible of extension and
generate conclusions guaranteed by the integrity of their
own internal structure.

In short, he required a logic

which aimed ultimately at accuracy, not consensus.
The protean concept of method, lifted from Ramean
dialectical manuals and made transcendent, supplied the
controlling metaphors for this new dialectic.

In Ramist

logic, however, method had operated as the controlling
principle only in judgement, leaving the mind free in the
process of invention to range back across the places in
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search of arguments stored for recall.

Ramus, in fact, had

conceived of method as a limiting concept not unlike what
Kant would later call a "regulative principle of pure
reason".

But Francis Bacon, herald of the new science,

passed beyond this regulative principle and enthroned
method as both the limit and the ground of inquiry.

He

expropriated Ramus' three laws of method and installed them
as the operative principles in a new apodictic science.*1
No longer willing to accept the places as a viable source
of arguments, Bacon placed both judgement and invention
under the control of method and secured the premises of his
logic without recourse to mediation.**
In some ways, the humanists' apotheosis of the past had
ironically served to retard the advancement of learning.
It had promoted a conception of antiquity as the repository
of a formerly perfect knowledge.

Protestant reform tended

to reinforce this view by looking to the Bible as a source
of primitive truth.

Ramean method had provided a key to

unlock and critically process this fund of ancient knowl
edge.

It had even allowed for the assimilation of new data

to the patterns of the old.
principle of innovation.

But it had lacked an actual

Bacon, on the other hand, lived

in an age of emerging science, an age not only pregnant
with change but conscious of it and with a will for it.

He

conceived of knowledge as incomplete, susceptible of revi
sion and capable of advancement.

The new man of science

stood at the threshold of discovery.

He needed a logic to

carry him forward, not back.
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Hence Bacon's logic bore no

trace of the historical and communal structures essential
to Ramism.

In fact he labelled these metaphors "idols" and

dismissed them as obstacles in the path of knowledge which
must be "abjured and renounced with firm and solemn resolu
tion."* 3

The advancement of learning could come only

through the careful observation of present experience
processed to yield new knowledge.
Bacon outlined his new logic in the Novum Organum whose
frontispiece graphically portrayed its conceptual orienta
tion, boasting a ship in full sail passing the Pillars of
Hercules to explore the seas beyond.
inscription plus ultra.

The Pillars bore the

Bacon clearly intended his logic

as a means to pass beyond the knowledge of the ancients.
The loci, as a tool for processing the knowledge of the
past, therefore had no "place" in his model.

Accordingly

he returned them to rhetoric where they resumed their
career in somewhat circumscribed fashion.**

Then, in a

crucial shift of metaphors, Bacon redefined Ramean "inven
tion" as first-order discovery, confined its operation
strictly to the sciences, and placed it under the control
of method.

Renamed "initiative," Ramean invention became

that procedure which "discloses and lays bare the very
mysteries of the sciences."*5

Under Bacon’s revised model,

the mind "initiated" its premises through induction.

From

the systematic observation of particular facts, it grouped
phenomena under general rules according to the principles
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of a method which transcended purely logical application
and entered the world of practical affairs as orderly pro
cedure.

In a sense, method took on a metaphoric life of

its own, replacing consensual knowledge s b the structural
element in Baconian science.
Bacon’s logic promoted a new ideal of natural knowledge
as a source of power.••

Controlled from beginning to end

by method, it promised to yield up not only an understand
ing of nature, but actual control over its elements.
Baconian logic contained images of manipulability at its
theoretic core.

It approached reality in a designedly

exploratory way, "vexing" nature with experiments to dis
cover causes which in turn would permit control. According
to Bacon neither simple classification nor invention con
ceived as recall could contribute to the expansion of
knowledge.

Only careful observation under strict meth

odological control could direct the mind deeply into the
phenomena of nature and guide it in the construction of
rules.

The metaphors of method, made manifest in Bacon’s

Tables of Induction, provided the key to s c i e n c e . A n d
only science could provide the means to mastery.
Under the impact of Bacon’s method, the world of nature
faded as the object of man’s knowledge, and became rather
the object of his will.

Under the motto naturae vincula,

Baconian logic left the Schools and entered the laboratory.
It abandonned the search for truth through understanding
and meaning through communication and concentrated rather
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on obtaining "access to the kingdom of man."*'

Form, as a

property of rational unity, gave way to fixed laws as prin
ciples of practical operation.

"In nature nothing really

exists besides individual bodies, performing pure individ
ual acts according to fixed law," Bacon argued.

"Yet in

philosophy this very law is the foundation as well of
knowledge as of operation."

This priority of principle

over property marked a fundamental shift in logical meta
phors which would underwrite technical advances in the
applied sciences for the next hundred and fifty years.6*
But as R. Hooykaas points out, applied science is not
the same as experimental science.

"Its first aim is ...to

gain power over nature [not] to discover its secrets by
rationally planned devices."70

Although Bacon supplied a

means for grounding analysis in carefully inducted
premises,

he provided no metaphoric language for for

mulating or expressing truly scientific laws.

The Novum

Organum established procedures governing the induction of
rules, but offered no means for moving beyond those rules
to the construction of axioms.

Hence Bacon could

understand and appreciate the work of William Harvey, whose
observations and experiments advanced anatomical practice,
but he completely missed the significance of William Gil
bert’s daring attempt to explain the cohesion of the
universe in one abstract law of magnetism.71

Driven by a

boundless ambition to dominate and exploit the material
aspects of nature, Bacon, like Ockham, sacrificed the
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ability to understand its structure.

Moreover, by

rejecting all the structural metaphors implicit in Ramean
logic, Bacon failed to grasp its latent ability to deal
analogically with nature through the language of
hypothesis.7*

Challenged by the possibilities of the prac

tical applications of science, he overlooked the
extraordinary potential of the mathematical imagination to
penetrate the secrets of nature.
Ong repeatedly stresses the "blind drive toward
quantification" characteristic of Ramean logic.7*

He

argues that the increased use of spatial metaphors proper
to topical logic threw it inevitably into a geometric
frame.74

The Pythagorean notion of "proof" allowed for an

easy correspondence between geometric display and topical
analysis.

But Bacon rejected the geometric modes of logic

as being proper only to an analysis of form.

His logic

dealt rather with phenomena, with principles of operation
not easily amenable to geometric display.

In his wholesale

rejection of Ramean metaphors, Bacon thus failed to
appreciate the unique ability of mathematics to express the
variability of phenomena in formal terms.

It was left to

Descartes, the new apostle of method, to invest the spatial
analogies of Ramus with a true mathematical force.
The quantified world was the spiritual home of Des
cartes and mathesis universalis his controlling metaphor.78
For him all of nature consisted of variables mathematically
manipulated.

Science comprised merely a body of mathemati
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cal demonstrations aimed at unravelling experience.

But

the mathematical implications of Ramean logic had drawn on
an ana logy with matter apart from energy and motion.
Kepler’s dictum "Where matter is, there is geometry," had
expressed its central vision.7*

By contrast, as the new

science was rapidly revealing, the world of nature rever
berated with contingent, accidental and fundamentally
"irrational" phenomena whose infinite variability resisted
neat display in geometric form.

In fact, nature operated

through "curves" -- ellipses, parabolae, hyperbolae -- all
vaBtly more complex than the simple figures of geometry.77
These "curves” manifested the principle of change inherent
in the processes of nature.

They corresponded to that

active principle, that concern for process, which Bacon had
introduced into analysis.

But the characteristic inability

of Pythagorean images to portray variability made it inca
pable of expressing these "curves" analytically.7*

Its

formal modes of analysis simply could not encompass dynamic
principles.

Yet the new sciences required a logical and

mathematical language which could express not only struc
ture, but motion.
Descartes supplied this vocabulary in a revolutionary
algebraic conception of thought.

"Give me extension and

motion and I will construct the world," he proclaimed, his
Archimedean rhetoric exemplifying the shift away from
Pythagorean metaphors.7*

In an historic mathematical

insight, Descartes saw that he could represent curves --
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the mathematical correlative of process -- algebraically by
treating the primary qualities of matter as mathematical
rather than geometric entities.

He saw that by substitut

ing algebraic symbols for the extensive properties of
objects he could construct a mathematical language without
recourse to diagrams.

He could thereby extend the meta

phors of method to that confusion of matter in motion that
comprised the world of natural phenomena.
By incorporating principles of motion into method, Des
cartes carried logical analysis a giant step beyond the
diagrammatic boundaries of Ramism.

Cartesian proofs could

represent ongoing processes and, by reference to a co
ordinate frame, relate them to the material world.

By con

flating the physical and mathematical sciences, Descartes
provided a means for analyzing all physical phenomena in
terms of the specifiable properties of matter in motion.
But by assimilating physical nature to mathematical analy
sis, Descartes also created a new role for logic and for
the mind which pursued it.
through universal rules.

Mathesis universalis operated
Yet these rules had no formal

reality -- Bacon had effectively dispensed with that.

They

merely articulated the rational constructions of an inquir
ing mind which, as the architect of rules, took on a new
relationship to the nature it sought to explicate.

Under

Cartesian metaphors the mind became more than simply the
seat of inquiry.

It assumed a new role as the author of a

world which, by authoring, it explicitly reduced to the

condition of object.
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By insisting on the deductive rela

tions of mathematics as the controlling metaphors of
science, Descartes created what Balz has called the
"anthropocentric predicament"*0 -- a logical impasse which
placed the mind in control of a natural world deduced
exclusively from its own postulates.
Made manifest in the cogito, this "anthropocentric
predicament" became the controlling principle of Cartesian
logic.

The cogito expressed a new set of logical metaphors

which rendered the subject the vanishing point of a world
reduced to mathematical expression.

Under this new prin

ciple of order, inquiry became a process pursued through
method but guaranteed through self-consciousness.

For if

all logical discourse expressed mathematical relations and
all mathematical relations expressed rational construc
tions, a self-validating mind must function as the ground
of inquiry.

The cogito thus represented the final stage in

the effective isolation of logical metaphors from the world
of shared discourse.

With it the increasingly apparent

alienation of the world of science from the world of sense
became a logical principle.* 1
The cogito underwrote a logic whose predicates
expressed, not outward assertions or a shared assent, but
simple acts of mental vision -- actual psychological events
grounded in a self-reflecting ego.

Ramean predicates had

derived from invention and reached back to a common past.
Baconian predicates had derived from initiation and reached

out to present experience.
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But Descartes isolated predica

tion within the cognizing mind.
in intuition,

His predicates originated

the "undoubting conception of an unclouded

and attentive mind” which reconstructed the entire world of
common experience from its own perspective.

Cartesian

predicates carried no imperative to convince by conforming
themselves to a shared reality since they sprang "from the
light of reason alone."8*

Indeed, they stood intuitively

prior to inquiry itself and served only as witness to an
inner world of self-consciousness from which all other
worlds methodically derived.8*
"My design has never extended beyond trying to reform
my own opinion," Descartes declared, effectively isolating
his logic from any metaphoric concern with communication.84
In fact, in the Discourse, Descartes explicitly identified
the act of communication with the "adulteration" of ideas.
The "undoubting conceptions" grasped through intuition
functioned prescriptively, not descriptively.

They

expressed dehistoricized truths which derived their author
ity from the immediacy of present experience and implied a
profound disregard for contextual concerns.88

Descartes'

"clear and distinct ideas" in fact remained totally
unencumbered by any genealogy in a common past.
From the point of view of a nascent science, this
proved a great advantage.

The ability to isolate immediate

experience from its contextual base allowed scientists to
consign to the realm of psychology all those phenomena
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extraneous to the formulation of physical laws.

Under

Cartesian analysis, scientists could ignore secondary
qualities except insofar as they could be reduced to
analytical referents.

They could thereby construct

theoretical systems that were sufficiently abstract to
absorb new data.

They could even lay claim to new knowl

edge through the manipulation of mathematical formulae.
But because of the psychological ground of their logical
premises, they could never reach outside their own
theoretical frame to that body of shared experience which
had supported the topical tradition.
The cogito established logic in a trajectory which
carried it inevitably away from the world of shared con
sciousness which had underwritten the "places.".

It

redefined the predicating mind as a uni-valent ego in whom
ground and consequent merged.

It transformed dialectic

from a function immersed in a world of common experience to
a method of procedure restricted to the individual mind.
Mediating language structures gave way to a new analytic
vocabulary based in mathematics which could express
abstract relationships without any existential reference.
As the natural world became more and more the object of
purely private inquiry, logic lost its voice -- the meta
phorical harmony of the symbolist spheres fading into the
silent object world of Newtonian space.
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of Law and History (New York, 1939).
Johannes Althusius
(1557-1638) systematized political theory in his Politica
methodice (1603) which claimed to treat all forms of human
association (see 0. F. von Gierke, The Development of
Political Theory (New York, 1939). Bartholomew Keckermann
(1571-1609), a "mixt" Ramist, brought all of theology and
natural philosophy under method in his Praecognita (1616)
and his Systema physicum (1610), while Johannes Piscator
(1546-1625) went one step beyond Keckermann and methodized
the Bible itself (see Ong, "Johannes Piscatore: One Man or
a Ramist Dichotomy?" Harvard Library Bulletin VIII
(1954):151-162.
See also discussions in Chapter 2 of
Ramus bearing on the diffusion of Ramism).
Although a sub
stantial Aristotelian party remained, Ramism had sufficient
influence to keep them always on the defensive (see Howell,
Logic and Rhetoric. 282-342; Ong, Inventory. 492-534).
58.

Moody, Studies. 387-390.

59. Ong discusses this aspect of Ramean logic in rela
tion to later mathematical logics, but concludes that "his
management of the syllogism is devoid of any valuable and
effective insights...[and that] the quantifying approach
into which he strays is...the result of loosely organized
mental habits acquired in the Parisian milieu and made
somewhat more ’simple’ or crude by the Agricolan influence"
(Ong, Ramus. 185-186). Moreover, Ong claims that Ramus
continually falls back on "a specially rigged terminology
which protects him from refutation only by total mystifica
tion" and argues futher that "the Ramist dialectic
manifests a quantification system which is almost certainly
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the most recklessly applied one that the world has ever
seen" (Ibid., 260, 203).
60. Ong is fascinated by the progressive visualization
of thought implicit and explicit in Ramean logic, linking
it to Copernican cosmology and drawing elaborate analogies
between the mechanics of printing, which "fixed" the spoken
word in a spatial matrix, and the Ramean drive toward
quantification ("Ramism and Printing as Related
Epiphenomena" in Ramus. 307-314 and "Closure and Print" in
Interaces. 147-189).
See also Eisenstein, Printing Press.
65-80.
61. For a description of Ramus' three laws see Ong,
Ramus. 258-260.
62. For an interesting discussion of the relationship
between Ramean and Baconian methods see Craig Walton,
"Ramus and Bacon on Method," Journal of the History of
Philosophy 10 (1972 ):289-302.
Walton argues that, despite
most scholarly opinion, there were distinct ties between
Bacon and Ramus in their application of method.
63. Francis Bacon. Novum Organum. ed. F. H. Anderson
(Indianapolis, 1960), I, i, 68. The "Idols", briefly
sketched in the Advancement of Learning (II, xiv, 9-12),
are fully elaborated in the Novum Organum I, i, 41-65.
For
discussion of the Idols see Gilson, Modern Philosophy. 3236.
64. For Bacon on rhetoric see Howell, Poetics. 78-86
and Logic. 371-372.
See also Walton, "Bacon and Ramus...",
300-301.
65. Francis Bacon,
De dignitate et augmentis
acientarum in The Works of FranciB Bacon, ed Spedding,
Ellis and Heath (London, 1857-1874), II, 449. For Bacon's
use of invention in the Ramist sense see Novum Organum,
Preface; I, viii; I.cxxix.
For a discussion of Bacon's
method with relation to Ramean invention see Walton, "Bacon
and Ramus...", 290-297; Howell, Logic. 367-370.
66. Bacon, De augmentis, II, 2. For a discussion of
the relationship of Bacon’s ideal of mastery with the
Protestant doctrine of success see Hardin, Glass. 140-141.
Edgar Zilsel ties this relationship directly to the rise of
the "physical law" metaphor ("The genesis of the Concept of
Physical Law," Philosophical Review 51 (1942):262-266.
For
a similar treatment see also Hooykaas, Religion and the
Rise of Modern Science (Edinburgh, 1972), 71-75.
67. Bacon present his Tables of Induction in the Novum
Organum, II, ii, 15. These "tables" of presence, absense
and variation reappear in Hobbes and finally, in modified
form, in John Stuart Mill.
For a discussion of their
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influence on the development of inductive logic see Gilson,
Modern Philosophy. 30-43.
68.

Bacon, Novum Organum, I, xiv, lxviii.

69.
Ibid., II, iii, 122. For a discussion of Bacon's
tendency to give priority to principle over form which ties
it directly to Ramean method see Walton, "Bacon and
Ramus...", 298-301.
See also Gilson, Modern Philosophy.
35-42.
70. Hooykass, Religion. 75. Hooykaas presents an in
depth discussion of "The Evaluation of Manual Work and
Experimentation" which ties these issues directly to the
development of modern science (Religion. 76-87). Hans
Jonas places a similar discussion in the context of "The
Scientific and Technological Revolution" in his Philosophi
cal Essays (Englewood Cliffs, 1974), 45-81. D. M. Clarke
discusses the distinction with relation to Descartes’
philosophy of science in "Experiments and Ordinary Experi
ence" in Descartes' Philosophy of Science (University Park,
Pa., 1982), 30-47.
71.

Gilson, Modern Philosophy. 35-37, 43.

72. Bacon had rejected the places of Ramean logic
while maintaining its preoccupation with a concrete means
of conceptualization.
The major difference between the two
logics lay in the fact that Ramus grounded his concepts in
past experience through reference to the loci, while Bacon
grounded his exclusively in the present.
Ramus guaranteed
his logic through structure; Bacon guaranteed his through
method -- but a method which could not step outside the
verifiable effects of present experience.
He therefore
missed the significance of any analogical approach to
science.
73.

Ong, Ramus,

188, 78-passim.

74. Ong maintains that a "drift toward visualism” is a
natural consequence of the spatial economy of the places.
He ties this to the general "scientizing impulse" of the
17th Century, the advent of printing and to a general move
away from an oral-aural culture grounded in community to a
visualist universe grounded in the individual (Ramus, 108116, 307-314; Interfaces of the Word. 121-135).
See also
Collin Turbayne, The Myth of Metaphor (Columbia, S. C.,
1962), 141-145.
75.
For mathesis universalis, see the Regulae. rule 4
in Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. Charles Adams and Paul Tannery
(Paris, 1964-74), vol. X, 377-8.
76.
From the De fundamentis astrologiae certioribus
(1601), thesis XX quoted in Hooykaas, Religion. 35.
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77.
For a discussion of the differences in the mathe
matical models needed to represent these curves see Bell,
Newtonian Science. 103-105.
78.

Bell, Newtonian Science (London, 1961), 45-48.

79.
Le Monde, chapter iv in Adams, Oeuvres. vol. XI,
16-23.
For a discussion of this shift in metaphors see
Turbayne, Myth. 67-69.
80. A. G. A. Balz. Descartes and the Modern Mind (New
Haven, 1952), 348.
81.
For the most relevant general treatments among the
massive literature on Descartes see L. J. Beck, The Method
of Descartes: A Study of the Regulae (Oxford, 1952); D. M.
Clarke, Descartes* Philosophy of Science (University Park,
1982); A. G. A. Balz, Descartes and the Modern Mind
(New
Haven, 1952); H. Caton, The Origins of Subjectivity; An
Essay on Descartes (New Haven 1973); J. J. Katz, Cogita
tions: A Study of the Cogito in Relation to the Philosophy
of Logic and Language... (New York, 1986); Etienne Gilson,
Etudes sur le rdle de la pens6e m6di6vale dans la formation
du ayatfeme Cart6sien
(Paris, 1951); E.-E. Saisset, Pr6curseurs et disciples de Descartes (Paris, 1862); Weinburg,
Occam, Descartes and Hume: Self Knowledge. Substance and
Causality (Madison, 1977).
82. Adams, Oeuvres. vol. X, 368.
For an interesting
analysis of the logical status of the cogito see Katz,
Cogi tations. Katz discusses the cogito as an "analytical
entailment," formally valid without subsumption under the
laws of either logic or mathematics.
83. Descartes* logic conformed to the exigencies of
reason, not to an existential order. The knowledge which
flowed from the cogito consisted of implied propositions
deduced from self-evident mathematical principles.
As such
it could guarantee objective analyses provided only that
the mind not violate the rule of clarity or deviate from
the path of method.
In this logical scheme "clarity"
became a purely personal criterion for private inquiry.
In
fact, as Etienne Gilson points out, Descartes proved unable
to formulate the cogito in broad logical terms (Modern
Philosophy. 56).
His first attempt, in the Regulae,
remained unfinished and represented more a propadeutic to a
future logic than an actual logical treatise. Ultimately,
Descartes articulated the cogito in the Discourse on Method
which functioned as a spiritual autobiography, not a formal
logical theory. It contained Descartes* personal prescrip
tion for reconstituting his own knowledge in a natural
world robbed of its formal reality.
84.

Adams, Oeuvres. vol. VI, 4.
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85.
Ibid., vol. VI, 69. For a discussion of the
isolating tendencies of Cartesian logic see Dalia Judovitz,
Subjectivity and Representation in Descartes (Cambridge,
1988 ) .

Chapter 2
LAW AND ORDER IN THE OLD WEST
Logical Metaphors
in
European Legal Models

The shift in metaphors implicit in Cartesian analysis
marked a critical moment in the history of logic and the
development of science.

It introduced a new principle of

logical order which in turn supplied a metaphoric founda
tion for a new conception of scientific law.

The accession

of the subject to a prescriptive role in inquiry redirected
logic away from mediational forms and refocused it firmly
on a specifiable and totally accessible reality.

The

Cartesian subject himself authored the world he explored
according to the dictates of his own clear and distinct
ideas.

These ideas retained none of the structural ele

ments which had survived in the Ramean places.

Nor did

they reflect any lingering attachment to the humanist ideal
of communication.

As private acts of vision, they

underwrote a formulation of knowledge whose validity
preceeded all contextual concerns.

In what Karsten Harries

has called "an escape from perspective," Descartes isolated
inquiry from historical modes of thought and accomplished a
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final shift away from a metonymic order to an order of rep
resentation based exclusively in the present.1
The cogito effectively replaced the historical powers
of memory with the a-temporal power of intuition.

Previous

logical traditions from Cicero to Augustine had held that
memory expressed the limitless power of the subject to con
struct a complex reality out of the manifold of human expe
rience.

Ramus went so far as to absorb memory into logic

and identify it with method.1

But Descartes regarded

memory as a weak link in the cognitive chain.
the mind with ideas of the second order.
could provide it with first premises.1

It presented

Only intuition
In place of meta

phors which drew on a collective consciousness, Descartes
installed the mathematical process of "enumeration" which
divided or "resolved" all phenomena into simple parts and
redistributed those parts in an abstract order appropriate
to mathematical expression.4
Enumeration reproduced phenomena as series of logical
propositions which, as constructions of the mind, remained
accessible to it through mathematics.

It encoded objects

and events in the language of order and measure -- ”en tant
qu'elles sont comprises par 1 ’entendement" -- and so
brought them under the control of the understanding.1

But

enumeration provided no historical account of experience.4
It simply rendered events comprehensible by bringing them
into right relation with the methodological postulates of
thought.

It reduced the complex of nature to schematic
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images -- "figures sch£matiques” -- which could be grasped
intuitively and so become the object of analysis.7
This reduction of the logical process of comprehension
to the mathematical process of enumeration underwrote the
entire Cartesian endeavor.

It placed mathematics at the

theoretic core of a logic controlled by the perspective of
an individual mind.

Enumeration constituted a revolution

ary conception of logical order whose syntax operated
solely within the immediate, instantaneous world of intui
tion.

As a quantified, serial system of representation,

enumeration neutralized all ontological categories, leveled
all hierarchical judgements of genus and species, and
abandonned all topical notions of structure.

It reduced

order and measure to methodological postulates and causal
relations to logical implications.

In effect, enumeration

sacrificed the ontological dimensions of thought to its
quantitative character and established mathematics as the
condition of possibility for all human knowledge.*
Ultimately, the reductive analysis implicit in its
processes became the controlling metaphor of the emerging
physical sciences.*
The ability of Cartesian analysis to reduce natural
phenomena to mathematical signs provided a powerful tool to
men intent on discovering simple, unifying rules with which
to control a mass of new data.

By dealing reductively with

phenomena, the scientific imagination could isolate
specific elements and forces in nature and deal with them
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analytically without reference to the carefully inducted
qualities and states which had limited Baconian science.
It could move beyond the referential properties of experi
ence and deal directly and exclusively with its processes.
But by exporting the necessary connections of mathematics
to the realm of process in nature, Descartes inadvertently
confused the order of logic with the actual unfolding of
physical phenomena and arrived at the correlative conclu
sion that the natural order in fact conformed to the meth
odological postulates of thought.

"Enthralled by his own

metaphor," Turbayne argues, "he mistook the mask for the
face, and consequently bequeathed to posterity more than a
world-view.

He bequeathed a world."10

Descartes’ bequest consisted of a neat, systematic
world governed by mechanical principles and necessary rela
tions which answered at all points to the mathematical
precision of his logic.11

Such a world invited inquiry.

In fact it promised to yield up its secrets to scientific
investigation provided only that the scientist not violate
his methodological rules.

But Cartesian metaphors did sub

stantially more than simply validate the pursuit of
scientific knowledge.

They actually fixed the character of

science and determined its content.1*

Descartes

explicitly required that any object, in order to fall under
scientific inquiry, be susceptible of reduction by enumera
tion to algebraic symbols which could be grasped intui
tively and manipulated through calculation.

This effec
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tively excluded the investigation of anything "except that
'matter' susceptible of every sort of division, shape and
motion, which geometers call quantity, and which they
presuppose as the subject matter of their proofs."1*
Cartesian logic thus redefined reality as measurable
quantity.

It withdrew inquiry from the world of motive and

meaning and confined it to a one-dimensional realm which
systematically excluded all contextual concerns.
Medieval science, by contrast, had rested on an analogy
of God with the world.

Its symbolic structure had

expressed a profound belief that the multi-form and vital
world of nature fulfilled a purpose.

Its logical metaphors

had supported a conception of scientific law grounded in
justice and truth.

But Cartesian analysis shed all the

protections of this analogy in favor of an analogy with
mathematical certainty.

It replaced the qualitative rich

ness of the medieval world with the quantitative precision
of a mathematically determined world -- a world confined to
the present, devoid of consciousness and animated by
mechanical principles. In such a scheme, the very regu
larity which made the world knowable made it meaningless as
well.

Cartesian metaphors effectively released the natural

world to scientific inquiry by unravelling its mysteries
through enumeration.

But it failed to knit it back up

again in a way which could satisfy the complex psychologi
cal needs of men. ” 'Tis all in peeces, all cohaerence
gone," John Donne protested.1*

Driven by an ideal of pure
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quantity, Descartes proposed a theory of inquiry which,
exhausting the meaning of consciousness in its logical
function, removed man as the central source of analogy in
the construction of theory.1*
The cogito itself expressed the supreme functional
postulate.

The procedural doubt which controlled its

operation effectively isolated the functional aspects of
thought from the thinking thing, leaving the mind to be
described only in negative terms -- a kind of paramechanical hypothesis convenient for explaining the fact of
inquiry.

In a sense, the cogito actually replaced the

independent functions of the mind with the quantitative
functions of mathematics.

Under its impact, the mind

operated constructively only in the sphere of the irra
tional where intuition took place.

As such it retained a

transcendent analogical force as the source of truth, but
became totally irrelevant to the construction of rules in
the practical econony of the natural world.

Cartesian

analysis, in fact, viewed the mind only as a limiting con
dition to an otherwise perfect prescription for inquiry.
The concomitant shift in metaphors seriously undercut
the ability of science to construct comprehensive models
relevant to the complex of human experience.

Eventually,

the lack of emotional satisfaction attendant on the appli
cation of reductive analysis to the natural order encour
aged a search for metaphors which could reinstate issues of
motive and value in the world of the emerging physical

sciences.
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But in the wake of Descartes' devastating criti

que, only the functional postulates of mathematics remained
as a source of scientific analogy.

Descartes’ defense of

enumeration had rendered quantitative relations the sole
means of articulating either physical or logical order.
These quantitative relations, when formulated algebrai
cally, expressed the self-validating "laws" which governed
self-regulating phenomena.

Hence both the laws and the

phenomena they described satisfied the methodological
requirements of Descartes’ science.

But Cartesian analysis

assumed substantially more than the quantitative integr ity
of its mathematical laws.

It assumed the implicit

quantitative structure of the reality which these laws
expressed.
Edgar Zilsel points out that the concept of "physical
law" in nature occurred fully developed for the first time
in Descartes.1•

Although Francis Bacon had used the term

in the Novum Organum, he had equated it with principles of
form.

"The form of heat and the law of heat are the same

thing," Bacon argued.17

But Descartes declared that he

had discovered the actual operative "laws which God has put
into Nature" and that these laws were "identical with the
rules of mechanics."1'

Cartesian laws expressed genuine

regulative postulates congruent not only to the laws of
mathematics, but to the structures of reality itself.
The consequent conviction that the natural world
actually conformed to the metaphors of mathematics
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ultimately proved just as satisfying in its own way as the
old belief that nature fulfilled a purpose. In fact, it
acted as a heady tonic on scientific minds in search of a
controlling vision.1'

Descartes' mathematically formulated

"physical laws" promised not only order, but control.
Whoever can construct a law can predict.
predict can preempt.

And whoever can

Here was a metaphor to conjure with!

It perfectly expressed that ideal of mastery initiated by
Baconian science.

Moreover, its quantitative syntax

allowed for the extension of "law" by analogy across a
broad spectrum of human experience.
The introduction of the metaphor of physical law into
science correlated directly to the conceptual shifts
implicit in Cartesian logic.

The principle of enumeration

inevitably encouraged a mathematical view of reality which,
in turn, justified the construction of analytical laws.
Moreover, these two mutually reenforcing notions coincided
with and perhaps underwrote significant changes in the
political, social and religious spheres."

Zilsel has

argued that "the idea of a comprehensive multitude of
rational physical 'laws' could not have arisen in feu
dalism, even if the corresponding physical facts had been
known."
world.

God had served as the principium of the medieval
Since He guaranteed the internal coherence of

nature, there was no need to investigate its rules.

But as

the integrated structures of feudalism broke down, percep
tions of nature ceased to enjoy their easy correspondence

with metaphysics.
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In defense against the more factious

ideologies of the 16th Century, Zilsel claims, natural
science turned to the juridical metaphor of "law" to
explain the perceived regularities of the natural world.
In fact, he suggests that the social connotations of the
law metaphor did much to shape the developing sciences.21
If one accepts the central thesis of the present study
-- that the metaphors of logic and science are mutually
dependent --

Zilzel's argument can provide a convenient

frame for tracing the general influences of logical theory
in the 16th and 17th Centuries as well.

For the crucial

juncture at which the concept of physical law made its
appearance in the world of science coincided precisely with
that point at which Cartesian metaphors began to supplant
the topical images of the Ramean tradition.

An investiga

tion of the joint careers of the legal and logical models
operative in this historical context may, therefore, add an
interesting dimension to the study of an era crucial to the
development of American thought.
The concept of physical law entered the European con
sciousness as the disintegrating socio-economic structures
of the High Middle Ages began to give way to developing
national cultures.

In fact, the rise of nation states can

itself be seen as an overt political and social recognition
of the regional and historical differences which became
more apparent as the feudal order faded.

Many forces

worked to reshape the mental contours of Europe during this

period.
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Voyages of exploration taught new lessons in per

spective and space.
nological knowledge.

Colonial experiences broadened eth
The promise of vast riches in the new

world gave impetus to an emerging money economy and encour
aged the development of competitive enterprise.

From the

relatively closed compass of feudal Europe, emerging
nations moved out into the indefinite and unfamiliar world
of global politics, while religious wars at home shattered
the cohesive orthodoxy of the Universal Church and replaced
it with a fractious heterodox truce.1*
All these trends undercut the univocal structures of
feudalism and reenforced notions of difference.

They

undermined existing principles of order and neutralized
operative conceptions of law.

The disenfranchisement of

the Universal Church left Europe without a Law of Nations
and encouraged the development of discrete legal models.
The discrediting of clerical authority placed administra
tive law in the hands of political partisans.

Dynastic

tensions and religious upheavals tended henceforth to
resolve themselves according to regional and political
interests which became the foundations of distinct national
traditions.**

Nor did national self-assertion limit itself

to the political and religious spheres.

The general

upheavals of the 16th Century made it impossible to enforce
orthodoxy in intellectual matters as well.

Developing

legal theories required justification through new princi
ples of logical order which could support their distinctive

characteristics.
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The rise of vernaculars attendant on the

breakdown of Latin Christendom coincidentally emphasized a
conception of truth as a commodity which could be articu
lated in different ways by different groups.1*

Subsequent

national developments in logic and science hence tended to
acquire their own distinctive vocabularies.
The interactions between logic and science stand out in
sharp relief against this background of emerging nation
states.

The ability to isolate trends in logic and science

as they emerged into developing national settings affords a
singular opportunity for assessing the mutual inter
dependence of the two disciplines.

Moreover, three of

these emergent national traditions assume special impor
tance in the present context because of their relevance to
American intellectual history.

England, France and Germany

developed radically different political and religious
structures in the 16th Century.

Hence their conceptions of

"law" operated within fundamentally different frames.

When

scientists in the 17th Century reached out to these dif
ferent formulations of "law” in search of a controlling
metaphor, the results were correspondingly different.

The

divergent paths taken by science and logic in these three
environments thus provides an interesting insight into the
ways in which the metaphors of logic relate to the con
struction of legal and scientific theory.
In England, the intervention of Henry VIII effectively
tied theories of law and sovereignty to questions of reli-

gious doctrine.1®
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Drawing on an amalgam of Tyndale's doc

trine of Christian obedience and Luther’s theories of
divine Kingship, Henry early severed England from Roman
jurisdiction and established himself as the Supreme Head of
the Church in England.
with the Sovereign will.

He unilaterally replaced canon law
But by invoking divine-right

theories, Henry violated ancient English Parliamentary
principles grounded in the Magna Carta and disclosed the
ambiguous role which positive law played in the English
political process.

He forced an early and definitive con

frontation between developing theories of absolute
sovereignty and traditional theories of common law.1*
The debates precipitated by the Royal Supremacy Act
prompted a general reassessment of English legal theory
which resulted ultimately in a reaffirmation of the power
of Parliament and the formulation of an unambiguous legis
lative theory which guaranteed the rights of men before the
law.1’

This theory became a powerful tool in the hands of

later reformers bent on concentrating political power in
the hands of religious partisans.

For, although under

Henry’s guidance the English Reform remained strongly
Anglican, essentially aristocratic and fundamentally con
servative, with the accession of Edward VI a major
reorientation in English religious life began which radi
cally changed the relationship between Parliament and the
King and brought the full impact of Henry’s actions to bear
on English legal theory.
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Edward came to the throne a pliant child of ten under
the Regency of the Duke of Somerset who encouraged him in
an aggressive Reform policy.

During his short reign,

Edward initiated many far reaching changes in English
ecclesiology, all of which tended to diminish the
aristocratic nature of the Anglican Church while coinciden
tally reenforcing lay interests.

Most significantly, he

offered shelter to a large group of Protestant scholars and
refugees fleeing the severities of Charles V.

These exiles

came predominantly from areas in Germany dominated by Cal
vinist rather than Lutheran doctrine.

Many assumed key

positions in English universities, while others became out
spoken political agitators.11

And they all brought with

them a conception of reform which, like Calvin's Visible
Church, reached far beyond the confines of purely religious
doctrine and entered the legal and political worlds as
well.

But when the religious program of Calvinism reached

out into English political life, it found already estab
lished there a firm conviction of the efficacy of positive
law and the inviolability of the legislative act.
Calvin’s ecclesiology proved curiously amenable to
English Parliamentary forms.

It found a particularly

strong ally in traditional English conceptions of the com
mon law.*1

Calvin established the inner life as a norm for

collective behavior.

He insisted on each man’s obligation

to answer personally, not only to God, but to his fellow
men.

His Visible Church provided a matrix in which all
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social activities converged toward man's primary function
of achieving salvation and glorifying God.

This external

reference translated questions of private religious con
science into questions of public vocation, ultimately
reducing theories of divine right to principles of original
sovereignty.*0

Moreover, the didactic charge of

Protestantism in general, and of Calvinism in particular,
encouraged a further shift away from law as a metaphor of
divine justice toward a new conception of law based in the
"commonweal."

The law in England consequently came to

represent a legitimate means of securing and improving pub
lic welfare.
Under the joint impact of political and religious
reform, English legal theory thus moved from an interpreta
tion of law as a private jurisdiction toward a new concep
tion of law as a public function which assigned men con
structive social roles related to the search for individual
salvation.

The Visible Church extended the revolutionary

implications of Luther's Christian Liberty to questions of
public authority and political legitimacy and placed juris
diction firmly in the hands of laymen. It reduced
government to "a sort of secular intellectual corporation
whose vocation was the analysis and regulation of human
relations" and made public utility the basis of political
power.*1

In the wake of Edwardean reform, the law in

England became the legislative guardian of civic order, an
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instrument contrived and administered by men to ensure the
integrity of a godly society.
In the six short years of Edward’s reign the socially
potent metaphors of Calvinism permeated all levels of
English life.

Nor could the five years of the Marian

interlude shake their influence.

By 1600, with the

Elizabethan Settlement and the recall of the Marian exiles
from their sojourns in Geneva, Zurich and Strasburg, the
image of Calvin’s Visible Church had established itself at
the very center of English life.

It had remade theories

of divine sovereignty over into an explicit theory of posi
tive law which claimed jurisdiction based on its ability to
interpret present experience and procure the "commonweal."
This early identification of Calvinist ecclesiology with
parliamentary forms established characteristic images in
English political and intellectual life which would exert a
powerful influence on the development of its logical and
scientific models in the century to come.

At a crucial

point in the growth of a national consciousness, it sup
plied distinctive legislative metaphors to scientific minds
reaching out for new principles of physical law and logical
order.

Henceforth when English scientists elaborated

"laws" or appealed to "order", they would do so under the
controlling influence of metaphors peculiar to their own
political heritage.
In France, on the other hand, the turmoil of the 16th
Century generated a radically different legal vocabulary.
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The interactions of political and religious unrest in
France tended, by contrast, to reenforce a native cen
tralized absolutism.

Gallicanism had traditionally

expressed an authoritarian ideal.

France, more than any

other European power save perhaps Spain, had historically
maintained an ideological conservatism in both religion and
politics.

Even in what Kelley has called "this age of

ideological pandemonium," France remained an essentially
conservative, authoritarian and Catholic power.**

The

Parleaent of Francis I thus bore no resemblance to the Par
liament of Henry VIII.

It held no traditional legislative

power but remained virtually and actually subservient to
the Sovereign will.

Consequently, metaphors of positive

law and legislative process acquired no status in France,
where all jurisdiction continued to rest firmly in the
hands of the King.**
In France the Reformation identified itself with
dynastic power, not positive law.

From Francis I to

Charles IX, French monarchs pursued religious policy
wherever their political interests dictated.

From the

Treaty of Viterbo, to alliances with the Turks, to flirta
tions with German Protestants against Charles V, the Valois
used religious unrest in Europe to consolidate the absolute
power of their line and advance the political interests of
France.

With the accession of Charles IX and the regency

of Catherine de Medici, religious issues became explicitly
identified with dynastic politics as the Guise and Conde
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factions struggled for power under their respective doc
trinal flags.

This identification became even more

apparent in the reign of Henry III as Navarre waged
dynastic warfare against the Guises under cover of reli
gious controversy.

The characteristic French subordination

of religious doctrine to political expediency became offi
cial State policy in 1593 in Henry IV’s famous dictum con
cerning the relative worth of Paris and a Mass.

With the

Edict of Nantes in 1598, Henry brought the religious con
flict in France to an uneasy close in a political settle
ment which instituted no sweeping changes, acknowledged no
fundamental breaks with tradition, and left French legal
models much as they had been in 1515 when Francis I took
the throne and Luther nailed his theses to the door.
Thanks to the political pragmatism of the French monar
chy, canon law retained a qualified force in France,
although patently at the pleasure of the King.

The "civil

law" which replaced it in certain jurisdictions reflected
in fact an absolute authority resting, by divine right, in
the hands of the monarch.

16th Century French legal theory

thus never experienced the creative interplay between
absolutist and legislative metaphors which had shaped
English legal models in the wake of the Establishment.
Despite the attempts of Huguenot politiquea to formulate
theories of resistance in support of their religious dis
sent, the concept of law in 16th Century France acquired
none of the interpretive cast which it had in England
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thanka to doaeatic political developaenta.*4

The law in

France remained essentially authoritarian and absolute,
propounded unilaterally and imposed from above.

It found

its adequate expression in Jean Bodin’s Republic (1576)
which stands as the quintessential statement of political
absolutism.
The political conservatism characteristic of France in
the 16th Century supplied its scientists in the 17th with a
distinctive set of legal metaphors destined to control the
development of logical and scientific models.

As French

scientists reached out in search of a metaphoric base on
which to construct new principles of physical law and logi
cal order, they encountered images and analogies which dif
fered substantially from those which underwrote the devel
opment of English science.

And their own formulations of

logic and science would differ accordingly.
In England, Henry's intervention encouraged the devel
opment of legislative paradigms which in turn encouraged a
positive theory of law.

In France, a conservative politi

cal regime enforced the maintainance of absolutist legal
models grounded in the Sovereign will.

In Germany, by con

trast, the extant political institutions generated a com
plex pattern of conflicting legal metaphors which reflected
the political realities of the Empire itself.

Germany in

1515 comprised a loosely knit collection of principalities,
free cities and imperial territories joined together under
the aegis of the politically ambiguous Holy Roman Empire.
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These units lacked a clear national identity and owed
allegiance to no centralized authority.

This political

fragmentation had a crucial impact on Gerian legal theory
and a consequent inpact on the development of German logi
cal and scientific models.**
"Europe's chief exit from the feudal age," Thomas Brady
notes, "moved through the dualistic prince-estates con
stitution toward the absolutist monarchy of the early
modern era."1*

In England, a centralized national

government stepped into the vacuum left by disintegrating
feudal forms and provided principles of order and theories
of law which controlled the national life.

In France, a

strong dynasty gathered the loose threads of feudal power
into an aggressive theory of political absolutism which
compelled ideological order and guaranteed the operation of
law.

But in Germany, the political ambiguity of the Holy

Roman Empire tended to perpetuate the hegemonic values
which had characterized the old feudal order.

The Hapsburg

imperial structure not only permitted but encouraged the
survival of small autonomous political units which a cen
tralized national monarchy would have absorbed.

As a

result, the power struggles which took place in Germany
during the 16th Century expressed a contest for local
supremacy, not national unity.

The dizzying sequence of

political and religious events which comprise German his
tory in the 16th Century clearly reflect the localization
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of interest which lay at the heart of the German Imperial
order.*1
Through its conscious exploitation of competing local
interests, German Imperial politics unwittingly provided
what Brady calls a "second exit" from the feudal age which
derived, not from the "prince-estates" complex operative in
England and France, but rather from the "main line of late
medieval social development," communalism.**

By permit

ting the survival of locally autonomous units, the Empire
ensured the growth and development of the free cities of
South Germany -- urban units peculiarly well-suited to
maintaining medieval functional theories of society as an
alternative strategy to Imperial rule.

The free-cities had

been founded as special cases of feudal priviledge within
the Empire.

Their notions of liberty thus derived from

legal metaphors of exemption and immunity, not from classi
cal notions of the polis like those which grounded the
developing political theories of England and France.

The

German free cities clothed their civic ideals in Christian,
not classical images.

They drew on concepts of the sacral

commune and the common good (Genoaaenschaft) for political
justification.

In short, they maintained an allegiance to

those elements of structure and community which had
underwritten symbolic modes of thought.**
Rich in resources and centrally located along strategic
routes, these South German cities quickly became centers of
trade, manufacturing and investment.

As such they provided
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the Imperial government with an effective foil against the
political and territorial ambitions of aggressive Princes.
The cities in fact played an active role in maintaining the
precarious balance between Imperial, Princely and urban
interests which characterized German politics throughout
the 16th Century.4*

This balance, in its turn, prevented

the ascendency of any consistent or univocal theory of law
within the Empire.
In fact, the persistence of these three competing
political interests actually encouraged the development of
three distinct legal models -- the G&ttliches Recht (divine
law basically congruent to canon law, imposed from above
and expressing the absolute authority of the Emperor), the
Herrschaftsrecht (seigneurial law more closely akin to
hierarchic notions of fidelity and duty) and the altes
Recht ("old law," which appealed to traditional communal
rights grounded in medieval customary law).**

The Imperial

government, quite naturally, encouraged allegiance to the
Gottliches Recht.

The Principalities answered to the

Herrschaftsrecht.

The cities of the South recognized the

jurisdiction of the altes Recht.
The competing sets of legal metaphors which grew out of
the political realities of the Empire both dictated and
reflected the unrest which plagued Germany during the 16th
Century.

The election of Charles V in 1519 placed unprece

dented territory and power in the hands of the Emperor.
Thus threatened, the Princes moved to consolidate their
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position by pursuing aggressive policies against the
cities.

At the Imperial Diet at Worse in 1521 , the Princes

appealed to the Herrschaftsrecht in an attack against the
cities’ crucial right of monopoly -- a right grounded in
traditional immunities guaranteed by the Crown under the
altes Recht.

This and similar threats forced the cities to

defend their ancient priviledges, in part by forming a
strong alliance with the Crown and in part by appealing to
legal principles drawn from their urban past.

In 1524,

however, Charles effectively neutralized this two-fold line
of defense by the Edict of Burgos, which unilaterally
invoked Imperial rights and authority.
But by invoking the Gdttlischea Recht against the
burgeoning Reform, Charles placed the cities in a dangerous
position.

Internal pressures militated against their com

pliance with the Edict.

Without abbrogating the civic

ideals which they sought to defend, the urban governments
simply could not continue to align themselves with the
Crown.

On the other hand, the very altes Recht which they

sought to protect drew its force from priviledges and
immunities granted by the Crown under the old order.41
Denying one necessarily meant denying the other.
In 1525, under the force of political and religious
eventB, the Gottiisches Recht, the Herrschaftsrecht and the
altes Recht came into open conflict in the Peasant’s War.
During the War, Brady claims, urban communalism "emerged as
the rebel’s leading political ideal" against the military
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and political threats of the Princes.**

But this unprece

dented intervention of the urban commons and the altes
Recht in the high politics of the Empire drove a decisive
wedge between the cities and the Crown.

Even in the inter

ests of a precarious political balance, Charles could not
ignore the threat posed by outright resistance in the
cities.

Ultimately the Peasant's War forced an unequivocal

response.

In 1530 Charles ordered a full reversion to the

Catholic faith in Oermany and attempted to compel
unqualified allegiance to the Gotti itches Recht which
underwrote his Imperial authority.
The Edict of Augsburg marked the final dissolution of
the partnership between cities and Crown.

Predictably this

definitivebreak greatly enhanced the power of
The cities

scrambled to regroup.

the Princes.

Deprived of the pro

tections of the altes Recht by the invocation of Imperial
authority,

they cast about for a new principle of order

which could validate

their ancient immunities. In

the end,

they discovered the metaphoric justification they sought in
a variation of the lex Christiana of the Lutheran heresy.
Urban ideologies translated Luther's "law" into a
theological version of the altes Recht, rendering the meta
phors of customary law universal by assigning them juris
diction in a sphere of meaning which transcended all
political authority.**

Thus interpreted, the lex

Christiana converged with and immeasurably strengthened the
ancient desire for self-rule in the cities and supplied a
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potent weapon for the defense of priviledges and immunities
against the power of both the Princes and the Crown.
Indeed, the Reform ideologies which developed out of
Luther's lex Christiana in the cities inadvertently mobi
lized a collective consciousness latent in the urban
enclaves of the South.

The cities already saw themselves

as organic parts of a cosmopolitan order.

Luther’s call to

freedom merely added fuel to the civic fires.4®

By

extrapolating a new defense for an old social ethic from
the priesthood of all believers, the South German cities in
a sense took their case for the altes Recht to a "higher
court," rejecting the law of both Lords and Empire in favor
of spiritual as well as political autonomy.
The political and doctrinal splits which occurred
within the Empire following the Augsburg decree olearly
reflected the legal models operative within their respec
tive spheres.4*

Those territories under direct Imperial

control of course remained loyal to Rome until such time as
the Emperor declared for a different source of divine truth
to underwrite his political power.

The principalities

tended through duty and necessity to follow the religious
preferences of the Princes, most of whom ultimately recog
nized the political expediency of Luther’s two swords.47
The cities of the South, on the other hand, found the
theocratic visions of Zwingli and Bucer to be most com
patible with their communal traditions.4®

Each of these

three political environments, controlled by its own charac
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teristic set of legal metaphors, would provide a distinc
tive climate for the development of principles of order and
conceptions of physical law in the 17th Century.

And the

political and economic influence of the South German
cities, along with their characteristic commitment to
education as the guarantor of civic righteousness, would
ensure that the logical and scientific models developed
under the influence of the altea Recht would come to
dominate the further development of German thought.4*
England, France and Germany thus each offered charac
teristic sets of legal metaphors to minds reaching out in
search of new principles of order at the opening of the
17th Century.

English civil or positive law gave priority

to the individual, celebrating his self-mastery and, by
extension the virtues of the society which accomodated him.
French absolutist or divine-right law gave priority to the
Sovereign, affirming his power over all aspects of his
realm.

South German customary law gave priority to the

community, encouraging a structural ideal derived from
medieval social theory.
But as scientists within each of these traditions
reached out to their respective legal models for analogies
on which to construct their physical laws, they did so
under the determining guidance of three equally distinct
sets of logical metaphors.

As previously noted,

the cru

cial juncture at which the conception of physical law
obtruded into the world of science coincided precisely with
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that point at which the analytical metaphors of Descartes
began to supplant the topical images of Ramus.

Moreover,

as Ramean and Cartesian logic vied with each other for
dominance in the Schools, they each interacted in charac
teristic ways with the Aristotelian tradition which per
sisted there.

This interaction produced three distinct

logical models, each curiously congruent to the national
setting in which it emerged.

If the underlying presupposi

tions of these logics can be shown to correspond in
meaningful ways to the legal models described above and to
the theoretical models emerging in English, French and
German science, it may provide important clues to the role
of legal and logical metaphors in the construction of
scientific theory.
Aristotelian, Cartesian and Ramean logic each
approached the worlds of thought and nature from strikingly
different perspectives.

Aristotelian logic proceeded under

metaphors grounded in the categories which grouped concepts
under ideal headings and organized thought qualitatively.
It obtained its predicates through existential assertions
made about the nature of things and the relationships which
pertained between them.

Under the postulates of

Aristotelian logic, the objects of knowledge existed as
derivative entities whose analytical nature depended on
fixed principles of hierarchic order.

Although inquiry

could pursue these principles through their perceived
effects and could express them through the ideal mechanism
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of the categories, it could never penetrate to the true
origin and nature of the order itself.

Under such a model,

knowledge of the natural world had to be inferred from
experience and then related referentially to an assumed
metaphysical order.
Cartesian logic, on the other hand, ordered all things
according to the perceptions of an individual cognizing
mind and expressed that order exclusively through the func
tional postulates of mathematicp.

Descartes’ logic

obtained its predicates through intuition and developed its
arguments through enumeration.

Under the operation of

these metaphors, the objects of knowledge existed as
rational constructs, reducible to mathematical formulae and
manipulable through calculation.

Inquiry could thus

determine both their nature and their function by investi
gating the quantitative relationships which pertained
between them.

Enumeration, Descarte’s controlling meta

phor, thus embodied a changed attitude toward the nature
and role of evidence in inquiry.

It reduced physical

objects to minimal units which one could expect to yield
promptly and entirely to inquiry.

Under enumeration,

scientia thus expressed an impoverished ideal which denied
the individual integrity of natural things, confined
scientific inquiry to the matrix of possible experience and
emasculated causal principles by reducing them to mechan
ical constructs.
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Ramean logic, in contrast to both, proposed a genetic
principle of order grounded, not in ideal categories or
mathematical relations, but in a collective consciousness.
Ramean logic operated not so much by addition or division
as by accretion. It sought truth through the impenetration
of perennial principles and obtained its predicates through
a process of invention which reached back through the
"places" to enduring truth-values grounded in the permanent
existence of the natural world, not in its ideal forms or
its present functions.

Under the metaphors of Ramean logic

inquiry brought the mind into contact with that store of
common experience which served to structure the traditional
wisdom of the race.
etrated the meaning.

By penetrating the structure, one pen
Nature itself expressed scientia.

Predictably, the scientific models constructed under
the guidance of such radically distinct modes of analysis
developed correspondingly different conceptions of physical
law.

The following chapters will explore the ways in which

these distinct logical and legal vocabularies helped to
shape the emerging scientific traditions of England, France
and Germany and provided each with a set of metaphors ade
quate to the expression of its own peculiar theory.
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was "the one area in Europe where the looseness of the
structure of power permitted the revolt within the Church
to penetrate the masses and allowed pressure for change to
be exerted from below.
In England, by contrast, the
Reformation came from above, and the broad mass of the pop
ulation did not become involved before mid-century; while
in France the Reformation captured neither the court nor
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the masses" ("Social History..." in Reformation Europe.
163-167).
Blickle also argues for the importance of the
participation of the common man in the revolt (Reformation
Europe. 173) while Janine Garrisson-Estebe notes that, by
contrast, the peasantry in France remained essentially
impervious to the Reformation (Protestants du Midi 15591598 (Toulouse, 1980)).
44. Moeller claims that Luther’s doctrine supplied a
"theological anchor” to late medieval urban ideals"
(Ozment, Cities. 6, 145-147). See also Brady, Swiss. 156.
45. Moeller observes that "the Protestant movement in
the cities [confronted] as nowhere else a special
world...that was aware of its own value" (Imperial Cities.
69). Blickle argues that the Reformation throughout
Germany tended to reenforce the latent communal structures
of German society
(The Revolution of 1525 (Baltimore,
1982).
46. The extent to which the Reformation differed in
regions across Germany is a hotly disputed issue. Ozment,
for instance, suggests that scholars have "exaggerated the
intellectual disunity of Protestantism" and argues that
"evidences... of serious differences between Luther, on the
one hand, and Zwingli and Bucer, on the other, is hardly
overwhelming" (Cities. 8-10, 121-123, 135-146). He
attributes what he sees as the superficial differences in
their political stances to their different responses to
concrete historical crises. Moeller, on the other hand,
develops the argument that the urban character of the
cities was directly responsible for both their doctrinal
stance in the Reformation and the sequence of events which
followed upon it (see Imperial Cities). But while Moeller
argues that Luther’s lex Christiana provided a "theological
anchor” for late medieval urban ideals, Ozment points out
that "his teaching about the two kingdoms rather threatened
to scuttle them" by harboring a modern theory of the sepa
ration of Church and State (Cities. 7).
47. Ozment describes a reciprocal relationship between
Lutheranism and the Princes.
In the context of the politi
cal realities of the Empire the metaphor of the Two Swords
aided the territorial consolidation of the Princes against
the Crown.
It allowed the Princes to turn to Roman law as
an instrument for consolidating their power over the German
countryside and helped them to transform feudal relation
ships of mutual dependence into a relationship of sovereign
to subject (See Scribner, "The German Peasant’s War" in
Reformation Europe. 109-117 and Ozment, Cities). Berndt
Moeller claims that Luther’s doctrine of the two kingdoms
harbored a serious "modernizing flaw" which played into the
hands of the aggressive princes (see Imperial Cities).
Brady agrees, claiming that, with the defeat of the
peasants in 1525, Luther led the faithful back into the
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arms of a feudal aristocracy, and "the Reformation became a
prisoner of the princes"
(see "Social History" in Reforma
tion Europe. 173).
Roland Bainton and Ernst Troelstch
both point out the affinities between the political thought
of Luther and Machiavelli and emphasize its utility for the
Princes (Bainton, "Changing Ideas...", 432; Troelstch, The
Social Teaching of the Christian Churches. (London, 1931),
532, 857-958)
48. The Southern cities rejected the political
quietism of Luther.
J. M. Kittleson goes so far as to say
that "Luther's doctrine of the two kingdoms was virtually
ignored by his followers [in the South]" ("The Confessional
Age: The Late Reformation in Germany" in Reformation
Burope. 363).
Brady points out that Zwingli and Bucer
both clothed their Evangelical message "in the language of
civic and communal ideals, the language of the sacral cor
poration" (Swiss. 203). Zwingli’s On Divine and Human
Righteousness and Bucer’s contemporaneous One Should not
Live for Oneself Alone (1523) clarified the role of civic
righteousness in a religion based on sola tides and argued
for a close integration of religion and society.
Luther
had driven religion and society apart. But, in what Moel
ler calls "a correcting and deepening of Luther", Zwingli
and Bucer propounded a "citified theology" whose main con
cern was to preserve the medieval ethical and social struc
ture of the South.
Zwingli and Bucer, Moeller claims, were
"more medieval than Luther" in their support of late
medieval Genossenschaft ideals. For a discussion of
Bucer's almost Dantesque view of law and civic righteous
ness see Ozment, Cities. 64-66; 101-109.
49.
"The South was the heartland of the Empire, Brady
points out, "where its Diet always met, and where its two
most powerful federations...kept the peace.
It also became
the heartland of all the social movements of the Reforma
tion era."
He even argues that "the political structure
of the Holy Reman Empire was toa very great degree a South
German one" (Swiss. 226, 10).

Chapter 3
ARISTOTLE. RAMUS AND BACON:
Logical Metaphors
in
English Scientific ModelB

In the context of the argument presented in Chapter II,
the respective careers of Ramean and Cartesian logic take
on a special significance.

Although most authorities agree

that Ramean logic enjoyed a preponderant influence across
Europe between 1543 and 1600, modern scholars often dismiss
the permanent effects of Ramism.

Yet Ramean logic in fact

left an indelible mark on Western thought which perpetuated
its influence well beyond the 17th, and indeed, into the
19th Century.

Ong documents 1100 separate printings of

Ramus' works between 1550 and 1650 alone.

In the context

of the early days of printing this represents an enormous
impact.

Nonetheless, he observes, Ramism tends to dis

appear into the huge intellectual and historical perspec
tives in which it is set, exerting an anonymous and often
intangible force.

Indeed Ong makes the important point

that Ramism becomes increasingly difficult to identify
"when the very forces which it spearheaded gain momentum
and finally swallow it up.

By the time method and logical
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analysis have established themselves firmly in the Western
European psyche, the paramount role of Ramism in their
establishment has been forgotten."

Craig Hardin agrees,

pointing out that logical analysis as we know it today
began with Ramus.

Hardin maintains that, although quickly

assimilated to other systems, "the popularity of Ramus is
not to be questioned."1
Bibliographic studies by Walter Ong, Perry Miller and
others have made it possible to trace the relative
influence of Ramean and Cartesian logic across national
boundaries and so to establish patterns relevant to the
present study.*

Moreover a close examination of the pub

lication patterns described by Ong revealB an interesting
and potentially important fact:

although Ramism exerted a

strong and far-reaching influence across most of Europe,
this influence developed differently in different areas,
both in intensity and in focus.
Exported through the efforts of wandering humanist
scholars, Ramism spread along two major routes: one up
through the Low Countries, down through Scotland to England
and thence to the New World; the other out through the
Rhineland and into Switzerland, Prussia and Moravia.*
Thus, despite its prevalence throughout Europe, Ramism
developed in three distinct environments —

one centered in

England, another in its native France, and a third in South
Germany.

In fact, the geographic patterns which emerge

from Ong’s Inventory prove to be curiously congruent to the
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geographic spheres of the legal models discussed above.
The different ways in which Ramean metaphors interacted
with Aristotelian and Cartesian logic in these three set
tings provides an interesting perspective on the correla
tive development of English, French and German theoretical
models.
Ramean logical theories entered England in 1574 when
the Huguenot AmigrA Vautrollier produced two London edi
tions of the Dialecticae.*

The first appeared

anonymously, the second under the name of Roland M ’Kilwein,
a Scot about whom little is known except that he matricu
lated in 1565 at the University of St. Andrews.

But

M ’Kilwein’s edition of the Dialecticae presented a rather
selective version of Ramean method.

Ramus had maintained

the traditional distinction between what he called the
"natural" and the "prudential” methods of communication,
the one appropriate to learned discourse, the other
appropriate to the persuasion of an unread public.
M ’Kilwein, on the other hand, ignored this important dis
tinction, virtually omitting the role given by Ramus to the
latter.

Howell claims that M'Kilwein "converts Ramism into

English with this part almost completely missing."1
By disregarding the traditional separation of learned
and popular discourse, M ’Kilwein refocused Ramus’ theory of
communication in important ways.

Indeed his omission of

prudential method misrepresented the balance between
rhetoric and logic and distorted Ramus’ original inten-

tions.
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By effectively subsuming the methods of logic under

the art of persuasion, M ’Kilwein transformed Ramus’ logic
into a theory of communication which reached into the prac
tical world of the politician, the educator and the
theological controversialist.*

Ramus, on the other hand,

had considered his dialectic to be totally uncontaminated
by rhetoric.

He had wanted to make communication more

logical, not rhetoric more methodic.

But M ’Kilwein’s

peripheral expansion of the metaphors of method diminished
the importance of purely logical forms and established
English Ramism in a trajectory which carried it rapidly
into a social, political and economic world well prepared
to receive its message.7
Consequently British Ramism exhibited an almost exclu
sively rhetorical focus from the start.

Ong calls it "the

central route over which the Ciceronian rhetorical tradi
tion moved in reorienting itself in the modern world."8
Introduced by figures associated with the lower arts cur
riculum and with literature in particular, it entered the
Universities under rhetorical auspices.

M ’Kilwein’s edi

tion of the Dialecticae coincided with the return of Andrew
Melville from France where he had come under the direct
influence of Ramus.

Melville carried Ramean theories home

to the University of Glascow where he initiated a Ramist
reform which, by 1578, had spread to the Universities of
Aberdeen and St. Andrews.

Meanwhile, a third dose of

Ramism had arrived in the intellectual baggage which Sir
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Phillip Sidney brought home from Frankfurt am Main where he
had lodged with Andr6 W6chel and Hubert Languet, Ramus’
printer and companion respectively.

Sidney directed the

flood of works pouring from the WAchel presses into England
and ultimately into Ireland.

In 1575, Gabriel Harvey

introduced Ramist theories at Cambridge where he held the
University Chair in Rhetoric.

Harvey’s Ode in Memory of

Peter Ramus launched a native British Ramism which, from
the first, possessed its own peculiarly rhetorical charac
ter. This selective focus became even more pronounced in
1584 when Ramus’ Dialecticae appeared for the first time in
English translation with its companion work, the Rhetorics
of Omer Talon.*
Indeed, the explicit linking of Ramean method with the
art of rhetoric articulated a bias endemic to English
society as a whole, closely linked to English conceptions
of law.10

By the late 17th Century, England had beheaded

one king, deposed another and witnessed the rise of a
politically and economically powerful middle class.

More

over, the Establishment had made controversy a fact of
political as well as religious life.

As the role of Par

liament grew, shifting political power and influence from
aristocrat to commoner, it became increasingly clear that
men could attain political power in direct proportion to
their polemical skills.11

And the Ramism peculiar to

England, which confined logic as a discipline to the func
tions of statement and proof, provided the perfect stone
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against which to whet the rhetorical tools appropriate to
the controversial needs of the age.
Conceived, organized and taught less as a master guide
to inquiry than as a tool for persuasion, English Ramism
"perfectly fitted its times."11

Its rhetorical focus

played well against the conditioned belligerence of the
religious and political milieu.11

The English legislative

system proved particularly receptive to the Ramean promise
that conviction followed naturally upon the application of
method.

Parliamentary forms tended to give verbal strategy

priority over rationality and emphasized impact rather than
logical consistency.

The rhetorically focused Ramism of

men like Phillip Sidney and Gabriel Harvey provided a con
venient theoretical justification for incorporating these
dialectical skills into the econony of practical and
political life.

English Ramism carried the curious

implication that everything one uttered in fact expressed a
self-evident truth, making it the perfect tool for dog
matists.

Moreover, the activism implicit in its didactic

forms harbored a kind of built-in social conscience which
carried over into proselytizing programs of religious
reform.
Ramism had a permanent effect on the English rhetorical
tradition.

Championed in the lower arts curriculum by fig

ures like Charles Butler, whose 1597 edition of Taleaus’
Rhetorica was the first Latin edition to appear in England,
it established itself as authoritative in the arts of dis

course.
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In 1629 Butler produced his own version of Ramus’

dialectic which transformed the Ramean doctrine of the
places into a system of subject-predicate relations
appropriate to rhetorical invention.

Known as the

Oratoriae Libri Duo, its title alone reveals the substan
tial reorientation of Ramean dialectic in England.

"That

he wrote on logic in 1629 and called his subject oratoria,"
Howell points out, "is a liberty that Ramus would never
have allowed himself."

Howell calls Butler an

"adulterated Ramist” who enjoyed a broad influence in pub
lic schools and played a major role in preparing the minds
which would dominate 17th Century intellectual life.

As

late as 1659, Butler's Rhetorica and his Oratoriae still
reigned as the "supreme authority" in the academy.14
William Dugard perpetuated Butler’s theories in his
Rhetorices Elementa (1648), which presented an elementary
version of Talaeus via Butler. Dugard’s work had reached a
fifth edition by 1657.

In 1671, John Newton produced an

English version of Butler, published as An Introduction to
the Art of Rhetorick.

By this time, Butler’s Ramistic doc

trine had "1ost some of its compulsiveness," but its
genealogy remained sufficiently clear to identify Newton as
at least a partial Ramist.

Dudley Fenner and Thomas Hobbes

collaborated on a primarily Ramist rhetoric as late as
1681, and a final edition of Butler’s Rhetoricae Libri Duo
appeared in London in 1684.

Howell traces its effects well
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into the 19th Century, tying it to the British Elocutionary
Movement and figures like Betterton, Sheridan and Mason.13
But the strongly rhetorical focus achieved by English
Ramists tended to obscure the purely logical aspects of
dialectic. Thus, although in rhetoric the introduction of
Ramean theories resulted in what Howell calls "a complete
victory for the French invader," in the upper reaches of
the curriculum -- that is in logic proper -- the effects of
Ramism proved substantially less pronounced.

In fact, the

Ramist "logics” which appeared in England between 1587 and
the late 17th Century all carried the same rhetorical twist
which Sidney and Harvey had given the doctrine.

William

Perkin’s The Arte of Prophecying (1606) typically focussed
on the arts of communication and preaching.

George

Downham’s Commentaries on the Dialectic of P. Ramus...
(1610) continued this bias, as did Alexander Richardson’s
The Logician's Schoolmaster (1624), which had a tremendous
impact on early American thought.

William Ames’

Demonstratio Logicae Verae and These Logicae (1646) both
clearly bore the stamp of Harvey’s refocused Ramism, as can
perhaps best be seen by the influence they had on Ames’
student William Chappell, who produced a dialectical
treatise with the curious title of Methodus Concionandi
(1648) which appeared in English translation as The
Preacher (1656).

It was Chappell’s Preacher which shaped

the Ramism of John Milton, whose Latin text of Ramus’
Dialecticae appeared in 1672.l*
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Although controversy between Ramists and Aristotelians
raged at Cambridge and Oxford, particularly in the 1580’s
and 1590's, Ramist logic itself never gained a significant
foothold in the English Schools.17

English logic in fact

remained strongly and somewhat naively Aristotelean in
character, following rather the "logics that were written
in England to restore scholasticism while preserving some
of Ramus’ innovations," among them Thomas Blunderville’s
Art of Logike (1599), John Sanderson’s Inatitutionum
Dialecticarum Libri Quatuor (1589), Samuel Smith’s Aditus
ad Logican

(1613) and Edward Brerewood’s Elements Logicae

(1614).1*

These logics, which explicitly revived the

predication theory abandoned by Ramus in favor of the
places of invention, "taught logic to all England during
the 17th Century."

Indeed the two most widely read, Robert

Sanderson’s Logicae Artia Compendium (1618) and Richard
Crakanthorpe’8

Logicae Libri Quinqui (1641), played a

great part in the education of Isaac Newton at Cambridge
between 1661 and 1665, as well as that of Jeremy Bentham at
Oxford nearly a hundred years later.1*

Perpetuated in

works like Henry Aldrich’B Artia Logicae Compendium (1691),
this Neo-Aristotelianism maintained the outlines of
Aristotle’8 logical doctrine in England well into the 19th
Century, in fact "for the entire period between Bacon’s
Novum Organum and John Stuart Mill’s A Syatem of Logic."10
The early adulteration of Ramean logic by a dis
proportionate emphasis on its rhetorical components, and
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the concomnitant revival of Aristotelian doctrine,
diminished the effects which Ramean method had on the
development of English scientific models.

When English

scientists sought a method, they followed Sanderson, not
Ramus.

"Few remembered," Ong laments, "that the cult of

method, which now meant almost exclusively the cult of
routine, had once meant not that but the cult of clarity.
Men no longer felt the quest for method as the quest for
logical lucidity which had stirred the soul of Des
cartes."11

This in turn tended to minimize the effects

which the logical theories of Bacon and Descartes had on
English science as well.

Indeed no logic based directly on

Bacon’s Novum Organua appeared in England before 1700.
And, although a derivative Cartesian logic appeared in the
Logique de Port-Royale after 1664, this also proved incapa
ble of dislodging the strong Neo-Aristotelian tradition
which dominated the English universities well into the next
century.11
In fact, Howell concludes,

"it looked as if English

logicians had permanently turned their backs upon the pos
sibility of reforming logical theory in the direction of
the revolutionary teachings of Bacon and Descartes.”11
Aldrich saw no future for logic in the experimental
sciences as outlined by Bacon and Descartes.

Indeed he

accused Descartes of simply replacing logic with mathe
matics and Bacon of replacing it with experiments.
Likewise, John Sergeant (The Method to Science, 1696), dis-
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missed Descartes as excessively speculative and Bacon as
insufficiently so.

He attacked Descartes specifically on

the grounds that the cogito expressed an a-logical princi
ple incapable of acting as the foundation of true
scientific knowledge.

Baconian induction he rejecced as

incapable of producing demonstrative certainty.**
In the meantime, however, the emerging physical
sciences continued to extend the limits of the field of
inquiry.

Baconian methods effected a revolution in

scientific practice, if not in theory.

And Descartes'

advocacy of mathematics found a ready audience among expe
rimentalists.

Consequently, the models of English science

drew farther and farther from the metaphors which control
led the logic in which its practitioners were trained.**
In reaction, English scientists sought their own forum in
the Royal Society which, under the motto Nullius in Verba,
renounced the logic of the Schools and asserted the right
of the physical sciences to explore and define truth
according to their own lights.
Significantly, however, the scientists of the Royal
Society did not turn to Ramus, Bacon or Descartes for illu
mination.

In fact, a strong Neo-Aristotelian lobby kept

all three from having a determinate impact on the develop
ment of English science.

When the pioneers of the Royal

Society sought logical metaphors, they turned instead to
one of their own -- John Wallis, whose Institutio Logicae
(1687) ironically perpetuated many of the main features of
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the very Neo-Aristotelian tradition which the Society
sought to escape.

Wallis systematically dismissed Ramus'

reliance on hypotheticals, ignored Bacon's doctrine of
induction and denied Descartes' mathematical insights.

Yet

this was the logic which shaped the theoretic core of
English science and bequeathed to the 18th Century the
metaphors which would control its models.
Wallis represented the conservative wing of the Royal
Society.

Indeed other, less influential, efforts within

the Society attempted to produce a logical theory more in
keeping with scientific advance, but these proved largely
unsuccessful.

Represented principally by the works of John

Wilkins, Robert Sprat and Joseph Glanville, these efforts
focused, characteristically, on the rhetorical aspects of
logical presentation and sought a dialectical theory which
would provide for the transfer of experimental knowledge
from scientist to scientist.

Sprat's History of the Royal

Society of London (1667) proposed an impartial vocabulary
which would subordinate argumentation to exposition and
make persuasiveness a natural consequence of accuracy.
John Wilkins attempted to provide this vocabulary in a cum
bersome work called

An Essay Towards a Real Character, And

a Philosophical Language (1668), which presented a
philosophical grammar specifically designed to enumerate
and describe all things.

Appended to the 454 pages of the

main text, Wilkins set out an Alphabetical Dictionary,
Wherein All English Words According to Their Various Sig
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nifications, are either referred to their Places in the
Philosophical Tables, Or Explained by such Words as are in
those Tables.

Wilkin's work stands as a clear example of

the Ramean rhetorical influence run amuck.

Although his

passion for a new scientific medium of communication had
little effect on the course of English science, it did
encourage the development of the plain style which Ong
claims became the literary arm of the new science.**
Wallis’ Institutio Logicae, on the other hand, pre
sented an explicitly, if somewhat modified, Aristotelian
logic.

It reaffirmed singular propositions as a distinct

class of universals and insisted that hypothetical state
ments and other composite arguments be brought under the
rules governing categorical syllogisms.

Most sig

nificantly, it denied that induction represented an inde
pendent form of argumentation.

Wallis did not associate

induction with observation, experiment or first-order dis
covery as Bacon had.

Induction, he claimed, expressed

rather a variant form of the syllogism incapable, except in
instances of complete enumeration, of producing
certainty.*7

Wallis’ textbook went through four 18th

Century editions, influenced Dugald Stewart as late as 1809
and was mentioned with approval by Richard Whately in his
Elements of Logic in 1826.

L. T. More claims that his

work in mathematics "became the standard work on the sub
ject and is constantly referred to by Fermat, Barrow [and]
Newton."*•
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The Neo-Aristotelian metaphors which controlled Wallis’
logic emerged clearly in the theoretic constructs developed
by the scientists of the Royal Society. Men like Gilbert,
Hailey and Newton operated under an elemental faith that
the fundamental regularities of nature could be expressed
in universal laws which ranged phenomena under ideal
mechanisms. But here was a scientific vision fundamentally
different from that of Baconian logic which had insisted on
initiating scientific reasoning through induction.

Nor did

it reflect Cartesian logic, which rejected the categories
as tools of inquiry and relied rather on intuition for its
self-sufficient propositions.

Indeed the vision which

drove the men of the Royal Society to construct their math
ematical models derived rather from logical metaphors which
represented particular propositions as reflections of a
categorical order.

It derived, in short, from the Neo-

Aristotelianism of men like Sanderson and Wallis.
Newton's methodology clearly illustrates the influence
which Neo-Aristotelian metaphors had on the scientific
models developed under their guidance.

Under the princi

ples of the logic in which he was schooled, Newton could
not represent the process of induction as apodictic except
in instances of complete enumeration.
hypothesis as an investigatory tool.
and Wallis had concurred.

Nor could he employ
Sanderson had said so

And yet the developing physical

sciences increasingly demanded the formulation of com
prehensive laws.

In response, Newton proposed a logical
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subterfuge.

In order for laws to be universally applica

ble, he argued, they must first be logically "inferred from
the phenomena", not induced from experiment or deduced from
hypotheses.

Only then could they be "rendered general by

induction".**

Newton’s reliance on inference in the con

struction of first premises gave his axioms a rational base
compatible with Neo-Aristotelian predication theory.

And

his reliance on induction in the verification of rules
brought his laws into conformity with the demands of the
new science.
Newtonian "inference" operated through metaphors
closely akin to those of mathematics.

Note for example the

way in which Newton arrived at his law of centripetal
force.

He simply stated that if a body moves around a sta

tionary point in such a way that radii drawn between the
body and the point mark out periodic areas, then the body
must be impelled "by a centripetal force directed to that
point."J#

But as Gerd Buchdahl points out, "to get from

the kinematical antecedent to the dynamical consequent, the
proof, apart from geometry, employs the first law of
motion, according to which since the body is not moving in
a straight line, it must be subject to 'the action of some
force that impels it’.

It also uses the second law [again,

Newton’s own], from which it follows that the acceleration
of the body takes place in the direction of the straight
line in which the force is impressed."*1

In other words,

Newton simply deduced the law of centripetal force from

. Ill

unilaterally formulated "laws of motion" and several
Euclidean proposition.

His inferred "law" thus expressed a

purely logical construct deduced from mathematical theorems
assumed from the start to reflect the phenomena -- a far
cry from Baconian induction!
Indeed the extension of Newtonian rules from particular
events to universal phenomena took place entirely under the
auspices of Newton's own third "Rule of Reasoning" which
authorized the investigator to rely on "the analogy of
Nature" in the construction of laws.

"The qualities of

bodies... which are found to belong to all bodies within the
reach of our experiments, are to be esteemed the universal
qualities of all bodies whatsoever," Newton’s rule bluntly
stated. "And this [process of inference] is the foundation
of all philosophy."**
With this sweeping definition of inference, Newton jus
tified his science according to the metaphors of his logic,
thereby avoiding any overt reliance on hypotheticals.
Wallis had dismissed hypotheses as inferior syllogistic
forms.

Ramus, on the other hand, had endorsed their use.

Newton, for his part, was content to smuggle hypotheses
into his arguments disguised as "rules” inferred from
phenomena.

His dictum of hypotheses non fingo

makes

sense, in fact, only in the light of his negative defini
tion of hypothesis as simply "Whatever is not deducible
from phenomena" --

a definition which rested squarely, if

somewhat ironically, on his sweeping definition of
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inference as virtually anything which is deduced from
phenomena.11

But by grounding his logic in inference, New

ton did substantially more than simply maintain the meta
phoric base of his logic.

He also fixed the character of

his science.
Inference supplied Newton with a logically articulated
metaphor for representing the formal operations of the nat
ural world.

Around this metaphor he built a set of

underlying images and conceptual analogies which supported
his mathematical physics.

Inference allowed Newton to

explain the complexities of experience using such abstract
concepts as universal attraction and the void while still
arguing for an inductive science.

It justified the inclu

sion of non-empirical entities such as idealized material
particles in the construction of "objective" scientific
laws.

Although these inferred forces and particles were at

base just as imaginary as the substantial forms and
qualities which they purported to replace, Newton could
treat them, according to his Rules, as first principles in
chains of deductive reasoning which aimed at laying bare
the underlying "realities" of nature.11
Ultimately this method made Newton’s inferred laws
appear more real than the observed phenomena they purported
to explain.

Donald Ault comments on how the metaphors con

trolling Newtonian science had the tendency "to isolate
those features which do not change and reify them as the
features of the world which are "real" while the shifting
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features of time are taken to be ' a p p e a r a n c e *

Newton’s

laws thus became Eternal Forms which expressed a meth
odological correlate of the categories.

By subsuming these

powerful metaphors of organization within a logically con
sistent theoretical structure, Newton gave his scientific
laws the ability to extend themselves analogically across
virtually all disciplines -- a characteristic which
accounts for his profound influence on 18th Century
thought.1•
Newtonian science thus operated through continuous laws
inferred from experience -- laws not unlike the positive
laws established by English Parliamentary forms.

Paul

Feyerabend points out that Newtonian laws in fact bore a
close resemblance to the Protestant Rule of Faith which
governed private and political life in England.

Both

enthroned experience as a new authority within a deductive
framework which remained "logically vacuous."

Experience

for the Puritans and for Newton operated within a community
already committed to certain ideas and faced with a
psychological need to support the process of indoctrination
on a logical base.

"In the case of Protestantism this base

supported a faith.

In the case of Newton, it supported a

scientific theory.

In both cases,” Feyerabend claims, "we

are dealing with nothing but a party line.”

Feyerabend’s

rhetoric is perhaps a bit strong, ignoring the genuine
abstractive qualities of Newton’s mathematical language.
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But the similarity between the supporting metaphors proves
striking in the present context.17
Indeed Newton’s portrayal of law as logical inference
rested on a central paradox born of his attempt to accom
modate the methods of an inductive science to the metaphors
of a Neo-Aristotelian logic.

And in fact the logical

ambiguity of Newton’s claim to derive universally valid
inferences from particular events ended by creating what
Gerd Buchdahl has called a "crisis of intelligibility"
within his physics.*•

This crisis manifested itself in

Newton’s inability to forge an existential link between his
inductive data and his theoretical laws.

It raised impor

tant questions as to the logical status and modus operandi
of these laws.

What actual physical properties cor

responded to the mathematical functions expressed by the
law of gravitation?
laws operate?

Through what physical medium did these

Newton claimed "only to give a mathematical

notion of those forces, without considering their physical
causes and seats."**

But clearly the analogical ground of

his Rules of Reasoning expressed a commitment to provide an
actual physical account of universal laws.
Faced with this crisis of intelligibility, the
scientists of the Royal Society reached out for logical
metaphors which could more adequately express the relation
ship which pertained between Newton’s data and his laws.
They needed a logic which could articulate the meth
odological structure of scientific hypotheses -- one which
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could arrive at valid laws without reference to the
idealizing tendencies of Newton’s Rules.

John Locke

addressed this need in his Essay Concerning the Human
Understanding and later in his more explicitly logical
treatise, Of the Conduct of the Understanding, which pro
vided a new set of metaphors which could validate the use
of inference in the construction of laws.
Like Newton, Locke accepted experience as the "new
authority" in inquiry.*®

But Newton had arrived at a meth

odological impasse by trying to adapt his scientific model
to the demands of his logical metaphors.

The originality

of Locke’s approach lay in his revolutionary commitment to
adapt his logical metaphors to the demands of his science.
Thus he rejected Newton’s tendency to portray experience as
phenomena and laws as logical consistency.

Experience,

Locke claimed, "extends as far as the present testimony of
our senses, employed about particular objects, that do then
affect them, and no further."41

Since there existed

nothing in experience so necessary as a logical law, the
whole "scientific" enterprise of constructing models that
conformed to logical metaphors became meaningless.
Newton had identified particular experimental results
with phenomena in general.

This had allowed him to ascribe

an actual logical status to phenomena.

Note, for instance,

the way Newton represented Kepler’s laws in the Principia.
For Kepler, these laws had expressed the theoretical con
clusions of an elaborate analysis of observational data.
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But for Newton, they formed part of a logical argument
which led back and forth between selected and carefully
controlled experiments and the articulation of a universal
theory.

The logical status with which Newton endowed expe

rience gave his laws their prescriptive power.

But this

same self-reenforcing definition of experience also led to
what D. M. Clarke has called the "theory-ladeness" of New
tonian science -- that is, its characteristic need to
create ideally isolated systems, to eliminate the
irrelevant from the observational field -- in short, to
control the experiment.4*
Locke, on the other hand, replaced Newton's categorical
ideal of consistency with a new scientific ideal of
accuracy.

He set out to provide an "historical, plain

method" for exploring nature which operated solely on the
data of experience.4*

Consequently, he ignored the

ontological status of the products of inference which had
so confounded Newton and focused rather on the process of
inference itself as it related to inquiry.

While he

admitted the functional role which inductive inference
could play in guiding the conduct of science, he denied the
ability of purely logical inference to underwrite scientia
in the older Aristotelian sense.44

For Locke, inference

consisted, not of rules which governed the operation of
reason, but rather in the process which the human reason
followed in forming its ideas.

"The Understanding is not

taught to reason by...Rules,” Locke claimed, "It has a
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native Faculty to perceive the Coherence, or Incoherence of
its Ideas."4®

Scientific laws embodied no "reality" dis

covered through the application of reason.

They described

tentative mental constructs legislated through the applica
tion of method.

They portrayed the way nature behaved as a

matter of fact, not as a matter of necessity.
"To infer," Locke declared, "is nothing but by virtue
of one Proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as
true, i.e. to see or suppose such a connection of the two
Ideas."

Inference thus represented an instantaeous natural

action of the rational faculty in its proper functions of
sensation and reflection.

What had been deemed by the

Neo-Aristotelians an imperfect form of reasoning became for
Locke a perfect form of inquiry, since what "shews the
force of the Inference, and consequently the reasonableness
of it" is not its conformabi1ity to a categorical order,
but rather "a view of the connection of all the inter
mediate Ideas, that draw in the Conclusion, or Proposition
inferr’d."

Since the mind itself was "able to judge of the

Inference," inquiry could proceed "without any need of a
Syllogism at all.”

In fact, Locke concluded, all knowledge

consisted in inference, being "nothing but the perception
of the connexion and agreement, or disagreement and repug
nancy of any of our Ideas."**
Locke’s redefinition of inference as a cognitive
process made the logical crisis implicit in Newton's meth
odology painfully apparent.

Newton’s inferred laws had
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derived their power from their ability to be theoretically
predicable throughout the universe.

Newton’s Rules had in

fact made his mathematical forms isomorphic, if not identi
cal, with the actual coherence of the world.

But Locke

portrayed inference as cognition, pointing out the total
inadequacy of Aristotelian categories to contain the
scientific spirit.

As a corollary to his phenomenalistic

theory of inference, Locke maintained that all abstractions
shared an intrinsic inability to represent physical
reality.

Under his critique, mathematical laws and logical

categories alike became mere "inventions and creatures of
the understanding" which remained ontologically distinct
from physical reality.

They could not express any actual

coherence or objective truth.

In fact, they presented only

an incomplete description of accidental connections per
ceived between analogous phenomena. Since physical science
could investigate only these accidental connections, and
since "there is no discoverable connection between any sec
ondary quality and those primary qualities it depends on,”
Locke concluded that science must abandon its theoretic
pretentions altogether and content itself with simple expe
rimental statements grounded exclusively in present experi
ence .4 7
It is important in the present context not to
exaggerate the influence which Locke ultimately had on the
construction of 18th Century scientific models.

Although

Locke’s Essay underwent 20 editions between 1706 and 1805
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and offered an increasingly effective foil to the
Aristotelianism of Aldrich and his school, his logic never
achieved total dominance in England.

The ambivalence of

Locke’s position in the English logical heritage is made
evident by the persistence of Neo-Aritotelianism even in
the face of his revolutionary epistemology.

"It must

always be remembered,” Howell points out, "that Locke’s
Essay was getting its first readers at the very moment in
history when Henry Aldrich in his Aristotelian treatise,
Artis Logicae Compendium, was denying to Bacon and Des
cartes the right to be considered as true logicians, and
that under Aldrich’s guidance the old logic seemed to have
withstood successfully the assaults of its two most formid
able early seventeenth Century adversaries, and to be no
longer in danger from them for the indefinite future."4®
In fact, English logic did not come to terms with induction
until after the development of its most influential
scientific models, most of which were developed under the
influence of the Neo-Aristotelianism described above.
On the other hand, Locke’s juxtaposition of a cognitive
theory of inference with a mathematical physics placed the
metaphors of English logic on an inevitable collision
course with the ideals of its science.

By making the con

ditions of the mind’s own functioning the metaphoric ground
of inquiry, Locke made the frontiers of science coextensive
with the limits of human experience.

But here was a

scientific ideal vastly different from the mathematical
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vision of Newtonian physics!

Locke's logic of inference

thus presented the English scientist with a fundamental
dilemma.

Methodologically confined to the investigation of

present effects, yet metaphorically committed to the
expression of theoretical laws, he would henceforth have to
justify his theoretical aspirations in the light of his
methodological postulates.4*
Much of the subsequent history of English science can
in fact be written as the history of various attempts to
resolve this dilemma.

Berkeley pursued an explicit criti

que of the limits and validity of mathematical models,
claiming that mathematics, as subordinate to experience,
had no role in the construction of theory.

His attack

against the value of numbers as a source of abstract con
cepts appears most clearly in his attempt to develop an
adequate theory of the processes of vision and perception
-- a theoretical problem paradigmatic of the general
philosophical difficulties arising from the introduction of
sensationalist theories of knowledge into a scientific
world conditioned by a mathematical physics.

Newton had

discussed perception in mathematical terms, presenting a
theory of vision which operated through geometric meta
phors.

But Locke had converted consciousness itself into

an optical analogy with his image of the camera obscura.*0
Berkeley, in turn, carried Locke’s optical metaphor over
into metaphysics and arrived at a whole new interpretation
of what it meant to be "real" -- esse is percipi.5l
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Likewise Hume, convinced of the critical inadequacy of
Newton’s methodology, took both Locke and Berkeley at their
word and proceeded to show what the ultimate consequences
of a phenomenalistic theory of inference would be.

He dis

missed both logical and psychological inference as a means
for arriving at existentially valid statements, thereby
reducing science to a purely experimental discipline devoid
of any ability to make existential statements beyond the
limits of concrete sensible effects.

Methodologically

committed to provide experimental descriptions of a purely
functional nature by his reductive analysis of cognition,
Hume arrived ultimately at a description of knowledge in
which all noetic structures proved derivative and therefore
subordinate to pure sensation.

On this foundation he pro

ceeded to build a psychological theory of knowledge founded
on prelogical beliefs which would eventually destroy the
logical basis of all theoretical science.®*
18th Century British scientific models thus developed
out of attempts to bring Locke’s redefinition of inference
to bear on the powerful metaphors which controlled New
tonian physics.

Indeed only with the radical dissociation

of these metaphors from scientific inquiry accomplished by
John Stuart Mill in the next century could English science
be said to have come to terms with its own logic.

Mill

gave Lockean metaphors of mental mechanism their fullest
possible expression.

For Mill, ideas became mere points of

consciousness -- Newtonian particles made mental -- and
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their construction took on a palpably mechanical quality
absent from Locke and even Hume.

Locke had preserved

resemblance as a mental analogue of Newtonian "attraction” .
But Mill, recognizing the deeper philosophical motives
lurking under the surface of Newton’s Rules, explicitly
denied inference, resemblance or relation as operative
principles in concept formation.

He simply denied the

analogical role of logic in the structuring of scientific
hypotheses.

Contiquity alone accounted for the construc

tion of concepts, he claimed.

With Mill’s System of Logic

in 1843 English science finally acquired a fully articu
lated logic of induction after the model of Bacon.

Mill's

System made induction "the main question of the science of
logic" and put the Neo-Aristotelian tradition of Wallis and
Aldrich "into permanent eclipse."®3
Hence the career of Ramism and its interaction with
Aristotelian paradigms in the English intellectual milieu
did indeed have an impact on the development of English
scientific models.

The naive Aristotelianism which per

sisted in the English Schools arose in reaction to the dis
proportionately rhetorical focus which English Ramists gave
to the art of dialectic.

Howell in fact argues that "the

two systems are so intertwined that the problems of the one
are in fact variations upon tne problems of the other, and
a firm grasp of the history of both is essential to the
understanding of the fate of either one."*4

As a con

sequence of this characteristic development, the logical
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doctrine which shaped the minds of English scientists in
the 17th and well into the 18th Centuries continued to draw
on metaphors grounded in Aristotelian logic -- metaphors
which perpetuated the paradox of basing a universal science
on the assertoric predicates of categorical logic.

These

metaphors dictated Newton’s Rules and shaped his com
prehensive laws.

Ultimately they encouraged the construc

tion of a scientific model which ended by denying its own
ability to legislate in the natural world.
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Chapter 4
A R IS T O T L E .

RAMUS AND D E S C A R T E S :

Logical Metaphors
in
French Scientific Models

Just as Newtonian laws and Lockean epistemology
reflected the logical and legal metaphors operative in
English society during the 16th and 17th Centuries, so also
did French scientific models reflect the logical and legal
models upon which they drew.

France, throughout the

turmoil of the 16th Century, had maintained a native cen
tralized absolutism.

Its legal models continued to express

an authoritarian ideal which conceived of laws as
incontrovertible dicta, propounded unilaterally and imposed
from above.

These political structures precluded the

introduction of legal metaphors based in inference.
Moreover, whereas in England the liberalizing effects of
Protestantism militated against the extension of dogma
across the entire field of inquiry, in France the continued
dominance of the Catholic Church tended to represent
political, religious and intellectual orthodoxy as coor
dinate value-systems.

As early as 1534, Francis I estab

lished a policy of monarchical control over the French
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intellectual community.1

This policy, reenforced by Jesuit

ideologues, insured a level of control over the
intellectual milieu in France which would have been
impossible in the religious and political atmosphere of
17th Century England.

As a result, logic in France through

the 17th, and indeed much of the 18th Century, hued essen
tially to a party line grounded in absolutist metaphors and
authoritarian ideals.
The Edict of Nantes sealed the fate of Ramism early in
France.

The implicit rhetorical focus of Ramean dialectic,

to say nothing of its explicit identification with the
Protestant cause, insured that Ramus would never receive in
France the sympathetic hearing which he enjoyed in England.
The need to convert, so central to English political and
religious life, had no meaning in Bourbon France.
Ramean rhetoric found no audience.

So

Likewise the anti

authoritarian valence of Ramus' dialectic made it unlikely
that he would find a constituency among the politically
dependent scholastics who served the French universities
after Henry's accession.

Henry’s Edict left the field

entirely to scholastic defenders of traditional
Aristotelianism.*
As a result, French logic never felt the creative
effects of the interplay between Ramean and Aristotelian
metaphors which generated the Neo-Aristotelian theories of
Wallis and Aldrich and supported Newton’s formulation of
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law as inference.

The ultimate effects of Ramism emerged

in absolutist France rather as a latent preoccupation with
method which Ong claims "haunts the French mind."

Where

Ramism had served as a catalyst in the freer development of
English logical theory, in France it served "as a crystal
introduced into a supersaturated solution, suddenly
precipitating and giving structure to the interest in
method with which the scholastic world in Paris was
charged."*
Descartes supplied the medium through which Ramean
method precipitated into French logic and science.

But

Descartes’ logic, although revolutionary in its mathemati
cal insights, proved curiously conservative in its practi
cal effects -- a consequence which derived explicitly from
its primary dependence on method.

Autonomous by nature and

always self-identical in operation, Descartes’ method pro
vided the ground for his logic.

So, unlike Newton, he had

no need to enthrone experience as a new authority in
inquiry.

His innatist logic stipulated that the materials

of knowledge were given to the mind by the mind.4

Experi

ence provided occasions for the application of method, not
data for the operations of reason.

Moreover, since his

method guaranteed the perfect intelligibility of his
system, Descartes had no need to justify his mathematics in
existential terms.

He could leave those questions of cor

respondence which had so confounded Newton in the hands of

134

traditional authorities and focus exclusively on the inter
nal operation of reason within ideal Mathematical con
structs .
Predictably, this type of "scientific revolution"
played well in the political atmosphere of 17th Century
France.

Descartes' acquiescence in a traditional ontology

placed issues of authority outside the field of science.
It divorced the unsettling discoveries of the new sciences
from the inviolable claims of Church and State and cleared
the path for an autonomous investigation of nature.

Coin

cidentally it provided welcome support to an intellectual
community committed at once to a revolutionary science and
a conservative regime.

Despite his appearance on the Index

in 1663, Descartes consistently avoided any break with
orthodoxy.

In addition to having firBt obtained the

sympathetic approval of the influential Cardinale de
BArulle and his Oratoire for his theories, Descartes con
tinually tested his ideas against clerics such as Mersenne
to determine their acceptability.

He repeatedly professed

a full submission to the articles of the faith and desisted
from any test of methodic doubt in the realm of revela
tion .*
Moreover, Descartes furthered neutralized adverse reac
tions to his analytical model by propping up his
mechanistic physics with an Augustinian doctrine of the
spirit.

Thus, although at first uniformly opposed by reac
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tionary Jesuit writers, Cartesian logic rapidly gained a
hearing as a viable alternative to an Aristotelianism which
was becoming increasingly untenable in the face of
scientific advance.

By 1662, Descartes’ logic had become

sufficiently respectable to acquire systematic expression
in the Logique de Port-Royale, which Howell claims
"achieved a phenomenal popularity in France."

The Port-

Royale Logic attacked the doctrine of the places as
insufficiently methodical and the categories as unproduc
tive of certain knowledge, establishing Descartes’ theories
of predication, as well as his deductive method, as the
cornerstones of French science.*
Supported by apologists like Gassendi and Malebranche,
Cartesianism was rapidly assimilated to the cause of
orthodoxy.

Pierre Gassendi early merged his atomistic

theories with the corpuscular hypotheses of Descartes.
Together the two conceptions lent strong support to the
enterprise of explaining all natural phenomena in terms of
bodies in motion.

Indeed Gassendi’s attempt to define the

soul in relation to certain highly refined atomic movements
found welcome justification in Descartes’ automatist
theories.

Similarly Nicholas Malebranche concentrated on

bringing the Cartesian theory of the vortices into cor
respondence with Mosaic physics.

His theory of

Occasionalism, anticipated by de la Forge and Cordemoy as
early as 1666, proved central in reconciling Cartesian and
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Catholic doctrine.

Malebranche's "chriatianization" of the

central tenets of Cartesian physics allowed for its full
acceptance in the orthodox milieu.

Varantian calls his

work "the subtlest and profoundest apologetics of the age,
converting innate ideas into a Christian-Platonic ‘vision
in God’ and mechanistic dualism into a providential theory
of occasional causes."7
Ultimately Bishop Bossuet brought Cartesianism right to
the treshold of officialdom in his Connaissance de Dieu et
de soi-m&me, which combined the Augustinian features of
Cartesian psychology with the strong Thomistic tradition of
the Parisian schools and made it acceptable in a university
milieu committed to the maintainance of traditional forms.
Even the Jesuits gave up in the end.

Indeed they

ultimately found in Descartes a powerful ally in the strug
gle against the deistic, materialistic and atheistic
tendencies of the Enlightenment.*

By the time of the

establishment of the AcadAmie Royale des Sciences in 1666,
Descartes had become authoritative.

To attack him invited

official censure.
The acceptance of Cartesian logic by an authoritarian
regime insured its metaphors a determining role in the
creation of French scientific models.

The ability of

French universities to maintain a high level of orthodoxy,
particularly in a discipline as central to the curriculum
as logic, allowed the controlling metaphors of Cartesian
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logic to penetrate the French intellectual milieu in a way
which they could not in England.

As a result, Descartes'

reliance on deductive method and his desire to eliminate
all vestiges of topical or categorical images in predica
tion embedded themselves at the very center of French
scientific inquiry.
Nor could the influx of Newtonian-Lockean theories of
inference dislodge Descartes’ deductive model.

Locke’s

logic may, in fact, have been robbed of some of its initial
impact by the circumstances which surrounded its introduc
tion in France.

Locke’s Essay first appeared there in 1688

in the form of an epitome by Jean Le Clerc.

But Le Clerc’s

work provided only a small portion of the text of the
Essay.

Howell points out that "in 1688 the Essay had not

yet reached its completed form in Locke’s mind, and thus
the epitome which he submitted to Le Clerc was a reduced
version of something not yet fully worked out.

Such a ver

sion would inevitably be incomplete in emphasizing the
basic points of the final work."

Nowhere, Howell claims,

is this more evident than in the treatment given by Le
Clerc to Locke’s explicitly logical theories, and particu
larly his critique of the syllogism.

The capacity of this

epitome to discredit the deductive theories of Descartes
thus proved minimal.*
Indeed not until the mid-18th Century did the hegemony
of Cartesian logic in France begin to be questioned in any
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fundamental sense.

Varantian argues that the standard

scholarship which claims that the theories of Newton and
Locke submerged the Cartesian view is faulty at best and
"typified by a reluctance to probe beneath the surface."
Newtonian and Lockean metaphors, he contends, met with a
"tenacious resistance from the majority of the members of
the Acad6mie des sciences.”

Although Descartes' physics

itself began to be discarded in the face of the more objec
tively convincing Newtonian physics, the scientific meth
odology that had inspired it remained and proved to be the
dominant factor in the development of French science.

This

accounts, Varantian claims, for the persistence of the
tourbilion theory as late as the 1770's —

a theory which

survived, not on any physical merit of its own, but rather
because it conformed to the metaphors of science developed
by Descartes.10
Indeed in 1752 Fontenelle lent the enormous prestige of
the AcadAmie to a defense of Cartesian physics in his
Th6orie des tourbillons CartAsiens which unequivocally sup
ported the vortices against Newtonian attractionism.

Sig

nificantly, Fontenelle’8 defense rested almost exclusively
on an attack upon Newtonian inference.

According to

Fontenelle, Newton’s method extended its mathematical meta
phors without justification to the existential world.

The

fact that calculation confirmed Newton's law, he argued,
did not in any way prove that attraction existed in the
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material world.

He pointed out that Descartes’ mathemati

cal laws, on the other hand, provided a matrix which need
not necessarily extend to material reality.

Cartesian laws

expressed the world en tant q u ’elle eat comprise par
1 ’entendement, unlike their Newtonian counterparts, which
defined a universal standard to which all reality, through
inference, must conform. Working from the deductive postu
lates of Cartesian logic, Fontenelle explicitly denied New
ton’s right to bridge the gap between theory and reality
with an inferential logic.11
Likewise Condillac, although ostensibly supporting
Lockean inference in his Traits des sensations in 1754, in
fact relied on the "esprit de syst&me” still so powerful in
the Cartesian tradition to carry him beyond Locke to a
theory of knowledge which buttressed established religion
and defended traditional metaphysics.

Etienne Gilson

points out that Condillac "shows himself a disciple of Des
cartes more than of his beloved Locke."1* In fact, his
Essai sur l'origine des connaisaances huaaines sought, not
to propagate Lockean theories in France, but rather to cor
rect what its author saw as several serious defects in
Locke’s owr. Essay.

Condillac pointed out that Locke

ignored the central question of how the understanding
achieved the transition from sensation to cognition.

In

effect, he pointed out that Lockean theories of inference
had the same difficulty dealing with issues of cor-
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resondence that Fontenelle had identified in Newtonian
physics.

Although ironically characterized as the champion

of Locke in France, in fact Condillac’s aim was to bring to
completion a logical task which he felt Lockean inference
left incomplete.**
The AcadAaie remained sufficiently in thrall to "la
grande id6e de Descartes" in 1765 to endorse an official
Eloge to its author.

In fact, throughout the entire period

characteristically styled the "Age of Newton," Cartesianism
remained the official position of French science.

Even in

defeat, the metaphors of Cartesianism triumphed in subtle
and telling ways.

"The decline of Cartesianism was not

exactly a rout," Varantian points out.

"There is reason to

believe rather that it was an orderly, even if inexorable,
retreat.

It left behind many all-embracing vestiges, which

proved all the more effectual for being too ’intangible’ to
be challenged by the philosophes."*4
A perfect example of the tenacity of Cartesian logic in
the French scientific world appears in the work of
Christian Huygens, whose brilliant theoretical work on
oscillating pendulums attacked one of the toughest dynami
cal problems of the age.

Huygens sought to calculate the

center of oscillation of a compound pendulum.

His experi

ments and calculations brought him to make potentially
important observations on the operation and magnitude of
centrifugal force.

Huygens clearly possessed the gifts and
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the data to apply these observations to the development of
a comprehensive theory of centrifugal or even gravitational
force.

But Huygens "was in bondage too long to Descartes’

philosophy."

He accepted as given Descartes’ logical

deduction of the vortex as an invisible "subtle matter"
which caused the restraining effects he observed in his
pendulum experiments.

He therefore ignored the theoretical

impact of his own observations, explaining them rather by
reference to Cartesian mechanics.

Likewise, in his impor

tant work with vacuum pumps and optics, Huygens dismissed
the theoretical implications of his own experiments and
"bent" his results to accommodate the Cartesian plenum.19
By so doing, he left the field to Newton.
The entire difference between the scientific models
developed in England and France during this period can in
fact be expressed by the metaphors implicit in their
respective logics.

As discussed above, Newton identified

inference as the operative principle in the construction of
laws.

But inference, from the Latin inferre, means "to

carry toward" or "bring into".

Thus for Newton, laws

expressed the product of a method which reached outside the
inquiring mind to "bring into" the reasoning process the
data of external experience.

The scientific mind in fact

went through an actual legislative process in the construc
tion of laws not unlike the process pursued by political
minds in the construction of positive law.
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Descartes' logic, on the other hand, operated through
deduction, from the Latin deducere, "to lead away from" -or, even more significantly, the French deduire, "to
deduct," "to draw out," "to discourse of."1*

Deduction

provided Descartes with a means of explaining ideas which
were logically prior to the process of inquiry itself.
But while deduction could "draw out" concepts from a logi
cally antecedent system, it contributed nothing to the
creation of that system in the way that Newtonian inference
did.

In fact, Descartes consistently held that experience

remained extrinsic to his method.

While it might supply

middle terms useful in determining the correctness of a
judgement made about a scientific system, it had no logical
status in the construction of laws.
D. M. Clarke makes some perceptive comments on the
ambiguous senses of the word experience in Cartesian writ
ings, claiming that at no point in his works does Descartes
use the word experience in a sense even roughly parallel to
the sense in which Newton uses it.

"Descartes’ concept of

experience," he notes, "is not univocal, nor does he
normally reserve any special term to discriminate between
scientific experiments and any other empirical procedures
which might be more generally classified as experience.
Instead he uses the word experience in French and experientia or experimentum in Latin and their corresponding verb
forms experimenter and experiri, in as many senses as we
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ordinarily use the words "experience" or "to experience" in
English.

In a few cases he also uses Spreuve (and

eprouver) and sentiment (and sentir) with almost the same
ambiguity of meaning as experience.

The Cartesian

repertoire does not, however, include the word experi
ment. "» »
Hence "experience" in the sense in which Newton used
the word, had no logical status for Descartes.

This may

account for Descartes' inclination to be so "unambiguously
hypothetical" in works like the Dioptrics and the Meteorol
ogy.

Where Newton felt the need to disguise his hypotheses

as inferences, Descartes could acknowledge them for what
they were because of his disinclination to justify them in
terms of objective experience.

Thus Cartesian laws sup

plied the source of a method whose role consisted in the
explanation, not the legislation, of concepts.

In a very

real sense they expressed the absolutist frame within which
political law operated in France throughout the 17th
Century.

Within that frame, Reason reigned supreme.

Out

side it, Reason had no jurisdiction at all.
But the comfortable accomodation of Cartesian logic to
the French political scene dissolved rapidly with the rise
of Jacobin power.

The explicit conservatism of

Cartesianism could not readily supply a nascent Republican
movement with metaphors appropriate to the overthrow of
traditional authority.

The libertins required a logically
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sound theory of law which could justify their revolutionary
aims and still provide a philosophic base for the estab
lishment of a stable regime.

Yet when they looked to their

logic for metaphors which could sanction their political
activism, they found only deductive models which tended
rather to reenforce traditional forms.

The logic in which

they had been schooled provided no opportunity for develop
ing legislative models grounded in inference.

Diderot, for

instance, received his formal schooling at the College
d ’Harcourt in the late 1720's under Guillaume Dagoumer, a
professor of philosophy who had championed the introduction
of Cartesianism in the Schools.

Diderot entered the

College shortly after Dagoumer had succeeded in estab
lishing Descartes as the center of the school’s philosophi
cal program.1*

Likewise his fellow encyclopGdiates matured

in an intellectual atmosphere where "almost all learned
societies [were] permeated...with the conception of science
proper to Cartesian tradition."1*
For want of logical metaphors which could support their
political program, the libertins reached out instead to the
latent implications of Descartes’ innatist theory of
predication.

The potentially radical aspects of Descartes’

"lumi^re naturelle toute pure", previously kept in check by
the political conservatism of the 17th Century, emerged in
the 18th as a beacon to free-thinkers and skeptics.*0
Reformulating Descartes’ innatist images in a political
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vocabulary, the libertina succeeded in fashioning a charac
teristic conception of natural law which, although revolu
tionary in its political effects, remained curiously con
sistent with the conservative metaphors of Cartesian logic.
This implicit, if rarely acknowledged, adoption of
Cartesian method by Enlightenment ideologues proved crucial
to the development of 18th Century French thought.
Almost all French writers in the Age des lumiAres
explicitly denied any debt to Descartes.

In fact, Des

cartes acquired a certain propaganda value for a
libertinism which sought to discredit all traditional
authorities.

Moreover, inasmuch as the innatist

metaphysics of official Cartesianism represented a position
which the philosophea unanimously rejected, they
understandably refused in good faith to be styled
Cartesians.

Not until the 19th Century, in fact, had

French criticism recovered sufficiently from the trauma of
revolution to accept at face value the contributions which
Cartesian logic had made to the development of Enlighten
ment thought.

By 1891, Hippolyte Taine could admit that

the innovations of the philoaophes were deeply rooted in
Cartesian images and that, notwithstanding the superposi
tion of Lockean and Newtonian theories, they derived from
an essentially a priori conception of scientific method.*1
Nonetheless Cartesian metaphors emerged clearly in
works like Montesquieu's Esprit des lois, which articulated
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a concept of natural law fundamentally different from the
physical laws which controlled Newtonian science.

Newton’s

mathematical laws expressed a poateriori concepts -abstractions inferred from the infinite variety of nature.
But Montesquieu’s natural laws existed a priori, as neces
sary relations that derived from the quantitative structure
of the world.

Within a cohesive world of matter in motion,

Montesquieu identified "permanently established relations"
-- operative ideals actually inherent in the constitution
of things.**

These "natural laws" controlled the effects

of nature in a manner not unlike the way innate ideas con
trolled Cartesian logic.

By following the light of reason,

men could deduce the rules of political association from
them, but the resultant positive laws, as deductive exten
sions of anterior relations, remained essentially dependent
on natural law itself, just as the deductive conclusions of
Cartesian logic depended ultimately on its intuited
premises.

Natural law remained logically antecedent to

authority, just as intuition remained logically antecedent
to inquiry.

From this fundamentally Cartesian conception

of law, the philosophea deduced their entire political
program.

And, in turn, this theory of natural law supplied

metaphors for the construction of a scientific model pecu
liar to Jacobin France.**
The

"universality" of Descartes’ method gave it the

implicit ability to extend its metaphors with equal ease
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across political platforms or scientific agendas.

In fact,

under the potent influence of Jacobin politics, the inves
tigator of nature became the guide and benefactor of
society.

Many of the themes animating the political

ideologies of the Enlightenment -- human progress, moral
perfectability, obligation to posterity -- derived directly
from a method which seemed to promise that the penetration
of the secrets of physical nature would furnish a cor
responding competence in all areas of human concern.

This

tendency in Descartes’ universal method provided the
"c8terie holbachique" with an excuse for referring all
moral and social questions to the laws of matter in motion.
And although Diderot would criticize this physicodeterminist conception of human affairs, it nevertheless
exercized a determining influence on the social theories of
the Enlightenment, ultimately issuing in Condorcet’s Pros
pectus of a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Huaan
Mind which sought to establish an actual physics of social
facts whereby it would become possible to engineer the
political conduct of nations.
The protean images which supported natural law appear
fully developed in the Encyclopedic, sacred book to a new
cult of scientific naturalism which developed in France at
precisely that point in time when Newtonian physics,
according to the prevailing wisdom, should have been at the
height of its influence.

In fact, however, the naturalism
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developed by the encyclop^distea differed radically from
the models developed under the metaphors controlling New
tonian science.

Newtonian inference had spawned a

physico-mathematical universe governed by an assumed
isomorphism between mathematical laws and the natural
order.

Locke had further restricted the scope of this

model by subjecting it to a rigidly empirical epistemology.
The end result was an experimentalism constrained by dis
crete data which offered at best a somewhat disjointed
explanation of an inferred order.

The encyclopSdiatea, by

contrast, ignored the issues of correspondence which
plagued Newton’s inferential logic.

By conceiving of law

as antecent to inquiry, they eliminated contingency as a
constituent of their models.

This in turn fostered a

physics committed to an absolute coherence in nature.

And

this faith in the integral lawfulness of all natural
processes ultimately encouraged the development of
scientific naturalism.
The naturalism of La Mettrie, Buffon and Diderot
acknowledged the right of science to give the most complete
interpretation of the physical universe within the compass
of human reason, not merely human experience.

It sub

ordinated experimental procedure to a method of hypotheti
cal deduction which, driven by Cartesian metaphors, allowed
the mind to grasp the essential order of all physical
phenomena.

Experience itself provided only "several iso
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lated and disjointed fragments of the great chain that
unites all things,” Diderot declared in his Interpretation
de la nature.

One of the principal differences between a

simple observer and a scientist, he argued "is that the
latter starts out from the point where sense-perception and
instruments abandon the former.

...From the order of

things he draws abstract general conclusions...[and] rises
to the essence itself of that order."14
The Encylop6die article on Hypothdae clearly sought to
vindicate this method.15

But the naturalists’ hypotheses

operated on a different level entirely from Newton’s, being
primarily imaginative constructions suggested by certain
key phenomena.

In fact, for the philoaophea, hypotheses

proved true or false, not as they corresponded to present
fact, but rather as they demonstrated an ability to lead to
fresh hypotheses.

Varantian even argues that in the natu

ralists the ideas of hypothesis and system in effect merged
to form a single concept.1*

Indeed Voltaire alone among

the philoaophea, strongly influenced as he was by Lockean
and Newtonian constructs, showed a signal incomprehension
of the scientific use of hypothetical constructs, calling
them only "suppositions”.
The "esprit de divination" made manifest in the
philoaophea' legitimation of hypothesis underwrote a
scientific method which stood as a polar opposite to New
ton’s physico-mathematical model.

Its overtly hypothetico-
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deductive method tended to diminish the importance of math
ematical analogies in physics and to explain nature rather
in its concrete and variable effects.

Diderot, in fact,

argued that "the object of the mathematician has no exist
ence in nature," while Buffon agreed that "that which is
called mathematical...posseses no [objective] reality."17
The philoaophea in general maintained that mathematical
science remained "idealistic" in that its laws applied only
under certain absolute conditions which need not actually
exist in nature.

It remained true ultimately, not to

physical reality, but only to its own primary definitions.
Naturalistic science, they argued, thus actually
represented a truer experimental ism by accounting
hypothetically for physical events in all their diversity
and variability.

Although Diderot early in his career

experienced a fascination for mathematical science, by 1748
he could claim that "if mathematical subjects were once
most familiar to me, to question me today about Newton
would be to speak to me about last year’s dream."**
By releasing physical reality from the mathematical
constraints of Newtonian physics, the naturalists
guaranteed a maximum degree of autonomy to their investiga
tion of phenomena and prepared the way for an entirely
independent and mature philosophy of nature.

Indeed from

the point of view of physical science, the convergence of a
hypothetico-deductive method with Enlightenment legal
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models had the great advantage of extending the field of
inquiry across a multitude of phenomena which had been
methodologically excluded from previous scientific models.
Descartes had consistently subordinated his physics to an
orthodox ontology.

Although he had supplied a concrete

instance of how a vast cosmogonic deduction might be
carried out in his tourbillon theory, he had hedged it
round with so many disclaimers in order to accomodate it to
Mosaic physics that it had lost its effectiveness as an
actual physical hypothesis.

Newton, constrained by his

inferential logic, had endeavored to fit his physical laws
into a teleological scheme which could account for their
operation in the world.

But he had left the key to his

clock-work universe in the hands of a Great Conserver who
had no logical status.
By contrast, the philoaophea built their scientific
models on the logically antecedent structures of natural
law.

This allowed them to portray the processes of nature

as inherent properties of matter which required no
ontological or teleological explanation.

They could there

fore view the Cartesian postulates of matter and motion as
ultimate principles of phyaical causation.

This in turn

encouraged them to construct cosmogonic theories which
encompassed the entire natural order from its most minute
organic effects to its most remote causal principles.
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By dismissing ontological causes and teleological
effects from their physical constructs, the philoaophea
released not only the materials but the mechanisms of
nature to scientific investigation.

They rendered the

cosmos an active and dynamic organism which developed
through the continuous processes of matter in motion,
thereby divesting it of the static qualities which had
characterized the Cartesian model, as well as the pass ivity
which had constrained the Newtonian.

Moreover, the

philoaophea, through an anological extension of the meta
phors of natural law, demonstrated that the natural order
would in fact continue to operate indefinitely in conform
ity with its present effects through the subsistence of its
physical causes.

They described nature as "a ceaselessly

active worker who knows how to utilize everything; who,
working on her own initiative with always the same
materials, far from exhausting them, renders them inex
haustible: time, space and matter are her means, the
universe her object, motion and life her ends."1*
From this naturalistic vision of dynamic matter in per
petual motion, grounded in the metaphors of natural law and
innatist logic, La Mettrie would deduce his vitalist biol
ogy.

Indeed La Mettrie's Homme machine described a logical

extension of Descartes' automatism.

A cross reading of the

basic assumptions of the Traits de l'homme and Le Monde
made it superfluous to consider the role of non-material
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factors in animal faculties and conduct.

Moreover, the

central tenet of Cartesian physics that all organic
phenomena derived uniformly from matter in motion supported
a belief in the continuity of all living forms.

Further

encouraged by pertinent discoveries in zoology -- Trembley’s discovery of the "polyp," Bonnet's disclosure of
parthenogenesis, Needham's discussions of spontaneous gen
eration -- La Mettrie moved beyond Descartes' automatism to
a theory which dissolved the traditional barriers between
animal, vegetable and human natures and established the
natural history of the soul as a phase in the natural his
tory of the body.

In a brilliant hypothesis, La Mettrie

introduced the powerful concept of organization as a
determining force in nature, describing a cosmos con
tinually and progressively organizing itself and expressing
this organization through organic as well as inorganic
functions.

The epistemological consequences of La Met-

trie’s theories reached out across all disciplines, focus
ing attention particularly on the mechanisms of learning
and the development of symbols.
Diderot, perhaps more than any other philosophe,
accepted the metaphors of natural law as constituent ele
ments in nature.

But in the light of scientific advance in

general and La Mettrie's vitalistic biology in particular,
he ceased to view natural law as an immutable rationalist
construct and began to view it rather as a dynamic concept
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grounded in organic unity.

In other words, he came,

through La Mettrie, to lay emphasis on the empirical basis
and pragmatic effects of natural law rather than on its
metaphysical content.

In his Elements de physiologie, he

presented a cosmos in a state of perpetual construction and
reconstruction consistent with the laws of moving matter.
But within this frame, Diderot ascribed an actual
developmental pattern to organic processes which added a
dimension of progress to the mechanisms of nature.
Ultimately Diderot's naturalistic science would have its
greatest and most lasting effect in the fields of ethics
and social theory, issuing in works like Condorcet's Pros
pectus. 1#
The work of the philosophes established French science
in a trajectory which would carry it from naturalism to
positivism in the next century.

Laplace’s celebrated

nebular hypothesis, Lagrange’s work on the conservation of
energy and Lamarck’s evolutionary chemistry are all exam
ples of the determining influence of Cartesian metaphors,
via naturalistic theory, on the development of French
science.

Laplace’s formulation of a purely material theory

of creation earned him renown as "the Newton of France" -not without some irony, since his theories systematically
refuted some of Newton’s central assumptions about the
nature of the solar system.

Beginning from his nebular

theory in his Exposition du syst&me du aonde (1796),
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Laplace deduced the essential stability of the universe,
showing that the disturbing irregularities which had led
Newton to fall back on teleological explanations were
actually periodic and contained within narrow limits.

His

reliance on metaphors of inherent lawfulness allowed
Laplace, in a now famous aphorism, to dismiss as irrelevant
"that hypothesis” of divine intervention with which Newton
had shored up his physics.11
Likewise Lagrange, in his MAchanique Analytique (1788)
made use of the concept of potential introduced into natu
ral acience by the philoaophea in order to complete New
ton's work on the conservation of kinetic energy.

By

introducing potential into Newton's essentially static cal
culations of force, Lagrange laid the groundwork for impor
tant advances in the fields of magnetics and elec
trostatics.

Most significantly in the present context,

Lamarck developed the philosophical bases of Buffon's natu
ral history into a full-blown chemical theory of evolution
which provided a materialistic explanation for the gener
ation and gradual development of all organic functions.11
Moreover, he offered his naturalistic theories in direct
opposition to the "new chemistry" being developed by
Lavoisier under Newtonian models.11
Thus, just as the Neo-Aristotelian biases of English
logic and methodology had helped to shape the models of
English science, so also did the Cartesian metaphors
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embedded in the French intellectual milieu have a determin
ing impact on its constructs.

In Bngland the operation of

Neo-Aristotelian metaphors encouraged the development of an
inferential logic and generated a physico-mathematical
science which drew on domestic legislative paradigms.

When

further circumscribed by Lockean epistemology this
scientific model issued in an empiricist, and ultimately, a
materialist philosophy.

In France, on the other hand, the

universal acceptance of Cartesianism by a conservative
regime encouraged the development of a deductive logic and
generated a mechanistic science which relied on an author
itarian ideal.

Further modified by Jacobin theories of

natural law, French scientific models developed in the
direction of naturalism, and ultimately, positivism.

Once

again the joint operation of legal and logical metaphors
conspired to generate a characteristic body of theory which
clearly reflected the intellectual tradition out of which
it grew.
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Chapter 5
RAMUS, LEIBNIZ AND WOLFF:
Logical Metaphors
in
German Scientific Models

In contrast to the respective receptions which it
received in England and France, in Germany Ramean logic
emerged as the controlling dialectical theory.

Interacting

with a native Rhenish humanism and a tradition of customary
law, Ramism there assumed its classic form as a master
guide to the organization and transmission of all knowl
edge.

Propelled by a thriving publishing industry and

institutionalized by systematic educational reform, Ramean
dialectic embedded itself in the uppermost reaches of the
German curriculum and established itself there as the metaph oric ground of all inquiry.
Ong speculates that the greater age of the French and
English universities prevented Ramism from producing any
comprehensive approach to the higher branches of knowledge.
But "the German universities," he points out, "were rela
tively new, their accumulation of tradition thinner, so
that the didactic drive indigenous to the whole university
movement, appears in Germany unmasked and bare.

...Else
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where the Ramist reorganization of the curriculum tends to
affect chiefly the rhetorico-dialectic dyad.

...In

Germany, however, its diagrammatic approach to knowledge
fires the imagination of polyhistors and of codifiers of
all the sciences, so that Ramist method moves into the
uppermost branches of the curriculum with a drive which
cannot be matched in any other country."*
O n g ’s Inventory bears this out.

Editions of Ramean

texts produced in Germany and Switzerland outnumber their
English counterparts by more than three to one and their
French counterparts by more than seven to one (259 in
Germany to 75 in England and 35 in France).

Even more sig

nificantly in the present context, the bulk of the Ramist
texts produced in Germany between his death in 1572 and the
end of the 17th Century were logics, not rhetorics.

While

by contrast in England the balance is clearly weighted in
the opposite direction, in Germany Ramean Dialectics out
number Ramean Rhetorics by more than two to one (149 to
65).

The picture appears roughly the same for Switzerland

(25 Logics and 17 Rhetorics) and the Alsacian regions,
which produced no Rhetorics at all, only Logics.

In fact

Ong's Inventory names 34 cities in Germany, Switzerland and
Alsace which saw the active production of Ramean texts, as
opposed to only five in France and four in Scotland and
England.
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Ramean theories entered Germany early.

Ramus himself

spent several years there as a royal commissioner to the
Rhineland and travelled extensively throughout Germany dur
ing his exile from Paris, lecturing frequently from Basle
to Heidelberg and as far east as Nuremberg.

Ramus found

the philosophic soil of Germany well-conditioned to support
his dialectic by earlier Rhenish manualists such as
Caesarius, Titelmans and Sturm, all of whom had carried on
the logical traditions of Agricola within the broader out
lines of Northern Humanism.

Anti-Aristotelian in spirit,

these German manualists emphasized what Ong calls the
"Agricolan development" in logic -- that is the centrality
of judgement and invention, rather than predication, to the
logical process.
Johann Sturm, Ramus’ mentor at the University of Paris,
played a particularly important role in preparing the way
for Ramus in Germany.

It was Sturm, in fact, who had first

brought Agricolan logic to Paris, where he taught from 1529
to 1536.

In 1538, Sturm returned to Germany to open a gym

nasium at Strasburg where he expounded a logic firmly
grounded in Agricolan principles.

Kelley calls Sturm "the

guiding spirit of [the Protestant] pedagogical enterprise"
and comments on the "spectacular growth" of his academy.1
The natural links between Agricolan method and Protestant
paedia insured that Sturm’s logic would thrive, not only in
Strasburg, but throughout the sphere of Protestant
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influence in southern Germany.

Moreover, the scholars

trained at his academy, particularly Hotman and Bucer,
played a central role in establishing Ramism at the heart
of the educational establishment in the theocratic South.*
This prior conditioning, Ramus’ acknowledged skill as a
rhetorician and teacher and his developing Protestant
affinities, all combined to insure that Ramean theories
would receive a sympathetic hearing in the Rhineland and
earn a place there as a viable alternative to the logic of
the Schools.

Moreover, Melancthon’s Loci communes had

prepared Rhenish audiences to accept Ramean dialectic as a
powerful tool for the conversion of Saints and the
indoctrination of the faithful.

A conspicuous martyrdom

underscored the natural ties between Ramism and militant
Protestantism, while the publisher Andr6 W6chel’s emigra
tion to Frankfurt am Main in 1572 provided German Ramists
with a powerful domestic organ for the dissemination of
their method.4

By prompting the flight of many other

influential Huguenot exiles to the cities of South Germany
in 1598, the Edict of Nantes further enhanced the Rhineland
as a natural seedbed for Ramist doctrines.
The theocratic atmosphere of the South German cities
proved particularly well-adapted to receive the message of
Ramism.

The convergence of a powerful dialectical method

with the needs and aims of the sacral communities along the
Rhine assured that Ramism would flourish there.

Sig-
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nificantly, not all German cities, nor even all German
Protestant cities, found Ramism appropriate to their needs.
Ong observes that Ramism "was most intense in the sectors
of Germany...[which] correspond roughly to the Rhineland
and its environs and weaker in the more Lutheran parts of
the country," pointing out that "theologically, Ramus stood
for a mild Zwinglianism."

"Most Lutherans," he claims,

"and many others who were in the heat of the religious fray
paid [Ramus] little heed and less respect."5

Perry Miller

agrees, stating that Frankfurt "seems to have been the con
tinental center [of Ramism]," and pointing out that,
although the Southern cities "were in general inclined to
Ramus,” Luthern cities maintained their allegiance to
Aristotelian doctrine.*
In the context of the present argument, some related
observations made by Stephen Ozment provide an interesting
aside.

In attempting to identify reasons for the distinc

tive development of Lutheranism as a coherent orthodoxy in
the Late Reformation, Ozment compares its decidedly
unsystematic structure with the highly systematic
ecclesiology which emerged in the free cities of the South.
He concludes that Lutheranism remained "intentionally
unsystematic" due to its politically dependent position
within the Principalities.

While this, of course, is true

(and incidentally serves to bolster the current argument),
Ozment only briefly touches on what this author sees as a
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much more telling issue.

"Unfortunately," he observes,

"scholars have so far evinced scant interest in how the
Lutheran version of Latin Christianity was conveyed to what
amounted to two generations of Lutheran pastors.
taught them?

...Who

How, in detail, were they taught? ...The very

methods the Lutheran theologians used may have had effects
upon their conclusions.”T
The foregoing discussion suggests that the lack of
systematic structure which Ozment describes derived, not
only from the different legal models which characterized
the Principalities and the urban South, but also from the
different logical models which underwrote their respective
educational systems.

The universities in the Lutheran

cities retained Aristotelian logical doctrines at the core
of their curriculum.

Indeed Lutheranism, with its

Augustianian view of the spirit, encouraged the use of
theological images which could accomodate the assertoric
predicates of Aristotelian logic.

Moreover, the legal

metaphors implicit in the herrschaft Recht which operated
within the Principalities reflected structures of rank and
estate which correlated directly to the categorical struc
tures of Scholastic logic.
All these tendencies militated against the adoption of
topical metaphors.

The mediated nature of premises

obtained through invention, as well as the leveling tenden
cies of the "commonplaces" made topical logic unacceptable
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to both the religious and political forces behind
Lutheranism.

Thus, the "cult of method", which found such

a congenial home in the theocratic communities of the
south, never penetrated the "priesthood of all believers"
in the Lutheran strongholds of central and northern
Germany.

Consequently, the compulsion to systematize

endemic to the topical tradition never drove Lutheran
ideologues as it did Zwingli and Bucer.

This difference in

the logical substructures of Lutheranism and the Reformed
Churches of the South undoubtedly contributed to the dis
tinctive evolution of their respective confessions.
Clearly the priority given by Ramus to the
communication of knowledge provided welcome support to the
bourgeoning evangelical movements based, for reasons of
spiritual and intellectual affinity, as well as political
necessity,

in the Southern cities.

Protestantism in gen

eral relied heavily on didactics and encouraged a view of
education as a tool for both social and spiritual control.
In the cities of South Germany, this didactic charge merged
with the characteristic urban notion of education as a pub
lic responsibility essential to the preservation of civic
ideals.

The strong pedagogical bias of Ramism could hand

ily support programs of public indoctrination designed to
shore up civic virtue as well as catechize the faithful.
Driven by the powerful notion of method, the Protestant
Academies which opened in the cities along the Rhine
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rapidly became effective arms of their respective
ecclesiatical and political establishments.
Chief among the educational centers which actively
propagated Ramean theories was the High Academy at Herborn,
located southwest of Marburg in the heart of Rhenish
Reformed Protestantism.

Here an influential group of

Phi 1ippo-Ramists -- so called for their attempts to recon
cile Ramist doctrines with the logic of Melancthon -systematically applied the methodological tenets of Ramism
to everything from theology to education to politics.
Bartholomew Keckermann, along with others such as Johannes
Piscator and Andreas Libavius, maintained Ramean method as
the natural means of pursuing knowledge and relied on the
familiar Ramist dichotomies to display the results of
inquiry.

The group as a whole continued to view knowledge

as "encyclopedic" -- hence their characteristic title of
the Herborn Encyclopedists -- and upheld the topical method
as the key to the circle.

These Philippo-Ramists, also

known as Mixts or Systematica, succeeded in maintaining
Ramean theories at the forefront of the German academy
throughout the 17th and 18th Centuries.®
Through their continuing emphasis on pedagogy and their
attention to the collective aspects of knowledge, the
Phillippo-Ramists provided the cities with powerful dialec
tical tools for the defense of their beseiged communal
values.

The structural elements implicit in Ramist doc
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trine not only satisfied the ideological needs of the
cities but supplied them with a set of logical metaphors
which vindicated their uncertain legal status within the
Empire.

Significantly, however, the Ramism which developed

in the urban enclaves along the Rhine never underwent the
major revisions which had reoriented English Ramism. In
England, substantial changes had been necessary to make
Ramean theories acceptable to a strong Aristotelian lobby
and a tradition of parliamentary law.

But in Germany,

interacting as it did with a native logical tradition
grounded in the Agricolan places and a legal tradition
grounded in the sites Recht, Ramism escaped drastic revi
sion and maintained its explicitly dialectical focus.

In

the urban South, Ramean metaphors could merge with the
broadly topical logics of Melancthon and Sturm to produce a
theory of inquiry which maintained the original contours of
Ramism.
Under the sponsorship of influential educators, and
propelled by its own internal penchant for didactics,
Ramism quickly became a part of the "sinews and bones" of
the Rhenish educational establishment.*

Carried throughout

Germany and most of Southeastern Europe by the systematic
educational reforms of Johann Comenius in the 17th Century,
Ramean method, reborn as pansophism, became a part of the
intellectual baggage of countless German scholars who, in
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turn, helped to shape the German intellectual milieu for
generations to come.
Comenius, a Moravian educator trained at Herborn by
Heinrich Alsted, clearly followed in the footsteps of
Johann Sturm.

Combining the teachings of Alsted and Sturm,

Comenius developed an expanded version of Ramean didactics
whose success relied, in his own words, "entirely upon a
suitable supply of encyclopedic textbooks" intended to
cover the whole range of the curriculum -course, according to Ramist principles.

methodized, of

Dovetailing hand

ily with the Protestant "cult of the Book" as well as with
the pedagogical bias of Ramism in general, Comenian educa
tional principles became deeply embedded in the German
educational system through a series of reforms of Grammar
schools and Gymnasia undertaken at the request of author
ities in Sweden, Prussia, Bohemia and Moravia.

Through

Comenius' efforts, preparatory schools throughout Germany
became so thoroughly immersed in overtly Ramean textbooks
and procedures that the further history of Ramism in
Germany has to be traced through its effects rather than
its substance.10
The Comenian reforms established Ramean dialectic as
the proper mode of inquiry throughout Germany.

It is

important, however, to define Ramean "dialectic" in its
proper context.

In the operation of Ramean method, the

term "dialectic" refers only obliquely to its normal mean
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ing of "reasoning by dialogue.”

Because of the subsumption

of the rhetorical places under logic as the places of
invention, any "dialogue" which took place in Ramean logic
took place as a process of discovery or invention.

One

"asked" a place if a concept in fact resided there and was
"answered" according to the content of the place.

This

constant interplay between the object of present experience
and its logical locus constituted the "dialogue" of method,
and supplied the cognitive bridge between the particular
and the general.

This process of purely logical dialogue,

which clearly implied the existence of a comprehensive
frame of reference against which to test all experience.
Hence the dialectic established by Comenius at the core
of the German curriculum operated under its own peculiar
rules, according to which the goal of inquiry lay in
understanding the unity of all knowledge, not merely in
amassing facts.

Science must seek the dialectical rela

tionships which exist between reality and thought, Comenius
argued, through a method "which can state all things of
this or any future age, hidden or revealed, in an order
inviolable and in fact never broken."

This pansophist

ideal clearly reached back to those metaphors which lay at
the heart of the topical tradition.

It looked to the "all

ruling force of order" not as a legislative principle (as
in English constructs), nor as a mechanical rule (as in
French models), but rather as an actual metaphysical force
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operating within nature.

"Order is the soul of things,"

Comenius declared, and dialectic the means of mastery.11
"Let us assume,” Comenius admonished the members of the
Royal Society, "that you have conquered the whole domain of
Nature.

If you rest content with that...your work will be

a Babylon turned upside down, building not towards heaven
but towards earth."

Science must go beyond facts, he

argued, and seek an understanding of that harmony which
"really holds together the fabric of this world of ours."11
Experiment alone could not hope to reveal the workings of
nature, since it explored only the particular.
enumeration suffice.

Nor could

Reductive analysis must be followed,

not only by synthesis, as for Descartes and Newton, but by
integration.

And only Ramean dialectic, which tied the

particular to the general in meaningful patterns congruent
to the natural structures of the mind, could provide the
tools with which to gain insight into the actual workings
of the world.1*
These dialectical metaphors imposed themselves
virtually unmediated on the German intellectual milieu and
had a determining impact on German scientific models.

In

fact, Newtonian theories never gained an official hearing
in Germany until 1747 when Frederick the Great brought
Maupertuis to Berlin. And it was not until 1775 that
Germany turned to any distinctly empirical modes of
thought. Moreover, as Klaus Fischer notes, "Locke’s first
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appearance in Germany... passed largely unnoticed" until as
late as 1754 and even then, "whatever his influence was in
England or France, it was negligible in Germany.

His

philosophic impact on [Germany] was always limited by
native traditions inimical to his thought.”14

The present

argument suggests that at least one of the "native tradi
tions" which militated against the acceptance of the Lock
ean/Newtonian complex was a strong logical tradition
grounded in the topics and systematized by Ramean method.
Likewise, Fischer observes that "French materialism, as
expounded by Holbach or LaMettrie, was regarded in Germany
with unmitigated horror," explaining this by the hollow
fact that "modern science replaced the qualitative medieval
ideology of science later in Germany than elsewhere.”

R.

S. Calinger agrees, pointing out that the Cartesians "had
little success" in Germany, limited primarily to the Prin
cipalities.13

Calinger’s geographic reference is important

in the present context.

But Calinger does not address the

issue in terms of logical models and, in fact, seems to
miss the continuity between Ramean and later German con
structs.

Similarly, Fischer singles out "a backward social

environment," "a deep urge of the German mind for order,"
and "a scholarly community which prized the spirit of
thoroughness” as reasons for the rejection of Newtonian
models.

But in fact, all these amorphous reasons can be

stated more concisely and explicitly as clear derivatives
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of the logical methodology of Ramus reenforced by the legal
metaphors of customary law.

Once again, the foregoing

suggests that the tardy intrusion of modern science in the
German intellectual milieu resulted, at least in part, from
the persistence of a topical tradition which rejected the
hypothetico-deductive methods of Descartes and the physicomathematical methods of Newton and depended rather on a
methodological paradigm grounded in the "places."
Indeed the survival of Ramean metaphors in the German
intellectual tradition had a determining impact on the
development of German scientific models.

Under the meth

odological postulates of its logic, German science could
pass beyond the empirical data which had embarrassed New
tonian models and could enrich the mechanical constructs of
Cartesianism with dynamic principles expressing the struc
tural and organic dimensions of nature.

Moreover, the

metaphors which controlled its logic invested German
science with a characteristic drive toward conceptual com
pleteness which both English and French science lacked.16
The convergence of this drive with the underlying metaphors
of customary law which survived in the educational centers
of the South tended to reenforce and validate scientific
models which sought to disclose the origins as well as the
operation of law.

Under the joint impact of the metaphors

implicit in Ramean method and the altea Recht, 17th Century
German science developed as a semantic rather than a
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syntactic discipline, committed to the exploration of human
experience in all its contextual richness and historical
depth.
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, chief architect of German
science in the "Age of Newton," drew on these metaphors to
develop a scientific model which perfectly demonstrates the
differences between the logical substructures of Newtonian,
Cartesian and German science.

Enlarging on his native

logical tradition, Leibniz propounded a theory of inquiry
which granted the formal possibilities of thought.

But he

abandoned traditional subject-predicate relationships in
favor of a system of logical order in which all issues of
correspondence dissolved into a principle of identity and
all categorical hierarchies yielded to harmony as an
organizing principle.
Leibniz’ ties to the Ramean tradition are clear.

An

ardent supporter of Comenian pansophism, Leibniz came under
the influence of the Herborn Encyclopedists early in his
career.

Loemker claims that his "reaction to the writings

of Alsted, Bisterfeld and Comenius, though never uncriti
cal, was early and enthusiastic.”

Leibniz’ own New Method

of Learning was clearly influenced by Comenius’ Analytic
Didactic and throughout his career Leibniz defended Com
enian doctrines.

Although he found Comenius deficient in

logic, Leibniz admired his pansophist approach to knowledge
and his structural views of nature.

An admiring student of

175

Alsted, Leibniz praised him, along with Keckermann, for
"joining method to things," adding that Alsted’s
Encyclopedia represented the summit (caput) of knowledge in
his time.

Leibniz in fact projected a revision of Alsted’s

Encyclopedia in which he proposed to incorporate new
scientific advances.

Loemker points out that although

Leibniz reacted against the excessive dichotomizing
indulged in by the Encyclopedists in general, he was "none
theless affected by their formal method of explicating and
analyzing problems through definitions, and inspired by
their pansophic labors and ideals."17
The most important influence from Herborn came to Leib
niz through the works of Johann Bisterfeld, whose Epitome
of the Art of Meditating inspired Leibniz’ own De Arte Combinatoria.

Loemker notes that Leibniz’ marginalia have

been preserved in his copy of Bisterfeld*s Epitome and pro
vide important clues in tracing the genealogy of some of
Leibniz' own central logical tenets.

Bisterfeld’s Epitome

presented a logic in which concepts replaced terms and
propositions as the fundamental units of knowledge.

Each

concept had a formal aspect which represented the thing
known under its primary attributes, and an objective aspect
which symbolized the object and assimilated it to the mind.
The relations between these aspects constituted the formal
structure of the act of knowing.

"Logic," Bisterfeld con

cluded, "is nothing but a mirror of [these] relations."
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(To which Leibniz responded marginally, "Nota bene").
Inquiry proceeded through a process which Bisterfeld called
immeation -- an "ineffable and inexplicable penetration of
thoughts by which one concept prepares, feeds and augments
another...[through] a certain intrinsic conformity or as it
were, configuration."
Clearly Bisterfeld drew heavily on the metaphors of the
topical tradition.

And Leibniz acknowledged his own debt

to that tradition through Bisterfeld in the Arte Combinatoria where he explicitly required that "everything be
derived from the metaphysical doctrine of the relations of
being to being.

...I believe that the most sound John Henry

Bisterfeld had seen this in his ...Epitome...all of which
is founded on the universal immeation."

Leibniz, in fact,

carried Bisterfeld’s logical immeation over into an entire
metaphysics in which the doctrines of proportion and rela
tion reappear as a universal harmony.

Loemker concludes

that "the notes on Bisterfeld thus show Leibniz giving gen
eral assent, but often pushing the clarification of his own
thought further..until, in the early Hanover years, refined
and clarified by mathematical learning, an appreciation of
the mechanical order of nature, and a clear theory of per
ception, they are reformed into his mature monadology."*•
Following Bisterfeld, Leibniz defined first terms as
dialectical concepts comprised of two interdependent prop
erties:

unity, or identity, and harmony, or congruence.
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The process of Inquiry aimed at unravelling the ontological
relationships which pertained between terms considered
under both these aspects.

It served to establish the

underlying patterns of congruence which supported self
identical units as they interacted to generate those
phenomena which men perceived as material reality.

For

Leibniz, in fact, the entire structure of the natural world
consisted solely in the relationships which pertained
between these terms.
Leibniz argued that to know something absolutely was
simply to know its sufficient reason for existing -- that
is to grasp the essential connections of all its implied
predicates (or, as Ramus might have put it, to perceive
simultaneously the entire content of its logical locus).
He stated the principle of sufficient reason as a law "by
which we believe that no fact can be true or real, no
statement trustworthy, unless there is a sufficient reason
why it should be so and not otherwise."19

This law per

sonified the contextual metaphors implicit in Ramean logic
and customary law. It gave concepts the power to retain in
existential fullness all the apparently contingent states
which could be predicated of them. Under its rule, the
truth of a concept became, in a sense, a function of its
origin.

By extension, any inquiry into causal principles

became an inquiry into history.
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By contrast, Newton and Descartes had both deliberately
finessed all explanations of origin due to what Leibniz
would have seen as the shortcomings of their logic.

Newton

accepted physical causation as a brute fact of nature
induced from the phenomena and referred final causation
back to the action of Qod.

Descartes made God himself the

logical ground of all causation and thereby avoided issues
of correspondence and origin.

But Leibniz insisted on a

metaphysical explanation of cause.

He insisted on bridging

that gap between physical and final causation which both
Newton and Descartes had been willing to leave unbridged.*0
Leibniz’ law of sufficient reason found logical
expression in the principle of identity which he developed
through an explicit critique of the validity of inference.
Passing beyond both the mathematically inferred truths of
Newton and the psychologically evident truths of Descartes,
Leibniz developed a definition of first premises in which
absolute certainty derived from an essential identity of
the concept with itself.

"First truths are those which

make a self-identical statement in themselves," he argued.
Leibniz objected to those who "use only incomplete and
abstract concepts which thought supports but which nature
does not know in their bare form."

"In identities," he

noted, "the connection and comprehension of the predicate
in the subject is in fact expressed; in all remaining
propositions, it is merely implicit."*•
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In this dramatic reduction of the order of existence to
the order of logic, Leibniz dismissed all inferential
knowledge as derivative and all hypothetical deductions as
irrelevant to the true nature of things.

Co-incidentally

he relegated all Newton's inferred laws to the status of
second-order propositions and subsumed all Descartes*
mechanical constructs under an overarching principle of
causation grounded in a notion of origin.
Leibniz' logic in fact moved in a direction contrary to
that of both Newton and Descartes.21

Newton and Descartes

had relied on abstractions -- whether inferred or intuited
-- in the construction of their laws.

But Leibniz' logic

moved from the purely conceptual to the absolutely con
crete, a drive typical of topical invention.

For Leibniz,

a complete concept consisted of the sum of its predicates.
The more completely specified a subject became, the more
real it became.

For Newton and Descartes, specificity had

implied contingency.

But for Leibniz, only completely

determined concepts could express a necessary truth.
Reaching back to the symbolist ideal which had inspired
Scotus, Leibniz claimed that "individuality includes
infinity."23

But this claim in turn reached out to the

metaphors controlling Ramean logic.

For Ramus, demonstra

tion had meant simply complete definition.

Leibniz'

portrayal of a self-identical concept as a subject which
virtually contained within itself all of its possible
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predicates merely presented an intellectualized version of
Ramus' description of a logical locus.

Of course, substan

tial differences pertain between Ramean and Leibnizian
logic, particularly in their levels of sophistication.

But

the metaphors which controlled their respective models
prove strikingly similar.
Leibniz drew on his principles of identity and suffi
cient reason to construct a science which replaced the
explanatory models of Newton and Descartes with one derived
from the Comenian ideal of the structural coherence of the
world.

Newtonian physics and Cartesian mechanics had each

made discrete material particles the ultimate ground of
their respective physical and mathematical laws.

These

discrete particles were irreducible by the standards of
inferential or deductive logic and could therefore function
as axioms for the construction of laws.

But Leibniz' prin

ciple of identity would not allow him to accept material
particles as the ultimate components of reality.

As a

logical subject, the concept of matter proved deficient
since it did not comprise within itself its primary
attributes of extension and motion.

Extension, in fact,

expressed a derivative notion of the second order logically
inferred from our perceptions of the operation of force in
nature.

Moreover, motion, as conceived by both Newton and

Descartes, contained no sufficient reason for its operation
in the world.
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Newton and Descartes had both been led by the metaphors
implicit in their logic to beg questions of ultimate causa
tion.

Newton had defined force as a prior concept which,

while inexplicable in itself, was responsible for those
motions which we perceived in nature.

While we could

explore the motions, we could never discover the force.
Descartes had likewise defined force as only apparent —

a

kind of optical illusion derived from the movement of
invisible particles.

His algebra allowed him to represent

motion, but only as an accidental quality derived
ultimately from his ontological vision of God.

Descartes'

static coordinate frame could thus accomodate principles of
reciprocal action, but not an actual principle of force.

A

clear example of the fate of Cartesian dynamics without a
mitigating principle of integral force appears in the works
of Spinoza.
By contrast Leibniz conceived of force as a logical
attribute integral to the notion of substance itself which
supplied the sufficient reason for motion.

His logical

method thus added a dynamic dimension to his analysis of
nature which both Newton and Descartes lacked.

By chal

lenging the fundamentality of the ideas of extension and
motion on the grounds of their logical complexity, Leibniz
could subordinate the concept of matter to a simpler, more
primitive notion of force.

This force, which obtruded

into the world as a vis viva, constituted the actual
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metaphysical source of all extension and all motion.1*
Derived logically through the principle of identity and
validated by the law of sufficient reason, this notion of
primitive force provided the metaphoric ground for an
entire cosmogony in which substance became energy and law
expressed potential.
Leibniz expounded the cosmological correlate of his
logical notion of force in the Monadology, which portrayed
the natural world as a vast assemblage of harmoniously
related, vitalistically conceived individuals interacting
in ways analogous to the laws of mathematical series.

But

Leibniz’ mathematical series differed in important ways
from Newtonian and Cartesian constructs.

Newton had

expressed his theory of fluxions, which was intrinsically
algebraic, in classic geometric terms, proceeding by
modelling a smoothly continuous curve out of a succession
of equal straight-line segments.

Thus Newton dealt with

the curve as he dealt with nature -- by breaking it down
into distinct particles which could then be brought under
the laws of geometry.**

Likewise Descartes, through his

differential coordinates, had supplied a matrix within
which he could represent all the possible variables along a
single pre-determined curve, thereby generating laws of
motion.

But Descartes’ mechanical laws always operated

with reference to his static coordinate frame.
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Leibniz, on the other hand, developed a mathematical
series which could express every point along an infinite
number of interrelated curves.

By supplying the general

equation of a curve in parametric form and varying the
appropriate coefficients, Leibniz could thus generate a
whole family of curves, each controlled by the "law of the
series."

This integral model supplied Leibniz with a sym

bolic language which could portray the actual living pro
gression of curves.

And the fundamental differences

between it and the more static geometric and algebraic
models of Newton and Descartes derived directly from the
logical substructures on which they each built.**
"Dynamics is to a great extent the foundation of my
system," Leibniz admitted, describing his monads as the
ultimate building blocks of a cosmos in which "all nature
is full of life."*7

The monads, in keeping with the prin

ciple of identity, expressed complete logical subjects
which contained all possible predicates.

Under the law of

sufficient reason, they were endowed with a primitive vis
viva that allowed them to develop according to an inner law
of change. These perpetually self-unfolding individuals
interacted dialectically under a related law of concomitant
variation to reflect a universal harmony deduced itself
from the law of sufficient reason.

In a scientific model

completely controlled by the metaphors of his logic, Leib
niz thus presented a view of nature which included dimen-
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sions of development impossible in the mathematical and
mechanical constructs of Newton and Descartes.
In Leibniz’ cosmos "every present is great with the
future."*•

Every tendential concept and every contingent

notion contributed to a larger truth.

Everything in

process served to complete a larger process.

In fact, the

whole system of nature rested on a gradual movement toward
the realization of an innate potential grounded in the vis
viva.

This model helped prepare the way for a mature

evolutionary science and raised theories of probability to
a new level of respectability.**

Indeed it supplied meta

phors for the construction of German scientific models
which would maintain their force well into the 19th
Century.
The principles of identity and sufficient reason became
permanent substructures of the German logical tradition
through the work of Christian Wolff, an academic whose
ubiquitous influence on German thought earned him the title
of "The Preceptor of Germany" among critics and champions
alike.10

Born in Moravia and educated at Jena and Leipzig,

Wolff came under the early influence of both Comenius and
Leibniz, whose logical doctrines he systematized (with
important modifications) and established as the foundation
of philosophical instruction in German universities in
direct contra-distinction to the logical doctrines of both
Locke and Descartes.

185

Wolff’s influence on the development of German thought
in the 18th Century is undisputed.

Although many scholars

disagree on the originality and sophistication of his work,
all agree on his controlling influence on the German
academic milieu for well over a century after his death.
Established at the core of the German educational system by
what Etienne Gilson refers to as "multifarious, immense and
determining manuals,"

Wolffian logic quickly became an

integral part of that Ramean/Comenian educational tradition
which Ong described as "the sinews and bones" of German
culture.

Wolff’s disciples "captured most university posi

tions in Germany," Klaus Fischer observes, citing a source
which claims that, in 1738, 231 of Germany’s top
intellectual figures acknowledged Wolff as their precep
tor.*1

Gilson marvels at Wolff’s "extraordinary

influence," while Howell quotes a French contemporary as
claiming that "Mr. Wolff is certainly the greatest
philosopher that there is in Europe...to be compared to
Descartes of France and to Newton of Great Britain."**
Perpetuated through the derivative logics of Martin Knutzen
(1747), G. F. Meier (1752) and

Alexander Baumgarten

(1761), Wolffian doctrines remained a determining factor in
the development of German philosophic and scientific models
well into the 19th Century.
It is also significant in the present context to note
that, unlike England and France, Germany did not feel the
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impact of revolutionary political ideologies until well
into the 19th Century.

In England, the political and reli

gious "revolutions" actually preceeded the systematic
development of its scientific models.

In France, revolu

tionary ideologies imposed themselves on scientific
theories already in the making but still sufficiently
receptive to accomodate the philosophes’ conceptions of
natural law.

In Germany however, where the Revolution did

not occur until 1848, scientific models had already assumed
their characteristic shape before the underlying metaphors
of the altea Recht were substantially disturbed.

This

allowed the logical and legal substructures of German
scientific thought to take a stronger hold on its models
and to maintain that influence over a longer period of
time.
Wolff’s logic, drawing on the metaphors of structure
and coherence explicit in his Comenian background, con
tinued to insist on identity and congruence as the logical
ground of a nexus rerum which underwrote the phenomenal
world and supplied the structural links which men perceived
as regularity in nature.

But, in a crucial shift in meta

phors, Wolff reversed Leibniz’ ontological priorities.
Leibniz had subordinated the principle of identity to the
law of sufficient reason, expressing it as the logical
adjunct of a metaphysical truth.

Wolff, by contrast,

established the principle of identity as the source of the
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law of sufficient reason -- a logical inversion made
manifest in his strong endorsement of syllogistic as the
primary mode of inquiry.
Leibniz' law of sufficient reason clearly contained alogical elements grounded in theology.

Wolff, on the other

hand, subordinated these elements to the process of syl
logistic, claiming that the link between subject and predi
cate derived from an ontological connection between essen
tial constituents rather than on a relationship of logical
entailment.

By insisting on the ontological nature of this

relationship -- that is by presupposing that subjects
objectively "contained" rather than subjectively "entailed"
their predicates -- Wolff could claim the syllogism as an
actual matrix for representing thought.

This clearly

reached back to Ramean metaphors in its preference for
logical structure over subjective order or purposive law.
Wolff claimed that the syllogism articulated the natural
logic of the mind itself.

It expressed an inherent ordina

tion within the human mind toward the attainment of knowl
edge.

In other words, far from being commentitia, syl-

logistics offered access to the very structures within
which all human thought proceeded.*1
By placing a logical law rather than a metaphysical
principle in control of his analytical model, Wolff effec
tively reduced concrete existence to a mere complement of
logical possibility.14

If existence functioned as the
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predicate of a logically identical subject and if all
predicates expressed dependent modes of being, then exist
ence itself must constitute a secondary attribute derived
from conceptual analysis.

Conversely, the existential

reality of any conceptual term must depend ultimately on
the extent of its logical development.

In the context of

German pansophism, this ontological stance allowed Wolff to
interpret logical metaphors as methodological correlates of
the structural coherence of the world.

Moreover, by sub

ordinating questions of actual existence to the analytical
structures of his logic, Wolff could provide a theoretical
justification for hypothetical reasoning grounded in Ramean
forms.
Wolff’s reformulated ontology generated a character
istic scientific model controlled by a metalogical notion
of contingency -- contingentia. mundi.

Since the principle

of identity took precedence over the law of sufficient
reason in Wolff’s logic, potential necessarily preceeded
existence in his science.

Since Wolff defined "being" in

terms of "possibility" -- quod possibile eat, ena eat -- he
consequently defined inquiry as an investigation of the
possible, not an analysis of the extant -- acientia poa
sibilium, quatenua eaae poaaunt.15

Under the postulates

of Wolff’s logic, inquiry into the natural world thus
became a hypothetical investigation into the compleaentum
possibi1itatia of any given phenomenon.1*

Hypotheses
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could function in inquiry as "substitute reasons” which
when tested brought the mind closer to the genuine suffi
cient reasons for the underlying structures of nature.
They could supply the data for an ars inveniendi which
investigated the natural world through a set of heuristic
techniques grounded in syllogistic, but capable by exten
sion of reaching outside the confines of strict deductivism
in the pursuit of new knowledge.17
It is important, however, not to confuse Wolff’s doc
trine of possibility with the traditional doctrine of
Aristotle which stipulated possibility as a complement of
existence.

Wolff, through his inversion of Leibniz’ ontol

ogy, clearly rejected the classical scheme of possibility
which defined actualization as a causal effect of
metaphysical tendencies.

By contrast, Wolff opted charac

teristically for a purely logical explanation.

"In Wolff’s

view," Van Peursen points out, "actual existence is the
outcome and part of possible existence, or, in Wolff’s
terminology, part of ’ens’, being, inclusive of all logical
possibilities."11

In an apparently inadvertent use of lan

guage, Van Peursen goes on to make a comment of particular
interest in the present context.

He describes Wolff's con

cept of being "as a kind of logical space" which contains
notions corresponding to possibilities.

He even points out

that Wolff himself used the term receptaculum to describe
general notions.

But Van Peursen never ties these images
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to the logic of the places.

In fact, he misapplies his own

image to the extent of claiming that Wolff’s logic "gives
profile to the line of Bacon [and] Descartes."

Clearly

Van Peursen has recognized the operation of topical meta
phors here without perceiving their provenance or
understanding their importance in underwriting the con
ceptual continuity of German thought.
In fact Wolff’s endorsement of hypothesis underwrote
crucial differences between his scientific model and those
of Newton and Descartes.**

Newtonians had

treated

hypotheses as second order propositions capable only of
testing impermeable facts.

Cartesians had

used them as

speculative explanations of mechanical events.

But Wolff,

like Ramus, employed hypotheses as actual working premises
in chains of composite reasoning designed to penetrate the
order and structure of nature.«•

The principle of

identity stipulated that any given phenomenon could
logically have come to exist in an infinite variety of
ways.

But logical possibility alone could not provide

sufficient reason for a concrete thing to exist.

Each

actual phenomenon in fact came about through a specific,
though not necessary, series of events.

The determination,

or cause, of any physical state therefore carried no logi
cal necessity, only a physical dependence on preceding
states.

In Wolffian terms, physical phenomena, as opposed
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to logical concepts, had their sufficient reasons outside
themselves.* 1
Wolff therefore insisted that the investigation of
physical phenomena must proceed through hypothetical
inquiries into the chain of concrete events which actually
led to the realization of one, rather than another, of the
complement of possibilities.

The scientific investigation

of a discrete fact must work to determine its "place"
within a series of empirically verifiable events.

This

could be achieved only through a sequence of inquiries each
of which built upon the outcome of the last.

In short,

Wolff’s logical metaphors rendered experiment the meth
odological correlate of hypothesis.
Indeed, Wolff’s entire scientific model rested on meta
phors of integration and mutual dependence which clearly
derived from the theories of men like Bisterfeld and Comenius as they worked to accomodate Ramean theories to the
logic of Melancthon.

By contrast, Newton and Descartes

tended to rely on the investigation of the proximate cause
of an event as revealed by specific experiments designed to
isolate phenomena from their contextual base.
appealed rather to contextual metaphors.

Wolff

He explained

cause as a process through which each experienced
phenomenon simply constituted the sufficient reason for the
next in an endless series of interrelated events.

Wolff’s

sequential explanation of cause clearly illustrates the
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direct operation of logical metaphors on his scientific
model.

Where reductive analysis and enumeration had gener

ated an atomic view of phenomena, the process of logical
integration generated a contextual, even an historical,
view.
The topical metaphors which controlled Wolff’s logic
become particularly significant when considered in com
parison to Bacon’s rejection of the "Idols" or Descartes’
"escape from perspective."

Consider, for example, Wolff’s

characteristic reformulation of Descartes' cogito:
"Whatever being is actually conscious of itself and of
other things outside itself, that being exists.

But we are

actually conscious of ourselves and of other things outside
ourselves.

Therefore we exist."4*

The crucial addition

of external reality to the determination of first premises
and the significant introduction of the first person plural
to the proposition clearly articulates the fundamental dif
ferences between the metaphors operative in Cartesian and
Wolffian logic.

Wolff’s entire analysis in fact proceeded

under the assumption that a community of consciousness
existed as the ground of inquiry and that the act of
predication itself expressed consensual knowledge.

More

over, the foregoing argument suggests that this predisposi
tion to subordinate the singular to the plural derived, not
only from Ramean logical metaphors, but also from the legal
metaphors which supported medieval functional theories of
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society and customary law in the urban enclaves of Southern
Germany.
The characteristic ability of Wolff’s logic to portray
any concept as a mediate term in an endless series -- an
ability which derived directly from his reliance on topical
metaphors —

gave his science the correlative ability to

view empirical facts as discrete stages within a coherent
sequence of related phenomena.
functioned as their cause.

Facts had histories which

Moreover, they had a future

controlled, but not dictated, by an actual principle of
development operative within the limits of the series.

But

Wolff’s principle of development invoked no divine plan, as
Leibniz’ had.

It merely expressed the sequential trans

formations which occurred within the logical structure of a
given event as it subsisted at various stages within the
series.**

This ontologically independent conception of

development, when applied to the natural world, produced a
powerful new notion of law grounded in the historical and
structural reality of phenomena themselves.

When combined

with Wolff’s methodological endorsement of hypothesis and
experiment, this morphotic principle of order generated a
distinctive set of metaphors which would dominate German
scientific theory for the next hundred years.
The metaphors of structural change implicit in Wolffian
doctrines emerged in German science as Naturphilosophie.
This cosmological model presented the natural world as an
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organic structure possessed of an inherent logic which
directed its phenomena and determined its effects.

In con

trast to English science, which concerned itself primarily
with physico-mathematical constructs, or French science,
which concerned itself with physico-mechanical functions,
18th Century German science evidenced a characteristic
preoccupation with morphological studies focused on the
origin and transformation of phenomena.

The Natur-

philosophen were committed to exploring nature in all its
logical complexity and historical depth.

They proposed a

systematic investigation of the correlations between struc
ture and function which underwrote the perceived regu
larities of things.

In short, they proposed a programmatic

application of Wolffian logical metaphors to the dis
ciplines of natural science.44
German morphologists sought an understanding of the
functions of nature through an understanding of its struc
tures.

Thus Jacob Fries developed a theory of organic

instinct grounded in the laws of crystalline structure
which he defended against Descartes' mechanical laws of
equilibrium.

Fries contended that the laws of crystal

lization in fact displayed the universal morphotic princi
ple behind organic growth.

By contrast, Descartes had

argued that organic forms derived from particles of matter
in motion achieving a state of equilibrium -- a theory
which clearly reflected his mechanical model.

But Fries’
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attempt to reduce organic to crystalline processes clearly
manifested the drive in Wolff's methodology to subordinate
existential events to logical structures.

Fries played a

central role in the founding of modern cytology as the
mentor of Matthias Schleiden, who extended the search for a
theory of free crystallization to a study of the pathology
and life history of cells.

His related attempts to explain

self-maintaining organic processes according to the circuit
laws of the voltaic cell made him influential in subsequent
studies of polarity, magnetism and galvanism.

Fries was a

Moravian educated according to Comenian principles by the
United Brethren at Herrenhut.

Moreover, he was a disciple

of the Moravian Karl Reinhold, an avowed Ramist.
Inspired by Fries, Karl Ernst von Baer applied the
principles of Naturphilosophie to anatomy in a study of
vertebrate morphogenesis which rested entirely on his
ability to envisage the organism as an historical entity.
Baer’s theories led to a unifying theory of embryology.
His discovery in 1826 of an egg in a mammalian ovary ended
a search begun in the 17th Century and pursued by such
lights as Gabriel Harvey.

In contrast to the theories of

the French naturalists, Baer developed an epigenetic theory
which stipulated that development occurred from the general
to the special -- a theory clearly grounded in the Wolffian
principle of identity.
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This characteristic theory of development allowed
German anatomists later in the Century to reject the
recapitulation doctrine central to Darwin’s theory of
evolution.

In a striking expression of a closed categori

cal model, Darwinians argued that "ontogeny recapitulates
phylogeny.”

As a result, they were unable to provide a

logical bridge from invertebrate to vertebrate species.

By

contrast, the German dialectical model allowed for a prin
ciple of development grounded in logical, not existential,
structure.

This left the structures of nature open to con

tingent effects which had no status in Newtonian or
Cartesian paradigms.

Baer’s epigenetic theories rendered

German evolutionary science more flexible and more open to
the fruits of experimental research.

Further developed by

Haeckel and Gegenbauer later in the Century, this struc
tural approach to evolution eventually issued in a theory
of ''caenogenesis" which could account for new evolutionary
acquisitions, effectively negating the recapitulation
theory.

In fact, as evolutionary theories matured

throughout the 19th and into the 20th Century, they tended
to follow the German rather than the Darwinian model.
Baer’s theories, in turn, led to studies in metabolism
which eventually replaced the mechanistically conceived
"combustion" theory of the Cartesians with a structural
model portraying the living organism as a dialectical unit
engaged in a constant exchange between its own constitutent
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parts.

Carl von Voit established an influential school of

metabolic studies at Munich.

His theories grew out of

Liebig’s "metamorphosis" theory of animal chemistry which
stated the laws of animal nutrition as transformational
principles.
clear.

Again, the evidence of Wolffian metaphors is

And again, it is interesting to note that Voit was

a Bavarian and educated at Gottingen, a center of Ramist
activity in the crucial period following Ramus’ death.
Another pioneer in morphological studies, Albrecht von Hal
ler, also taught and pursued research at Gottingen.

Haller

demonstrated, through experiments in capillary action, that
the laws of hydraulics could not, in fact, be applied to
the functions of living organisms as the Cartesians had
claimed they could.4*
Meanwhile, at Jena, Carl Gegenbauer developed Baer’s
morphogenetic theories into a new science of comparative
anatomy, arguing that reductive analysis was methodologi
cally incapable of exhibiting the underlying structural
relationships that pertained among organisms.

Indeed

Gegenbauer’s defense of comparison as a methodological tool
is particularly significant in the context of Wolffian and
Ramean logic.

Gegenbauer insisted on comparison as the

basis of all phylogenetic reconstruction.

Given the formal

and temporal priority of the cell, he argued, the only way
to establish the morphological relationships which existed
between organs, organ systems or entire organisms was
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simply to experimentally determine and then compare their
respective structures and development.

Structural analysis

within an historical context provided the foundation of
this scientific model, just as they had in Wolff's logical
model.*•
To meet the demands of these emerging disciplines,
which necessarily pursued their inquiries at the cellular
level, an entire science of microscopy developed at Bonne
under the direction of Max Schultze and Ernst Briicke.
Indeed the bare conception of microscopic analysis fits
more comfortably within a logical model determined by
Wolffian rather than by Newtonian or Cartesian metaphors.
Newton portrayed the ultimate components of his science as
abstract mathematical points hardly receptive to structural
analysis at any level.

Likewise, the material components

of Descartes represented impermeable atoms irreducible by
logic, much less by analytical instruments.

But Wolff con

ceived his elements as actual physical constructs whose
very existence implied a structure derived from the
specific determination of a spectrum of possibilities.
Such an ontology could easily accomodate the notion of
structural analysis carried on at a level which subtended
normal perception.
With microscopy supplying the analytical tools and com
parative research in zoology, botany and anatomy supplying
invaluable experimental data,

German science developed an
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independent discipline of experimental medicine character
ized by clinical observation, physical diagnostics and cel
lular pathology.

Pioneering in the use of experimental

laboratories and morphological techniques, both of which
drew on the metaphors central to Wolffian logic, German
medicine attained an ascendency in Europe that would not be
challenged until well into the 20th Century.

In the pre

sent context, it is significant that all these emerging
disciplines developed in Universities which fell within the
geographic sphere dominated by the altes Recht:

metabolic

studies at Munich; vertebrate morphology and comparative
anatomy at Jena; plant pathology at Leipzig and Halle; cel
lular pathology and experimental medicine at Wiirtzburg;
embryology at Konigsberg; microscopy at Bonne. The argu
ments developed above suggest that these geographic con
gruences are not accidental, but rather co-incidental with
the dominance of powerful legal and logical metaphors
deeply embedded in the intellectual traditions of South
Germany.
Likewise in the fields of psychology and epistemology
the principles and methods of Wolffian logic, grounded in
Ramean and Comenian metaphors, underwrote the development
of a theoretical model which issued eventually in the
establishment of experimental psychology as an independent
discipline.

German psychological theories developed out of

one of the primary assumptions of Wolffian logic -- that
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modal linkages, rather than occult forces or substantive
communication, underwrote the processes of perception.
This became, in psychological terms, the theory of psycho
physical parallelism.

English psychology, in keeping with

its inferential logic, attempted to explain perception
through "occult" forces directly analogous to those of New
tonian physics. Cartesian analysis generated a psychology
which exhausted the meaning of consciousness in its logical
function and explained perception through mechanical causes
directly analogous to those operative in the material
world.

By contrast German psychology, building on meta

phors of identity and congruence, developed a model in
which structural relationships conditioned the process of
perception.
Johann Friedrich Herbart developed a theory of percep
tion which, in an explicit use of Ramean images, described
consciousness as an "apperceptive mass” which functioned
through its ability to "glue" together simple concepts to
form complex ideas.

In a direct application of Comenian

ideals, Herbart also established the first experimental
program in pedagogy at Konigsberg where he tested his
purely Wolffian theory that education proceeded through
morphological changes within the individual.

Herbart drew

explicitly on spatial analogies and principles of structure
in developing his theories of relative intensities and
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sensory thresholds to explain the physical processes
involved in perception.
Furthermore, the images which lie at the base of Her
bert's theories prove to be curiously persistent throughout
the German psychological tradition.

German psychological

theories in fact encouraged the use of spatial analogies
and metaphors of local motion drawn directly from the
Ramean tradition.

Consider Gustav Fechner’s treatment of

psychology as an exact science of functional relations and
Ernst Weber’s reduction of those relations to an integrated
Bystem of arithmetical and geometrical series.

Consider

Hermann Lotze’s theory of perception as a system of local
signs governed by a network of structural relationships.
Consider Wilhelm Wundt’s arguments for the localization of
function based in a structural definition of consciousness
and Karl Ewald Hering’s development of an actual diagram
matic matrix for the spatial ordering of sensations.

Above

all, consider the structural metaphors and spatial analo
gies controlling the theories of Gestalt psychology which
described perception as a holistic grasp of generic struc
tural features.
Moreover the foregoing anaylsis suggests that the
Ramean images and analogies which lie at the base of the
German psycho-physical tradition were reenforced by those
legal metaphors characteristic of customary law.

This

premise becomes even more tantalizing in the light of a few

202

geographic facts.

Herbart pursued his researches at

Konigsberg, Jena and Gdttingen.

Weber and Fechner estab

lished their theories at Leipzig and Halle, where Lotze
studied before succeeding Herbart at Gottingen.

Wundt,

educated at Heidelberg and TObingen, spent his career at
Heidelberg, Leipzig and Zurich.

Hering, educated at Leip

zig under Wundt, carried on his research there and at
Vienna and Prague.

Brentano, educated at Wurzburg,

pursued his career there and at Vienna.

Just as with the

physiological disciplines, developed out of Wolff’s mor
phological metaphors, the psychological disciplines,
grounded in his principles of structure and identity, seem
to be centered in precisely that region controlled by Comenian ideals and the sites Recht.
Even in the traditionally analytical field of physics,
German science maintained a philosophical commitment to the
logical metaphors which shaped its theories.

Helmholz, who

declared himself in open reaction to the principles of
Naturphilosophie, drew nonetheless on the metaphors
implicit in its tradition.

His interest in force conver

sion, which resulted in the development of the laws of
thermo- and electrodynamics, derived principally from ear
lier researches in optics and acoustics -- researches
grounded in visual localization and a structural theory of
resonance.

Likewise his reduction of body movement to

chemical forces built on the metabolic theories of Voit and
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other morphologi8ts.

Indeed, Helmholz was character

istically dependent throughout his career on spatial analo
gies.

He viewed force and intensity as functions of posi

tion, rather than velocity, basing his entire argument on
the claim that, if all matter is in fact dispersed into its
ultimate components, the only way to conceive of motion is
to conceive of the change in relationships as spatial.
Again, it is interesting to note that Helmholz was educated
by leading morphologists and pursued his scientific career
at Konigsberg, Bonne and Heidelberg.
Thus it seems evident that the respective careers of
Aristotelean, Cartesian and Ramean logic did indeed have a
significant impact on emerging European scientific models.
The centrality of logic to the scholastic curriculum, still
in substantial control of all European universities in the
17th Century, ensured that the principles and methods of
the logic taught in the respective Schools would be a con
trolling factor in the construction of theoretical models.
Moreover the distinct political environments in which these
models arose also exerted a determining influence by sup
plying characteristic sets of legal metaphors to scientists
reaching out for new conceptions of physical law.

In

England, Neo-Aristotelian constructs interacted with
domestic legislative paradigms to produce an inferential
logic and an empiricist science.

In France, Cartesian

principles interacted with a native centralized absolutism

204

to produce a hypothetico-deductive logic and a mechanist
science.

In Germany, Ramean models interacted with a

native Rhenish humanism and an urban tradition grounded in
the altes Recht to produce a dialectical logic and an expe
rimental science.
Each of these logical and scientific models would in
turn have an impact on the American intellectual tradition,
unique by virtue of being an amalgam of all three.

The

following chapters will assess the relative impact which
these metaphors of physical law and logical order had on
American thought and examine the ways in which they
prepared it to cope in the 19th Century with a revolution
ary new scientific model which would, in turn, demand metaph ora adequate to its theory.
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Chapter 6
RAMUS IN THE NBW WORLD:
Logical Metaphors
in
A Colonial Environment

Investigations of the metaphors underlying the con
struction of physical law and logical order hold a special
relevance for discussions of American intellectual history.
Concepts of law and order took on a compelling urgency for
colonists clinging to the edge of a remote wilderness.

In

the New World the demand for prescriptive law and a viable
order expressed neither an abstract philosophical quest nor
an innate conceptual drive.

Here it expressed an exist

ential need which ranked second only to the more immediate
concern for food and shelter.

In a frontier environment

the menace of disorder threatened more than the conceptual
coherence of the colonial endeavor -- it threatened its
actual survival.

The early colonists desperately needed

the protections of law and the assurance of order to
succeed in establishing a foothold in the New World.
But the conditions of settlement themselves isolated
these fledgling communities from traditional models of law
and order which might have served to underwrite their
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polity.

Moreover, this isolation tooJt place at a crucial

juncture in the development of Western Thought -- at
precisely that point in time when European conceptions of
physical law and logical order underwent significant revi
sion.

Colonists in the New World thus found themselves

doubly isolated -- both from consoling contact with tradi
tional models and from that invigorating interplay between
competing logical systems which effectively restructured
thought throughout 17th Century Europe.1

This double

isolation forced the early colonists into a defensive pos
ture.

Far removed from familiar patterns of authority yet

faced with the necessity of maintaining order in a hostile
environment, they fell back on that logical model which
offered the greatest degree of control.

They then pro

ceeded to adapt that model to the organization of colonial
perceptions and the management of colonial experience.
It lies beyond the scope of this study to examine and
evaluate the myriad forces which helped to reshape the
European intellectual heritage in its American image.

That

task has been ably undertaken by an endless stream of
scholars intent on identifying tangible processes of cause
and effect in the construction of an American ideology.*
The present chapter will restrict itself rather to the more
basic task of uncovering and articulating the conceptions
of physical law and logical order developed by Colonial
Americans in their attempt to deal with wilderness experi
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ences.

According to the current argument, the delineation

of this logical substructure should provide valuable
insights into the formulation of legal and scientific
models peculiar to the American intellectual milieu.
The initial and most potent influence on the develop
ment of colonial thought came undeniably from English
sources.

But the radically different historical and social

contexts from which English conceptions of order derived
guaranteed that they would not impose themselves unmediated
on colonial life.

Moreover, it remains an essential fact

of the colonial search for order that this search went on
in the wider context of general political and intellectual
disorder at home.

The stresses placed on English legal

models by the Commonwealth, the Restoration and the
Glorious Revolution combined with the inadequacies revealed
in English logical models by the developing physical
sciences tended to lessen the impact which these would have
on developing colonial constructs.*
This proved particularly true of the forms of Puritan
polity which emerged in the northern colonies.4

Here the

crisis of legitimacy endemic to any transplanted community
became excruciating due to the peculiar circumstances of
establishment and growth.

The settlers of Massachusetts

Bay arrived in America armed with a holy mission to estab
lish a new Zion. Their faith underwrote that mission and
guaranteed its legitimacy.

"The Lord hath given us leave
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to drawe our owne Articles," Winthrop declared.*

But the

secular legal foundations of Puritan polity proved less
clear.

In fact the architects of the Citty held a clouded

title to that Promised Land upon which they built.
Although their patent derived ultimately from the Crown,
the Royal prerogative extended only as far as those
specific purposes set forth in the document of incorpora
tion.

De facto authority rested within the community

itself and emanated entirely from the agreement of its mem
bers.'

Moreover, by remaining in actual possession of the

instrument of power upon which their community was founded
-- that is, by bringing their Charter with them to the New
World -- the colonists of Massachusetts Bay cast a second
shadow over the legitimacy of Royal authority, subordinat
ing it not only to God but to the General Court.
The chartered company, while a useful instrument for
economic organization and control in England, proved a
hopelessly inadequate source of order under the vastly dif
ferent conditions of New World settlement.

Designed to

administer a limited commercial enterprise within an estab
lished political regime, the corporation functioned well
within the confines of European order.

But in colonial

America, the charters represented the only order.

Their

authority extended by default to the administration of all
civil relationships.

In actual operation, the everyday

administration of colonial affairs reverted to local
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authorities who, in turn, justified their power under the
tevms of the charter.

But the charters offered no logical

justification for the de facto order, only a hazy appeal to
the "rights of Englishmen" which, although supported and
defined by centuries of common law at home, proved tenuous
at best under wilderness conditions.7
Yet the confusion of the political and religious
errands upon which the settlers of Massachusetts Bay
embarked ensured that they would seek a logical justifi
cation for their polity.

If the Balvific experiment were

to succeed, it had to conform not only to the pragmatic
demands of the frontier, but to that model of Eternal Truth
revealed in the Scriptures and expounded through logic.
And the religious confession of the Fathers determined in
advance that the logic upon which they would draw to jus
tify their errand would be that of Peter Ramus.

Miller,

Morison, Ong and Howell have made it essentially super
fluous to argue for the congruences between Ramean logic
and the "New England Way."

Their works provide a clear

genealogy for New England Ramism, transmitted through the
curricula of colonial colleges and, subsequently, through a
system of public education administered by a profession
trained up in its principles. Logic, Morison tells us,
remained "the basic subject in the curriculum... and the
most esteemed writer on this subject was Peter Ramus."*
Perry Miller claims that the transmission of Ramean
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theories to New England is "clearly traceable," pointing
out that "almost all the principle works of Ramus appear in
the New England lists.”•
Moreover, Aristotelean paradigms lent support to
Popery, while Cartesian logic came too late to the New
World to contribute to the construction of its models.
Cartesian logic first entered Harvard in 1689, under the
administration of William Brattle.

But Brattle's

ostensibly Cartesian Compendium did not discard Ramean
principles.

It merely translated them into Cartesian

images, thereby giving them a new life and force. As late
as 1719, Miller points out, logic in New England "continued
to be closer to Ramus" and remained essentially unchanged.
Indeed the first serious threat to Ramean logic did not
appear until well into the 18th Century when the logic of
Locke, not Descartes, began to make inroads on the Colonial
consciousness.10

Throughout the formative Colonial period,

in fact, the logic of "that Great Scholar and Blessed
Martyr, Peter Ramus,"11 which subordinated all questions of
priority and legitimacy to the ordering role of the places,
provided logical justification for the emerging Puritan
order.
Indeed "the fundamental fact concerning the
intellectual life of New England," Miller contends, "is
that they ranged themselves definitely under the banner of
the Ramists."1*

In the New Canaan of Massachusetts Bay,
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Ramean logic found its spiritual home.

Here, in the

splendid isolation of a colonial frontier, its methodizing
techniques could extend themselves not only across a cur
riculum but across the entire spectrum of practical,
intellectual and spiritual life.

Moreover, the "baptismal

efficacy of the ocean-crossing" cleansed New Bngland Ramism
of the disproportionate rhetorical focus which had con
taminated its English counterpart and allowed the purely
logical components of Ramism to reach out in all their
naive simplicity across a physical and intellectual
environment which cried out for controlling principles of
order.13

Ramism, Miller claims, provided the colonial mind

with a framework which survived "without serious modifica
tion, for the remainder of the 117th] century and well into
the eighteenth."14

As a means of organizing and classify

ing all experience,

it became the very heart and soul of

the Puritan endeavor.
But the Ramism developed in the northern colonies dif
fered, predictably, from that expounded in Europe.

Under

the impact of the colonists’ millenial expectations, the
perfect rationality portrayed by the Ramean places in fact
became an objective means of salvation.

The colonists

required principles of order with which to organize and
control their community.

Yet those principles had to

operate within the context of their holy mission.

By tying

the logical mechanisms of Ramism to the struggle for exist
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ence aa well as the quest for spiritual truth, New England
divines found they could provide justification for both
their piety and their polity.

The exigencies of the fron

tier rendered the pursuit of objective order synonymous
with the pursuit of grace. This led the colonials, by
extension, to view disorder as a substantive evil brought
on by a lapse of method.13

Encouraged by the conditions of

settlement to thus reformulate their piety in the language
of their logic, Puritan theorists effectively integrated
the processes of redemption and rational endeavor.

And

this integration became the central paradox of intellectual
life in the New World.
Yet, although the colonists grounded their sacral com
munities in a minutely articulated intellectual system, the
faith which had launched their mission still demanded a
piety whose "emotional propulsion was fitted into the
articulated philosophy as a shaft to a spear-head."1*
Although conversion in its practical aspect might occur as
an enlightening of the mind, it remained in its theological
aspect a humbling of the heart.

Hence New England Ramism

always harbored the implicit hazard of fostering a
pietistic anti-intellectualism such as that raised up by
Anne Hutchinson in the Antinomian crisis of the 1630’s.

In

England, the force of tradition conspired with the vested
interest of the clergy to thwart enthusiasm in religion and
"levellers” in society.

But in the New World, the frontier
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conspired with uncertain political structures to lessen the
prestige of rationality and encourage the pursuit of truth
through direct revelation.

This incipient threat to an

already precarious order in turn forced colonial divines
into the perilous position of placing a special emphasis on
perfect rationality as the only path to righteousness.
"If every heated imagination is free to people the
world with the hypostasies of its own fancy," Paul Shorey
warns, "the result is chaos, not a teachable catechism."l1
But above all colonial leaders required a teachable
catechism with which to invoke order.

They had to bring

revelation under the aegis of reason in order to enlist it
in the service of a redeemed community.

Significantly,

Puritan doctrine maintained that God had bestowed revela
tion on man only after the Fall.

He had added it, so to

speak, to a completed creation as compensation for the loss
of Grace.

Revelation thus occurred as an afterthought,

Miller claims, "devised for the emergency, but serving
incidentally to substantiate and reenforce the pattern of
ideas upon which the natural universe had been con
structed. "1#

The fact that Puritan dogma portrayed

revealed truths as exemplars of creation allowed New
England theologians to justify their emphasis on
rationality as a means of salvation, thereby expanding the
sphere of natural knowledge to the very boundaries of their
faith.
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Ramean method supplied them with an ideal mechanism for
accomplishing this in its promotion of composite proposi
tions. Ramus had claimed composite statements as the
rational constructions which most clearly reflected the
natural configurations of the mind.

Going the "blessed

martyr” one better, New England Ramists substituted Bibli
cal authority for the "if” clauses in hypotheticals and
prelapsarian rationality for the "inner monitor" which
guaranteed disjunctives.

In a crucial move, they rendered

composite statements axiomatic and placed them in control
of discourse.
A typical Puritan construction of a hypothetical
proposition might run thus:
-If God has commanded that his children form
churches, then all Saints in covenant with God
must form churches.
-The Bible clearly states that God has so
commanded.
-Therefore all God’s children must form
churches.
A typical Puritan construction of a disjunctive proposition
might run thus:
-Either God created the world or He didn’t.
-Any fool possessed of method must come to the
conclusion that the rational order of nature
could only have orginated with God.
-Therefore, God created the world.
Under the rules of this logic neither the establishment of
the Visible Church, nor the justification of political
order, nor the creation of the world itself remained a sub
ject for revelation.

Natural reason could penetrate these
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and all other questions as well.

Indeed logical arguments

of this stripe could lend authority to just about any
statement, provided only that the Bible be sufficiently
searched for premises and the method accepted as apodictic.1•
This characteristic colonial reformulation of composite
reasoning generated a correlative soteriology which stipu
lated that spiritual regeneration occurred as an actual
event within the natural order.

Since God had specifically

structured human rationality for the apprehension of truth,
he could treat with man through regular psychological chan
nels.

Moreover, he could reveal hiB truth through the

objectively existent laws of method.

Method, as a trans

cription of the divine order, gave immediate and infallible
access to truth without recourse to supernatural means.
According to this "doctrine of means" the process of con
version originated in nature with stimulae received through
the senses.20

Through the logic of the places, man could

interpret these impressions in the light of divine truth
and so gain access to "natural revelation."

The reenforce

ment of composite statements by Holy Writ and innate
rationality conveniently guaranteed the absolute identity
of these logical "arguments" with objective truth.
The doctrine of means effectively linked the Puritans'
piety to a logical ground which justified their emerging
theocratic order. By embedding "the light of logic and
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dialectic" in the actual structures of the mind and confin
ing revelation therein, New England Ramiats declared
philosophic allegiance to a naive realism which effectively
delimited the role of personal vision and ensured a
preeminent place for natural reason in New England
thought.*1

Moreover, by assuring Puritan divines that

reason could not possibly encroach upon the truths of
faith, the doctrine of means left them free to pursue natu
ral knowledge wherever their innate rationality led them.
Ramean logic, with its trust in direct perception, its
immediate adjudication in disjunctives, and its fundamental
reliance on the existence of an objective order, allowed
the authors of the New England Way to dichotomize their
theology into the separate spheres of faith and reason** -and then to place almost total reliance on the latter.
Spiritual revelation could serve only to validate the order
and vindicate the method.
The comprehensive Ramist ars technologicae perfectly
expressed the order and method in which New England placed
its faith.

It stipulated that the natural universe

embodied the pattern of God’s intention toward the world.*1
Logic served simply to direct the reason toward those ends
enunciated by God in creation.

Technologia thus effec

tively tied the pursuit of knowledge to the identification
of purpose and wove "means” and "ends" into the very fabric
of logic.

Under the terms of the Ramist ara technologicae

223

all rational endeavor aimed at eupraxia, a Greek term mean
ing roughly "application" or "good conduct".*4

But in the

New England canon eupraxia acquired the additional connota
tion of that practical use to which any theoretical con
struct oust be put in order to justify its participation in
God’s wider purpose.

The combined operation of technologia

and eupraxia thus supported a significant shift away from a
conception of logic as contemplation or inquiry to a power
ful new conception of logic as a rule for action.
The conceptual link forged between "means” and "ends"
by the application of Ramean constructs to colonial experi
ence guaranteed that a deep-seated affinity would develop
between the colonists’ logic and their polity.

And in fact

the political implications of New England’s peculiar logic
did emerge in one of its most creative theoretical con
structs -- the federal covenant.

Miller describes the com

plex mechanisms of federal theology as "the capital
instance of the Puritans’ deliberate effort to combine
their piety with their intellectual concepts, to preserve
the irrational force of revelation and yet to harmonize it
with the propositions of reason and logic."**

Indeed

covenant theology was not unique to the New World.

The

concept of the covenant as an organizing principle had in
fact developed in the context of the Calvinism which
dominated English and South German civic models.

But

covenantal theory in Europe had always operated within an
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established political order.

It never had the opportunity

there that it enjoyed in the New World of contributing to
the actual construction of a regime.
In the covenantal theory peculiar to New England,
colonial divines invoked the controlling principles of
Ramean logic in a forthright pragmatic injunction which
made faith without performance a logical impossibility.
They tied the inward obligations of their faith to the out
ward obligations of their fellowship and made ethics a
corollary of election.

Manifested politically in the Mas

sachusetts Body of Liberties, the federal covenant effec
tively linked religious confession to social
responsibility.

It established the sacral community as a

political entity with a clearly delineated program for the
legitimation of communal values.2*

Further reenforced by

the Cambridge Platform, covenant theology provided the
institutional means for satisfying the conceptual demands
of New England's logic and the spiritual demands of its
faith.
In the federal covenant, New England magistrates found
a logic of social control which, while offering an effec
tive means of imposing external order, still expressed the
positive ideals of their errand.

By defining the justice

of God in the rational language of Ramism, colonial leaders
harnessed the master motive of salvation to the success of
their communal enterprise and rendered the establishment of
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political order a logical correlate of redemption.

Under

the terms of the covenant, and thanks to what Miller calls
the "awe of logic" which controlled Colonial thought, the
naive realism implicit in Ramism imposed itself virtually
unmediated on the development of Puritan polity.*7

The

covenant supplied an external standard for the foundation
of law in the apparent lawlessness of the frontier and gave
man a definite legal status within a rationally com
prehensible order.

Technologia guaranteed that man could

comprehend the standard.
achieve the order.

Eupraxia guaranteed that he could

Thus armed with the strength of their

faith and equipped with the tools of their logic, the chil
dren of the covenant set out to incorporate the metaphors
of both into a powerful new conception of community which
would have a determining impact on the construction of
American political models.
As the frontier settlements matured, however, the care
ful balance struck between reason and faith by Ramist
mechanisms became increasingly precarious.

External pres

sures from political events in England, increased migration
and economic growth, and the dispersion of the Saints to
outlying districts combined with the dialectical tensions
intrinsic to Ramism itself to set up a kind of "sympathetic
vibration" between sacred and secular interests which shook
the redeemed communities to their very foundations and
forced them to revise their errand.
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The adjustments attendant upon the abrogation of the
Charter and the Restoration exemplify those required across
the entire spectrum of political and intellectual life.
The establishment of the Dominion renewed the crisis of
legitimacy endemic to the colonies and forced a reevalua
tion of concepts of order and authority.**

Compelled to

support a policy of toleration and to replace their appeal
to chartered rights with an exclusive appeal to the "rights
of Englishmen," colonial theorists vainly tried to extend
familiar constructs to encompass new and unsettling social
realities.

But they were caught with their doctrine in

disarray by the Restoration, which restored them to
citizenship, not orthodoxy.

The enforced endorsement of

tolerance spelled the end of their organic community.

And

the restructuring of political authority under the new
regime reduced the Saints' unique status under the covenant
to one specifically circumscribed by a compact designed to
protect the Royal prerogative, not foster righteousness.
The reformulations precipitated by the social and
political unreBt in Stuart England paralleled and encour
aged a similar process in the religious and intellectual
sphere at home which permanently altered the disposition
and thrust of colonial values.**

As the "emotional propul

sion" of the wilderness errand dispersed itself among the
determined socio-economic forms of more established com
munities, the residual rationality which had driven the
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mechanisms of Ramism asserted itself full force on the
emerging order.

The Half-Way Covenant gave further impetus

to this process by enlarging the operational sphere of the
doctrine of preparation and refocusing Christian endeavor
on secular pursuits.**

Faced with the attendant erosion of

piety, New England divines fell back on rational method as
a corrective for flagging faith.

Significantly, however,

political events forced this crucial revision before the
introduction of Cartesian logic.

Moreover, the ensuing

process of adjustment had already achieved a certain
precarious equilibrium before the introduction of Lockean
constructs.

This in turn ensured that, in the New World,

Ramean models would underwrite the decisive transition from
a religious to a secular axiology.11
Faced with the need for ideological reconstruction,
Puritan leaders drew on the metaphors of technologia as a
means to shore up their polity and those of eupraxia as a
means to reinvigorate their faith.

But in so doing they

called down the full consequences of the rationality
implicit in their logic.

Indeed as the theological barrier

of the covenant gave way and the energizing faith of the
Fathers faded, the emphasis on human ability which had
underwritten the doctrine of means gained force, until nat
ural reason itself was deemed an adequate qualification for
citizenship in the Citty.

Forced to redefine their mission

in the light of existing social conditions, the colonials
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arrived ultimately at the conclusion that the New Zion lay
outside the boundaries of Eden altogether, in that region
controlled and defined exclusively by reason.
The decade of the 1720’s marked a crucial moment in the
joint processes of political and philosophical declension
in New England.

Within that decade the last of the true

Saints died, leaving their troubled flock to cope with a
series of social and intellectual crises which served only
to aggravate the latent tensions which lay at the heart of
their logic.11

The judgement of the smallpox and the

trauma of the witches forced the colonists to reevaluate
the relationships which pertained between rational con
structions and revealed truth.

Under the stipulations of

Ramist technologia, issues like "innoculation" or
"testimony" could not be isolated within in a purely
secular context.

Questions of contagion related neces

sarily to analogical questions of spiri' al affliction and
redemption.

Conversely the notions of confession and con

version central to the withcraft trials related by analogy
to secular principles of probity and truth.
Moreover, the concurrent controversies over currency
and the Land Bank spun out a whole new set of metaphors
which New England divines had to weave into the rational
fabric with which they clothed their evangelical message.
The introduction of mercantile metaphors opened a new logi
cal frame of reference against which to judge the utility
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of propositions.

Henceforth the "if" clauses in composite

statements could originate in the language of the market
place and disjunctives could appeal to purely practical
standards of utility.

The result, Miller claims, was "an

ethical quagmire to which ancient rules seemed every year
less and less applicable."**

And in one last decisive

shift in metaphors, John Wise translated the outright dis
play of anti-ministerial sentiment precipitated by declen
sion into the language of politics, thereby transforming
the theological issue of covenantal obligation into a
sociological conception of compacted rights.*4
All these eddying cross-currents of rapid social,
political and intellectual change tended to muddy the logi
cal waters of New England.

This in turn diminished the

ability of colonial leaders to formulate rational
responses.

Manifested rhetorically in the jeremiad, this

conceptual disorientation appeared as an attempt to sub
stitute an officially endorsed myth as a logical explana
tion for a complex of experience which no longer fit within
accepted forms.*5

But the anomolous reliance of this myth

on the direct perception implicit in composite reasoning,
which in the context of the covenant had fostered an
increased role for rationality, became something of an
embarrassment to spokesmen trying to justify their author
ity under the new regime.

Yet appeals to reason

unsupported by an anological order conceded far too much to
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competing secular interests, while an unmediated appeal to
intuitive perception always carried with it the incipient
threat of enthusiasm.
"Enthusiasm... and method...are normally polar oppo
sites," Ong notes.

"But they are reconciled, or at least

yoked to one another, in the Ramist cult of logic or
dialectic."**

The logical construct of the covenant had

held these two in a precarious balance.

But as the mil-

lenial dream faded and the organic polity fragmented under
the impact of social and political forces, this balance
degenerated into an uneasy tension.*7

The inability of

colonial leadership to provide convincing rationalizations
for the encroaching disorder encouraged a mounting sense of
crisis.

The faithful found themselves cast in a

psychological drama whose text was logical confusion.

This

drama climaxed in the compelling scenes of the Great
Awakening.
The Awakening embodied the inevitable confrontation
between the "emotional propulsion" of Puritanism and its
logical substructures.

The systematic application of

Ramean metaphors to the redemptive scheme of Calvinism had
elicited the unforeseen correlary that spiritual regenera
tion could take the form of rational conviction.

The

dominant theories of faculty psychology, imported intact
from 17th Century Oxford and Cambridge, had tended to reen
force this view.**

Moreover, Ramism and all its attendant
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theoretical constructs had relied entirely on their ability
to enforce a strict conformity between logical method and
the objective order.

Thus New England philosophy had

always run the risk of having its spiritual dimensions sub
sumed under the causal postulates of its logic.
Indeed throughout the 17th Century, the doctrine of
means had encouraged New England divines to accept
scientific advances at face value without examining them
for hidden threats to doctrine.

But as the full implica

tions of Newtonian physics began to assert themselves on
the colonial consciousness, the dangers inherent in mechan
ical constructs became ever more apparent and more acute.
For if in fact the objective order conformed to the demands
of Newton’8 model, the implications for orthodoxy under
Ramean dialectic proved devastating.

If the psychological

reflex invoked by the doctrine of means actually complied
with the mathematical laws of mechanical causation, the
notion of moral responsibility vanished in a puff of logi
cal smoke, leaving the covenanted community without a logi
cal ground on which to stand.
Seen in this context, the Awakening expressed a renewed
search for metaphors capable of expressing the changing
realities of colonial life.**

The perfect rationality of

Ramism could no longer support or express the actual expe
rience of the community.

To make matters worse, the all-

powerful Ramean method no longer seemed able to absorb the
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data of the physical sciences -- at least not without
endangering its doctrinal base.

Clearly the Citty needed a

new logical prophet, one who could restore the original
errand to conceptual conformity with present experience
without sacrificing its evangelical thrust to the
mechanisms of science.

Jonathan Edwards complied with a

unique philosophical program which integrated Newtonian and
Lockean metaphors into the logical substructures of Ramism.
Armed with a working knowledge of the new learning and a
passionate devotion to the old faith, Edwards forged an
analytical link between the two which would carry the
Saints forward to citizenship in a national Eden.
Edwards relieved the intolerable tensions endemic to
New England logic by formulating a psycho-logical identi ty
for the faithful.40

In reaction against the increasingly

irrelevant federal covenant, Edwards recentered the
spiritual life in the individual.

Locke’s empirical

psychology provided him with metaphors ideally suited to
the task.

By deemphasizing the importance of the external

covenant and tying the internal covenant to the processes
of association, Edwards found that he could revalidate the
spiritual, regenerative features of Puritan piety without
overtly disavowing the intellectual structures which sup
ported Puritan polity.
The Ramists themselves had prepared the way for Edwards
by systematically dissecting the psychology of conversion
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in order to clarify the fatal principle of preparation.
But, always fearful of enthusiasm, New England divines had
consistently emphasized the purely rational aspects of con
version.

Edwards, by contrast, employed the associative

principles of Locke to extend the operation of Grace beyond
the understanding to include the affections and the will.
He had learned from Locke that the reason, imagination and
will did not function as separate faculties as the Ramists
had assumed.

Rather they expressed functionally discrete

aspects of an integrated human personality.

Replacing the

metaphors of faculty psychology with Lockean images,
Edwards argued that the human mind in fact operated as a
single organic unit in cognition.

His orthodoxy naturally

led him to identify God as the ultimate source of human
thought and action.

But his Lockean orientation led him at

the same time to insist on a psychosomatic conception of
man.

Through "laws of...union which the Creator has fixed

between soul and body,” he claimed, man became a totally
integrated creature whose psychological make-up held him in
perfect harmony with the natural order.41
Edwards extended Locke’s epistemology across the econ
omy of salvation by subsuming the protean concept of expe
rience under the covenant of Grace.

Under Edwards’ analy

sis, the Lockean metaphors of experience expanded to
encompass all of m a n ’s physical and spiritual reality.
"Divine things” became a part of the data of the senses.
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Man could therefore "experience" Grace as a psychological
reorientation which permitted him to perceive more clearly
-- not understand more fully —
order -- of God.

the loveliness -- not the

Through a "spiritual sense," man gained a

taste of the "superlative excellency of divine things”
rather than a rational comprehension of their design.
Edwards defined the infusion of Grace as God's means of
determining the will to virtuous action, not as his means
of bringing reason into right relation with truth.

"In

religious matters," he warned, "the spring of [men’s]
actions are very much religious affections; he that has
doctrinal knowledge... without action, never is engaged in
the business of religion."

Hence in a crucial shift in

images, Edwards relocated the "spiritual sense" which
governed conversion in "the will and inclinations" of the
heart.4 *
Edwards thereby ensured that notions of moral
responsibility would survive despite the application of
mechanical models to the natural order.

Indeed Edwards,

from the vantage point of his Lockean psychology, could
recognize what the Ramists, as slaves to their method,
could not -- that the ultimate enemy to faith lurked in an
identification of God with the laws of motion.

Although

Edwards’ theology would allow him to accept Newtonian
physics as an accurate description of the natural order,
his psychology militated against accepting that order as a
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complete explanation of man's spiritual reality.

So, as

Paul Conkin explains, "while the Deists were using Locke to
justify a rational and unemotional religion and Newton to
justify a mechanistic and self-sufficient universe, Edwards
used Locke to explain the phenomenon of conversion and New
ton to prove the Glory of God."«*
Ironically, however, Edwards’ Lockean defense of the
will, intended as a psychological argument for orthodoxy,
coincidentally reenforced the Ramean doctrine of natural
ability.

The Ramists had argued that the natural structure

of the mind gave man a rational ability to pursue truth.
Edwards redefined that rational ability in psychological
terms, as a "moral agency" which gave man the ability to
pursue virtue.

Differentiating between "natural" and

"moral" ability, Edwards described the first as arising
from external factors and therefore irrelevant to issues of
conduct.

Moral ability, on the other hand, he portrayed

as intrinsic to the will and arising from "propensities"
which resolved, in the last analysis, into motives.

A

moral agent, he claimed, possessed "a moral faculty... and a
capacity... of being influenced in his actions by moral
inducements or motives.”

But, under the influence of

Locke, Edwards’ had grounded his defense of the will on
principles of association and this had led him, in turn, to
formulate virtue in psychological rather than theological
terms.

"If a man’s will is truly right and lovely,"
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Edwards argued, "he is morally good or excellent."44

And

this crucial shift in perspective effectively placed
spritual redemption on the same analytical plane as ethical
probi ty .
Indeed only Edwards' orthodoxy kept him from developing
his argument for a "spiritual sense” into a purely secular
theory of "moral sense" after the manner of Hutcheson.

For

although within the confines of orthodoxy Edwards’
reconstructed will reaffirmed the sovereignty of the God
who shaped and determined it, outside the boundaries of
faith the psychological argument for moral ability in fact
supplied a logical justification for human agency.

Thus,

although by establishing a role for "religious affections"
in the process of conversion, Edwards mitigated the
theological dangers implicit in Newtonian physics, he coin
cidentally supplied therein a logical mechanism for trans
ferring the evangelical thrust of the original errand onto
the emerging secular order.
Edwards’ reformulation of the will clearly offered a
psychological release to Saints torn between the emotional
demands of their faith and the rational demands of their
logic.

By joining the "emotional propulsion" of

Protestantism to the perfect rationality of Ramism through
the medium of Locke’s psychology, Edwards provided an out
let for the tensions which had precipitated the Awakening.
Eventually the religious affections which drove Edwards’
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will would supply the impetus for a characteristic American
theology which subordinated the forensic elements of
Puritanism to a new ideal of practical activity in the
Church.

Under Edwards' metaphors of moral agency, the nar

row sectarian vision of the Citty ultimately gave way to
the wider concept of "universal benevolence" which offered
a rational explanation of the relationship which pertained
between Newton's laws and the decalogue.4*
But in the context of the present study, Edwards'
revised logical metapors had a more far-reaching con
sequence.

For while he redefined the moral agent as an

individual motivated by objective truth, Edwards nonethe
less maintained the characteristic Ramean commitment to a
fully articulated and rationally ordered world.4*

Indeed

only his deep faith in the transcendent conceptual order
reflected in the ars technologicae saved him from the
philosophical fate which the Deists suffered as they
struggled to adapt Newtonian physics to a religious world
view.

Hence, while arguing for "religious affections" as

the engines of salvation, Edwards coincidentally argued for
the possibility of independent action within a rational
framework of order and authority.

At a crucial moment in

the development of a national consciousness, Edwards
offered a rationally defensible means by which freedom and
law could work together within an overarching logical
structure.
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In the context of colonial America, and particularly in
the atmosphere of disruption which engulfed New England at
the turn of the 18th Century, these principles of personal
freedom and positive law acquired a special urgency.
Colonial theorists, faced with a rapidly changing political
reality, had to maintain authoritative order at home
without subjecting themselves to it abroad.

They therefore

needed to define the freedom of the individual within a
lawful community while simultaneously articulating the
freedom of that community in relation to the Crown.

At the

hands of Whig theorists in London, Lockean constructs had
translated easily into theories of rights which fit into an
existing framework of common law.

But colonial theorists,

forced to wrest a viable order from a chaotic frontier,
could not rely on the slow, cumulative processes which sup
plied the principles of common law. The political con
structs derived under the impact of Lockean theories in the
colonies thus proved quite different from those devised by
English Whigs.

And the conceptual differences between the

two in fact relate directly to the logical substructures
upon which they rested.
Locke had based his political theories on an inferen
tial logic.
status.

But for Locke, inference had no ontological

It consisted simply of a cognitive process which

traced "the order and connection of ideas” and supplied
contingent premises for existential propositions.

Edwards,
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on the other hand, defined the connection between ideas as
logical, not psychological.

Although he abandonned

faculty psychology for Lockean constructs in his discussion
of the will, on methodological issues Edwards remained
firmly in the Ramist camp.

The order and connection of

ideas, he argued, expressed no purely cognitive process,
but rather a "full and fixed connection between the things
signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition."47
This "full and fixed connection" conveniently allowed
Edwards to deny the operation of efficient causes outside
the natural order, which in turn rescued the spiritual
process of regeneration from Newton’s mechnical models.
But although theologically motivated, Edwards’ argument for
a "full and fixed connection" between terms remained
explicitly logical.
According to Edwards, three types of propositions could
express a "full or fixed connection" -- the first "selfevident," the second "historical” and the third "com
posite."

A self-evident connection occurred when the

obverse of a proposition implied "a contradiction, or gross
absurdity."

An historical connection pertained when "the

existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now
become necessary."

And a composite connection merely

expressed "the connection of two or more [such] proposi
tions one with another."4*

These three principles of con

nection, Edwards claimed, controlled all logical method.
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Edwards' debt to his Ramean forebears is patent here.
His "self-evident” connections in fact express disjunctive
propositions placed under the jurisdiction of prelapsarian
rationality, while his "historical" connections collapse
easily into hypothetical statements grounded, typically, in
the data of experience referred back to Biblical authority.
Moreover, Edwards’ "composite" connections explicitly
recall their Ramean counterparts, which similarly merged
the disjunctive and the hypothetical into a hybrid argu
ment.

Indeed, all three of Edwards' "principles of connec

tion" relate back to composite forms, since, as he himself
stipulates, all composite reasoning "is either fully and
thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely neces
sary in its own nature [i.e., the self-evident], or with
something which had already received and made sure of its
existence [i.e., the historical]."«•

Hence, although

undeniably committed to the psychological aspects of the
new learning, Edwards remained committed in the construc
tion of his logical model to principles markedly similar to
those which had controlled the logic in which he was
schooled -- a logic explicitly grounded in Ramean meta
phors .
Edwards’ Ramean principles of connection provided the
vocabulary for his defense of moral agency, which rested on
the assumption that the rules of method themselves pre
cluded the possibility of natural causes producing moral
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effects.

Natural and moral causes, Edwards claimed,

operated within different orders -- that is, they resided
in different "places."

Therefore one could never

demonstrate a self-evident or historical connection between
a natural event and a moral consequence.

And since com

posite connections, the only other acceptable form of argu
ment, consisted simply of combinations of these two, a
"full and fixed" connection between a natural cause and a
moral effect became a logical impossibility.

Freedom in

the moral order could therefore subsist as an integral but
autonomous part of a strictly determined natural order.
Under the operation of Edwardsean logic, moral agency in
fact expressed a kind of independent "law of motion" which,
within the limits of human ability, contributed to the pat
tern of existence.
Edwards’ argument for moral agency portrayed freedom as
an antecedent law grounded in logic, not a derivative right
grounded in inference.

And herein lay the fundamental dif

ference between the respective political models developed
on either side of the Atlantic.

English Whigs had inferred

the concept of individual freedom from an established
political model and treated it as a derivative right within
that model.

But in the colonies, freedom had asserted

itself as an existential reality coincident with a compell
ing need to establish principles of order.

Since the cir

cumstances of colonial life demanded that concepts of order
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be cut from the whole cloth of colonial experience, and
since individual freedom constituted an important part of
that experience, colonial political models had to
incorporate concepts of freedom into their logical struc
ture -- not as a derivative effect, but as an integral
cause.

Edwards’ logic, building on Lockean psychology but

grounded in a Ramean ontology, supplied the means to
accomplish just that.
Although the drama of the Great Awakening had substan
tially played itself out by 1750, the theoretical con
structs developed under its impact remained to become
permanent features of American intellectual life.30

Oscar

Handlin points out that "few colonists, by 1750, had
actually read the works of Sir Isaac Newton or of John
Locke."*1
revival.

But most had been drawn into the ferment of the
This allowed Edwardsean models to be imposed

largely unmediated on a colonial consciousness amply
prepared to receive them by its Ramean heritage.

Indeed

Locke and Newton ultimately entered Colonial political and
scientific models clothed in a fabric woven from the meta
phors of Edwardsean orthodoxy and the images of Ramean
ontology.

Moreover, although Edwards died in 1758, his

influence persisted through the posthumous publication of
two of his major works as late as 1788.

Indeed, even into

the 19th Century, Edwards still reached out into American
intellectual life through an educational system staffed
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primarily by teachers thoroughly schooled in his principles
and itinerant preachers who fanned the flames of subsequent
revivals.**
By releasing the psychological tensions endemic to
Puritan logic, the Awakening freed colonial theorists to
make constructive use of the logical metaphors preserved in
Edwards’ model.

Thus, in a sense, it served to hypostatize

the structural elements of the New England Way.

For

although ostensibly the application of Lockean psychology
seemed to discredit Ramean logical constructs,

in fact

Edwards’ insistence on a "full and fixed" connection
between ideas insinuated them anonymously into the sub
structures of American thought.

Through Edwards’

reformulation of the will, the metaphors of the naive
realism which lay at the base of Ramean logic became a part
of "the huge, unrecorded hum of implication" which
sustained American intellectual life.5*

In the decades

which followed, the architects of the Revolution would con
struct legal models on the foundation which Edwards had
laid -- models which institutionalized the metaphors pecu
liar to his logic.
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CHAPTER NOTES

1. Miller points out how dependent the colonists were
on that model which they brought with them which became
"frozen in time" so to speak under frontier conditions.
The logical systems which "were disputed so furiously in
the universities of Europe" had little impact on the logic
which was "taught so serenely at Harvard and Yale"
(Mind,
141 ).
2. Gordon Wood argues for an ideological cause and
effect in The Creation of the American Republic (Chapel
Hill, 1969); T. H. Breen attributes local variations to
cultural backgrounds in Puritans and Adventurers (New York,
1980);
C. M. Andrews points out the importance of the
frontier in The Colonial Background of the American Revolu
tion (New Haven ,1931); Daniel Boorstin (The Americans: The
Colonial Experience (New York, 1958) and The Genius of
American Politics (Chicago, 1953)) and Lewis Perry
(Intellectual Life in America; A History (New York, 1984)
both cite environmental factors as formative while James
Henretta cites the persistence of a pre-commercial ethic
(Evolution of American Society: 1700-1815 (Lexington,
1973)). Others like Bailyn, Robbins and Miller trace
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realists. ...Thus the ancient battle over universals was
renewed.” The genius of Puritan logic, Miller argues, is
that it did "take hold of reality," giving a means of con
ferring order on chaotic frontier experiences (Mind. 146147) .
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26. Puritan life in New England was centered upon a
corporate and communal ideal, a fact made manifest in the
role which sermonizing played in political and ecclesiasti
cal life. See Miller, Mind. 297-299; Sacvan Bercovitch,
The Puritan Jeremiad (Madison, 1978); Daniel Boorstin, The
Lost World of Thomas Jefferson (Boston, 1948), 3-13. Ralph
Barton Perry points out that the members of the Puritan
community "were conceived as so linked together as to have
their spiritual fortunes in common." This "broad principle
of solidarity", he claims "is not grasped until it is
understood that [Puritan] piety is intrinsically social in
its nature or quality.
It is not merely that the piety of
the individual cannot be achieved, protected, and advanced,
but that it cannot be possessed and enjoyed in isolation"
(Puritanism and Democracy (New York, 1944), 327-334).
27. Miller, Mind, 425. Miller claims the covenant as
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Medieval Science Through Ramist Homiletic,” JHI 14
(1953) :248.
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the reault "a relentless psychic strain" (Origins. 23).
The rhetorical form of the jeremiad amplified this tension
and acted ultimately as a force for psychological and
social disruption.
Miller represents Cotton Mather as the
archtype of this tension, portraying Mather's curiously
unbalanced personality as a reflection of the dialectical
confusion which plagued his generation (Colony. 429).
Jef
frey Jeske likewise represents Mather as the expositor of
"a fundamental split in the Puritan mind." See "Cotton
Mather: Physico-Theologian," JHI 47 (1986 ):583-594.
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doctrine, since to them no other concept was available.
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40. For a general and accessible discussion of
Edward’s psychology and theology see Baritz, City. 47-90.
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251

(Colony. 410).
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theology of Dwight, Belamy and Hopkins, the concept of
benevolence issued in the social gospel of Nathaniel
Taylor, which stood on the characteristic composite state
ment that universal depravity is not consistent with the
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For discussions of benevolence as
a force for conservatism see W. David Lewis, "The Reformer
as Conservative: Protestant Counter Subversion" in Stanley
Cohen's Development of an American Culture (Englewood
Cliffs, 1970) and Leonard Labaree, Conservatism in Early
American Histroy (Ithaca, 1948), 60-89.
46. Conkin points out that Edwards "always searched
for the complete design" and displayed "an unending inter
est in the corporate whole" (Puritans. 46, 71).
47. Jonathan Edwards, Freedom of the Will ed. Paul
Ramsey (New Haven, 1957), 131.
48.
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153.

50. For a discussion of the permanent effects of the
Awakening on American culture see Richard Hofstadter,
America at 1750: A Social Portrait (New York, 1973); C. E.
Olmsted, History of Religion in the United States
(Englewood Cliffs, 1960); Alan Heimert, Religion and the
American Mind: From the Great Awakening to the Revolution
(Cambridge, 1966).
51.

Handlin, Americans. 127.

52. For discussions of the determining effect which
sectarian colleges had on the development of American
thought see Morison, Life. 27-112 passim; Labaree, Con
servatism . 91-118. See also Morison's treatments of Har
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53.
Lionel Trilling, The Liberal Imagination (New
York, 1976),
112.

Chapter 7
ORDER IN THE COURT:
The Logic of Law
in
America

The Awakening evoked the first expression of national
consciousness in colonial America.

Under its impact the

metaphors of conversion central to the original errand
became the cornerstone of a national identity in which the
perfection of the individual extended to a new social
ideal.

As itinerancy undermined insular local models and

forced the expansion of political perspectives, the
unrealistic sense of total community which had underwritten
Puritan polity eventually shaded into a more pragmatic
sense of actual community.1
By integrating the millenial axiology of the Saints
into the wider economy of secular values, the Awakening
provided the colonies with a comprehensive national ideal.
In the light of the revival experience, the redemptive
meaning of America became legible in the promise of the New
Jerusalem.

Edwards himself had developed this theme in

his Faithful Narrative of the Surprising Works of God,
where he described the movement of the Holy Spirit in the
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Great Awakening as a probable prelude to the conversion of
the world.

The establishment of the Visible Church in

America, he claimed, constituted the last act in the drama
of salvation.*

The debates surrounding the Half-Way

Covenant had anticipated this projection of Puritan ideals
onto secular models, but the Awakening legitimized the out
ward focus of religious energies and justified their appli
cation to the national myth.
By transferring the evangelical thrust of the errand
from the first to the second table of the decalogue,
Edwards had supplied a means for translating the logical
language of the covenant into an expression of social and
political purpose.

The development of revolutionary senti

ment throughout the 1760's thus amounted to a swelling
ritual of national affirmation.*

In a reciprocal process

of reenforcement, religious leaders incorporated the
rhetoric of politics into their salvation history, while
revolutionary ideologues usurped the images of a Holy War
to support their political platforms.

Whig sermons

replaced the jeremiad as a litany of hope and political
pulpits rang with the promise that independence would
initiate the chiliad.
At the base of American revolutionary rhetoric, there
fore, lay an ontology which perpetuated the metaphors of
Ramism in American political life.

Ramean forms in fact

supported an entire national mythology which emerged as
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justification for the political case against George III.4
Boorstin defines this national mythology as "a belief in
'giveneBB1t [which] seeped into the interstices of the
Puritan dogma and was gradually to dissolve... into a more
general faith in the magical definition of American pur
pose."

Americans enjoyed a characteristic belief, he

claims, "that values are in some way or other automatically
defined: given by certain facts of geography or history
peculiar to us, ...[or] that values are implicit in the
American experience."*

Paul Conkin likewise argues for a

characteristic "backdrop of theory" against which Americans
constructed their theoretical models.*

But neither Boor

stin nor Conkin ties their observations to the logical
vocabulary controlling the construction of those models.
The present argument, on the other hand, suggests that this
"backdrop of theory", this "belief in giveness," derived
directly from the metaphors implicit in Ramean constructs,
perpetuated, in modified form, by the logic of Jonathan
Edwards.
Thanks to the translation of millenial expectations
accomplished through Edwards' logic, America had in fact
been conceived in thought before it became a political
reality. The Awakening had produced a national mythology
long before the Revolution produced a nation.

And this

ideal informed all the theoretical constructs which flowed
from it.

18th Century Americans could thus represent their
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emerging institutions as models for the world.

They

were

"among the last children of an expanding West," Conkin
claims, "who could, out of innocence rather than racial or
cultural arrogance, still marshall cosmic support for their
fondest aspirations."7

Yet this "cosmic innocence" could

not have survived in the face of Lockean reductionism.

It

required the realist ontology of Ramism to support and jus
tify it.
As a consequence of their Ramean heritage, American
political theorists in fact explicitly demanded that their
models express a universal content.*

Derivative rights

inferred from human events could not provide a sufficient
logical ground for a nation "conceived in liberty."

In

Ramean terms, Lockean rights expressed "inartificial argu
ments" -- that is, predicates derived from a logically
inadequate process which had a merely notional base.

Lock

ean rights defined equity and a political psychology.

But

they expressed no logical truth.

The millenial mission of

America, however, required that political principles be
grounded in an antecedent order derived methodically from
"artificial" arguments which actually expressed the con
currence of rational forms with objective truth.

Locke,

working from an inferential logic, could view rights as
opportunities for individual activity.

But American

theorists needed to view rights as legal obligations to an
antecedent moral order.*

They required objective laws
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grounded in inherent structure -- laws which could provide
normative principles but still ensure that the society
developed under them would fulfill its larger purpose.
At the heart of Revolutionary rhetoric, Lester Cohen
observes, lay "an unstated epistemological assump
tion ...[ which ] entailed the articulation or, at the very
least, the presupposition of an immutable standard of value
against which the necessity and the propriety of the
Revolution could be measured."10

The present argument sug

gests that this "immutable standard" in fact expressed a
political extension of Ramist technologia, filtered through
Edwardsean logic.

The "unstated epistemological assump

tion", which Cohen mistakenly locates in colonial rhetoric,
in fact subsisted as the realist ground of colonial logic.
(Indeed, any good Ramist would accuse Cohen of having com
mitted the crime which Ramus himself found most dire -that of assigning a rhetorical function to a logical
"place"!)

Revolutionary spokesmen simply subsumed the

metaphors of Ramism, along with the rest of their
intellectual heritage, under their political models.

But

where New England divines had controlled their method
through the invocation of Holy Writ, political ideologues
controlled theirs through juridical evidence drawn from
Vattel, Pufendorf and Burlamaqui.

The result was a unique

amalgam of rationalism, moralism and piety derived from
classical sources, but developed through Ramean forms.
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The circumstances of the colonial environment conspired
with the millenial axiology of the Awakening to make New
England models dominant in Revolutionary thought.

A system

of public education established as early as 1641 and sup
ported consistently thereafter, more compact patterns of
settlement, and an urban mentality all encouraged the
articulation of a cogent body of New England "thought"
which could be effectively developed and transmitted
through a sectarian educational system.

By contrast,

larger agricultural holdings in the Tide-water colonies
encouraged settlement patterns which militated against pub
lic education.

There, education remained primarily a pri

vate affair enjoyed by a landed elite.

The promising young

minds of the Middle Colonies pursued advanced education on
the Continent -- or at Harvard or Yale.
The characteristic American formulation of sovereignty,
when compared with developing European constructs, clearly
illustrates the emerging nation’s reliance on the metaphors
of New England Ramism.

The millenial identity forged dur

ing the Awakening obviated all concern for original
sovereignty in American political models.

In a nation con

ceived as the New Jerusalem, original sovereignty resided
logically in the hands of an omnipotent God.

Yet the

American deference to an omnipotent God bore no resemblance
to the Cartesian submission to authoritarian forms.
Because of their absolutist frame, French theorists could
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simply transfer all sovereignty from God to the State.
American theorists, on the other hand, could not make the
state a political absolute since the antecedent order which
underwrote its power resided in a different "place."

Hence

the enormous quantity of American literature between 1790
and 1815 which denounced the French Revolution with, as
Miller points out, "proportionately almost nothing on its
behalf.">*
Likewise French moral theorists, working within an
intellectual heritage defined by Cartesian logic, could
trade moral bondage for intellectual freedom.

But this

trade-off clearly would not work for American ideologues,
working within the context of a realist logic and a
covenantal polity.

The logical substructures of colonial

thought made moral responsibility an essential ingredient
in the natural order -- an ingredient which precluded the
construction of provisional forms.**

For this reason the

mechanist constructions of militant French Deists never
really made serious inroads on American thought.

Although

works like Ethan Allen’s Reason the Only Oracle of Man
(1784) and Elihu Palmer’s Principles of Nature (1802)
attempted to articulate an American Deism, they had little
effect against the relative theological conservatism of men
like Adams, Madison and Jefferson.

The effects of French

rationalism on American moral theory ultimately emerged in
the characteristic constructs of Universalism and Unitarism
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rather than in a militant Deism.

But the debates between

men like Chauncy, Ware, Mayhew and Channing all took place
within the confines of a liberal Christian orthodoxy which
the French, because of their logical orientation, could
effectively ignore.1*
For similar reasons, American theories of sovereignty
differred markedly from those developed under the impact of
Lockean constructs.

Unlike English Whigs, who arrived at

an ideological impasse by equating sovereignty with the
empirical operations of positive law, American theorists
continued to conceive of sovereignty as a logical premise
which resided in God.

They refused to subordinate

sovereignty to the products of legislative inference.

From

a Ramean point of view, English political theorists simply
reasoned without major premises.14

But even as Newtonian

physics encouraged the reduction of their own First Premise
to an anological expression of a mechanical First Cause,
American ideologues, working in an intellectual tradition
controlled by Ramean metaphors, maintained the antecedent
logical status of sovereignty.

American political models

therefore described the empirical aspects of political
order as an expression of proximate rather than original
sovereignty.

And the Ramean metaphors which supported

those models ensured that the proximate sovereignty they
defined would reside, not in the individual, but in the
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covenanted conmunity as it stood in relation to objective
truth.
The Awakening had made the covenanted community a meta
phor of the American body politic.1*

Puritan covenant

theory did not, however, express merely an ecclesiastical
extension of Lockean contractual ism.

Lockean contracts,

like the premises of nominalist logic, operated through
willed agreements and verbal conventions which offered
equity and control under specific conditions.

By contrast

a covenant, as developed under Ramean logic, implied a
rational unanimity between consenting parties who
voluntarily took on a mutual obligation to strive toward a
logically antecedent purpose.

Moreover, a covenant presup

posed a "full and fixed connection" between the consenting
parties and the purpose they strove to achieve.1*

Thus a

social covenant

possessed an ontological dimension which a

social contract

did not.

In a covenant, positive law

became merely eupraxia, or the pragmatic means of securing
a rational end.

And popular sovereignty became, not a

legislative tool for determining derivative rights, but the
institutional means by which the transcendent community
could achieve its political ends.
John Adams supplied the classic formulation of the
American political covenant.17

Combining the predominant

concerns of the Enlightenment with the attitudes and
institutions of his Ramean heritage, Adams affirmed the
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antecedent sovereignty of law and then placed its adminis
tration firmly in the hands of consenting communities.
Positive law, he argued, must enunciate the laws of logic
and the laws of nature in order to command obedience from
those who stood in covenant under it.

"Laws," Adams

claimed, expressed "emanations of the Divine Mind” and
functioned as "silent magistrates" to administer eternal
truth.1*

A rational appreciation of the objective order

which underwrote positive law in fact represented the
ultimate political virtue to Adams, a virtue which streng
thened the commitment of the individual to the values of
the group.
In this respect the conservative drift of Adams’
political thought perfectly reflected the rational elements
of America’s Ramean past.1*

But as Edwards had clearly

demonstrated, Ramean forms always harbored an alternative
aspect which Adams, like a good conservative, chose largely
to ignore.

Accordingly, Adams political model acknowledged

no role for that "emotional propulsion" which Edwards had
articulated in his defense of moral agency.

It reserved no

objective status for individual freedom and "missed the
spiritual exaltation of an immanent deity, knowable in
every encounter with natural symbols."*0

Significantly,

the "enthusiasm" implicit in Ramean models -- that
spiritual autonomy against which Puritan divines had fought
so hard -- entered American political models not through
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the Brahmin Adams, but through the naturalist Jefferson,
whose moral theories created an active role for individual
freedom within the confines of antecedent communal values.
Jefferson, like Edwards, found spiritual truth ade
quately symbolized in the empirical facts of nature.
Indeed, for Jefferson, nature itself became the receptacle
and vehicle of all knowledge and value.
that "facts" alone could express reality.

Jefferson claimed
But Jeffersonian

"facts" did not reflect Cartesian "innate ideas” or Lockean
"sense impressions."

They expressed rather an objective

reality which could be grasped as "self-evident" by the
natural structures of the mind.

In short, they reflected

an Enlightenment variant of Ramean first premises, stated
in the context of a realist ontology.
Research by Wilbur S. Howell indicates that this
affinity between Jeffersonian and Ramean constructs is not
accidental or contrived, but indeed derived from Jeffer
son’s direct exposure to Ramean principles via the Elements
of Logick of William Duncan.

Howell describes the text --

found in Jefferson’s library -- as a derivative Ramean
treatise filtered through the Scottish Schools.

Moreover,

Howell points out, Jefferson’s tutor at William and Mary -who Jefferson himself claims "probably fixed the destinies
of my life" -- had himself been a student under Duncan at
Marischal College in Aberdeen.

Thus, Howell argues, "there

is every reason to suspect that, if Small fixed the
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destinies of Jefferson’s life, William Duncan helped to fix
the destinies of the Declaration of Independence."

Howell

even goes so far as to argue that the rhetorical construc
tion of Jefferson’s "self-evident" truths in fact drew
directly on arguments in Duncan’s treatise.*1
Howell'8 findings certainly tend to support the current
argument.

By placing the "Deist" and "philosophe" Jeffer

son under the direct influence of a Ramean logical model,
Howell suggests fascinating new dimensions in the develop
ment of American political forms.

But Jefferson’s "Ramism"

differed from that of Adams in significant ways.

Unlike

the Puritan Adams, the naturalist Jefferson defined the
individual as a functioning member of a biological species,
not as a rational member of a social group.

His political

science, although developed under Ramean principles, thus
dealt less with the logical consistency of institutions
than with the biological characteristics which underwrote
them.

In a sense, Jefferson collapsed Adams’ essentially

medieval theory of community into an Enlightenment for
mulation which viewed political forms as an empirical con
sequence rather than a rational cause of the social
order.**
Jefferson's naturalist metaphors rendered m a n ’s innate
capacity for communal life the mechanism whereby he con
trolled his environment and thereby achieved happiness.
Jefferson’8 concept of "community" thus no longer carried
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an imperative for political organization and control.
Communities fulfilled the empirical promise of nature, he
claimed, not the rational promise of God.

Their values

reflected objective structures inherent in the environment
which supported them, not external systems of political
administration.

Accordingly the social destinies of Jef

ferson’s communities became more than constituent elements
in the political destiny of a nation.

They in fact became

identified with the natural destiny of the species itself.
Jefferson's subsumption of the community under the
species, and his subsequent description of the species in
Ramean images, led ultimately to his characteristic sub
stitution of "happiness” for Lockean "property" as the
object of pursuit in the Declaration of Independence.**
Locke had grounded his right to property in a theory which
generalized a private prerogative into a social right
through inference.

But Jefferson, under the influence of

Ramean metaphors, grounded his rights in an antecendent
order.

Under the rules of his logic, "property," as a

source of individual fulfillment, simply did not contain
the logical attributes necessary for the construction of a
"right."

Happiness, on the other hand, could be taken to

signify the material prosperity and survival of the species
as a whole.

It could therefore support the formulation of

a right with ties to a wider purpose.

By substituting

"happiness" for "property" in the Declaration, Jefferson
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thus declared conceptual allegiance to a logical model
which could subordinate the individual to the health and
prosperity of the biological group without sacrificing his
personal worth.

Jefferson still celebrated property, but

in a manner vastly different from the legal-minded English
Whigs or the French physiocrats.

The right to property

survived in his agrarian model as a vehicle for advancing
the happiness of the species, not for gratifying individu
als .
Jefferson’s naturalistic morality, held in tension with
John Adams' characteristic rationality, perpetuated the
dialectical structures of American political life.

Jeffer

son placed more emphasis on the processes of moral behavior
than on the content of moral law.

Indeed his contention

that the relationship of every individual to the species by
birth provided the best proof of the original and natural
equality of all men precluded any concern with equality as
a moral absolute.

Like a good Ramean, Jefferson acknowl

edged the logical antecedence of moral laws.

But he inter

preted those laws as a framework of opportunity for the
development of the species, not as a framework of authority
for governing the community.
Thus although Jefferson’s biological definition of com
munity implied an informing ideal of the common good, his
naturalistic "means” of government left the moral "ends" of
his political philosophy vaguely implicit in nature.
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Indeed, while both Jefferson and Adams maintained the
priority of common purpose at the center of their political
models, they approached that purpose from two radically
different perspectives -- perspectives which in fact
reflect the dichotomous elements of their Ramean heritage.
In a sense, while Adams argued for the virtues of technologia, Jefferson argued for those of eupraxia.

Together

they constituted a complete Ramist!
The dialectical structures established at the base of
American political life by Adams and Jefferson emerged full
force in the "enlightened realism" of James Madison, who,
like the Constitution he fathered, worked to maintain a
dynamic balance between these conflicting ideological
impulses.1*

Madison drew heavily on the works of Scottish

Enlightenment thinkers in the construction of his political
model.

He received his grounding in Scottish thought under

John Witherspoon who "had recently come from Scotland where
he had been immersed in its intellectual and public life."
Witherspoon put "all the leading Scottish authors...on his
reading lists" where Madison found them in 1768 and
absorbed their realist orientation.1 *
Chief among Madison’s sources was Thomas Reid, who like
Jefferson’s tutor Small, studied under William Duncan at
Marischal College.

Reid’B Brief Account of Aristotle's

Logic (1773) contained numerous references to Ramus, call
ing him at one point a reformer "who had a force of genius
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sufficient to shake the Aristotelian fabric in many parts."
Reid argued for a Ramist aodel of cognition which operated
through "an instinctive prescience of the operations of
nature.”

Inquiry, he claimed, depended for its validity on

"a fixed and steady course of nature" which man could
anticipate through the natural structures of his mind.2*
While Reid’s logic hardly qualifies as an overtly Ramist
text, it nonetheless perpetuated some crucial Ramean ele
ments, primarily that naive confusion between induction and
hypothesis which Ong noted as the source of Ramean realism
and which the Puritans had adopted as the methodological
ground of their doctrine of means.

It seems reasonable to

assume that Madison absorbed at least a portion of Reid’s
Ramean bias.
In fact, Madison’s "enlightened realism" can be seen as
a political variant of a Ramean logical paradigm, trans
mitted to him primarily through Reid.

Madison constructed

a political model which viewed societal change as a devel
opmental process driven by a dialectical exchange between
man and his social environment.

Unlike Adams and Jeffer

son, Madison refused to celebrate America as the ideal
embodiment of either a natural or a political Eden.
Instead he built on the developmental concepts expounded by
the Scots in their "four stages theory" to construct a
political model which celebrated the potential of
America.27
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The "four stages" theory, developed by Smith, Ferguson
and Millar, described social change in rudimentary evolu
tionary terms.

Madison followed Ferguson in placing great

value on ongoing human relationships within a society.

He

could therefore, unlike Jefferson, appreciate the contribu
tions of succeeding generations to the process of societal
change.

Moreover, by adapting the discussions of Smith and

Millar on the origins of property to a broader political
perspective, Madison could further argue that laws in fact
reflected a social consensus evolved over time in response
to changing conditions.

This in turn led him to formulate

a cummulative legal model which, unlike English common law
theory, acknowledged society's ability to change and
advance within the context of transcendent political forms.
Furthermore, the dialectical exchange between man and
his environment which dominated Madison's political model
gave it the unique ability to accomodate factional inter
ests as legitimate features of political order -- something
which neither Adams’ rationalism nor Jeffersons' naturalism
could ever do.1*

But Madison modified the Scottish defense

of faction in significant ways.

In fact, he brought the

Scottish theories more explicitly under the operation of
Ramean metaphors by translating them into the character
istic language of covenantal theory.

By portraying

political factions as voluntary associations intersecting
across traditional forms of association, Madison in effect
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cast the legitimating mantel of the external covenant over
the field of private interests.
Indeed Madison's ideal of America as "the workshop of
liberty" clearly expressed a political version of Ramist
eupraxia.

It portrayed the nation as a logical nexus in

which practical means would work to realize transcendent
ends.

By tying the pursuit of goods and knowledge to the

fulfillment of the nation's wider purpose, Madison gave a
vital impetus to the developing commercial and economic
life of the new nation.

Coincidentally he perpetuated the

dialectical structures which lay at the base of American
thought.

Drawing on a native Ramean tradition reenforced

by the Scots, he set the new nation on a realist course
from which it would not substantially deviate for the next
hundred years.
The Constitution, for whose final form Madison was
chiefly responsible, defined the institutional means by
which the dialectical impulses of American political life
could be maintained in equilibrium.

In a sense, the Con

stitution did for American politics what Edwards had done
for the Awakening and Ramus had done for the Citty -- it
furnished a realist ground for the constructive interaction
of conflicting ideological drives without sacrificing the
energizing ideals behind them.

The Constitution explicitly

defined the moral ends of the national government
( technologia), while providing a pragmatic means for the
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implementation of political power ieupraxia).

As such it

offered a corrective for Jefferson’s unwillingness to give
rational form to his biological community, while supplying
Adams with a vehicle for bringing his rational community
under a viable political order.

Put simply, the Constitu

tion outlined a set of methodological postulates for con
trolling the political discourse of the nation.
In the present context, it is interesting to note that
the primary sources of American constitutionalism are in
fact German, not French or English.

Morton White points

out that in spite of a nominal homage paid to Locke, "the
framers of the Declaration and the Constitution never use
his reasoning in what is probably the most powerful piece
of political and moral writing that Locke ever
influenced."1*

Likewise Michael Durey claims that "Sidney

was mentioned only rarely, and then usually in a general
litany of heroic names," while John Werner points out that
Revolutionary leaders "execrated Hume’s work" and "had no
use for the man."10

Similarly, the patriots’ rejection of

French political models was both patent and outspoken.

In

fact, those political models on which American theorists
relied most heavily were Rhenish models developed under the
operation of a Ramean logical tradition.

In political

theorists like Althusius, Vattel, Pufendorf and Burlamaqui,
who Conkin claims were "all celebrated in America,"
American ideologues found models much more compatible with
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their own intellectual heritage than those of Locke or
Montesquieu.* 1
Indeed Althusius propounded theories of sovereignty and
consent which Conkin claims to be "almost indistinguishable
from those of the Puritan leaders in New England."
Likewise Vattel, a disciple of Christian Wolff who
developed theories which tied popular sovereignty to com
munal consent, exerted his strongest influence "not in
Europe, but in America,"

where he provided Adams with a

Ramean perspective on the ancient respect for tacit consent
grounded in custom and compact.12

Pufendorf supplied not

only John Adams, but John Wise before him, with a Ramean
justification for the objective grounding of moral law.
Miller claims, in fact, that whole paragraphs of Wise's
Vindication "turn out to be paraphrases of Samuel
Pufendorf's De jure Naturae et Gentium."**

And Burlamaqui,

who rewrote Hobbes in a Ramean context, exerted a strong
influence on Jefferson's formulation of moral science as a
derivative of antecedent forms.

The present argument sug

gests that all these Rhenish models found a philosophic
home in America due to a shared Ramean heritage.
The Constitution itself presented a Ramist argument.
It predicated no theoretical construct, formulated no amor
phous rights, propounded no abstract principles.

It simply

"invented" and "disposed" of logical "arguments" in a com
posite proposition. Its Preamble invented a major premise

272

whose arguments its subsequent Articles disposed into
appropriate loci.

In fact its entire structure can be

described as a huge composite statement in the "if-then"
mode.

If "we the people do ordain and establish a more

perfect union,” then the following conditions must apply.
Edwards would have called the "full and fixed connection"
which pertains an historical one.
Replacing Holy Writ with popular sovereignty as the
guarantor of truth, the Constitution simply declared an
antecedent disposition of objective political powers and
duties as the inviolable order within which the "perfect
Union" would hereafter function.

The Framers had no need

to define the theoretical form which their government would
take.

Under the operation of their logic, they needed only

to "invent" it -- that is, to lay open to view that logical
locus which contained its predicates and then dispose the
arguments found therein.

The subsequent Articles

accomplished this by locating the various powers and
prerogatives of government in their appropriate places.
Political powers in fact subsisted in the Constitu
tion’s Preamble and were methodically "vested" in particu
lar "places" by the ensuing Articles.

Article I located

the legislative powers while Article II disposed the execu
tive; Article III, in a crucial move, placed judgement -the second half of Ramean method -- in a separate judicial
"place;"

Article IV articulated the Ramean Law of Justice
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by guarding against overlapping jurisdictions; Article V
endorsed hypothesis by allowing for tentative interpreta
tions known as "amendments;" and Articles VI and VII sealed
the covenant.

Significantly, however, by placing the major

premise of the Constitution in its Preamble, the Framers
effectively precluded the possibility of its revision under
Article V.

The "union" thus ordained supplied the minimal

and universal conditions for human happiness and would
admit of no revision.**
The Ramean structure of the Constitution significantly
militated against the inclusion of "rights" among its Arti
cles.

Individual rights -- "the blessings of liberty" --

subsisted as part of the major premise expressed in the
Preamble.

They therefore underwrote the logical loci which

contained the powers of government but had no "place" in
the disposition of terms.

This was essentially the stand

taken by James Wilson in his Defense of the Constitution
(1787) and by Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist #84
(1788).

Wilson argued that a Constitution must operate on

the logical premise that it would ensure the welfare of the
whole people, not protect the rights of a few.

Hamilton

agreed, noting that, from this perspective, the Preamble
expressed "a better recognition of popular rights than
volumes of those aphorisms which make the principle figure
in...bills of right, and which would sound much better in a
treatise of ethics than in a constitution of government."
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In a sense, both Wilson and Hamilton argued that there
was "no place" for inferred rights in the Constitution.
Under Ramean logic, inferred rights such as those defended
in Lockean constructs remained irrelevant to logical law
and therefore had to reside outside the antecedent con
stitution of powers.

Addenda might be so constructed as to

remove specific governmental prerogatives from a given
locus, thereby ensuring individual freedom within a certain
sphere.

But "rights" per se could never function as an

justification for the disposition of powers.**

The isola

tion of rights outside the main body of the U. S. Constitu
tion has been claimed as its most distinctive feature,
clearly marking it off from its French and English counter
parts.

The foregoing argument suggests that this charac

teristic form derived directly from the Ramean metaphors
which supported American political ideology.
The logical exclusion of rights from the formal con
stitution of powers in America proved crucial to political
debates relating to sovereignty and suffrage in the 19th
Century.

The political pressures brought to bear by

increased immigration and rapid internal expansion early in
the Century rendered the careful balance achieved through
Madison's realist policies increasingly precarious.**

The

decades of the 1820's and 1830’s witnessed the disruption
of familiar patterns of settlement.

The influx of

immigrants from widely diverse cultural backgrounds, along
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with consequent demographic shifts from urban to rural dis
tricts, tended to increase factional pressures while
weakening the force of covenantal logic.

This in turn

clouded the political issues of sovereignty and suffrage.
The problem of suffrage proved particularly
intransigent to American ideologues.

The franchise had

never been addressed explicitly in the Constitution.

"We

the people," stated as an irreducible logical premise, had
never been scrutinized for its logical content.

Moreover,

as an argument "invented" in the Preamble, "We the people"
stood definitively outside those powers disposed in the
Articles, among them the power of amendment.

This logical

idiosyncracy militated against addressing the issue of suf
frage on a national level.

In fact the logical form of the

Constitution ensured that issues of suffrage would be
addressed at the state level until such time as the rights
of the states to legislate on such questions collapsed into
the wider issues of the Civil War.*7
Since, in effect, the franchise had no "place" in the
Constitution it could not be "relocated" among its Arti
cles.

Yet the social realities of a burgeoning nation

demanded that the government clarify its constitutive
premise and adjust its legislative formulas to accomodate
expanding perspectives.

The theoretical challenge lay in

finding a means to define the social substance of the Con
stitution’s major premise without impugning the integri ty
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of its logical argument.

The Jacksonian Democrats claimed

to have a political program which could accomplish the
first.

The question remained whether they could do so

without sacrificing the unique covenantal character of
American political life.
Jacksonian democracy can best be understood as an
exploration of the political issues raised by the logical
exclusion of the right of suffrage from the U. S. Constitu
tion.

The populist program sought simply to clarify the

logical ground of American political power by defining that
anomolous community which had occupied the conceptual cen
ter of Adams’ and Jefferson's political thought.

To

accomplish this, the Democrats merely carried the political
implications of Jeffersonian naturalism out to their logi
cal conclusion.

They conceived of the political community

as an aggregate of private interests underwritten by cohe
sion rather than by a vague rational or biological unity.*®
In a sense, they atomized the rational and biological com
munities of Adams and Jefferson and reassembled them, fol
lowing Madison, under concrete principles of association
rather than abstract principles of obligation.

Under

populist theory, "We the people" became a community of dis
crete individuals driven by private interests to maintain
social order through the imposition of political forms.
Had this definition of community expressed the entire
content of the Democrats' political program, however, they
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would rapidly have found themselves in possession of a
failed ideology.

Clearly such a Hobbesean view, while

appropriate to Whig theories developed under an inferential
logic, could not survive in a political atmosphere fed by
the philosophic currents of Ramism. But the Jacksonian’s
concept of the individual in fact rested on a logical foun
dation not unlike that which had supported Adams’ and Jef
ferson’s own concepts of community.

Indeed the voluntary

principle which animated populist thought expressed a firm
belief in a pervasive and fundamental order which, left to
its own devices, would manifest itself through society.
This belief in an antecedent order allowed the Demo
crats to formulate their platform in terms amenable to the
nation’s political past.

Moreover, this faith in what John

Ward calls a "cosmic constitutionalism" led the populists
by implication to the two logical axioms which controlled
their political program: first, that the natural order of
society subsisted apart from its institutions; and second,
that political intervention in fact contaminated rather
than preserved the natural order.**

These two axioms com

bined to generate a characteristic negative theory of
government which in turn provided the Democrats with the
logical mechanism they needed to address the issue of suf
frage at the Constitutional level.
Under the populists’ negative theory, "the blessings of
liberty" invented in the Constitution's Preamble signified
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merely a lack of intervention in the interactions of indi
viduals whose fundamental equality before the law derived
from an irreducible logical premise.

Under this curious

inversion of a political covenant, the right of suffrage
could be treated as a political privilege acquired through
the negation of political powers.40

Accordingly, argu

ments for suffrage could take the form of propositions
which removed specific prerogatives from logical loci and,
by negation, relocated them as rights outside the con
stituted powers of government.

The realist ontology which

lay at the base of the Democrats’ political theory allowed
them to justify logical negation as a means of preserving
the antecedent natural order of society.

Thus they could

forge a viable analytical link between political powers and
individual rights while remaining within the methodological
structures of the Constitution.
While ultimately Jackson’s own devotion to his party's
ideology proved suspect in the light of his aggressive use
of executive power, the logical formulation of that ideol
ogy remains significant in the present context.

For the

Jacksonians articulated their negative theory of government
in the key words "natural" and "artificial" -- terms which
had likewise underwritten the theoretical constructs of New
England Ramists, as well as those of Edwards, Adams and
Jefferson.

In a characteristic statement one Jacksonian

spokesman claimed that the "natural" charter of privilege
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which existed among individuals could be threatened only by
the institution of "artificial" advantages through legisla
tive charters.

"Once man was freed from the 'artificial

institutions’ of society, he would 'walk abroad through the
free creation’.”*1

Thus, in a curious rhetorical con

currence, the Jacksonians in fact propounded a political
argument almost identical to the logical argument which
Ramus had brought against the Aristotelians -- an argument
which rested on the commentitious nature of the artificial
restraints which men imposed on the natural structures of
the mind.
The increasing complexity of American life in the mid19th Century, however, quickly debased the Populists'
political ideal.

Rapid expansion of the industrial and

commercial life of the nation drastically reduced the
sphere reserved for independent action.

Moreover, the

practical exigencies of conserving order on a continental
scale encouraged an implementation of government controls
which belied the Democrats avowed intentions.

Yet although

the Jacksonians’ platform became less and less relevant to
the political realities of the nation, the die was cast.
The formidable forces of populism, previously contained
within the limits of strict constructionism, gained
legitimacy under the banner of the Democrats’ logical nega
tions and threatened to unbalance the delicate dialectical
mechanisms of the Constitution.

Henceforth they would
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remain a permanent feature of American political life.

In

reaction, those alarmed over the political consequences
searched their intellectual heritage for a means to
neutralize the impact.

They found an appropriate defense

in an interpretation of law drawn directly from the Ramist
structure of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution’s Preamble had expressed the major
premise of a political proposition.

Articles I and II had

disposed the arguments of that proposition across various
political loci.

Article III, on the other hand, differed

radically from the first two.

Rather than disposing of

political powers, it created an independent logical "place"
in which it "vested" the crucial mechanism of judgement.42
By placing the controlling process of judgement in an inde
pendent logical locus, Article III in fact created a judi
cial "place" wherein resided those dialectical tools neces
sary for maintaining methodological control over the
centripetal forces of popular democracy.

Under the rules

of Ramean logic, which identified the operation of law with
the application of method,

Article III in effect entrusted

the antecedent logical structure of the nation to the
Courts.
Ramus had placed judgement in control of the second and
probative half of method.

In the present context it is

interesting to note that one of the major differences which
pertained between Baconian and Ramean logic lay in Bacon’s
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extension of judgement across the entire field of dis
course.

Where Ramus had restricted the application of

method to the disposition of terms,

Bacon invoked it as a

controlling principle in predication as well.

Baconian

logic would thus have represented the logical premise of
the Constitution as susceptible of revision, as was the
case under English Parliamentary forms.

Ramean logic, on

the other hand, rendered this impossible.

Although the

process of judgement -- i.e. the operation of the courts -could adjust and reinterpret the disposition of political
terms, the logical structure of the Constitution itself
militated against intervention in its major premise.
Therefore, although specific laws could be declared
"unconstitutional," the Constitution itself could not be
declared invalid.

This fundamental legal issue, clearly

grounded in a Ramean ontology, provided justification for
Northern conservatives during the Civil War.

The Union,

Lincoln claimed, could not logically be dissolved.

It had

been invented as an irreducible logical premise grounded in
objective truth and was therefore inviolable.
Article III in fact appointed the judiciary branch
guardian of the national covenant.

It created a special

category of law which cast the Supreme Court in the role of
that "inner monitor" on which New England Ramists had
relied to adjudicate their disjunctive statements.

Judi

cial review in effect furnished a mechanism for submitting
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particular manifestations of the popular will to the test
of logic.

The process of judgement -- i. e. the applica

tion of method -- allowed the Court to monitor the practi
cal means by which factional interests achieved their
political ends.

Moreover, by making the judiciary an inde

pendent arbiter over the disposition of the Constitution’s
logical terms, Article III ensured that any subsequent
relocation of those terms through amendment would not
encroach on the minimal and universal conditions for
political happiness set forth in the Preamble.43

Thus by

authorizing the application of method to the composite form
of the Constitution, Article III guaranteed the stability
of a political model increasingly plagued by internal and
external forces for change.44
The Supreme Court embodied a unique dialectical tool
for controlling the political discourse of the nation.

It

allowed American legal theorists to adjust a transcendent
national ideology to the present needs of a social environ
ment where change exerted too obvious a force for revision
to be ignored by any viable political construct.

Early in

the life of the new nation legal philosophers like Madison
and Wilson had recognized the necessity of incorporating
processive theories drawn from Scottish sources like Smith
and Millar into the fabric of American judicial thought.45
Following the logic of their argument, and responding to
increasing pressures from disruptive debates over
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sovereignty and suffrage, Justices like James Kent and
Joseph Story moved gradually toward a reevaluation of Jef
ferson’s wholesale rejection of common law, seeing in its
cumulative processes a means for incorporating the changing
realities of American life into a characteristic body of
American law.46

Since the structure of the Constitution

precluded the possibility of common law principles usurping
the logical antecedence of the national covenant, American
jurists could safely adapt the common law’s reliance on
historical precedent to American needs, thereby providing a
legal rationale for judicial response to societal change.
Under the determining influence of its early Justices
the American judiciary fulfilled its Ramist role as the
arbiter of the nation's political conscience.

Through a

legal dialectic which measured societal change against the
standard of a transcendent ideal, the Court brought
American legal philosophy into conformity with the objec
tive realities of American life.

Indeed the characteristic

ability of Ramean forms to bring the contingent effects of
social experience under the operation of an antecedent
order allowed American jurists to elevate the mores of the
community into a moral absolute.47

Emerging ultimately in

the legal pragmatism of men like Holmes and Brandeis, the
realist metaphors which controlled American law in fact
allowed for the development of characteristic principles of
order which, like New England’s early Ramists, interpreted
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law as a rule for action.

Moreover, the unique ability of

Ramean metaphors to incorporate principles of development
and change into fundamental logical structures prepared
American legal models to absorb the intellectual shocks
which the second half of the 19th Century held in store.
By viewing change as a refinement of structure, American
jurists could adapt evolutionary models to characteristic
American conceptions of order without impugning the logical
integrity of their national ideal.4*
Newtonian paradigms had supported traditional naturallaw reasoning.

But Darwinian theory would demand a dif

ferent formulation of law.

As Darwinian theory gradually

began to displace mechanistic models in the mid-19th
Century, American jurists identified in it a scientific
analogy which they could accept.

Evolutionary theory

placed mechanical constructs in a temporal frame.

Yet it

lent a certain permanence and constancy to the contingent
world by viewing change as development.

As such it took an

intermediate position between mechanism and teleology
curiously congruent to Ramean models.

Indeed, even before

the introduction of fully developed evolutionary theories
in the second half of the 19th Century, Miller marvels, at
how American legal models "often hovered on the very edge
of an evolutionary philosophy [and] approached an insight
into the organic."4*

The present argument would contend
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that this flirtation with evolutionary forms drew directly
on the metaphors which underwrote Ramean constructs.
The political adjustments which followed in the wake of
the Civil War brought the logic of law full circle in
America.

The clarification of the political issues of

sovereignty and suffrage accomplished through Constitu
tional responses to the national trauma encouraged a sense
of closure to the search for principles of order.

The

major premise of the Constitution had been defended with
the nation’s blood.

Henceforth the Union would stand

"indivisible" as the political manifestation of that
irreducible premise.

Although the application of judicial

review would continue to increase the structural density of
American law, the antecedent order had been secured.
Indeed the major social and political constructs
developed immediately after the Civil War, generally
grouped under the rubric "Social Darwinism," in fact all
operated within Constitutional boundaries.

Herbert Spen

cer, whose cosmic theory outlined a process by which a
self-regulating nature moved from incoherence toward an
equilibrium underwritten by a perfect order, was the pri
mary source of these models.

William Graham Sumner drew

on Spencer’s principles of laissez-faire capitalism to
argue for a unique amalgam of Jefferson’s naturalism and
Jackson's negativism.

According to Sumner an activist

state not only denied biological fact. It presented a posi
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tive deterent to progress.

Thorsten Veblen, on the other

hand, turned Spencerian doctrine on its head to develop a
Theory of the Leisure Class which clearly reached back to
Madison's Ramist image of the "workshop” .

John Fiske fol

lowed Jefferson in his attempt to interpret Darwinian
theory at the level of the species.

The struggle for sur

vival, he claimed, supplied a biological warrant for
cooperation and solidarity within the species.

Lester Ward

developed this moralistic view into a full-blown social
ideology.

Drawing on those somatic impulses incorporated

into American thought by Edwards, he propounded a theory of
"collective telesis" which gave biological substance to the
social community which underwrote all American political
thought.
All these different interpretations of change, however,
operated within an antecedent frame which expressed a
rational end.

They could thereby change the face of

American society without impugning its wider purpose.

The

conspicuous lack of revolutionary or anarchist ideology in
America at a time when these forces ran rampant in Europe
attests to the force of the paradigm, which the present
argument would identify as overtly Ramean.50
As the nation’s political life became more assured, the
intellectual energies expended in its defense could shift
to related issues of scientific order which, under the
impact of evolutionary theory, had become critically
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unstable.

The search for order in modern American would

subsequently focus on the means by which the nation's
dialectical metaphors could accomodate powerful new concep
tions of scientific law.
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Chapter 8
BACON AND RAMUS:
The Logic of Science
in
America

"The Age of Modern Science," Stow Persons notes, "coin
cides with the span of American history."1

And in fact,

the concurrence of revolutionary scientific advance with
the formulation of American thought has had a determining
impact on the disposition and thrust of American values.
Morton White has gone so far as to claim that the entire
history of American philosophy "may be represented by a
cyclical curve depicting the fortunes of science."*

The

argument presented in Chapter VI tends to support that
claim.

Furthermore, it suggests, as does White, that the

interactions between logical and scientific metaphors might
prove even more decisive in the New World than in the Old.
Early American scientists explicitly adopted a Baconian
ideal.3

But New England Puritans made significant adjust

ments to that model as they applied it in the New World.
The frontier provided them with a unique opportunity.

It

offered a God-given clean slate standing ready to receive
the lineaments of a new order -- a tabula rasa on which
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they could inscribe at will the principles and products of
their method.

In the New Eden Puritan scientists enjoyed a

de facto Baconian laboratory from which all Idols save God
had been exorcised -- a kind of "hypothetical space" in
which inquiry could be pursued and theory applied outside
traditional contexts.

When, under the operation of the

doctrine of means, Puritan divines discovered that the New
Atlantis and the New Eden were in fact contiguous states, a
powerful new notion of the role of science in society
emerged.
The predisposition of American Colonials to view them
selves as residents in Bacon's New Atlantis rested in part,
to be sure, on Protestant eschatology.*

Bacon’s "experi

mental knowledge" correlated directly to the epistemological techniques implicit in the doctrine of means.3

More

over, the Colonial scheme of redemption encouraged a view
of inquiry which could readily extend itself to incorporate
Bacon’s ideal of mastery.®

Ramist logic had the

flexibility and scope to accomodate both these value com
plexes, largely due to the looseness of its definitions.
But the apparent affinity between Ramean and Baconian
paradigms ran deeper than a superficial subsumption of
practical knowledge under the rubrics of faith.

It rested,

in fact, on explicit methodological parallels which
pertained between the two logics themselves.
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Bacon, like the New England Ramists, had viewed law as
prescriptive --

that is, as a logical construct expressing

a rule for action.

Under the operation of his logic, Bacon

could declare, as did the Puritans, that "Truth and utility
are...the very same things."7

In fact, both Ramean and

Baconian models harbored within their reliance on method
the potential to issue in pragmatic injunctions like the
foregoing and that expressed by Ramist eupraxia.*

More

over, they fostered a correlative tendency to give full
weight to material relations and quantifiable values.

But

most significantly in the present context, Bacon and Ramus
each shared a general confusion concerning the respective
roles of hypothesis and induction which had a significant
impact on American scientific models.
Bacon had built his logical model around a series of
aphorisms described as "anticipations" which presented "the
dawn of a solid hope" that the investigator's leap to
theory, analogous to an act of faith, would be born out by
the processes of verification.9

The New England Ramists’

method likewise built on composite statements which served
as indices of divine intent, leading the mind through pro
gressive stages of empirical confirmation.

Both models

manifested an appreciation of the essential congruence
between experimental knowledge and rational insight.

More

over, both systematically conflated the roles which
hypothesis and induction played in the identification of
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causal processes, consciously integrating the respective
functions of evidence and truth.10
But where Bacon had left the methodological status of
his aphorisms conspicuously vague, New England divines
invoked prelapsarian rationality and Biblical truths in
support of their composite forms.

In the comprehensive

Ramean method they thus found a means of validating experi
mental knowledge which coincidentally supplied a logical
justification for the construction of physical laws.

In

effect, Ramism provided the Colonial mind with the missing
methodological links necessary to reconnect the "scattered
occasions" of Bacon’s "knowledge broken."
The logical integration of hypothesis and induction
achieved under Ramist doctrine clearly differentiated
American Baconianism from its Continental counterparts.
The virtuosi of the Royal Society, who turned to Ramus for
rhetorical guidance but to Wallis for instruction in logic,
tended to exaggerate Bacon’s attention to inductive data
and ignored his preoccupation with deep-seated systematic
causes.11

They sacrificed the potential scope of Bacon’s

science to its practical import.12

Newton’s

intellectualization of the inductive process and Locke’s
subsequent psychological critique served to further isolate
English science from synoptic concerns.

These restric

tions, however, proved patently unaccceptable to Colonial
Ramists.

The ars technologicae required that empirical
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data be tied to an anological order to function as raw
material for the construction of laws.

Thus, although

Bacon may have supplied the method of early American
science, Ramus clearly supplied the motive.13
It proved crucial to the subsequent development of
American science that the logical substructures of technologia and eupraxia remained in place in the colonies
throughout the transition from a medieval to a modern
scientific view.

Miller’s research clearly indicates a

prolonged period of interaction between Baconian and Ramean
paradigms in New England.

He places the beginning of the

shift from the old to the new physics in 1686, with the
emigration of Charles Morton, but consistently argues for
the persistence of Ramean logic well into the 18th Century.
Even the introduction of Cartesian texts at Harvard
represented "no radical break with Ramist methodology,"
claims.

he

Indeed, as late as 1719, logic in New England

"continued to be closer to Ramus."14

George Daniels

likewise places a definitive shift to the new learning well
into the 18th Century, pointing out that Samuel Johnson
completed a manuscript synopsis of Ramist technologia in
1714 which "did not even demonstrate an acquaintance with
Copernicus, to say nothing of Descartes, Boyle, or New
ton."15

The fact that Ramean logical paradigms survived to

interact with Baconian constructs well into the 18th
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Century served ultimately to differentiate American science
from its French and English counterparts.
Indeed, any understanding of American science hinges
directly on an appreciation of how Baconian method adapted
itself to the requirements of Ramism in the context of the
American frontier.

Ramism supplied a compelling warrant

for the pursuit of science.

Under the joint operation of

technologia and eupraxia, Bacon’s Book of Nature, as an
emblem of G o d ’s intention in the world, became the ideal
object for scientific investigation.

"After making the

proper obeisance before the impenetrable sanctuary [of
faith]," Miller claims, "the Puritan logician was free to
pierce the very secret of nature, to seize upon the eternal
and universal laws o, the cosmos."16

Since technologia

established an analogy between natural law and divine
decree, those trained up in method need place no restraint
upon their study of nature, but could pursue scientific
inquiry as an adjunct to faith itself.

Since method

expressed the formal mode of reason and reason necessarily
conformed to the objective order of nature, its proper
application must lead to a true comprehension of the
material effects of the divine will.17

Moreover, eupraxia

ensured that the fruits of inquiry would not only support
the truths of revelation but actually work toward their
realization in the new Zion.
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The tendency of Ramism to subordinate revelation to
reason fostered a correlative tendency to maintain a
theoretical noncommitment in the face of scientific
advance.

Nature’s ability to function as a symbol remained

far more important to New England Ramists than which system
of physics was used to explain its operation.

In the con

text of the ars technologicae it mattered little whether
one employed Peripatectic or Newtonian constructs to des
cribe the natural order as long as one accepted the essen
tial analogy.

Moreover, eupraxia clearly stipulated that

the choice must be determined by practice, not doctrine,
and verified by experience, not authority.

Hence, since

science posed no threat to faith, Colonial theorists could
adopt its discoveries enthusiastically, provided only that
they reconcile them, as did Edwards, through the applica
tion of method.
Thus, while taking up the cry of Verulam in chorus with
the virtuosi in London, American scientists had in mind an
ideal far different from that pursued by Boyle, Sprat and
Glanville.

And

the practical limitations imposed on the

dissemination of information in the Colonies only served to
reenforce this integration of religious and scientific pur
pose.

The "new learning” first struck the Colonial con

sciousness through almanacs, "as ubiquitous in New England
as the Bible and nearly as popular."1®

These fragmentary

summaries found their way into the pulpits of virtually
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every town and hamlet, from whence they filtered down to
minds previously conditioned by Protestant paedia to rely
on rational means in fathoming divine intent.1*

Moreover,

the denominational character and geographic distribution of
colonial colleges encouraged the propagation of this
scientific gospel not only in New England, but throughout
the Colonies wherever New England’s "first fruits" were
called to preach and teach.20
But the disruptions which diffused the focus of
Puritanism in the 1720’s tended to broaden and consolidate
the base of the Colonial scientific community.

Although

the population of New England nearly doubled during this
period, that of the Middle Colonies almost tripled.21

The

progressive urbanization of New York, Pennsylvania and the
Mid-Atlantic Colonies likewise played an important role in
shifting the balance of scientific knowledge off its
Puritan axis.

And the rapid growth of printing estab

lishments, libraries, newspapers and almanacs -- cultural
advantages previously confined largely to New England -all tended to materially increase the intellectual
resources of the more urban middle colonies and so to
cultivate an "enlightened" scientific state of mind.22
The popularity of lecture series, an intellectual spin
off of the Great Awakening, carried New England’s
scientific gospel out of the pulpit and into a more secular
forum.

Inaugurated by Isaac Greenwood at Boston in 1727,
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the scientific lecture series (complete with illustrative
apparatus) had, by 1740, become "sufficiently well received
to become a lucrative source of income for lecturers
[throughout] the colonies."*3

Figures like Archibald

Spencer and Ebenezer Kinnersley "wowed" them from
Portsmouth to Charleston with topics from electricity to
anatomy and added substantially to the process of popu
lar izat io n .
Moreover the establishment of important educational
institutions free from the direct influence of Puritan
orthodoxy further loosened the hold which New England had
previously enjoyed on American science.

The College of New

Jersey (1741), the Philadelphia Academy (1755), King’s Col
lege (1754), the College of Rhode Island (1764) and Queen’s
College (1766) all appeared on the scene during these cru
cial three decades, acquiring libraries and experimental
apparatus and vying for recognition as centers of
scientific study.

Moreover, as Hindle notes, the character

of society itself in the Middle colonies had much to do
with forming the character of these new colleges.

"Those

at Philadelphia, New York and Providence," he claims,
"demonstrated a broader tolerance which mirrored the cos
mopolitanism of the communities that supported them."24
By 1723 a nascent scientific community had arisen in
New York, centered around Samuel Johnson, Cadwallader
Colden, and James Alexander.

In the present context it is
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interesting to note that Colden drew explicitly on
Edwardsean logic, while Johnson had tangible ties to the
physico-theologians of the Hutchinsonian school, one of the
few surviving Ramist "covens" in England.25

By the 1730’s

a similar group had coalesced around the figures of
Franklin and Penn in Philadelphia.

Although not until mid-

century did either of these communities rival that of the
older Citty, by 1768, with the establishment of the
American Philosophical Society in Philadelphia, the
hegemony of New England in colonial science had been
seriously threatened.
And yet the New England Way continued to contribute in
significant ways to the construction of late Colonial
scientific models.

The perpetuation of Ramean logical sub

structures via the philosophical program of Jonathan
Edwards and the extension of those substructures to
American social constructs through Revolutionary rhetoric
ensured that American science would work for the advance
ment of society as a whole, not for the enlightenment of an
individual mind or the refinement of a disembodied
scientia.

Hindle stresses the fact that "continuity was

more conspicuous than change" in post-revolutionary
science, while Stearns points out the importance of its
communal and federal aspects.26

The present argument would

locate the source of the persistent features of postrevolutionary science in Ramist technologia and eupraxia,
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which insisted on the relevance of knowledge to the con
struction of a redeemed community and represented science
itself as the custodian of the social enterprise.
The Revolution, as the nexus of legal and logical meta
phors in American life, established this communal ideal at
the very core of the new nation’s intellectual life and
guaranteed that it would continue to operate through its
scientific models.

The realist bias of Revolutionary

ideology portrayed American science as a social endeavor,
dependent upon a matrix of inquiry which transcended the
needs and goals of individuals and reached out to embrace
the original errand, transformed into a mission of social
redemption.

Stearns identifies this curious characteristic

of American science as a part of "a subtle union of social
forces originating in economic, demographic and urban
growth."27

But the fact remains that European communities

underwent similar patterns of growth without developing
similar scientific ideologies.

Again the present argument

would attribute the difference to the survival of Ramean
metaphors.
Brooke Hindle describes the impact of the Revolution on
American science as primarily negative, arguing that it
swept away much of its momentum -- a momentum which he
claims was not regained until well into the 19th Century.
Science was "badly disturbed and disrupted by the war,” he
claims, citing as primary factors the focus of hostilities
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in the cities, the disruption of contact with the interna
tional scientific community and the refocusing of
intellectual energies on practical issues.

While careful

to discuss the positive accomplishments achieved during the
war -- advances in cartography, engineering and medicine -Hindle concludes that "the disruptive influence of the war
upon the whole pattern of science in America was much more
serious than the limited number of beneficial influences it
provided.”

Stearns concurs, maintaining that "while a host

of technological contrivances testified to the inventive
ness of the early Americans, they also testified to the
overwhelming utilitarian bent of the American mind."*8
Hindle’s and S t e a m ' s perspective, however, judges
American science by the standards of the Royal Society and
ignores those peculiar features of Colonial intellectual
life which persisted and in fact matured in what he con
siders the diminished scientific stance taken by the new
republic.

While belittling the "utilitarian emphasis" of

post-Revolutionary science,

Hindle overlooks the fact that

the interaction of Ramean and Baconian metaphors in
Colonial America had rendered utility a defensible
scientific ideal.**

Baconian "improvement", filtered

through the philosophic lens of Ramist eupraxia, had
emerged as a utility vastly different in both content and
scope from that expounded in London.

The utility promoted

by Franklin, Jefferson and Paine possessed a dimension con-
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spicuouslv lacking in that pursued by Boyle and Sprat -- a
dimension which derived directly from the Ramist compulsion
to integrate means and ends.

Under Ramean logic, utility

became a reflection of purpose and technique a hallmark of
design.

In fact, the "merely" technological focus of post-

Revolutionary science expressed values rooted deep in its
Ramean past.
Indeed the essential continuity of American Revolution
ary ideology with its Ramean heritage influenced the devel
opment of post-revolutionary science in important ways.

By

representing God as the Architect of the national Citty,
Revolutionary ideologues could transfer the emotional
propulsion of Puritan eschatology onto the task of nation
building.

Science in the new republic would thus require

no metaphysic to justify its elevation of practice over
theory.

The practical work of realizing America’s special

destiny carried with it its own moral imperative.

More

over, the concurrence of this political ideal with the
logical metaphors of Ramism encouraged American scientists
to cast themselves in a similar image and contributed
materially to the rationalization process by which the
scientist and technician became the philosophers of the
"Workshop of Liberty."
The cultural nationalism awakened by the Revolution
extended itself readily to demands for scientific achieve
ment.10

"What a field have we at our doors to signalize
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ourselves in!" wrote Thomas Jefferson, challenging science
to fulfill its special mission in the new Republic of Let
ters.

Politicians and pundits commonly interwove the

themes of independence and inquiry in appeals to the
scientific community to "become a lamp to guide degraded
and oppressed humanity."

"In Europe Science reigns no

more," one partisan claimed,
tyrannic power."

"Their souls are fetter’d with

But in America, liberty "unfetters and

expands the human mind, and prepares it for the reception
of the most important science."31

"May we not hope," David

Ramsay cried, revealing the deep philosophic undercurrents
which supported the rhetorical linking of revolutionary
zeal and scientific endeavor,

"that the exalted spirits of

our politicians and warriors will engage in
the...[promotion of] useful knowledge, with an ardor equal
to that which first roused them to bleed in the cause of
liberty and their country?"33
With such a challenge before it, American science
turned wholeheartedly to its task.

Benjamin Franklin, as

archtype and champion of the cause, provided philosophic
justification by reading into the Sermon on the Mount a
literal interpretation of the Puritan doctrine of means.
In an explicit accomodation of Enlightenment ethics and
Ramist technologia, Franklin propounded a scientific ideal
which drew its inner dynamism from a deep conviction that
the natural world reflected a rational order which man
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experienced through his senses and mastered through his
intellect.33

Ramist eupraxia further guaranteed that all

inquiry must issue in practical effects which contributed
to the constitution of that order.

For if all nature

expressed a purpose, Franklin argued, then each natural
phenomenon must possess an inherent value.

By identifying

and exploiting that value, man actually participated in the
larger design.

In fact, Franklin claimed, the ability of

science to explicate the intrinsic usefulness of "nature’s
ways” expressed its entire function and comprised its
ultimate moral value.
Franklin’s instrumental ethics imparted a special
accent to the new nation’s demand for "Usefull Knowl
edge."34

His typically Puritan view of theory as a guide

to action allowed him to forage nature for useful facts
while taking for granted those abstract principles which
served as the object of "pure" science.

Moreover, by

translating practical scientific achievements into evidence
of a special ordination, Franklin lent a cultural and
philosophic significance to technical advances which con
firmed a continuing faith in America’s mission.

Henceforth

when post-revolutionary scientists appealed to utility,
they appealed to a conception which reached out to deeper
values.

Each canal or railroad built, each physical

obstacle overcome, each technical advance or invention

311

became an icon of a national destiny writ large in the
objective order of things.
The spectacular rate of growth and change which the new
republic experienced in the half-century following the
Revolution provided its scientists with ample opportunity
for vindicating that special faith.35

A floodtide of

immigration, the systematic extinction of the frontier, the
vast expansion of the nation’s economic base and the social
dislocations attendant on progressive urbanization all
challenged the scientific community to supply the tools and
materials needed to channel this torrent of progress into
programs which would preserve the nation’s unique axiology.
Encouraged by premiums, patents and limited monopolies,
American scientists and entrepreneurs applied themselves
enthusiastically to an agenda explicitly aimed at massive
''improvements” which would contribute to the realization of
the nation's millenial dream.36

Supported by religious

appeals to "benevolence" and humanitarian movements for
reform, post-revolutionary scientists slipped easily into a
new role as Saints of the national Citty.

Under the force

of events and the operation of a distinct logical heritage,
science became the intellectual correlate of the American
frontier and the engineer the new folk-hero of the age.37
The belief that technology enjoyed a special affinity
with the goals of democracy gained force with the rise of
Jacksonian populism.38

In the expansionist atmosphere of
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the 1820’s and 30’s, populist sentiment had little diffi
culty in submerging any lingering Jeffersonian doubts about
the value of "manufactures.”

Moreover, the new Democratic

rhetoric charged science with an explicit reform mission,
portraying technological advance as part of a "general
social revolution” directed toward "the benefit of...the
whole body of the people."3®

This mission was made

manifest in the rise of polytechnic education and the
lyceum movement, both designed to open avenues of selfimprovement and thereby eliminate class distinctions.
Moreover the propensity of Jacksonian partisans to articu
late their ideals in terms which juxtaposed "the natural"
and "the artificial" tended to shift the focus of
scientific inquiry away from a concern for the perceived
regularities of nature to a concern for the potential of
its material effects.
they claimed,

The hope of social redemption lay,

in the enhancement of everyday life and not

in the rational comprehension of "artificial” laws by a few
elitist minds.
As the infant republic marched to the cadences of Jack
sonian rhetoric through the early decades of the 19th
Century, a concurrent rush of material progress encouraged
a mood of fervid optimism which only served to deepen
America’s conviction that somehow science drove the inner
engines of its millenial dream.40

Neither the economic

distress of the 1830’s nor the gathering clouds of sec
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tionalism in the 40’s could diminish the nation's faith in
the power of technology to carry it forward to greatness.41
The activist ideal imparted to it by Ramism in the 18th
Century allowed American science in the 19th to construe
mechanical contrivances as benefactions to the race and
factories as vehicles of redemption.

The power of inven

tion manifested m a n ’s special relationship to God and
Americans seemed to possess that power to a degree which
gave abundant assurance of national election.42

Expounded

in scientific journals which enjoyed a wide circulation and
preached throughout the country in lecture halls and
lyceums, America’s new technological faith subsumed all
previous formulations of national piety under its meta
phors.

Encouraged by discoveries of gold in the West,

political successes abroad and a temporary respite from
internal dissension in the Missouri Compromise, celebrants
of America’s scientific gospel raised a chorus of selfcongratulation which seemed to promise that Christ in the
Second Coming would in fact arrive by train.
But the philosophic optimism of the 1850’s proved the
worst possible preparation for the political and
intellectual cataclysm of the Civil War.43

The War

tarnished the credibility of the Union as the irreducible
logical premise on which the national life had rested.

Any

consequent philosophic reconstruction would have to
incorporate a redefinition of that premise in terms which
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could encompass the social realities consequent upon the
War.

Moreover, the War not only temporarily derailed the

juggernaut of material progress which had propelled the
nation forward for half a century, it also rent the tightly
woven fabric of millenial self-righteousness in which
American ideologues had carefully clothed the national
dream.

The harsh social and political realities of war and

reconstruction urgently demanded a reevaluation of those
phil osophic assumptions which lay at the base of American
1 i fe .* *
Chief among these, of course, stood the national faith
in technology as the tie that binds.

The obvious failure

of science, despite its success in spanning the continent,
to prevent the disintegration of the union prompted a pain
ful reassessment of the nation’s uncritical acceptance of
the technological ideal.

As post-bellum politicians and

theorists turned jointly to the task of philosophic
reconstruction, they looked to their former allies in
science for reassurance that technology would in fact ful
fill its extravagant promise.
By 1865, however, the American scientific community was
in the throes of its own ideological revolution.

Dis

concerting new theories suggested during the preceding
decades had exhausted the descriptive potential of existing
metaphors and demanded a new synthesizing vocabulary.

The

vast accumulation of empirical data accomplished under the
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banner of Bacon threatened to encumber inquiry by its sheer
weight and aroused the suspicion that perhaps science had
exceeded the scope of its models.

The Baconian method had

proceeded under the assumption that the simple accumulation
of particular facts would eventually yield a general con
struct.

But the avalanche of data culled from the explora

tion of a continental laboratory had infinitely complicated
the task of classification and had multiplied, shifted and
rearranged methodological categories to the extent that
they had become essentially meaningless.45
The case for chemistry provides a clear example of the
problem.

In 1768, the French chemist Lavoisier had estab

lished a functional method for classifying chemical sub
stances based on two criteria -- an enumeration of elements
and an analysis of composition.

Based on these criteria he

constructed a series of analytical tables designed to meth
odize the discipline.

In one column he listed five

categories of simple substances.

In an adjacent column he

identified compound substances as functions of those simple
elements.

Acids, for instance, formed one class of com

pound substances produced by combining simple elements with
oxygen, the "acidifying agent.”

Lavoisier then assigned

functional names to the resulting compounds -- the combina
tion of sulphur and oxygen, for instance, yielded sulphuric
acid.

The same procedure was followed for salts, which

became respectively sulphates and sulphites, and so on.
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Lavoisier’s neat, orderly construct stabilized the chaotic
state of chemistry and provided a comprehensive system of
nomenclature which made possible important theoretical
advances.
But shortly after Lavoisier’s death, chemists discov
ered several new elements which stubbornly refused to con
form to his model.

By 1830 they had identified several

acids which contained no oxygen and at least three other
substances which supported combustion.
data demanded new metaphors.

Clearly the new

Since chemistry, unlike

mechanics, reached into the very nature of substance
itself, this dislocation of theory and data proved particu
larly disconcerting.

To make matters worse, by the 1860’s

the classical atomic theory articulated by Dalton had been
complicated by Helmholtz’ and Kelvin’s "atomic vortices,"
which attacked the assumptions of fixed mass which had
characterized organic chemistry up to that point.

The

century had nearly ended before chemists could come to
terms with the theoretical implications of the new data and
offer alternative explanatory principles.46
Disillusionment with existing systems of classification
could only aggravate the doubts which plagued American
scientists following the War.

The inability of Baconian

models to provide reassurance became increasingly apparent
as the millenial axiology which had previously supported
them faded under the force of social circumstance.
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American science at mid-century indeed faced the painful
realization that its logical constructs could no longer
support its theoretical aspirations.

Some Baconian

diehards responded by claiming that the dislocations were
only apparent, resulting from an insufficiently stringent
application of method.

Benjamin Silliman’s castigation of

geology as a "merely theoretical and usually a visionary
and baseless speculation" articulated this reactionary tac
tic.

Geologists must completely eschew theory, he

declared, and apply themselves exclusively to an "actual
examination into the nature, structure, and arrangement" of
data in order to penetrate the mysteries of the world.47
The irony here, of course, lay in the intrinsically his
torical nature of geology as a science, a dimension which
Silliman’s methodology completely denied.
Reactionary responses like Silliman’s generally served
only to deepen the persistent tension between theory and
practice.

One notable exception, however, emerged in the

field of social-statistical theory.

As census information

accumulated, politicians and planners began to develop an
interest in trends, identifying the pursuit of progress
with the logic of an empirically determined common good.
Statisticians and census analysts claimed that by quantify
ing the notion of "the common good," they could better
define social order.

A movement perfectly in tune with

Jacksonian populism, this arithmetic conception of ethics
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transformed qualitative Enlightenment concepts into a
majoritarian ethic which claimed the greatest good for the
greatest number.48

But it did little to advance the devel

opment of new scientific metaphors.
By contrast, some adventurous minds gave up the attempt
to cope with data on a systems level and settled for synec
doche -- the most notable being Emerson, whose use of
literary technique went deeper than a stylistic habit of
reading sermons in rocks and streams and ultimately took
the form of a philosophic principle.49

Emersoii explicitly

extended synechdoche to a justification of science by
crediting technology with the power to carry the minds of
men from an appreciation of particular inventions to a
wider sense of wonder at their power.50

Like a good

Ramist, Emerson insisted on the moral implications of
science.

Machines, he claimed, manifested "the same Spirit

that made the elements at first."51

But these metaphoric

excesses, characteristic of a wider Romantic compulsion,
merely enhanced the intellectual ambiguity which ultimately
served as philosophy for the entire Transcendental gener
ation.

The tendency to see technology as an objectifica

tion of the power to create and redeem ultimately reduced
the role of science to the socio-economic means by which a
moribund Calvinism confronted an updated problem of Job.
Although such a view went a long way toward validating
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programs for improvement,

it did little to help formulate

an actual philoso ph y of science.
By far the vast majority of American scientists turned
to

Scottish realism for reassurance.52 The

facile formulas

of

the Scottish school provided welcome support to a gener

ation attempting to reconcile a devotion to science with a
recognition that it no longer gave purpose and meaning to
life.

Moreover, the "mental philosophy" explicit in the

Scottish realist position flowed easily into those
phil osophic channels carved by Ramism in the bedrock of
American thought.53
an

Its epistemological theories expounded

intellectually defensible version of thedoctrine of

means; its scientific theories retraced the

fading outlines

of Ramist technologia', and its ethical systems tapped the
undercurrents of Ramist evpraxia.
Given logical expression in the treatises of Thomas
Reid, Scottish realism patently rejected the logic of
inference characteristic of British empiricism, portraying
it as a huge collective error rooted in Cartesianism, which
"like the Trojan horse... carried in its belly death and
destruction to all science and common sense."54

By inter

posing ideas between objects and the mind, Reid claimed,
Descartes and all his Lockean progeny had obstructed the
natural flow of invention and judgement.

Dismissing asso

ciation as "one of the main pillars of skepticism,"

Reid

argued that the process of judgement preceded the formation
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of ideas and hence fell "not within the province of reason,
but of common sense.”

"Natural judgements," he concluded,

"are therefore a part of the furniture which nature has
given to the human understanding.
constitution.

...They are part of our

...They make up what is called the common

sense of mankind."*s
Reid's topical orientation is patent here.

But it

becomes even more so in his redefinition of induction,
which redrew the line between hypothesis and induction in
such a way as to avoid inference entirely and so halt the
fatal erosion of metaphysics.

Newton’s Regulae, Reid

argued, expressed, not rules of reasoning, but "maxims of
common sense."

They outlined a non-rational inductive

principle which provided man with "an instinctive pres
cience of the operations of nature.

...Upon this principle

of our constitution, not only acquired perception but also
inductive reasoning, and all our reasoning from analogy,
grounded," he claimed.56

is

By thus redefining inference as a

disposition to belief, Reid provided a clear philosophic
justification for the epistemology implicit in the doctrine
of means, bringing welcome relief to American scientists
defending their ideological model against methodological
critics.
Reid’s logic exerted its strongest influence on
American scientific theory through the work of Dugald
Stewart, who maintained that the business of the scientist
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was simply "to ascertain those established conjunctions of
successful events, which constitute the order of the
universe... and then to refer them to their general laws"
which could only be determined "by an examination of the
principles of the human constitution" -- that is, by
induction-according-to-Reid.57

This patently Ramean meth

odology provided James McCosh at Princeton with a means to
integrate scientific advances into a conservative theology.
And McCosh in turn championed it across America as the
deliverance of science as well as a justification for
orthodoxy.

In questions of method, McCosh declared,

"Stewart must ever be referred to as an authority."58

That

such a metaphysic could merge, even superficially, with
Baconian models rested entirely on the philosophic ground
work laid by Ramist technologia and eupraxia, which reen
forced Reid’s "inductive principle" and gave it the ability
to carry the mind from "successful events” to objective
truth.
Francis Wayland, the most influential of the "American
Scots," drew on Stewart and Reid to develop an elaborate
scientific model which claimed to solve the troublesome
"problem of induction" once and for all by simply making
the entire predictive element of science over into analogy.
Wayland’s "Philosophy of Analogy" rested on two principles:
"First. A part of any system which is the work of an
intelligent agent, is similar, so far as the principles
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which it involves are concerned, to the whole of that
system.

And, second.

The work of an intelligent and moral

agent must bear, in all its lineaments, the traces of the
character of the Author."59

Thus Wayland went far oeyond

the relatively modest claims which Reid had made for anal
ogy to declare that it had not only a descriptive but a
normative status.

Analogical reasoning, he declared, dis

closed not only the actual but the necessary structure of
the universe.
The alacrity with which American scientists reached out
to Wayland's "philosophy of analogy” indicates the depth of
confusion into which they had sunk.

As George Daniels

points out, Wayland’s logic "was admirably designed to pro
mote loose reasoning and hasty generalizations.

Where

previously the inductive process of confirmation had seemed
intolerably endless, Wayland would dismiss it as largely
unnecessary."

Yet "virtually any American

scientist... could serve as an illustration of the use of
analogy in the Wayland sense," Daniels claims.90

Indeed

the praise of analogy had reached such heights in America
by 1848 that James Whelpley could take the final step and
explicitly identify analogy as the exclusive method of
science.
But even the uneasy alliance of common sense and common
purpose achieved under Scottish realism could not withstand
the fundamental shifts which occurred in scientific theory
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as the Century progressed.

The stubborn refusal of the

"imponderables" to remain in the inferential background of
physics underscored the epistemological shortcomings of
Locke’s psychological critique.

Indeed Lockean constructs

proved signally ill-equipped to cope with the problem of
the "imponderables."

Dedicated to the proposition that

only sense makes sense, Locke had excluded from inquiry
phenomena like atomic particles, electrical currents and
fields of force.

Consequently,

the closer Baconian inquiry

carried Lockean psychology to the fundamental building
blocks of the universe, the less capable either became of
coping with their own data.

Yet the obvious explanatory

power of hypothetically inferred entities demanded that
they be dealt with analytically.
had wrestled with the problem.

All the major empiricists
But still the stubborn

irony persisted that the scientific tradition known as
"atomism" could not absorb the concept of an "atom."

A

drastic revision of methodology would be necessary to admit
these forbidden hypotheses as viable explanations of physi
cal events.61
At the same time the inability of Newtonian mechanics
to absorb the troublesome new fields of thermodynamics and
electromagnetics discredited prevailing notions of order
and change.

The principles of classical mechanics declared

all motion'reversible.

But the existence of entropy, sug

gested by Avogadro’s theory of gasses in 1811 and later
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confirmed by Carnot, Clausius and Kelvin in the second law
of thermodynamics, asserted the existence of irreversible
processes -- that is, of phenomena which tended inexorably
toward a limit.

Quantified by Fourier through

trigonometric series expansions, the "irreversibility
thesis" allowed for the description of such physical
processes as frequencies and dynamic equilibria.
But Newtonian mechanics had no mathematical language
adequate to the task of expressing irreversible processes.
Statistical theory stepped in to fill the gap, particularly
after James Clerk Maxwell applied his bit of Victorian
whimsy to the problem, but statistical laws could not
satisfy the methodological demands of classical physics.
Moreover, the ether, which had previously served as a con
venient repository for those properties of matter and
energy which didn’t fit the Newtonian mold, could no longer
offer any help since its assumed qualities had come under
attack in the "ether drift" experiments of Michelson and
Morley.

The methodological conflict remained unresolved,

in fact, until Einstein’s work on Brownian motion revealed
the physical and philosophical import of atomic theory,
providing a logical bridge from classical to quantum
mechanics.8 2
The increasing credibility of these hypothetically
inferred entities and forces distorted the logical
categories under which men inquired into nature.

Then,

325

into this philosophic "critical mass," Darwin introduced
the catalyst of evolution, destroying the relevance of
analogical argument and forcing a reevaluation of the goals
and processes of inquiry itself.

As many of Darwin’s

critics hastened to point out, evolution by natural selec
tion did not describe a scientific principle based on
induction.

Despite Darwin’s massive array of evidence, his

theory remained just that -- a unifying hypothesis with no
objective ground in the natural world.

Yet the inability

of taxonometric methods to produce anything even approach
ing the manifold explanatory potential of Darwin's model
only served to underscore what critics and champions alike
began to perceive as "the limits of Baconianism."•3
This series of methodological shocks proved particu
larly disorienting to American theorists.

Although

prepared by Scottish realism to accept the explanatory
potential of the "imponderables," American ideologues
remained curiously loathe to accept their unsavory
philosophic consequences.

Reid’s endorsement of immediate

perception allowed for the analysis of "imponderables"
despite their stubborn refusal to display the normal
attributes of matter.

But microcosmic systems had little

relevance to the Ramist ars technologicae and the doctrine
of means specifically stipulated that man’s rational
faculties could adequately comprehend the natural order.
How, then, could these unthinkable thoughts function in

326

inquiry?

Until concepts like atomic valency, radiating

energy and molecular structure could boast an objective
reference they literally had no "place" in scientific
method.
Likewise, although prepared by a millenial axiology to
sacrifice the concept of "reversibility” in physics,
American theorists proved peculiarly reluctant to integrate
the correlative notions of "force" and "field" into their
cosmology.

Irreversibility confirmed the directionality

of time, a concept crucial to the eschatological bias of
American ideology.

But the second law of thermodynamics

described a movement from order to disorder which encour
aged analogical extensions of "dissipation" and "degrada
tion" at the macrocosmic level.

This presented an urgent

phil osophical problem to minds trained up in Puritan doc
trine and the Revolutionary faith.84
Moreover evolutionary theory drastically altered those
taxonomic schemes which had previously supported the natu
ral sciences.

Indeed it struck directly at the roots of

that analogical method which had allowed American ideology
to extend its metaphors across all disciplines and effec
tively neutralized both the content and the method on which
American inquiry had come to rely.

The classical notion of

species, like the topical notion of a "place," had
expressed a fixed grouping of terms under an immutable
order.

From this notion flowed the protean concept of the
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"great chain of being" on which all analogical reasoning
drew.

But Darwin’s principle of selection destroyed logi

cal as well as biological fixity.

By representing the

species as naturally and inevitably mutable,

it undercut

not only the classification systems of natural science but
both categorical and topical schemes of organization as
well.

The implications of the reduction of the species to

a phenomenal level proved patent and devastating.

"It is

like confessing murder," Darwin himself remarked.65
By the early 1870’s, the compelling need for a new
logic of science had become patent.

Wayland’s naive,

psychologized "principle of induction" simply could not
supply data adequate to the demands of an increasingly
sophisticated scientific community.

The hypothetical

notions arising out of thermodynamics and electromagnetics
simply had no "place" in Baconian or Ramean methodology.
Baconian science had no way to account for postulational
entities, while Ramism, though supporting hypotheticals in
discourse, had no way to produce logical predicates which
could provide them with an objective content.

Moreover,

Darwin had exposed the monolithic conceptions of system
which had characterized modern science up to that point as
essentially inadequate descriptions of reality.

The sweep

ing philosophic implications of these methodological dis
locations clearly underscored the fact that American logi
cal models had fallen drastically out of step with funda
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mental issues in the philosophy of science.66

Driven by an

urgent need for new metaphors adequate to the expression of
a reconceived reality, American scientists began a search
for a new methodology.

And a persistent Ramean heritage

ensured that the first step in the process would be to
articulate a logic which could underwrite the method.
The impact which these methodological shifts had on
th ose national scientific models outlined in previous chap
ters provides an interesting comparative reference for the
logical accomodation achieved by American philosophy under
the shock of scientific advance.

In England, for example,

Darwin’s developmental hypothesis confronted a Newtonian
world whose physical aspect expressed absolute permanence
and whose logical essence consisted in abstract quantity.
Indeed for Newton, the abstract truths of mathematics
enjoyed logical certainty precisely because they remained
devoid of any empirical content.67

Such a mechanical

universe left little or no room for biological analogy.68
The transformations which had preoccupied Newton had no
reference in concepts of process or growth.

They took

place rather through simple changes in the position of dis
crete particles driven by purely mechanical means.

The

word "development" in its Darwinian sense thus had no
reference in English thought.68
Locke’s associationist critique, carried to its logical
extreme by Hume, expressed the inevitable methodological
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correlate of Newton’s corpuscular view.

And just as

English physics could not easily absorb the random events
explicit in Darwin’s theory, so English logic resisted the
concepts of probability and hypothesis implicit therein.
Locke had denounced all hypotheses as mere "inventions and
creatures of the understanding."

Hypotheses had no addi

tive value, he claimed, only a negative function as
vehicles of verification.

But since Darwinian theory

tended to endorse hypotheses as constructive forms, Locke’s
inferential logic and any philosophy of science based
thereon must prove inadequate for its purposes.70
Throughout the late 19th Century the Mills’ "savage logic,”
which stubbornly upheld Newton’s limiting definition of a
vera causa, perpetuated this Lockean bias in English
science.71

In fact, only with a belated appreciation of

Whewell’s "philosophy of discovery" did English logic begin
to integrate the methodological implications of evolution
into their philosophy of science.7*
Likewise French theoretical constructs proved curiously
unresponsive to the philosophical demands of Darwinism.
The French scientific tradition had been initiated by a
radical act of separation of man from his environment.
Descartes’ cogito, extended to the natural world in Le
Monde, had redefined science as an axiomatic discipline
which itself determined and structured experience.

"Allow

your imagination to leave this world," Descartes enjoined
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the scientist, "and visit an entirely new one which I will
cause to be born in these imaginary places."73

Under

Cartesian rules, the scientist imposed his own logical
order upon nature to extract meaning.

By defining this new

order, he guaranteed his ability to investigate it
unencumbered by perceptual limits.

But the logical

priority thereby given to mechanism over experience made
Cartesian constructs peculiarly unreceptive to evolutionary
forms.
Cartesian logic had provided the philosophes with a
justification for grounding change in antecedent law.

But,

like Newton's transformations, the naturalists’ transformism left no room for the precarious aspects of environ
mental determinism described by evolution.

Neither

Laplace’s physics nor Diderot’s biology could accomodate
concepts of emergence or novelty.

This persistent

Cartesian bias, made explicit in biology by Lamarck’s
unilinear development and in logic by Comte’s positivism,
continued to insulate French theory from the methodological
implications of Darwinism in much the same way that Locke
had done in England.74

Indeed not until the end of the

19th Century, with Bergson’s "creative evolution," did
French theoretical models begin to display genuine evolu
tionary features.75
The German response to Darwinism proved somewhat more
complex -- if no more positive -- than that of England or
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France.

Prepared in some ways by a strong morphological

tradition to accept developmental constructs in both
science and philosophy, German theoretical models nonethe
less displayed a curious incompatibility with evolutionary
doctrine -- an incompatibility grounded ultimately in
logic.

While German dialectical models allowed for a prin

ciple of development grounded in logical structure, they
had no mechanism for extending that principle to existence.
On the one hand, this rendered them more flexible and open
to creative theory. On the other,

it made it difficult for

them to perceive the practical potential of Darwin’s work.
Moreover, the philosophical

idealism which dominated German

thought throughout the 19th Century contained its own
built-in evolutionary scheme which rendered Darwin's
hypothesis essentially superfluous.7®
Wolffian logic had declared existence a "complement of
possibility," strictly limiting any notions of biological
development to a metaphoric movement within a logically
antecedent frame.

This doctrine, known as "preformation,"

stipulated that natural development took place as a succes
sive unfolding of a predetermined organic constitution, not
as an autonomous or random process like the one Darwin
described.77

Kant’s reduction of Wolff’s logical

categories to functions of time had done little to render
Wolffian constructs more receptive to evolution since
Kant's imperatives operated primarily on the noumena and
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had little relevance at the organic level.

For Kant,

although causal sequences pertained in both the noumenal
and the phenomenal realms, each proceeded under the opera
tion of its own imperatives.78

It was a misconstruction of

these distinct imperatives which the Post-Kantians per
petuated ad nauseam.

Darwinian theory, on the other hand,

placed Kant’s noumena and his phenomena on the same time
line, as it were.

By making psychic activity an evolu

tionary consequence of physical development, Darwin not
only neutralized Wolff’s metaphysical priorities, he pulled
the logical ground out from under Kant.

Unable to find

support in its native philosophical traditions, German
science fell back on an unrelenting experimentalism
relieved by flights of idealistic fancy.

Only with

Nietzsche’s "Philosophy of Becouing" did it acquire a logi
cal mechanism capable of establishing the priority of
process over structure.79
Predictably, according to the current argument, the
impact which Darwin had on American philosophy proved sub
stantially different from any of these.

Evolutionary

theory struck chords in America which had no harmonics in
European thought.

In the New World, Darwin spoke directly

to the heart of a young society whose national life
appeared almost as a caricature of an evolutionary model.
The transforming power of the environment exerted itself as
a fact of life in America.

Moreover, the philosophical
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implications of Darwinism converged there with an ideology
grounded in concepts of conversion and election.

When 19th

Century American scientists reached out for principles of
order, they reached out, not to Mill or Comte or Hegel, but
to a distinctive logical tradition which had subsisted in
American thought since the founding of the Citty.

The

phil osophic undercurrents of Ramism which had fed into
American theory throughout the Colonial and Revolutionary
eras ensured that the radical shifts in scientific theory
described above would interact with logical metaphors sub
stantially different from those encountered in England,
France or Germany.
Although at first the American response to Darwinism
followed a predictable course, the speed with which
American theorists achieved an accomodation with its
philosophic implications suggests the operation of factors
unique to the American intellectual milieu.®0

The doctrine

of means had explicitly acknowledged the precedence of
creation over revelation.

The Book of Revelation, it

claimed, had been written as a sequel to the Book of
Nature.

This crucial doctrine, supported by the Ramist ars

technologicae, had enabled Puritan divines in the 18th
Century to interpret Newtonian mechanics as an expression
of Providential design.

In the 19th, it provided latter-

day Saints with a cogent argument for incorporating evolu
tionary theory into the national axiology.
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In fact, as Darwinian theory adapted itself to the
American intellectual environment it produced theoretical
offspring which bore a strong genetic resemblance to their
Puritan forebears.

The Ramean metaphors embedded in

American ideology translated the Darwinian hypothesis into
a process by which each species underwent a refinement of
structure directed at ensuring its biological
"immortality."

Development became an analog of conversion

and survival a mode of redemption.

Adaptation came to

represent a biological integration of means and ends not
unlike that achieved under the doctrine of means, while
natural selection expressed the biological correlate of
election.

Thus evolution, viewed from a Ramean perspec

tive, displayed a distinct realist bias.

It extended a

degree of permanence and constancy to the world of present
experience by explaining it as a developing system of
steadily increasing structural density.
By merging the developmental aspects of Darwinism with
the emotional thrust of their ideology and the structural
bias of their logic, American theorists could argue for a
philosophical program which stood midway between mechanism
and teleology

--

an option not open to English theorists

(committed to experience), French theorists (committed to
mechanism), or German theorists (committed to structure).
Technologia ensured that this distinctive evolutionary
model would infiltrate those disciplines previously
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encompassed by natural philosophy.81

Eupraxia ensured that

it would permeate the social and political economy as well.
Indeed by the 1870’s, this unique national hybrid of Bacon,
Ramus and Darwin had spread itself, in true panso phist
fashion, across the entire spectrum of American thought.
In what Stow Person’s calls "a paradoxical mixture of
scientific objectivity and moralistic preachment,"
theorists in all fields reached out to its metaphors for a
means whereby to synthesize the increasingly disparate
vocabularies of philosophy and science.82
"Gospellers" of all stripes hastened to invoke the new
metaphors in support of their cause.

The scientific

gospellers, thrown off-stride by the War and its consequent
dis iopt ’ons, found renewed justification for their tech
nological creed in an industrial naturalism which tempered
a Malthusian interpretation of Darwinian selection with a
persistent millenial axiology.83

The social gospellers

concocted a reform ideology out of an amalgam of Baconian
statistics, environmental determinism and Puritan ethics.84
Theists like John Fiske and Frank Abbott attempted a
philosophic reconstruction of orthodoxy which employed
Baconian "improvement" and emergent evolutionism to but
tress a traditional eschatology.85

And "evolutional

idealists" like Joseph Leconte propounded laws of cyclical
advance which read concepts of evolutionary growth as evi-

336

dence of a dialectical reasonableness energizing the
world.*•
The one characteristic which all these various
theoretical constructs shared was a realist bias -- a bias
embedded in what the present argument will call "the con
tinuity thesis."

The continuity thesis simply assumed that

no absolute discreteness existed anywhere in nature or
experience.

It expressed the persistent commitment to

antecedent structure which had permeated American
intellectual life since New England’s "first fruits" had
begun spreading the gospel according to Ramus in the
1600’s.®7

Evident in such diverse constructs as Edwards’

logic, Adams’ covenant and Jackson’s populism, this commit
ment continued to underwrite American thought throughout
its period of philosophic adjustment in the 19th Century
and became an integral part of those models which American
science developed in response to scientific advance.
Indeed the realist of bias of their intellectual
heritage enabled many American scientists to marshall sup
port for new theoretical constructs by claiming that they
merely restated this principle of continuity in
"scientific" terms.

Hence thermodynamics demonstrated the

cosmic reality of purposefulness,®•

while electromagnetics

confirmed the existence of effective forces at work in the
world.®*

Darwinian theory, far from discrediting metaphors

of continuity, merely made their logical structure objec-
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tive and open-ended.

Sumner’s "folkways,"•* Ward’s "telic

structures,"•* Piske’s "roaring loom of Time,"*1 and
Leconte’8 "residuum"** all gave metaphoric expression to
this characteristic commitment to perpetuate the principle
of continuity in American ideology.
Predictably the "continuity thesis" emerged most
clearly at precisely that theoretical point at which
science and logic intersected -- at that nexus of American
intellectual life where Bacon and Ramus had converged to
create a unique scientific ideology. The intellectual
atmosphere peculiar to the development of American science
had encouraged the integration of natural history and natu
ral philosophy.

As late as 1874, Louis Agassiz could still

give a ringing endorsement to this persistent Ramean
orientation: "It cannot be too soon understood that science
is one, and that whether we investigate language,
philosophy, theology, history or physics, we are dealing
with the same problem, culminating in the knowledge of our
selves.

...Our own nature demands from us this double

allegiance."**

Bacon and Ramus’ joint conflation of

hypothesis and induction had provided a methodology
curiously well-suited to support such an analogical model.
But by removing God as the last remaining Idol in
America’s Baconian laboratory, Darwin had, in a sense, made
the analogy real.

Under evolutionary doctrine natural his

tory and natural philosophy did in fact express coordinate
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value systems, thereby rendering science, from a Ramean
point of view, a system of encyclopedic radii which reached
out to no encompassing circle.

And the problem for

American logicians became one not unlike that which
medieval scholastics had faced in the doctrine of transubstantiation -- that of determining whether a discrete fact
could contain the logical attributes of a wider truth.
Thus stood the case for America’s philosophy of science
when Charles Sanders Peirce began his inquiry into its
theoretical structures in the 1870’s.

Guided by concep

tions of law and principles of order embedded deep in his
intellectual heritage, Peirce would attempt a reconcilia
tion of positive science and realist logic which clearly
reflected the thrust and disposition of American values.
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46. For a discussion of the significance of chemical
developments in the 19th Century see G. M. Fleck, "Atomism
in Late 19th Century Physical Chemistry,” JHI 24(19631:106114.
47. Benjamin Silliman, American Journal of Science
I(1818):416.
48. For a discussion of social statistics which
reaches back to issues discussed in Chapter VI see P. C.
Cohen, "Statistics and the State: Changing Social Thought
and the Emergence of a Quantitative Mentality in America,
1790 to 1820," WMQ, III 38( 1981 ):35-55 .
49.
In social theory this synecdochic bias manifested
itself in the reform ideologies of Samuel Gridley Howell,
Dorothea Dix and Bronson Alcott who explicity defined the
good of the community in terms of individual selffulfillment.
In the liberal arts the bias appeared in his
torians like Francis Parkman and George Bancroft.
In lit
erature it emerged in the localism of Hawthorne, the
psychology of Poe and the symbolism of Melville; in the
graphic arts, in the keen perceptions of the Hudson River
School.
50. See "Works and Days in Complete Works of Ralph
Waldo Emerson, e d . E. W. Emerson (Boston, 1903), VII, 185).
In "Progress and Culture" Emerson went even farther, claim
ing the "chief value [of technology] to be metaphysical"
(Ibid., VIII, 220-221).
51. See "The Uses of Natural History" in The Early
Lectures of Ralph Waldo Emerson, ed. S. E. Whicher (Cam
bridge, 1959), I, 15-45); and Journals of Ralph Waldo Emer
son (Cambridge, 1960), IX, 161). Leonard Neufeldt points
out that such a view of technology is "virtually synonymous
with what the classic Greek term techne denoted ("The
Science of Power: Emerson’s views on Science and Technology
in America," JHI 38(1977):333).
In the present context it
is interesting to note that it is also virtually identical
to the philosophic rationale behind the Ramist ars tech-

347

nologicae.
52. Next to Baconianism, Daniels claims, the Scottish
philosophy was the most popular vehicle for 19th Century
philosophers of science (Jackson. 199). Herbert Schneider
agrees, outlining the process by which "Scottish philosophy
invaded the country and rapidly crowded out the older 18th
Century texts" (History. 208-211).
Miller claims that "for
five or possibly six decades [Scottish realism] constituted
what must be called the official metaphysic of America"
(American Thought, ix). Manfred Kuehn presents an argu
ment, interesting in the present context, for the theoreti
cal affinities between Scottish realism and German thought
in his "The Early Reception of Reid, Oswald, and Beattie in
Germany : 1768-1800," JHP 21(1983 ): 479-491 .
53. Although Reid can hardly be called a Ramist,
Howell points out that he was influenced by Ramus’ 1555
French edition of the Dialectique and often referred with
approval to Keckermann’s Systema Logicae.
In his own Brief
Account of Aristotle’s Logic (1773) he described Ramus "as
having made additions to Aristotle’s theory of the syl
logism" and called him a reformer in philosophy "who had a
force of genius sufficient to shake the Aristotelian fabric
in many parts." Howell also emphasizes Reid’s linguistic
analysis as a survival of Ramean rhetoric (Howell, Logic.
372-391 ).
54. Thomas Reid, An Inquiry into the Human Mind....
(Dublin, 1764), II, 455-457.
55.
56.
in Butts

Ibid., II, 417-418.
Ibid.,497-499.
See also Laudan, "Thomas Reid..."
and Daivs, Heritage. 122).

57.
Outines of Moral Philosophy in Works of Dugald
Stewart. (Cambridge, 1829), III, 376, 380.
58. James McCosh, The Scottish Philosophy... (New
York, 1875), 292. For a discussion of Stewart relevant to
the present argument, see Salim Rashid, "Dugald Stewart,
'Baconian' Methodology, and Political Economy," JHI
46(1985):246-257 . Interestly, Rashid describes Stewart’s
as an "almost Austrian methodology".
59.
Francis Wayland, American Philosophical Addresses
e d . J. L. Blau (New York, 1946), 353.
60.

Daniels, Jackson. 169-178.

61.
For relevant discussions see J. P. Monteiro,
"Hume’s Conception of Science," JHP 19( 1981 ):327-342; N. S.

348

Arnold, "Hume's Skepticism about Inductive Inference," JHP
21 (1983 ):31-55; D. E. Soles, "Locke’s Empiricism and the
Postulation of Unobservables," JHP 23( 1985):339-369.
62. For relevant discussions see Bell, Newtonian
Science, 152-168; Ian Hacking, "19th Century Cracks in the
Concept of Determinism," JHI 44 (1983 ):455-475; S. G. Brush,
"Irreversibility and Indeterminism: Fourier to Heisenberg,"
JHI 3 7 <1976):603-630.
63. See Alvar Ellegard, "The Darwinian Theory and 19th
Century Philosophies of Science," JHI 18( 1957): 362-393.
64. The attendant philosophic disorientation emerges
explicitly in Henry Adams’ desperate "Letter to American
Teachers of History" (1910).
See Joseph Mindel, "The Uses
of Metaphor: Henry Adams and the Symbols of Science," JHI
26( 1965) :89-102.
65. Quoted in Hofstadter, Social Darwinism. 16. John
Dewey pointed out that "the combination of the very words
origin and species embodied an intellectual revolt" (John
Dewey, The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other
Essays (New York, 1910),1-19).
66. As John Dewey noted in retrospect, "in laying
hands upon the sacred ark of absolute permanency... the
Origin of the Species introduced a mode of thinking that in
the end was bound to transform the logic of knowledge.
...The issue," he warned, "lay primarily within science
itself" (The Influence of Darwin. 1,2).
67. Under such a model, as Walter Ong points out
"quantity and being tend to become interchangeable"
("Psyche..., 20). By extension "being" tends to draw far
ther and farther from the world of experience and to define
itself through mathematical limits which have the paradoxi
cal quality of existing only at that point at which their
numerical ratios vanish. This was essentially the weakness
which Berkeley perceived in Newton’s model and which he
exploited in constructing his idealist response.
For a
dissenting view see J. W. Garrison "Newton and the Relation
of Mathematics to Natural Philosophy," JHI 48(1987):609626) .
68. Henry Guerlac points out that "there is but a
single passage suggesting concern for living matter” in the
1687 edition of the Principia ("Theological Voluntarism and
Biological Analogies in Newton’s Physical Thought," JHI
44(1983):219-229 ) .
69. Peter Bowler points out that the word "evolution"
did not acquire its current meaning in English until well
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into the 19th Century, in fact until after the battle over
Darwin's theories had raged for a decade or more ("The
Changing Meaning of Evolution," JHI 36( 1975 ):95- 114 ) .
70. For a discussion of Locke which highlights these
tensions in his methodology see James Farr "The Way of
Hypothesis: Locke on Method," JHI 48(1987):51-72 and
Laurens Laudan "The Nature and Sources of Locke's Views on
Hypotheses," JHI 28(1967 ):214 .
71. Walter Ong calls the Mills' logic a "savage logic
learned from associationism and brooking absolutely no
interference, statfing] bluntly that predication itself -that is -- any conceivable human statement whatsoever -does no more than mark the order of trains of thought"
("Psyche..., 22). Mill’s view of hypothesis rested on
three Lockean principles: any general conception expresses
a mental representation of an entire class of individuals;
no general conception is furnished by the mind until it is
furnished to the mind; and a general conception never
precedes analysis (Logic. II, 190, 191, 193).
"Induction,"
he claimed, "is proof" and hypothesis has no "place" in
induction (Ibid., I, 314). Thus, although Mill loudly
praised Darwin’s theory as "an unimpeachable example of a
legitimate hypothesis," he immediately qualified his praise
with the condescending observation that Darwin, of course,
had not been "concerned with the conditions of
proof...[since] he was not bound by the rules of Induction,
but by those of Hypothesis" (Ibid., I, 353).
72. Whewell based his Philosophy of Inductive Science
(1840) on three distinctly non-Lockean arguments: the his
torical relativity of theory and fact; the constructive
role of controversy in the progress of knowledge; and the
indispensable role of hypotheses in the process of discov
ery.
In his later Philosophy of Discovery (1849), Whewell
developed this position into a full-fledged theory of logic
which validated hypotheses as additive notions. Renamed
"Colligations of Facts," Whewell's hypotheses were "sup
plied by the mind in order to bind the facts together," and
actually drove the inductive process (for the complete
argument, see Discovery. Chapter 22). Whewell's account
had the obvious advantage of being able to accomodate Dar
winian theory. (Scientific truth, he claimed, "is progres
sive" (Ibid., 343).) Moreover his view on causation
allowed for the introduction of notions of force. ("Force,”
he argued, "is a quality not identical with events, but
disclosed by means of them" (Inductive Science. I, 170).)
Nevertheless, as C. J. Ducasse points out, the popularity
of Mill’s Logic prevented a general recognition of the
merits of Whewell'a theory. "Disregard of its merits," he
claims, "was the easier because of its sharp break with the
traditions of British empiricists" ("Whewell's Philosophy
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of Scientific Discovery," Philosophical Review
60(1951):56).
For a detailed discussion of the debate see
E. W. Strong, "William Whewell and John Stuart Mill: Their
Controversy About Scientific Knowledge," JHI 16( 1955 ):209231 .
73.

Adams, Oeuvres. XI, 31.

74. Unlike Darwin, Lamarck argued that habits became
organized as instincts under the operation of the struc
tural characteristics of the organism. These structures
determine "an inclination towards the actions [which], bec
oming habitual, have occasioned the development of the
organs which execute them" (Zoological Philosophy, trans.
Hugh Elliot (London, 1914), 11). By contrast, Darwin
argued that "habits give structure, therefore habits
precede structure, therefore habitual instincts precede
structure" (Second Transformation Notebook transcribed by
Gavin de Beer Bulletin of the British Museum of Natural
History 2(1960), 106). For his part, Comte adopted a
Cartesian ideal by explicitly rejecting any referential
claim for logic.
"Ideas govern and revolutionize the
world,” he declared and proceeded from that simple dictum
to outline a program whereby logic could provide a
systematizing framework for knowledge.
The fact that logic
enjoyed no objective dimension in fact gave it its organiz
ing power, he claimed in La synthase subjective.
"Thus
understood," Etienne Gilson observes, "Comte is a new Des
cartes” (Recent Philosophy:
From Hegel to the Present (New
York, 1962), 273).
75.
In a curious inversion of Cartesian metaphors,
Bergson presented a philosophic rationale for evolution in
which intuitive perceptions disclosed an objective process
of "becoming." According to Bergson, time functioned in
two separate modes: the "mathematical fictions" of physics
and the sequential flow of "lived time" (temps v6cu).
The
first was conceptual, the second intuitive.
Like Des
cartes, Bergson claimed the superiority of the latter.
But
unlike Descartes he claimed that the intuitive perceptions
of "lived time" could support conceptual analysis by
providing an appreciation of the perceptual flow which made
up existence.
Through an appreciation of "lived time" man
gained an intuitive insight into the continuous operation
of an "61an vital" which generated the natural world.
Bergson thus defined evolution as a creative process flow
ing from a primordial impulse perceived intuitively.
76. J. H. Randall agrees that German thought in gen
eral "found Darwin either irrelevant, or else a mere addi
tional support" for prevailing philosophic schemes ("The
Changing Impact of Darwin on Philosophy," JHI 22(1961):444.
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77.
For a discussion of the biological implications of
"preformation" theory see Francesca Rigotti "Biology and
Society," JHI 47( 1986 ):215-233.
78.
See the First Analogy of the "Transcendental Doc
trine of Judgement," Critique of Pure Reason, and
Proleaamena to any Future Metaphysics.
79. Nietzsche grounded causality in experience.
"Our
belief in causality," he claimed "is belief in force and
its effect; a transference from our experience [to the
world]." Causation, he claimed, is a habit of belief given
objectivity by our "thinking compulsion into the process"
(The Will to Power, trans. Hollingdale and Kaufmann (New
York, 1968), 295, 301). Thus causal beliefs had a con
structive role not only in inquiry, but in experience
itself, projecting onto an objective reality the determina
tions of an active will. The physical world is "a sort of
primitive life in which all the organic functions... are
still synthetically bound up with one another" awaiting the
organizing power of an effective will to give it shape and
meaning (Beyond Good and Evil, trans. Marianne Cowan
(Chicago, 1955), #36, #42-43).
Clearly Nietzsche supplied
a dimension missing from the monistic schemes of Fichte,
Schelling and Hegel -- a dimension in which emergence and
novelty could acquire objective meaning.
For an interest
ing discussion of Nietzsche which relates to the present
topic see G. J. Stack "Nietzsche’s Influence on Pragmatic
Humanism," JHP 20(1982):369-406.
80.
Initially Darwinian theory provoked a reactionary
response on the part of orthodox clergy, articulated
against a backdrop of methodological dispute among
scientists, culminating in an often incongruous accomoda
tion between the two. F. A. P. Barnard, President of
Columbia University clearly articulated the reactionary
response:
"Much as I love truth in the abstract, I love my
hope of immortality more....If this, after all, is the best
that science can give me, give me, then, I pray, no more
science" (quoted in H. W. Schneider "The Influence of Dar
win and Spencer on American Philosophical Theology," JHI
6(1945):4).
Asa Gray of Harvard articulated the
ambivalence of the scientists:
"View these high matters as
you will, the outcome, as concerns us, of the vast and
partly comprehensible system, which under one aspect we
call Nature, and under another Providence, and in part
under another, Creation, is seen in the emergence of a free
and self-determining personality" (Natural Science and
Religion (New York, 1880), 102-3).
James McCosh of Prin
ceton displayed the adaptive instincts of the clergy,
claiming that "supernatural design produces natural selec
tion" (The Religious Aspect of Evolution (New York 1888),
7), while Henry Ward Beecher signalled their capitulation,
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declaring himself a "cordial Christian evolutionist" from
the most influential pulpit in the land.
"Design by
w h o l e s a l e h e rationalized in uniquely American imagery,
"is grander than design by retail"
(Evolution and Religion
(New York, 1885) , 51-52) .
81.
"Evolution was eagerly accepted as a substitute
religion," J. H. Randall notes. Coming at what he describes
as "the psychological moment” in an "Age of Anxiety," Dar
winian theory, expanded under the operation of Ramean
method, provided a "cosmic sanction" for the perceived
realities of American life ("Impact...," 439).
82. Persons, Minds. 241. Person’s analysis identifies
two distinct responses to two elements in Darwinian evolu
tion -- heredity and environment. The first, operating
under Malthusian assumptions, generated an essentially con
servative response (here find Sumner and the naturalists,
as well as Fiske and Abbott). The second, viewing the
"struggle" for survival as an immanent process, generated
an essentially liberal response (here find Leconte, Ward
and Social Gospellers in general).
While the distinction
is instructive, however, it remains irrelevant to the pre
sent argument since both evolutionary "schools" built their
models on the same philosophic ground, as the following
makes clear.
Furthermore, a correlative argument could be
made that these two "strains" of American Darwinism drew on
the two operative components of American Ramism -- technologia and eupraxia.
For a discussion of the ambiguities
of Darwinian struggle see Peter J. Bowler, "Malthus, Darwin
and the Concept of Struggle," JHI 37(1976):631-650.
83. Herein lay the fundamental difference between
Spencer and his American counterparts.
Spencer mixed Lock
ean empiricism with mechanics to develop what Bergson would
later call "a false evolutionism" (Creative Evolution
(London, 1907), xiv).
He presented an essentially static
model which equated progress with "persistence" and goals
with "an impassable limit" (First Principles (New York,
1903), 369). William Graham Sumner, on the other hand
assumed the evolutionary efficacy of Protestant ideals.
Sumner and his disciples refused to divorce the message of
evolution from the "gospel of progress." Evolution, Rock
efeller claimed "is merely the working-out of a law of
nature and a law of God" (Quoted in Hofstadter, Social Dar
winism . 45). Moreover, not only was evolution teleological
-- it was open-ended.
"There is no conceivable end to
[man’s] march to perfection," Carnegie claimed, refuting
Spencer (Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (Boston, 1920),
327). Most significantly in the present context,
American
"Spencerians" retained a Ramean epistemology. Using a
striking mixture of Ramean and Baconian metaphors, Sumner
described experience as "a mixture of convention and
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wonder, half prudence, half gambling.
What we call 'brute
facts'...are partly to be understood as normal events,
partly as 'acts of God'” (Schneider, History. 353). This
desire to preserve the rational character of the inventive
intelligence and minimize fortuitous instincts clearly dif
ferentiates American from English "Spencerianism."
84.
Drawing on a Jeffersonian view of biological com
munity, the Social Gospellers constructed a reform ideology
which refuted Darwinism as a conservative rationale and
incorporated evolutionary theory into a program for social
action.
Henry George gave this "reforming Darwinism" its
clearest quantitative expression in Progress and Poverty
(1879) where he used a statistical approach to affirm the
ability of political action to change the curve of develop
ment outlined by Malthus and Spencer.
Lester Ward gave it
a philosophical base in his Dynamic Sociology (1883), argu
ing from a distinction between telic and genetic phenomena
to a conception of progress as a moral imperative rather
than a physical law. Given fanciful expression and popular
appeal in Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, the gospel of
cooperation claimed the scientific ability to change "the
conditions of human life...and with them the motives of
human action" (Looking Backward (Boston, 1889), 60-61).
It
is interesting in the present context to compare this
moralistic approach to scientific reform with its French
counterpart, Saint-Simonian Technocracy.
For Saint-Simon,
the principle of cooperation expressed a social law driven
by physiological mechanisms.
For George and Ward it
remained a moral law grounded in psychological structure.
For a relevant discussion see R. B. Carlisle "The Birth of
Technocracy: Science, Society, and Saint-Simonians," JHI
35(1974):445-464.
Schneider comments on the necessity of
viewing reform Darwinism "as indigenous and not merely as
an extension of European movements" (History. 191).
85. According to the theists, Darwin had provided an
evolutionary proof of God far more potent than the New
tonian argument from design.
"He who has mastered the Dar
winian theory," Fiske claimed, "sees that in the deadly
struggle for existence which has raged throughout countless
aeons of time, the whole creation has been groaning and
travailing together in order to bring forth that last con
summate specimen of God’s handiwork, the Human Soul"
(Miscellaneous Writings (Boston, 1884), IX, 19). Evolution
in fact proclaimed a gospel of good cheer which identified
redemption as a promise incarnate in the objective
processes of nature itself (Ibid., VII, 184). Although in
most cases the Christianity of the "theistic evolutionists"
proved purely nominal (see particularly Frank Abbott's
epistemological critique in Scientific Theism (1885)),
their arguments were marshalled in support of an orthodox
theology and a conservative ethic.

354

86.
"Organic evolution," Leconte maintained, "is by
vis a tergo, a pushing upward and forward from below and
behind."
In social evolution, however, growth occurred "by
a vis a fronte, a drawing upward and forward from above and
in front by an aspiration, an attraction toward an ideal."
The course of history represented a dialectical interchange
between the two ("The Theory of Evolution and Social Pro
gress," The Monist 5(July 1895 ):492-493).
Like Hegel’s
scheme, Leconte’s theory culminated on an ideal plane.
But
unlike Hegel, Leconte described an indefinite social
advance characterized by a "residual accumulation" of
reasonableness through which the ultimate laws of nature
would be fulfilled (Evolution: Its Nature. Its Evidences ,
and Its Relation to Religious Thought (New York, 1894), 6566). Variants of this idealism, from "Plato Clubs" to
Christian Science, reached out into American life
throughout the last decades of the 19th Century. Most
clearly articulated by the St. Louis Hegelians and by
Bronson Alcott's version of New England Transcendentalism,
these movements voiced the persistent American desire to
incorporate present experience into a wider spiritual econ
omy. More pertinent to the present context, however, is
the ultimate failure of "imported" idealisms to flourish
unaltered in the American intellectual milieu.
87. Substantial support exists for assuming the
predominance of Puritan and Ramean paradigms in the
scientific debates over evolution.
Van Wyck Brooks argues
for Boston as the dominant "culture-city" after Spengler’s
model (Flowering. 1936), 526-527), while Robert Bruce
quotes a contemporary as claiming that Boston was "the only
city where anything of account is done for science".
Bruce
pointB out that "it was evidently the human factor, the
spirit, the values and resources of the people, that
chiefly nurtured Boston science" (Launching. 32-35). Kuklick confirms this view (The Rise of American Philosophy
(New Haven, 1977), xviii), while Stow Persons describes a
characteristic "Protestant scholasticism" which, emanating
from New England, ”provide[d] intellectual stability and
order" to the nation (Minds. 202). Moreover, as Daniels
points out, the centering of the initial round of debates
in Boston ensured that the issues would be articulated in
metaphors consistent with a New England "perspective”
(Jackson. 243). Only in the South, in fact, where they
were "imbued with the spirit of Locke" did this dominant
influence breakdown (Irving Bartlett, The American Mind in
Mid-19th Century (New York, 1967), 115-116).
88. The idea of purpose, translated into an ideal of
progress, displayed unique characteristics in the American
context.
"The American idea of progress was one intrinsi
cally satisfied with most things as they were," Rush Welter
points out.
In America, progress would occur "within the
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framework of the existing social order." This American
perspective, which Welter calls "a habit of mind,” clearly
differentiated "the whole complex of American thought and
behavior from that of Europe" ("The Idea of Progress in
America: An Essay in Ideas and Methods," JHI 16(1955 ):404405, 407). The present argument would locate the source of
this "habit of mind" in a Ramean commitment to continuity.
89.
"If the study of physics has taught us anything,"
Fiske argued, "it is that nowhere in Nature is inertness or
quiescence to be found. All is quivering with energy" (The
Idea of God as Affected by Modern Knowledge (Cambridge,
1887), 149-150).
90. Sumner’s "folkways" expressed the evolutionary
counterpart of Scottish "moral sense". As "the rules of
the game" derived from experience and crystallized into
laws, they provided a convenient rationale for political
conservatism.
But from a logical point of view, they reas
serted the primacy of antecedent structure over discrete
events.
As symbolic renderings of environmental circum
stances, Sumner’s "folkways" represented a peculiarly
American synthesis of a Ramean heritage and the Darwinian
hypothes is.
91. Ward's "telic structures" differed from Sumner’s
"folkways" only in that they were functional and instrumen
tal rather than merely symbolic.
"The knowledge of experi
ence," Ward claimed, is "a genetic product" which builds
upon antecendent forms to supply rules for action under
present conditions (Dynamic Sociology (New York, 1883), II,
539).
It is interesting in the present context to note
that Ward differentiated between biologic and telic evolu
tion in the classic Ramean terms "natural" and "artificial"
and that his description of education as "the great
panacea" had clear Comenian overtones.
92.
"Our reason demands that there shall be a
reasonableness in the constitution of things," Fiske argued
in clear Ramean images. This rational constitution, woven
on "the roaring loom of Time [as an] endless web of
events ... make[s ] more and more clearly visible the living
garment of God" (Writings of John Fiske (Cambridge, 1902),
118, 188-189). The logical patrimony is patent, becoming
even more so as Fiske, following Edwards, disparages the
"apparent antagonism between Science and Religion" and
argues for the "epic of nature" as a palpable path to
objective truth (Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy (London,
1874), I, 184).
93. According to Leconte, no evolving form was
entirely new. "There is always a residuum, which accumlating throughout geological times, goes to form the cycle of
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the earth's life and development" ("The Natural Law of Cir
culation," Proceedings of the California State Teachers
Institute. Sept. 13-16(1871): 66, 62).
Leconte’s
"residuum" clearly differentiated his developmental scheme
from that of Lamarck and, in the absence of any cogent
genetic theory, from that of Darwin also.
Evolution, he
maintained, was merely "a law of derivation" ("Theory of
Evolution...," 487). Again, the controlling metaphors, as
well as the synoptic focus, are clearly Ramean.
94.
Louis Agassiz, "Evolution and the Permanence of
Type," Atlantic Monthly 33(1874):95.

Chapter 9
RAMUS. LEIBNIZ AND PEIRCE:
Metaphors of Continuity
in
Pragmatic Thought

By the 1870’s, when Charles Peirce applied himself to
the task, several American theorists had already supplied
important negative critiques of traditional logical models.
But none seemed able to shore up their critique with a
positive program sufficiently flexible to support both
their individual philosophic concerns and the meth
odological demands of evolution.

Evolutionary models con

tained an element of rudimentary contingency which seemed
impervious to logical analysis.

As Francis Bowen put it,

"the tendency of Mr. Darwin’s theory...is to enlarge the
domain of what is... arbitrary and contingent.

...[He]

denies that the same physical antecedents are always fol
lowed by the same consequents; he affirms that irregular
and unexpected variations are perpetually interrupting the
chain of orderly succession.”1

Chauncy Wright attempted an

analytical explanation of these variations in his discus
sion of the Unconditioned, but ended by employing the whim
sical image of "cosmical weather" to accomodate it to his
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philosophy.

His confusion before the randomness explicit

in Darwinian theory emerged in a tortured equation which he
gave as "the precise formula" for determining its impact.*
Wright’s attempt to calculate the operation of random
factors through the absolute variables of a mathematical
equation expressed the essence of the methodological
dilemma faced by logicians as they wrestled with the
theoretical implications of Darwinism.

For the logical

analog of contingency is probability, not arithmetic.

And

although previous empirical philosophies had acknowledged
the importance of probability, none had inquired into the
logical or analytical relations which governed its opera
tion.

Bacon, for instance, had invoked a rudimentary form

of probability in his Tables of Presence and Absence as
well as in his gradualist interpretation of "prerogative
instances."3

Similarly, Locke had acknowledged the impor

tance of probable relations but had declared analogy as
their "great rule," thereby neutralizing their potential
impact on science.4

Of all the empiricists, only Hume

seemed to have a mathematical conception of probability,
but he limited its operation to those verifiable physical
events which could be quantified.9

Significantly, all

these theories remained non-additive -- that is, they had
no means of accounting for the impact which one probability
statement had on another.

Hence, they could provide no

mechanism for reckoning the cumulative aspects of develop-
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ment which stood in need of logical justification after
1859.•
The natural laws which had underwritten Enlightenment
science had existed outside of space and time on a plane of
absolute mathematical certainty.7

The copula linking their

constituent parts had thus found adequate expression in the
equal sign and the verb to be.

But evolution demanded a

new logical grammar controlled by partial conjunctions
which could express the manifold existential relationships
it described.

It demanded a modal logic which could give

full scope to the constructive aspects of development and
yet provide an objective reference for the heuristic
process it implied.

In many ways, it required an inversion

of mental attitude curiously congruent to a Ramean logical
paradigm.
Colonial Ramists had trafficked in cognitive relations.
They had explicitly defined inquiry as "discourse" -- that
is, as a methodology akin to grammar which assumed rather
than verified its constituent terms and concentrated on
determining the semantic relationships which governed them.
Ramism construed inquiry as a means to determine the con
nections which pertained between the content of logical
loci.

Its processes of invention and colocation served to

arrange terms in objective patterns which the mind assessed
against cognitive "templates" through the operation of
judgement.

These "templates," which structured man’s
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innate rationality, contained not only the outlines of
providential design, but the accumulated wisdom of the
race, stored for recall through inquiry.
Moreover, Ramism supplied a logical mechanism for
expressing the adaptation of means to ends which lay at the
heart of the evolutionary process.

Ramist eupraxia could

easily extend its principles to encompass the functional
relationships which Darwin suggested between an organism
and its environment.

And technologia could provide a con

venient framework within which to analyze biological change
as a function of a permanent process.

The Ramean substruc

tures which supported American intellectual life thus had
the potential to provide a philosophic platform for a
processive theory of inquiry appropriate to a Darwinian
world-view.
But the controlling metaphors of Ramean logic had been
spatial.

Under Ramean method, discourse had aimed

primarily at providing a "map of the mind" -- a diagram
matic representation of the contents of consciousness which
could govern the disposition of terms.

Significantly, the

relationships among those terms, while objective, remained
static.

They had no temporal reference.

Evolutionary doc

trine, by contrast, effectively subsumed all relationships
under the notion of process.

It placed all phenomena,

including causation, in a temporal frame.'

Evolution, in

effect, demanded not only a map of the mind, but a history
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as well.

American theorists thus needed to accomplish a

fundamental shift in metaphors before they could adapt
their logical heritage to the demands of the new science.
They needed to invest their static spatial analogies with a
temporal dimension.
This was precisely the methodological task which
Charles Peirce undertook in his cognitive theories, which
set forth a processive theory of inquiry conceived as
propaedeutic to a realist reconstruction of science.
Peirce's logical theories established American logic in a
trajectory which would carry it well into the 20th Century.
In the present context, they also serve to demonstrate the
persistence of Ramean metaphors in the substructures of
American thought.
Peirce came upon his analysis peculiarly wellconditioned to grasp both its philosophic content and its
logical scope.

Born into what Van Wyck Brooks has called

"the younger generation of 1849," Peirce matured in an
intellectual atmosphere saturated with the philosophic con
cerns of a Puritanism declining into reaction.*

It is sig

nificant in the present context to note that Peirce, alone
among the later pragmatists, received no education abroad
but developed his thought entirely within the confines of
New England. Although he travelled extensively with the
Geodetic Survey in pursuit of a livelihood and read widely
across continental sources, his philosophical development
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proceeded almost exclusively within the intellectual orbit
of Cambridge.1*

Reared in a heterodox home where

scientists of the stature of Agassiz, Gibbs and Gray fre
quently joined Longfellow and Emerson in lively debate,
Peirce absorbed the eclectic biases of a generation of
self-conscious provincials who perceived as their revised
errand the task of leading America forward to an indigenous
culture.
Peirce's family had intimate ties with Harvard, where
his grandfather had been Librarian and institutional his
torian.

His own father, a remarkable scholar steeped in

mathematical lore and Unitarian theism, held chairs there
throughout his career, as did his brother.

During his

youth, Charles enjoyed the best that the Harvard tradition
had to offer and reaped the mature fruits of its
intellectual atmosphere.

Indeed until 1879, when he left

for Johns Hopkins, Peirce remained immersed in the Harvard
milieu.

By the time he left its controlling influence, he

had substantially matured as a thinker.

Moreover, after

Peirce left Baltimore, one scholar points out, he "lived in
almost total isolation.

Although he kept up a large cor

respondence and followed the journals at least sporadi
cally, he was not in direct contact with the men who were
doing new and exciting work even in his own fields."11
This intellectual isolation probably served to intensify
and deepen Peirce’s reliance on those models which had
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governed his early intellectual life -- models which the
present argument would identify as Ramean.
Charles frequently acknowledged his intellectual debt
to his father, claiming "if I do anything it will be his
work.”12

A brilliant mathematician who held chairs in

mathematics, natural philosophy and astronomy, the elder
Peirce also held strong views on the religious implications
of science and expounded a philosophy which, like that of
Colonial Ramists, claimed a special adaptation of the human
mind to nature.

He believed that knowledge of nature gave

insight into God’s purposive plan and that inquiry and
faith traced coordinate paths to truth.

"The mind of man

and that of Nature’s God must work in the same channels,"
he argued, explicitly identifying the pursuit of science as
a correlary of religious duty.12

A proponent of the

nebular hypothesis, he also subscribed to a pre-Darwinian
view of cosmic evolution which maintained the action of a
creative force in the initiation of a developmental process
whose subsequent progression occurred according to
universal laws.
Under his father’s tutelage, Peirce honed his substan
tial analytical powers on a rigorous regimen of logic,
mathematics and theory, and by the age of 25, had succumbed
to an intense preoccupation with logic which would shape
and direct his thought throughout his life.

Thomas Goudge

describes how Charles, while "still of tender age,...was
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given a table of logarithms, with one example of how to use
it to find the logarithm of a number, and another to
illustrate the multiplication of numbers by logarithms.
Beyond that the boy had to fend for himself in the mat
ter."14

Peirce himself relates how his father would

require that he repeat the demonstrations of various
philosophers and then "in a very few words would usually
rip them up and show them empty."1* "From the moment when I
could think at all,” Peirce claimed from the vantage point
of 40 years, "I have been diligently and incessantly
occupied with the study of methods [of] inquiry, both of
those which have been and are pursued and those which ought
to be pursued."1*

"It was the topic to which he looked for

the most enlightenment in philosophy," James Feibleman
notes. "He studied all the logic he could find and probably
read more books on the subject than any other student of
his d a y ."1*
Peirce developed his own logic as a systematic reaction
to European logical models -- a task for which his idiosyn
cratic background had prepared him well.1*

Deeply read in

continental sources and trained in critical analysis by his
formidable father, Peirce demonstrated his analytical
skills in a series of methodological critiques which early
betrayed the distinctly American character of his
thought.1*

In 1860, with the revealing invocation "I pray

thee, O Father, to help me regard my innate ideas as objec
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tively real," Peirce embarked on a philosophic odyssey in
search of a method which could bring the increasingly
urgent demands of experimental science into conformity with
the conceptual demands of his own intellectual heritage.20
"Science [had] hitherto been proceeding without the guid
ance of any rational theory of logic," he would write later
in life.

"In my opinion, the time [had] come when it ought

to be provided with a logic."21

Turning first to a com

mentary on Kant, then to a critique of British empiricism
and finally to a rejection of Cartesian psychologism,
Peirce had arrived by 1877 at a characteristic theory of
inquiry which would survive the many tortured turns his
philosophy would take over the course of his career.
Peirce’s later thought, which one can quote to support
a variety of positions, can in fact be separated biographically from his earlier works in logic considered here.

The

years between 1859 and 1879, a period which qualifies as
"formative" for Peirce, found him confined almost com
pletely within the Cambridge intellectual milieu.

But in

1879, less than a year after completing his crucial
Illustrations of the Logic of Science, Peirce left Cam
bridge for Baltimore where, presumably, a wider range of
philosophic influences came to bear on his thought.

Sig

nificantly, however, Kuklick points out that when scholars
look to Peirce for logical insights, they go "almost exclu
sively to the published series of works that Peirce pro
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duced in the 1860's and 1870’s.''

Boler concurs, adding

that the logic developed during this period "does not drop
out of his writings at all; on the contrary, it gains
increasing prominence.

2

The present argument, of course,

gains force by accepting the chronology of Kuklick and
Boler, since those works written before 1879 provide the
strongest evidence for the persistence of Ramean models.
As early as 1859, Peirce began transforming Kantian
categories into his own triadic conception of reality.

In

Axioms of Intuition After Kant, he fused Kant’s "space" and
"time” into a characteristic notion of a "third dimension."
In 1865, in his seventh Harvard Lecture, he related Kant’s
categories directly to issues in the logic of science.

In

1866 he laid out his own Method of Searching for the
Categories, which led him a year later to his New List of
Categories, considered by Peirce himself as his "one con
tribution to philosophy ...the gift I make to the world."23
The key to Peirce’s Kantian critique lay in his
insistence on the central role of sign relations in the
structure and function of arguments, an inquiry to which he
"devoted more labor...than to any other single field of
research."

By insisting that all reasoning consisted in

sign relations, Peirce in a sense went behind Kant’s
categories to examine the structural elements which
underwrote their validity.

In doing so, he neutralized the

central Kantian notion of the ding an sich and replaced it
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with his own notion of reality grounded in relation.

"The

great and fundamental secret of the logic of science,"
Peirce claimed, is that "there is no term, properly so
called, which is entirely destitute of information."

Hence

"there can be no conception of the absolutely incognizable,
since nothing of that sort occurs in experience."

In 1871

he pointed out that his own idea of reality was "instantly
fatal to the idea of a thing in itself."*1

Like Miller's

good Puritan, Peirce declared that "cognizability. ..and
being are... synonymous terms."**

The result, Feibleman

claims, "was the complete objectification of the Kantian
system."*•
Peirce focused his critique of British empiricism on
its associationist assumptions, which denied the shared
elements of experience essential to Ramism.

He declared

Locke's psychological critique "wholly inadequate and
false,” and argued, against Mill, that logic must extend to
those "circumstances [which] are not within the range of
our experience."

Significantly, he identified Whewell as

"the most profound [English] writer upon our subject,"
saying that his works contained "at least the possible germ
of a strictly logical doctrine of induction."

Comte he

described as "helplessly restricted to a single
intellectual point of view,

while Mill, about whom "the

worst thing to be said...is that he is an admirer of August
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Comte," he accused of falling victim to a p'jtitio principii
through his excessive reliance on association.*1
Pointing out "the peculiarities of the English mind,"
Peirce criticized the empiricists as "a somewhat insular
group of thinkers...[whose] chief methodological character
istic.^..is the application of Ockham’s razor...to every
thing which looks like a metaphysical superfluity."

Asso-

ciationism, he claimed "has nothing to do with logic what
soever," repeatedly referring to the "peculiar lines of
thought" which ran through English logic as a "certain fam
ily resemblance" grounded in a "nominalistic tendency."**
His critique culminated in the 1871 Review of Fraser's
Berkeley, which consolidated his position into a fully
articulated allegiance to a realism grounded in consensual
Knowledge.
But Peirce reserved his most devastating critique for
Descartes.

"If Kant was his teacher, and Duns Scotus his

friend,” Feibleman claims, "Descartes was his adversary.”**
Peirce launched a major offensive against Descartes’
psychologism in three articles which appeared in the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy beginning in 1868.*°

In

the first, Peirce redefined Cartesian intuition and intro
spection as mediated inferential processes.

In the second,

he mounted an attack on the Cartesian pretension to
universal doubt and innatism.

Descartes, Peirce claimed

had mistakenly confined reasoning to ”a single thread of
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inference depending upon inconspicuous preiisses," ignoring
the fact that inference "derives its validity from its com
bining the character of induction and hypothesis" (pace
Bacon and Ramus!).11
Peirce reenforced this position in the third article in
the series, which defended the syllogism on the purely
Wolffian grounds that "the relation between syllogism and
thought does not spring from considerations of formal
logic, but from those of psychology" -- that is, from the
natural structures of the mind.

He recapped these argu

ments in his Lessons in Practical Logic in 1869 where, sig
nificantly, he quoted Peter of Spain in his own defense.
"It would be difficult indeed to overstate the importance
of these three papers in the Peircean corpus,” Fisch
claims.11

The present argument would certainly agree,

since they led directly into the arguments presented in his
Illustrations of the Logic of Science, for which they pro
vide a curiously Ramean backdrop.
Scholars, encouraged by Peirce's own admission that as
"a babe in philosophy [his] bottle was filled from the
udders of Kant," as well as by the tenor and sheer volume
of textual references, have generally given Kantian
philosophy priority in discussing the origins of Peirce's
thought.11

Research by Max Fisch, however, suggests an

interesting dimension to Peirce’s abundantly analyzed
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ambivalence toward Kant -- a dimension which has special
relevance for the present argument.
Fisch argues for a determining influence on Peirce’s
thought by the writings of Leibniz. "The name of Leibniz
was familiar in the Peirce household and in the Cambridge
of his youth," he points out.

"His father was a leading

member of the Cambridge Scientific Club, which had several
meetings on Leibniz.”

Moreover, Fisch notes, throughout

Peirce's college career -- that is, before and during that
time during which scholars normally portray Peirce as
immersed in Kant -- Benjamin Peirce was preparing and pub
lishing his Analytic Mechanics, which "contained an appen
dix arguing for a return to Leibniz' position on the force
of moving bodies.”

In 1876, just before Peirce began his

Illustrations, Benjamin published his last work, "A New
System of Binary Arithmetic," which he compared step by
step with Leibniz' system.*4
It seems likely, in the light of Fisch’s observations,
that Leibniz would have been a regular topic of sympathetic
debate in the Peirce household during an important phase of
Charles* intellectual development -- a phase which led into
his critique of Kant.

Fisch suggests that "while accepting

without change scarcely any of his positive doctrines,
Peirce identified himself more closely with Leibniz than
with any other thinker."

Leroy Loemker lends support to

Fisch’s argument, claiming that Peirce "knew Leibniz better
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than any other Aaerican of his time.”*®

Indeed, not only

did Peirce’s exposure to Leibnizian logic preceed his
exposure to that of Kant, Fisch claims, but Peirce’s read
ing of Kant in fact proceeded in the context of "the liter
ature in the light of which it was to be understood; espe
cially ... Leibniz and Wolff."*®
"Peirce was no Kantian," Feibleman agrees, pointing out
that Kantian philosophy remained "a discipline rather than
a revelation of the truth” to Peirce and served him
primarily as a negative example.
emerge as a neo-Kantian.

Nor, he adds, did Peirce

"While [he] owed much in the

formation of his philosophy to the influence of Kant, the
result was

not Kant’s philosophy nor even that of a good

Kantian."

"In this distinction," he argueB, "iscontained

the key to

the understanding of much in Peirce's whole

position."*7

Kant’s Critique, although at first praised by

Peirce as "perhaps the greatest work of the human
intellect" was ultimately rejected as "in reality nothing
more portentous than a sickly little nanny-goat masquerad
ing as a world-shatterer," while Leibniz, by contrast,
remained "the Columbus of the subconscious mind."

"The

reasoning of Leibniz," Peirce claimed, "was nearly, if not
quite, of the highest order, being far more accurate than
that of Kant or almost any metaphysicians that can be
named."
logician,

Kant,

although "constituted by nature agreat

[was] not indeed to be compared with Leibniz, who
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in his later years, in his infinitesinal calculus, in his
law of continuity... soared high above his earlier
nominal ism.’’*•
Fisch conjectures that Peirce’s persistent and out
spoken preference for Leibniz over Kant may well mark his
"first steps from nominalism toward realism.”1*

Indeed

Peirce’s fascination for scholastic realism, and for Duns
Scotus in particular, dates from precisely the period which
Fisch describes.40

Peirce turned to Scotus after, and in

reaction to, his study of Kant and it was in his reading of
Scotus that he found justification for his own logical
program.

"Pragmatism,” Peirce himself later pointed out,

"could hardly have entered a head that was not already con
vinced that there are real generals."41

By 1868, Peirce

was ready to identify hiB position with scholastic realism
and, by 1869, had identified that realism with the concept
of continuity.

By 1871, he had explicitly identified his

own logic of science with Scotist realism and had concluded
that "science has alwayB been at heart realistic, and must
always be so."41
All these factors lead Fisch to claim that, in certain
respects, Peirce’s pragmatism "was a matter of going on
from where Leibniz left off."41

If Fisch's reading of the

documents is correct, Peirce’s enduring sympathy for "the
glorious logical strength of Leibniz” may have important
implications for the current argument, which would further
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claim that this affinity in fact rested on deep-seated
resonances between Leibniz’ "great principle of continuity"
and Peirce’s own native Ramean heritage.**
Synechism, "or the principle of universal con
tinuity. ..which is involved in all existence," played a
central role in Peirce’s thought.**

"We ought to assume

things to be continuous as far as we can," Peirce
insisted.**

In fact, he identified his own intellectual

errand as the task of "carrying the idea of Continuity into
all parts of philosophy."*7

As early as 1867, Peirce

propounded a theory of continuity similar to Leibniz’
own.**

In 1868, he reiterated that principle in three

papers on the validity of the laws of logic.**

In 1884, he

again endorsed continuity, attributing the principle
directly to Leibniz and in 1899 claimed, in a review of
Renouvier’s La Nouvelle Monadology, that the principle of
continuity "would form the basis of a philosophy in deepest
unison with the ideas of the last half of the 19th
Century."*0

Indeed as late as 1893, Peirce was still

articulating a theory close to Leibniz’ in a discussion of
the evolution of natural laws.*1

His later interest in

topical geometry, existential graphs, and semiotics all
maintained this persistent commitment to continuity.*1
Peirce’s entire phenomenology in fact had harmonics in a
Ramean logical paradigm.
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Although Peirce did not articulate his phenomenology,
or phaneroscopy, until around 1900, indications of it
appear in his thought as early as 1867, during that period
in which Fisch describes him as "under the influence" of
Leibniz.

And Peirce’s phaneroscopy in fact contains clear

echoes of Ramean metaphors.

The Ramist ideal of an acces

sible order totally within the ambit of the conscious mind
emerged in his definition of philosophy as "an experimental
science, resting on that experience which is common to us
all." Truth is only necessary, Peirce argued, "in the sense
that all the world knows beyond all doubt those truths of
experience upon which [it] is founded."

For Peirce, as for

Ramus, philosophy, as "the most primal of all the positive
sciences" rested always on the Ramean presuppositions that
the phanera remained fundamentally the same for everyone,
and were completely accessible to rational inquiry.5*
The conceptual congruences between Peircean and Ramean
logic extend as well to Peirce’s theories of classification
and communication.

One need only insert the word "place"

to make Peirce read like a Ramist when he defines a natural
class as "a family whose members are the sole offspring and
vehicles of one idea."

His description of classification

as "a kind of Argument by which general ideas are attached
to the objects of experience," as well as his claims that
thought "invariably needs something like a diagram" or
"tabular array of familiar symbols” to make itself clear
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all employed explicit Ramean images.

His faith in the

argument as the fundamental logical form, his designation
of judgement as the source of "leading principles," and his
reliance on the intermediate step of colocation all echoed
Ramean metaphors.

Moreover, Peirce, in his semiotic, hoped

to resuscitate the Ramean discipline of "Speculative
Rhetoric" as "the highest and most living branch of
logic."**
It is difficult, however, to demonstrate substantive
ties between Ramean logic proper and Peirce’s philosophy.
The Collected Papers contain only three references to
Ramus, while Fisch’s Chronological Edition adds only three
others to date.

Fortunately for this author, Fisch has

completed his Chronological Edition through 1878, the year
in which the final Illustration appeared.

The material

contained therein can thus be construed as indicative of
those Ramean factors which might have effected the forma
tion of the argument Peirce makes in these crucial essays.
Unfortunately, the references are scattered and
ambiguous.

In one included in Fisch’s edition, Peirce

brackets Ramus with Kant as a reformer in logic and
science; in another he links him with Cicero and comments
(negatively) on his rhetorical focus; in a third he links
Ramus with Agricola and "the peculiarities of the humanist
mind. In this same passage, however, Peirce significantly
accuses Bacon and Locke of "putting aside the old syl
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logistic and topics as though they contained something
false, instead of being only incomplete.*9

In two of the

references contained in the Collected Papers, Peirce shows
some familiarity with Ramean texts themselves and includes
Ramus in an etymological account of the Kantian term
Kritik.

In the third, he describes Ramus as representative

of "a new awakening" which brought "rather important things
to the tradition of logic."
and Valla.59

Here he ranks Ramus with Vives

In a later reference in a review of Greens-

let's Joseph Glanvilie, Peirce credits Ramus with "attack
ing Aristotle in large round style" and links him with
G iordano Bruno.9T
Yet in the present context, even this meager evidence
proves significant.

The fact that a logician of Peirce's

stature would decline to analyze in depth the texts of a
logician of Ramus’ stripe is not surprising.

But the

references show that Peirce, through his extensive read
ings, had become familiar with Ramean models -- something
which probably could not be said of most of his con
temporaries.

Significantly when the editors of the Century

Dictionary needed entries on "Ramism" and "Ramist," they
turned to Peirce, whose subsequent contributions described
Ramism as a logical system "characterized by simplicity and
good sense,
skill.”99

[which] was set forth with some literary
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Indeed, Peirce’s education and family background make
it almost inconceivable that Peirce could have escaped some
contact with Ramean texts in his early methodological
inquiries.

And the fact remains that Peirce found occasion

to mention Ramus several times in his writings without
seriously attacking him -- a priviledge not enjoyed by most
other logicians.

Moreover, Peirce’s sympathies for the

philosophical implications of Ramism, though unattributed,
emerge clearly in his own methodological orientation and in
his adoption of those elements of Leibniz' thought which
represent survivals of the Ramism which underwrote the
German models discussed above.
Peirce declared his methodological affiliation early on
in a note which described "two methods of viewing
metaphysics which give rise to two methods of treating it.
One starts by drawing the conceptions from logical rela
tions and thence reasoning to their place in the mind; the
other starts by drawing the conceptions from the system of
psychology and reasoning to their logical meaning.

The

former," he decided, "seems to me, if less psychologically
exact, to be more metaphysically true in its results, and
it is the method I adopt."*•

This methodological commit

ment, with its clear Ramean overtones, remained firm
throughout Peirce’s career.
The tie between Ramus and Peirce resides in fact in
biography, not bibliography.

Absorbed as a latent value
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system through the Cambridge intellectual milieu, his
father's philosophical biases and the educational atmos
phere of 19th Century Harvard, Peirce’s ''Ramism” appears in
his writings as a commitment to those realist substructures
which had governed American intellectual life since the
founding of the Citty.

His entire cosmology, with its

explicit defense of "cosmic reasonableness" and "collective
wisdom,” rests upon an ontology which, like Ramus’ own,
acknowledged the reality of the shared elements of human
experience.
Peirce held that logic comprised "the traditional expe
rience of mankind."

Thus it not only controlled inquiry,

it revealed the actual structure of reality itself.

These

functions merged in the science of Bemiotic, which began
with the Ramean assumption of a universe held in common
through experience.

Semiotic incorporated under its prin

ciples "the total everyday experience of many generations
of multitudinous populations."*0

Fisch claims that Peirce

had committed himself to a semiotic view as early as 1868
and was, at his death, still hard at work on 'A System of
Logic Considered as Semiotic’.

In fact, Fisch places all

Peirce’s work in logic within a semiotic framework.*1

But

this extension of logic to semiosis drew on directly on
Peirce’s affinity for medieval logicians, Peter of Spain
among them.**

Moreover, it had harmonics in Peirce’s

Ramean heritage, where the crucial doctrine of the logos
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provided it with a platform, as well as in the Comenian
tradition which had remade German logic in the Ramean image
-- an influence which in turn came to bear on Peirce
through Leibniz.
Paul Conkin characterizes Peirce as one of "the last
spiritual children of Puritan New England," a latter-day
Saint who sought principles of rational order which would
ultimately illuminate the purpose of the natural world.*1
Drawing on powerful metaphors embedded deep in his
intellectual heritage, Peirce set out to develop a logical
system which could heal the rift between fact and form
caused by science in the modern world.

Like a good Ramist,

he attempted in his logic to construct a probative frame
work within which a cognitive covenant could link conduct
and concept through a bond of meaning.

This covenant,

articulated most clearly in his Illustrations of the Logic
of Science, proved to be one of the most enduring elements
of Peirce’s shifting and often paradoxical thought.

380

CHAPTBR NOTES

1. Francis Bowen, "Review of Darwin’s Origin of the
Species," North American Review 90(1860), 506.
2. "The living forces
potentials of their forces
ical values of their heat,
(Philosophical Discussions

of all moving bodies, minus the
of gravitation, plus the mechan
equal to a constant quantity"
(New York, 1877), 19).

3.

NO, II, xxii in Works, I, 268.

4.

Locke, Essay. IV. xvi. 12.

5.

Hume, Treatise. I. iii , 6.

6. Bayard Rankin presents a relevant discussion of
probability in "The History of Probability and the Changing
Concept of the Individual," JHI 27(1966):483-504.
Drawing
on distinctions between the classical figures of Tyche and
Moira, Rankin describes probability as an analytical corre
late of a dynamic interaction between the individual and
its statistical counterpart, the population.
"The problem
of Tyche and Moira," he claims, relates to the theoretical
problems which emerge in quantum mechanics and is in fact
"prophetic in emerging into the realm of ideas long before
scientific instruments could probe it and long before
scientific thought could cope with its intricate nature"
(Ibid., 490). Rankin focuses his discussion on probability
theory as it relates to changing conceptions of the indi
vidual and consequently ignores the wider issues implicit
therein. The present argument, however, would interpret
Rankin’s "population" as "community" and extend his obser
vations to include the question at hand. Peirce’s use of
the terms "tychism" and "tychistic" make the extension par
ticularly apt.
7. For a discussion of natural law which has implica
tions for the present question see Leonard Krieger, "Kant
and the Crisis of Natural Law," JHI 26(1965):191-210.
8. Kant had attempted to address a similar logical
issue by bringing causality under the categories of experi
ence, but he had ultimately been driven back through a
logical regress to an incognizable Ding an sich which pre
cluded "scientific" knowledge of hypothetical forms —
knowledge which a later generation of theorists demanded.
Empiricists could accept Kant’s logical compromise in
exchange for the protections of an unrelenting positivism.
Minds trained up in the Ramean tradition, on the other
hand, could not.
Their innate rationality precluded it.

381

This was essentially the gist of Sir William Hamilton's
critique of Mill -- a critique which Peirce read with great
sympathy.
9.

Brooks, Flowering. 180.

10. Indeed Peirce himself claimed that the New Bngland
mind "had a peculiar genius for philosophy," one to which
he apparently considered himself heir. He indulged in a
lengthy paean to the "subtlety and ideality of the Yankee
mind,” and noted, interestingly, that "the Scotch and the
Germans are the peoples with whom the New Englanders ought
to be compared." CE 1.455-456.
11. Murray Murphey, The Development of Peirce's
Philosophy (Cambridge, 1961), 292-293.
12.

CP 3.405.

13. See Benjamin Peirce: 1809-1880 - By Various Hands
(Oberlin, 1925), 6 and Astronomical Journal 2(1851):19.
14. Thomas Goudge, The Thought of C. S. Peirce (New
York, 1969), 327.
15.

CP 3.405.

16.

CP 1.3.

17. Janes K. Feibleman.An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce. (Cambridge, 1969), 20.
18. Feibleman identifies twelve specific logical
theories which Peirce sought to discredit on the grounds of
their reliance on "subjective feeling, on the natural light
of reason, on philosophy, on psychology, on the data of
psychology, on epistemology, on philology, on the order of
society, on the authority of theChurch, on the history of
science, on individualexperience
and on factsreasoned
about" (Introduction. 81-84). The present argument will
confine itself to the three major traditions into which
these twelve theories fall -- the Kantian, the Lockean and
the Cartesian -- in order to maintain the historical focus
of previous chapters.
19. The principle documents are the 1864 Treatise of
the Major Premisses of Natural Science, which describes the
principles of science in Baconian terms, as a priori
"anticipations of experience"; the 1865 Harvard Lectures On
the Logic of Science, which investigate "the degree and
character of the certainty of scientific ratiocination
[and] ...primitive principles" in the context of an
ex Pi icit critique of British empiricism; the 1865 Logic of

382

the Sciences, which traces the rough outlines of Peirce’s
later semiotic theories; the 1866 Logic Notebook which con
tains the significant assertion that "there is no dif
ference logically between hypotheticals and categoricals";
The Lowell Lectures on The Logic of Science, with the
important addendum Or Induction snd Hypothesis, which des
cribe logic as "a testing art" and present an indepth
examination of the nature of inference; the 1866 On a
Method of Searching for the Categories which deals with the
nature of intuition and anticipates Peirce’B rejection of
Descartes; the 1867 Critique of Positivism, which
identifies it as "entirely false” ; the 1868 Questions Con
cerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man and Some Con
sequences of Four Incapacities, which together reject
Cartesian innatism and psychologism as irrelevant to the
task of logic; the 1869 English Doctrine of Ideas and Lec
tures on British Logicians, which reject associationiBt
theory as "simple Bnglish psychology"; and the important
1871 Berkeley Review, which refines the arguments of ear
lier critiques and sketches the outlines of Peirce’s own
later thought.
20.

CE l.xlvi.

21. C. S. Peirce to G. F. Becker, June 11, 1893;
quoted in Nathan Reingold, Science in 19th Century America
(New York, 1964) , 231.
22.

Kuklick, Rise. 125; Boler, Realism. 152.

23.

CE 1.xxvi.

24. CE l.xxiii;
5.255; CE 2.469.

CP 3.641;

CP 1.350;

CE 1.465;

25.

CE 2.208.

26.

Feibleman, Introduction. 37.

27.

CE 1.172; CE 1.201; CE 1.211,209; CE 1.212.

28.

CE 2.302;

29.

Feibleman, Introduction. 69.

CP

See also CP 5.452.

CE 1.362; CB 2.310.

30. CE 2.193-2172.
Fisch includes an early manuscript
version under the title Questions Concerning Reality (CE
2. 162-186).
31. CE 2.193;
CE 2.268.
32.

CP 5.265; CP 5.63; CP 5.264; CE 2.220;

CE 2.351; CE 2.xlii.

383

33. CP 2.113. See also CPI.4, CPI.563. Max Fisch, on
the other hand, claims that the first book in logic read by
Peirce was Whately’s Elements of Logic, devoured at the age
of twelve (CB l.xix). Goudge concurs and states that
Whately "opened up the domain of logical analysis, and
pointed his mind in the direction of semiotic" (Thought.
334) .
34.

Max Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," JHI 33( 1972 ):485-

491.
35.
Ibid., 496; Leibniz, Philosophical Papers and
Letters. trans. Leroy Loemker (Dordrecht, 1969), 57.
36.

Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," 490.

37.

Feibleman, Introduction. 11-12, 33-34.

38. CE 1.104; Peirce Ms 609, p.9, quoted in Fisch,
"Peirce and Leibniz," 496; Review of Latta’s translation of
the Monadology, The Nation 68(1899):210; Peirce Ms 609,
p .9 .
39.
40.
Realism

Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz,” 491, 496.
See John Boler, Charles Peirce and Scholastic
(Seattle, 1963), 152.

41.
CP 1.19, 1.560; CP 5.503.
5.439, 5.453, 6.485, 8.208, 8.258.

See also CP 5.423,

42.
CE 2.239; CE 2.336; CE 2.462-492; CP 1.20. In the
present context, it is interesting that Feibleman
identifies Reid as the second, and perhapB proximate,
source of Peirce's realism (Introduction. 451-457; See also
"Reid and the Origins of Modern Realism," JHI 5(1944):113—
120). Peirce himself acknowledged his debt to Reid (See
particularly CP 5.438-463 and CP 5.502-537). Reid’s ties to
Ramism are discussed above.
43.

Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," 492.

44. Peirce Ms 284, p.13, quoted in Fisch, "Peirce and
Leibnez," 495.
45. Peirce Ms L107, p.10, quoted in Fisch, "Peirce and
Leibniz," 493.
46.

CP 6.277.

47.
"The 19th Century: Notes," Peirce MSS quoted in
Wiener, Values. 261.

384

48.

CP 2.392.

49. See especially CP 5.263, 5.267, 5.284, 5.289,
5.295, 5.311, 5.327, 5.329, 5.333-336.
50. Peirce Ms L107, p.10, quoted in Fisch, "Peirce and
Leibniz," 493; The Nation 69(1899):97-98.
51. CP 8.276. Peirce called the postulate of con
tinuity "the leading conception of science" (CP 1.62).
52. Fisch concludes that "Peirce's chief contribution
to experimental psychology, as well as his mathematics,
logic, and metaphysics, had Leibnizian affiliations"
(Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," 493).
53. CP 3.560; CP 5.39. For an interesting general
discussion of the relationship between phenomenological
thought and logical realism see Robert J. Henle, S. J., "A
Phenomenological Approach to Realism," in Gilson Tribute
ed. C. G. O ’Neill (Milwaukee, 1959), 68-85.
54. CP 1.222; CP 6.472; CP 2.267; CP 3.419; CP 2.619;
CP 2.356; CP 2.462-465; CP 2.333.
55.

CE 1.162; CE 1.163; CE 3.3.

56.

CP 1.355; CP 2.205; CP 4.30.

57. C. S. Peirce, review of Ferris Greenslet’s Joseph
Glanville in The Nation 71(11 Oct 1900):295-296.
In terms
of the topical tradition in general, Peirce's references
are numerous (some twelve in the Collected Papers and
another eight in the Chronological Edition) and, on the
whole, positive.
58. The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia: With a New
Atlas of the World; A Work of General Reference in All
Departments of Knowledge (New York, 1909) 12 vol. Peirce's
annotated set of the C entury Dictionary, with his own con
tributions marked in green, are in the Houghton Library at
Harvard. The entries for Ramism and Ramist appear on page
4950.
59. Fragment dated July 3, 1860, quoted in Philip
Wiener, "Peirce's Evolutionism and Pragmatism," JHI
7(1946):325.
See also CE 1.63.
60.

CP 1.654;

CP 2.357; CP 5.522.

61.
CP 2.241; Max Fisch, "Peirce’s Place in American
Thought," Ars Semeiotica 1/2(1977 ):21-37).

385

62. John Deeley traces the roots of semiosis in Intro
ducing Semiotic: Its History and Doctrine (Bloomington,
1982), tying it explicitly to Peter of Spain.
But Deeley
claims the most important important lines of transmission
ran through Fonseca and Poinsot. The present argument
would trace an equally important influence through Ramus
and Comenius. (It is interesting to note here that Deely
acknowledges that Fonseca’s doctrines were being taught at
Graz in Austria in 1615 and makes explicit ties to the
Ramean tradition through Agricola (Ibid,. 75, 160-161).
For relevant discussions see Sandra Rosenthal, "C. S.
Peirce: Pragmatism, Semiotic Structure and Lived Perceptual
Experience," JHP 17(1979):285-290; T. L. Short, "Life Among
the Legisigns," in Deely, Frontiers; Charles W. Morris,
(The Pragmatic Movement in American Philosophy (New York,
1970) .
63. Peirce "wanted not only substance but order," Conkin claims.
"His bent was ever toward complete synthesis.
Like the Puritan who toiled at his systematic classifica
tion of all the arts, Peirce...classified as an act of
piety, in order to elaborate the order of creation and the
intentions of God.” He was "Edward’s first real succes
sor," Conkin maintains -- a logician who read the cosmos as
a living symbol of a divinity that wanted to be fully com
prehended.
Conkin, Puritans. 306, 205-206, 193.

Chapter 10
THB MENDING OF *KNOWLEDGE BROKEN ':
Pei rce
and the
Continuity Thesis

As Fisch’s chronology makes clear, by 1872 Peirce had
committed himself almost exclusively to a methodological
inquiry which culminated five years later in his Illustra
tions of the Logic of Science.1

The Illustrations, which

dared to acknowledge the sweeping philosophic implications
of modern science, presented a cogent argument for a moder
ate realism recast in a scientific image.*

Peirce strove

therein to provide a synoptic synthesis of order and func
tion which could serve as logical ground for both the grad
ualism implicit in evolution and the hypothetical
inferences inherent in theoretical forms.

Through a radi

cal reformulation of experience grounded in biological
function, Peirce dissolved meaning and method into alterna
tive, though individually valid and purposively distinct,
environmental responses.

The resulting cognitive theory,

which embraced Peirce's pragmatic maxim, made all
intellectual meaning ultimately a matter of purposive
action and tied existential fact to the very structure of
thought.

The first Illustration appeared in 1877 under the title
"The Fixation of Belief."

Here Peirce undertook, through

an analysis of the conditions of inquiry, to establish an
objective ground for those "guiding principles of
inference" for which he had argued in his earlier criti
ques.

"To describe the method of scientific investigation

is the object of this series of papers," he affirmed.

But

"since each chief step in science has been a lesson in
logic,” an analysis of "those rules of reasoning which are
deduced from the very idea of the process itself" and which
therefore "are the most essential," must precede any dis
cussion of science.

"A moment's thought will show,” he

argued, "that a variety of facts are already assumed when
the logical question is first asked. It is implied, for
instance, that there are such states of mind as doubt and
belief -- that a passage from one to the other is possible,
...and that this transition is subject to some rules which
all minds alike are bound by.”

Only by understanding the

grounds of this logical "transition," Peirce maintained,
could one truly comprehend the methods of science.3
"The object of reasoning," Peirce observed, "is to find
out, from the consideration of what we already know, some
thing elBe which we do not know."

But "that which

determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference
rather than another, is some habit of mind.”«

These

habits, he claimed, derived from an experiential passage
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from doubt to belief which "reminds us of the irritation of
a nerve and the reflex action produced thereby."®

Pointing

out that "we generally know when we wish to ask a question
and when we wish to pronounce a judgement," Peirce argued
that there must be "a dissimilarity between the sensation
of doubting and believing."

The first surfaced as "an

uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to
free ourselves," while the second emerged as "a calm and
satisfactory state which we do not wish to avoid."

The

struggle involved in the passage from one to the other,
Peirce concluded, must encompass the entire process of
inquiry, a process which resulted in "there being estab
lished in our nature some habit which will determine our
actions."•
The existential priority of doubt and belief in
Peirce's model allowed him to argue for the habits they
produced as normative principles grounded in the organic
metaboly of signs.

Moreover, as positive determinants to

action, habits took on an objective reality derived from
the verifiable processes which generated them.

"Habits

guide our desires and shape our actions," Peirce claimed.
Elsewhere he treated them as synonymous with natural law.7
In fact, according to Peirce, habits controlled the entire
process by which the mind crystallized itself into a
determinate world of "concrete reasonableness."

In a
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sense, he relied on habit to generate that perfect
rationality which the Colonial Rameans had simply assumed.
Peirce’s environmentally determined habits thus gave
him the objective justification he sought for the guiding
principles which underwrote scientific discovery.

Coin

cidentally, they demonstrated a structural correspondence
between reason and experience similar to that which had
controlled the logic of Colonial Ramists.

Like a good

Ramist, Peirce subscribed to a logical theory congruent to
the doctrine of means which interpreted ontology as a cog
nitive enterprise.

But by identifying habit as the

ultimate logical interpretant, Peirce essentially subsumed
the Ramist confusion of first and second intentions under
his general theory of semiotic, arriving thereby at a
curious inversion of Ramist ontology which "conceivefd]
Nature to be perpetually making deductions in Barbara.”
"Every scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon," he
claimed, "is a hypothesis that there is something in nature
to which the human reason is analogous."*
But in order to extend this analogy to the methods of
experimental science, Peirce needed to tie it to a cogni
tive theory which could validate both the logical and the
material aspects of inference.

He needed to ground it in

an ontology which, while relevant at the level of human
action, could withstand an extrinsic test.

Character

istically, he turned to the principle of continuity,
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reformulated as "unlimited community," for a means by which
to determine the objective validity of inferred "habits."
"The question of validity," Peirce noted, "is purely
one of fact and not of thinking.”

Hence beliefs must "be

caused by nothing human but by some external permanency -by something upon which our thinking has no effect."

He

located that "external permanency" in "the conception of
truth as something public" -- in a typically Ramean convic
tion that "the ultimate conclusion of every man must be the
same.”

Maintaining that the principle of continuity and

the intrinsically provisional "scientific method of set
tling opinion" expressed logically equivalent formulae,
Peirce argued that "the problem becomes how to fix belief,
not in the individual merely, but in the community.”•
The fundamental hypothesis of science, he pointed out,
is this:
There are real things, whose characters are entirely
independent of our opinions about them; those realities
affect our senses according to regular laws, and,
though our sensations are as different as our relations
to the objects, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of
perception, we can ascertain by reasoning how things
really are, and any man, if he have sufficient experi
ence and reason enough about it, will be led to the one
true conclusion.
"The new conception here involved," Peirce concluded,
that of reality."

"is

In fact, as Peirce had argued in his

critique of Descartes, "the very origin of the conception
of reality shows that this conception essentially involves
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the notion of COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and
capable of a definite increase of knowledge."10
The intimate connection established here between
reality, inquiry and community remained a permanent feature
of Peirce's thought.

He in fact based an entire cosmology

on this "full and fixed connection" which, like Edwards’
own, anchored moral obligation in "a wider sort of social
feeling."11

"The social impulse," Peirce maintained,

"is

rooted intrinsically in logic," reflecting environmental
responses occurring at the instinctive level of life.
Since the integrity of that impulse rested on the selfconsistency of logic and the self-corrective of method,
Peirce could argue that it transcended the peculiarities of
finite data and operated at the level of science.11

More

over, by portraying cognition as the accumulation of objec
tive beliefs which the mind instinctively rolled into
habits, he could further claim that his normative princi
ples remained within the reach of inquiry.

But above all,

by relocating the concept of reality in the notion of
unlimited community, Peirce imparted a temporal dimension
to logical forms which could accomodate the processive ele
ments implicit in evolutionary thought.
For, in fact, the essence of Peirce’s notion of
"unlimited community" lay in its time-dependent structure.
"The idea of time," Peirce noted, "must be employed in
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arriving at the conception of logical consecution."

A gen

eral inference, he argued, "cannot be fully realized.

It

is a potentiality; and its mode of being is ease in
futuro.”

Moreover, since "there is no time in the Present

for any inference at all, least of all for inference con
cerning that very instant,

...the consciousness of the pre

sent is...that of a struggle over what shall be; and thus
we emerge from the study with a confirmed belief [in] the
Nascent State of the Actual."1*

Fisch claims that Peirce’s

major contribution lay in "giving 'real' and ’reality’ a
forward rather than a backward reference."14

The present

argument would maintain that the significance of Peirce’s
argument lay in its giving reality any temporal reference
at all.
Under Peirce’s model, the process of inquiry coexisted
temporally with an awareness of a changing reality.

The

static "spatial" dimensions of thought, while instrumental
to the process, remained largely irrelevant to its ultimate
goal, which aimed at a truth apprehended cooperatively over
time.15

Moreover, since habits, as products of the experi

ential passage from doubt to belief, constituted rules of
procedure adopted under changing environmental conditions,
they themselves partook "of the general nature of expecta
tions of the future" and thereby retained a temporal dimen
sion which ”correspond[ed] to the idea of probability."
conceiving of reality as a hypothetical construct "con

By
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stituted by an event indefinitely future," Peirce
accomplished that fundamental shift in logical metaphors
needed to accomodate the time-dependent formulas of evolu
tion. *•

Significantly, he did so in a logical context con

trolled by the principle of continuity

--

a context

which, although largely ignored by his successors, bore the
unmistakeable imprint of a Ramean heritage.
In his second Illustration, which appeared under the
title "How to Make our Ideas Clear,"

Peirce presented an

epistemological account of how these logical principles
emerged into consciousness.11

In his first essay, he had

developed "a method for reaching a clearness of thought of
a far higher grade than the 'distinctness* of the
logicians."

Now, having rescued inquiry from "the rich mud

of conceptions" in which the "circle-squarers" had mired
it, he sought a criterion for meaning which would allow for
the extension of his model to empirical analyses.1*

Draw

ing on a musical analogy, Peirce presented an argument for
"mediate consciousness" which he interpreted as the meth
odological correlate of development.
"We have found," he reminded his readers, "that the
action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt,
and ceases when belief is attained."

Thus doubt, "however

[it] may originate ...stimulates the mind to an activity
[in which]...images pass rapidly through consciousness, one
incessantly melting into another, until at last...we have
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attained belief."

But in this "activity of thought,"

Peirce clained, there subsisted "two sorts of elements of
consciousness" which he defined as "immediate" and
"mediate."1*

Likening the first to a single tone which is

"completely present at every instant" and the second to an
air which "consists in an orderliness in the succession of
sounds,"

Peirce extended his analogy to describe thought

itBelf as a relational complex -- "a thread of melody run
ning through the succession of our sensations."

Cognition,

he argued, must therefore define a "system of relation
ships" which revealed "a congruence in the succession of
sensations which flow through the mind.”

Hence "there must

be some continuity of consciousness," he concluded, "which
makes the events of a lapse of time present to us” and
thereby drives the process by which prereflective impres
sions become habits.20
The principle of continuity thus underwrote both
Peirce’8 theory of truth and his related theory of cogni
tion.

Through it, he established the coalition between

logical meaning and practical purpose which would inform
the rest of his Illustrations.

Since "the whole function

of thought is to produce habits of action," he argued, "it
is absurd to say that thought has any meaning unrelated to
its function."

Consequently, "what a thing means is simply

what habits it involves;

...and there is no distinction of

meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible
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difference of practice" -- a difference perceived through
that "congruence in the succession of sensations" which
structured thought.

Peirce articulated the rule of proce

dure here involved in the now familiar "pragmatic maxim":
Consider what effects, which might conceivably have
practical bearings, we conceive the object of our con
ception to have. Then, our conception of these effects
is the whole of our conception of the object.*1
On this maxim Peirce would ground the distinctive equation
of process and reality which extended his cognitive theory
to ontology.
"Reality," Peirce suggested, "like every other quality,
consists in the peculiar sensible effects which things
partaking of it produce."

Since "the only effect which

real things have is to cause belief," the ontological
status of any phenomenon must depend on the mind’s activity
in distinguishing false from true beliefs.

In other words,

it depended on "how we think," not "what we think."

But,

as Peirce had established in his first essay, "the question
of validity [was] purely one of fact" and therefore
"appertain[ed] exclusively to the scientific method of set
tling opinion." Since he had already identified the
"external permanency" which underwrote that method as
"something public," Peirce could, by extension, define
reality as "predestinate opinion."

"The opinion which is

fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,"
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he intoned, "is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real.
would explain reality."

That is the way I

Having forged this cognitive link

between meaning and truth, Peirce was prepared to "cross
the threshold of scientific logic,” a step he took in his
next two Illustrations, "The Doctrine of Chances" and "The
Probability of Induction."22
Peirce began his third essay with the observation that,
although "science first begins to be exact when it is
quantitatively treated,” it is "not so much from counting
as from measuring...that the advantage of mathematical
treatment comes."

In fact, only through "the conception of

continuous quantity" could mathematics become "the direct
instrument of the finest generalizations.”

Thus, he

argued, "in the studies of numbers, the idea of continuity
is ...indispensible."

Through its ability to dissolve dif

ferences of quality into differences of degree, the princi
ple of continuity bridged the nominalist disjunction
between absolute quantity and actual fact and supplied "a
powerful aid to the formation of true and fruitful concep
tions .”2 2
The mathematical correlate of continuity, Peirce
claimed, resided in principles of probability which, as
methodological expressions of "continuous quantity,"
encompassed "the science of logic quantitatively treated.”
But "there is a real fact," he maintained, "which cor-
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responds to the idea of probability, and it is that a given
mode of inference sometimes proves successful and sometimes
not, and that in a ratio ultimately fixed."

Hence

probability served to chart the relative frequency with
which the passage from doubt to belief produced conclusions
in harmony with the "predestinate opinion" which underwrote
reality.

Peirce described the procedure involved as fol

lows :
There are two conceivable certainties with reference to
any hypothesis, the certainty of its truth and the
certainty of its falsity.
The numbers one and zero are
appropriated, in this calculus, to marking these
extremes of knowledge; while fractions having values
intermediate between them indicate... the degrees in
which the evidence leans toward one or the other.
The object, he claimed, "is, from a given state of facts,
to determine the numerical probability of a possible fact."
Hence, "the problem of probabilities is simply the general
problem of logic" and the meaning of any probability judge
ment became explicable in terms of a conditional proposi
tion based on "a kind of relative number."*4
But Peirce had already argued for an essential con
gruence between meaning and reality in his two previous
essays.

How, then, could he bring the conditional proposi

tions which expressed meaning in probability judgements
into conformity with the "predestinate opinion" which sup
ported that view?

Once again, he turned to the principle
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of continuity to guarantee the objective validity of his
model.
"The idea of probability," he observed, "essentially
belongs to a kind of inference which is repeated
indefinitely."**

It thus expressed a quantitative analog

of that cummulative inquiry described earlier as "the
scientific method of settling opinion."

Since the degree

of belief in probability judgements varied with evidence
drawn from both past and future events, Peirce argued, "in
reference to a single case considered in itself,
probability can have no meaning."

Since the validity of a

conditional statement "consists in the truth of [a]
hypothetical proposition...and since the only real fact
which can correspond to such a proposition is that whenever
the antecedent is true the consequent is so also, it fol
lows that there can be no sense in reasoning in an isolated
case at all."

Indeed, "the very idea of probability and of

reasoning rests on the assumption" that the number of
inferences drawn will be "indefinitely great.”

Con

sequently, Peirce identified "hope in the unlimited con
tinuance of intellectual activity" as an "indispensable
requirement of logic” and, predictably, tied that hope to
"an interest in an indefinite community."

In fact, he con

cluded, "logicality inexorably requires...a conceived iden
tification of one’s interests with those of an unlimited
community."*•
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Having settled, at least to his own satisfaction, the
question of the validity of probability judgements, Peirce
turned next to a discussion of their structure.

In "The

Probability of Induction," he attempted to go behind Kant’s
famous question, "How are synthetical judgements a priori
possible?" to his own antecedent question, "How are any
synthetical judgements at all possible?"
wondered,

"How is it," he

"that a man can observe one fact and [probab ility

notwithstanding] straightaway pronounce judgement concern
ing another fact not involved in the first?"

Character

istically, Peirce approached this question through an his
torical critique, drawing on distinctions between what
Venn, in his Logic of Chance, had termed the "conceptualist" and the "materialist" views of probability.27
"The great difference between the[se] two analyses,"
Peirce noted, "is that the conceptualists refer probability
to an event,” thereby isolating it from that flow of "con
tinuous quantity" which underwrote legitimate probability
judgements. "Conceptualistic writers," he complained,
not admit of indeterminate probabilities."

"do

This, he

warned, led to the misconception "that alternatives of
which we know nothing must be considered as equally proba
ble."

And this misconception in turn implied "the

thoroughly unclear idea of cases equally possible in place
of cases equally frequent.”

But this, Peirce declared, "is

only an absurd attempt to reduce synthetic to analytic
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reasoning,"

pointing out that to assume all natural events

independent

is to assume "that the chances in favor of

of which we

are totally ignorant are even."**

assumption,

moreover, encouraged the purely gratuitous

that

Such an
con

clusion "that Nature is a pure chaos, or chance combination
of independent elements, in which reasoning from one fact
to another would be impossible."

In fact, "it would be to

suppose all human cognition illusory and no real knowledge
possible.”*•

Peirce had definitively rejected such claims

in his earlier critique of British nominalism.
Venn’s "materialists," on the other hand, accepted
probability "as a matter of fact, i.e., as the proportion
of times in which an occurrence of one kind is accompanied
by an occurrence of another kind."

They thus conceived it

as "the ratio of frequency of events of a species to those
of a genus over that species, thus giving it two terms
instead of one" (emphasis Peirce's).*®

Peirce's own

definition of probability, given earlier in "The Doctrine
of Chances", clearly conformed to this materialist view.**
Moreover, Peirce perceived that by viewing probability as
relative frequency, he could maintain its essential timedependent structure and argue for its ability to generate
synthetic inferences in tune with his theory of a con
tinuous reality.

Only by defining probability as relative

frequency could he claim it as a viable means of investiga
ting that manifold reality he had described.
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Peirce made clear his ontological commitment to
probability in his analysis of chance.

Probability as

defined by the "conceptualists," he pointed out, "is the
ratio of the favorable cases to all the cases."

Chance, on

the other hand, expressed "the ratio of favorable to
unfavorable cases," and thus related to the process of
belief, or habit, formation.

The chance of an event, as

opposed to its probability, represented the "combination of
all arguments in reference to it which exist for us in the
given state of our knowledge."

It therefore rested

ultimately on the antecedent relationship between belief
and fact.

Moreover, as Peirce pointed out, the isolated

events described by the "conceptualists," having a
probability of 1/2, all enjoyed "an even chance, or 1/1."
But "an argument having an even chance can do nothing
toward reenforcing others, since according to the rule [for
the multiplication of probabilities, given earlier], its
combination with another would only multiply the chance of
the latter by one.”*2

Thus the "conceptualists” had no

mechanism for analyzing "conjoint probabilities" such as
those expressed by the cumulative and interdependent
phenomena described by evolution.

Chance as reformulated

by Peirce, on the other hand, could do just that.
"Chance," Peirce demonstrated, "is a quantity which may
have any magnitude."*2

Moreover this quantity, he claimed,

"has an intimate connection with the degree of our belief
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in it."

Since the truth of any given phenomenon depended

on its ability to govern the experiential passage from
doubt to belief, the objective value of phenomena must vary
in direct proportion to the intensity of belief which
accompanied them.

The mathematical relationship Peirce

expressed as follows:
We have seen that the chances of independent concurrent
arguments are to be multiplied together to get the
chance of their combination, and therefore the
quantities which best express the intensities of belief
should be such that they are to be added when the
chances are multiplied in order to produce the quanti ty
which corresponds to the combined chance.
"The logarithm of a chance," Peirce noted, "is the only
quantity which fullfills this condition."

Tying this

observation to Fechner's psycho-physical theories, which
demonstrated that "the intensity of any sensation is
proportional to the logarithm of the external force which
produces it," Peirce declared his own representation of
chance to be "entirely in harmony with this law."
feeling of belief," he concluded,

"The

"should be as the

logarithm of the chance, this latter being the expression
of the state of facts which produces the belief."*4
By restructuring probable relations as synthetic
inferences and tying them to the process of habit forma
tion, Peirce effectively integrated the logic of
probability and the logic of induction.

The integration
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resulted in a "logic of relatives" to which Peirce had
given early expression in his "Logic of Relatives Memoir"
which Daniel Merrill has called "one of the most important
works in the history of modern logic."

In it Peirce

replaced the copula "=" with the sign of illation ( ),
thereby making inclusion the fundamental logical rela
tion.*9

This substitution, Merrill claims, "was an impor

tant step on the road to a less algebraic approach to the
logic of classes," a step whose origins, he admits, are
"obscure."»•

The present argument would suggest that

Peirce's insistence on the relation of inclusion recalls
the techniques of topical analysis which had governed
Ramean forms.

Although the level of analysis proved

infinitely more sophisticated in Peirce, the compulsion to
subsume relations under classes rather than under other
relations characterized both models.

Moreover, Peirce tied

the logic of relatives directly to the function of symbols,
thereby absorbing it into his larger science of semiotic,
which also had harmonics in a Ramean paradigm.
Peirce’s conviction that the numerical value of chances
varied in proportion to the state of our beliefs led him to
the consequent belief that the synthetic inferences which
governed their calculation must derive from "a classifica
tion of facts, not according to their characters, but
according to the manner of obtaining them" -- or, as Peirce
had phrased it in his second essay, not on "what we think",
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but on "how we think."

Although "in the case of analytic

inference we know the probability of our conclusion,"
Peirce maintained, "in the case of synthetic inferences we
only know the degree of trustworthiness of our proceeding."
Dut "as all knowledge comes from synthetic inference," he
noted, "we must equally infer that all human certainty con
sists merely in our knowing that the processes by which our
knowledge has been derived are such as must generally have
led to true conclusions."

This "rule of induction," in

which Peirce located "the whole utility of probability,"
merely reiterated in logical form "the principle that
reality is only the object of the final opinion to which
sufficient investigation would lead."*7
Thus Peirce's analysis of induction, according to which
probable statements expressed time-dependent variations of
a wider reality, led directly back to his recurrent theme
of continuity.

The identification of probability and

belief accomplished under the doctrine of chances allowed
him to claim that the principle of continuity was "simply
what generality becomes in the logic of relatives. •

In

his fifth Illustration, Peirce would carry his reformulated
theories of probability and induction over into the physi
cal sciences and demonstrate their usefulness in investiga
ting "The Order of Nature."
Peirce proposed in his fifth essay "to inquire into the
degree of orderliness in the universe" in search of "any
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general characteristic,

...any mannerism in the ways of

Nature, any law everywhere applicable" which could assist
in illustrating the logic of science.

To that end, he

applied those arguments developed in his earlier essays to
a methodological analysis of the concept of order itself.
"Any uniformity, or law of Nature," Peirce noted, "may be
stated in the form 'Every A is B ’."

"This is the same as

to say, however, that 'there does not exist any A which is
not B'; ...so that the uniformity consists in the non
occurrence in Nature of a certain combination of charac
ters.

...Conversely, every case of the non-occurrence of a

combination of characters would constitute a uniformity in
Nature."

But this logical truism, he warned, would only

lead the inquirer into an infinite regress unless he took
into account the "highly-important logical principle" that
"any plurality or lot of objects whatever have some charac
ter in common (no matter how insignificant) which is pecu
liar to them and not shared by anything el8e.",•
In support of this "highly important principle," Peirce
offered the following proof:
The things, A and B, are each distinguished from all
other things by the possession of certain characters
which may be named A-ness and B-ness. Corresponding to
these positive characters, are the negative characters
un-A-ness, which is possessed by everything except A,
and un-B-ness, which is possessed by everything except
B. These two characters are united in everything
except A and B; and this union of the characters of unA-ness and un-B-ness makes a compound character which
may be termed A-B-lessness. This is not possessed by
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either A or B, but it is possessed by everything else.
This character, like every other, has its corresponding
negative un-A-B-lessness, and this last is the charac
ter possessed by both A and B, and by nothing else.
It
is obvious that what has thus been shown true of two
things is autatis mutandia, true of any number of
things. Q.E.D.
"In any world whatever, then,” Peirce concluded,

"there

must be a character peculiar to each possible group of
objects."

Hence, "whatever further conclusions we may come

to in regard to the order of the universe, thus much may be
regarded as solidly established, that the world is not a
mere chance-medley."40
Peirce's proof established the logical impossibility of
complete disorder.

Since even an "endless series must have

some character," Peirce could claim that "chaos is pure
nothing."4*

But in order to construct a corresponding

material proof, Peirce had to tie his logical theorem to
cognition.

"As long as we regard characters abstractly,"

he pointed out, "the whole system of relationship between
the different characters [is] given by mere logic.”
Fortunately, however, "the explanation of induction by the
doctrine of probabi1ities...is not a mere metaphysical for
mula, but is one from which all the rules of synthetic
reasoning can be deduced systematically and with mathemati
cal cogency." Thus Peirce could maintain that his logic of
relatives extended to those material propositions involved
in determining the character of physical laws.4*
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"In order to descend from th[e] abstract point of
view," Peirce explained, one need only "consider the
characters of things as relative to the perceptions and
active powers of living beings."

To accomplish this,

Peirce redefined his theory of induction as "a process of
sampling”

which "only has its full force when the charac

ter concerned has been designated before examining the
sample."4*

"When we take all the characters into account,”

he warned,

"any pair of objects resemble one another in

just as many particulars as any other pair."

But "if we

limit ourselves to such characters as have for us any
importance,

...then a synthetic conclusion may be

drawn...on the condition that the specimens by which we
judge have been taken at random from the class."

These

"statistical inductions," Peirce claimed, involved "the
inference that a previously designated character has nearly
the same frequency of occurrence in the whole of a class
that it has in a sample drawn at random out of that class.”
They therefore must inevitably lead to "a class of which
the same predicate may be affirmed universally," provided
only that the investigation prove "sufficiently prolonged."
"The truth of this principle," he maintained,

"follows

immediately from the theorem that there is a character
peculiar to every possible group."44
Armed with this method of statistical induction, Peirce
could argue for the validity of the central assumption of
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physical science -- that "there exists a cause for every
event, and that of a kind which is capable of being discov
ered."

But "if there be nothing to guide us to th[at)

discovery," he cautioned,
getting made."

it "would have no chance of ever

And yet experience demonstrated that "there

are certain of our inductions which present an approach to
universality so extraordinary that ...we cannot possibly
think that they have been reached merely by accident."

The

concepts of space, time and force, he noted, all presented
powerful arguments for the material efficacy of such
theoretical forms.45
But how, Peirce wondered, could such inferences enter
into consciousness at all, much less govern the experi
ential passage from doubt to belief on which all inference
relied.

The only logical explanation, he concluded, lay in

the assumption that "the mind of man is strongly adapted to
the comprehension of the world; at least, so far as this
goes, that certain conceptions, highly important for such a
comprehension, naturally arise in his mind."

In fact,

Peirce maintained, the process of determining beliefs which
governed the logic of relatives made it clear that "without
such a tendency, the mind could never have had any develop
ment at all."

Moreover, as he hastened to point out, since

"the great utility and indispensableness" of these "natural
conceptions" suggested that they arose as "the results of
natural selection," it followed that they did in fact
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relate to the process of habit formation.4*

Consequently,

under the terms of his model, Peirce could treat statisti
cal inductions as practical beliefs which led to the forma
tion of adaptive habits, which in turn reenforced beliefs.
Thus evolution, as the process by which organisms
absorbed information about their environment and
incorporated it into patterns of conduct, expressed an
objective version of the theory of probability -- a kind of
biological correlate of that progressive increment in
knowledge described by the logical process itself.

Peirce

had argued earlier that the process of natural selection
was itself "in large part, a question of logic" which
merely applied "the statistical method to biology."

Devel

opmental theory, he pointed out, "shows how merely fortui
tous variations of individuals together with merely fortui
tous mishaps to them would, under the action of heredity,
result, not in more irregularity, nor even in statistical
constancy, but in continual and indefinite progress toward
a better adaptation of means to ends."

Since Peirce’s cog

nitive model rendered all human knowledge "the development
of our inborn animal instincts," he could further argue
that evolution actually governed the incremental process by
which reason became incarnate in the world.

In a sense, to

Peirce, evolution simply presented a special case "of the
general adaptation of genetic products to recognizable
utilities or ends ...whereby the existent becomes more and
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more to embody those generals which [are] said to be
destined."* 7
Moreover, having established the objectivity of natural
order in a logical proof, Peirce could further extend his
metaphors to portray evolution as a process of habit forma
tion that implanted in man's mind certain rudimentary
notions, like those of space and time, which accorded with
the order of the natural world.

But Peirce’s "rudimentary

notions" bore no resemblance to "innate ideas" of the
Cartesian stripe.

In fact Peirce’s entire critique of Des

cartes had rested on a rejection of such "metaphysical
moonshine."

Peirce’s notions derived rather from "the con

stitution of the human mind,” being produced "partly by the
object, partly by me," and thus avoided any of the subjec
tive implications of Cartesian constructs.

Because certain

general features prevailed throughout nature, and because
the investigating mind itself developed as a product of
that nature, these general features became an integral part
of the mind through the adaptive process of habit forma
tion.

Rather than representing indefensible a priori con

cepts, Peirce’s rudimentary notions thus expressed a purely
Ramean "affinity between the reasoner’s mind and nature’s,"
or, by extension, an "affinity of the human soul to the
soul of the universe."**
The structural correspondence between logic and experi
ence, previously established in "The Fixation of Belief",
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here provided a cognitive justification for those statisti
cal inductions which governed the physical sciences.

Fur

thermore, by making the cumulative processes of evolution
continuous with the life of the mind, Peirce brought his
principle of continuity to bear on the construction of
scientific laws, since to argue for evolution as the ground
of induction meant simply to argue for statistical induc
tion as the ground of "that fundamental law upon which all
science rolls."4*
Indeed evolution, taken in conjunction with the logic
of relatives, provided Peirce with the objective evidence
he sought for his universal principle of continuity.

"Nat

ural selection," Peirce claimed, "is a mode of evolution in
which the only positive agent of change in the whole pas
sage from moner to man is fortuitous variation."

But since

"to secure advance in a definite direction chance has to be
seconded by some action that shall hinder the propagation
of some varieties or stimulate that of others,"

evolution

must be "nothing more nor less than the working out of a
definite end" controlled by "a machinery of efficiency"
which ensured that, ultimately, "chance begets order."
Peirce identified that machinery with his doctrine of
chances, which stipulated that plurality implied
relativity, which in turn rested on a continuous reality.50
"When we gaze upon the multifariousness of nature we
are looking straight into the face of a living
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spontaneity," Peirce wrote.

And yet somehow that primeval

spontaneity gave way, through selection, to regularity.
Peirce described the process as an extension of statistical
generalization and tied it directly to his related theories
of meaning and probability:
In the beginning -- infinitely remote -- there was a
chaoa of unpersonalized feeling, which being without
connection or regularity would properly be without
existence.
This feeling, sporting here and there in
pure arbitrariness, would have started the germ of a
generalized tendency.
Its other sportings would be
evanescent, but this would have a growing virtue.
Thus, the tendency to habit would be started; and from
this, with the other principles of evolution, all the
regularities of the universe would be evolved.
At any
time, however, an element of pure chance survives and
will remain until the world becomes an absolutely per
fect, rational, and symmetrical system, in which mind
is at last crystalized in the infinitely distant future
Thus, evolution "was but the consequence of a theorem in
probabilities, namely, the theorem that if very many
similar things are subject to very many slight fortuitous
variations,...the result must, in the long run, be to pro
duce a change of the average characters of the class."*1
Peirce’s subsumption of the biological under the logi
cal aspects of evolution had important consequences for the
construction of scientific laws.

According to his

statistical account, laws "emerged” from the experiential
passage from doubt to belief as transcriptions of the con
tinuous flow of experience.

Hence they had the power to

accomodate the primal contingency which plagued post-
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Darwinian science.

"My hypothesis of spontaneity," Peirce

claimed, "explains the general fact of irregularity
...[thereby] loosening the bond of necessity." Moreover,
"it gives room for the influence of another kind of causa
tion, such as seems to be operative in the mind." The
objectively verifiable "coalesence, the becoming con
tinuous, the becoming governed by laws," Peirce maintained,
"are but phases of one and the same process of the growth
of reasonableness."

Chance thus became an active logical

principle and the laws which governed its operation became,
like all expressions of statistical regularity, continuous
reconstructions of events grounded in the antecedent con
tinuity of experience.52
Peirce’s model thus considered "laws themselves [as]
subject to law."

But his principles of probable induction

stipulated that even the "law of laws must be...capable of
developing itself."

Since "the only conceivable law of

which that is true is an evolutionary law," he reasoned,
"we therefore suppose that all law is the result of evolu
tion."

Furthermore, "if law is a result of evolution,

which is a process lasting through all time," he argued,
"it follows that no law is absolute," but must rather
relate to those time-dependent structures which comprised
the continuous reality expressed by "unlimited community."
So "it is clear," Peirce concluded, "that... habit, itself
due to the growth by habit of an infinitesimal chance
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tendency toward habit-making, is the only bridge that can
span the chasm between the chance medley of chaos and the
cosmos of order and law."

Habit, not inexorable law,

expressed the ontological dimension of "the principle of
universal continuity... which is involved in all exist
ence ."*3
Under Peirce's model, scientific investigation thus
proceeded as a tentative inquiry into the time-dependent
structures of habit.

Hence it required logical techniques

adequate to the task of charting the gradual ascendancy of
order over the indeterminate and random events from which
habits emerged.

Peirce set out to supply those techniques

in his sixth Illustration, which presented a functional
analysis of the methodological roles of "Deduction, Induc
tion and Hypothesis" in the context of his conjoint
theories of meaning and truth.
"The chief business of the logician," Peirce began, "is
to classify arguments," of which he himself recognized the
three types enumerated in his title.

Deductive arguments

demonstrated "nothing but the application of a rule."
Inductive arguments, "being something more than the mere
application of a general rule to a particular case,”
represented a type of "inversion of the deductive syl
logism" which inferred "a rule from the observation of a
result in a certain case."

A similar yet distinct inver

sion yielded hypothetical arguments,

(or as Peirce called
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them, abductive inferences), which gave "the inference of a
case from a rule and result."

"Deduction," Peirce stipu

lated, "is the only necessary reasoning.
the experimental testing of a theory.

...Induction is

...Abduction [or

hypothesis] consists in studying facts and devising a
theory to explain them."
tion evaluated them.

Deduction defined terms; induc

But only hypothesis explained any

thing.54
Peirce illustrated his point thus:
Begin with
Rule Case Result

this deduction in Barbara:
All the beans in the bag are white.
These beans were in the bag.
- These beans are white

Now, infer
Case Result
Rule This is an

the rule from the case and result:
These beans were in this bag.
- These beans are white.
All the beans in the bag are white.
induction.

Next, infer the case from the rule and the result:
Rule - All the beans from this bag are white
Result - These beans are white.
Case - These beans are from this bag.
This is an hypothesis.55
The problem for experimental science, Peirce observed, lay
in a general tendency to confuse the functions of these
distinct types of argument.

On the one hand, "con-

ceptualist" theories of probability tended to reduce
synthetic or inferential forms to analytic or deductive
ones.

Peirce had dealt with that issue in "The Probability

of Induction."

But other misguided theorists, although
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they might accept a "materialist" view of probability,
still tended to confuse the related but distinct roles
which hypothesis and induction played in discovery.
Indeed, "the analogy of hypothesis and induction is so
strong," Peirce pointed out, "that... hypothesis has been
called an induction of characters." But in the first place,
he argued, "characters are not susceptible of simple
enumeration like objects;

[and] in the second place,

characters run in categories” and hence could not be
treated atomically. Those "mere affair[s] of arith
metic ...[which] the physicists call an empirical formula"
cannot therefore be likened to hypotheses since they rest
"upon mere induction."

Although "very useful as means of

describing in general terms the results of observations,"
these inductions could never "take any high rank among
scientific discoveries."*•
Hypotheses, on the other hand, introduced explanatory
concepts which ”furnish[ed] the reasoner with [a] prob
lematic theory which induction verifies."

Peirce summed up

the methodological distinction as follows:
Induction is where we generalize from a number of cases
of which something is true, and infer that the same
thing is true of a whole class. Or, where we find a
certain thing to be true of a certain proportion of a
class and infer that it is true of the same proportion
of the whole class. Hypothesis is where we find some
very curious circumstance, which would be explained by
the supposition that it was a case of a certain general
rule, and thereupon adopt that supposition.
Or, where
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we find that in certain respects two objects have a
strong resemblance, and infer that they resemble one
another strongly in other respects.
"The great difference," Peirce argued, "is that [induction]
infers the existence of phenomena such as we have observed
in cases which are similar, while hypothesis supposes some
thing of a different kind from what we have directly
observed, and frequently something which it would be
impossible for us to observe directly."57
Peirce's methodological distinction had several clear
implications for science, not the least of which was to
provide a means of dealing with hypothetic inferences like
the "imponderables."5*

But its most important consequence

in the present context lay in its ability to explain away
that confusion of induction and hypothesis which had pro
vided the logical ground and proved the practical undoing
of the Baconian and Ramean models expounded by American
theorists.

The tendency of both Bacon and Ramus to sub

stitute hypothetical or composite forms for inductive
inferences had justified the Puritans’ organic polity and
underwritten the formulation of a national ideology.

It

had provided an impetus for scientific inquiry and driven
the engines of technological advance.

But it had also

hampered the adaptation of American logical models to the
demands of the new science by making it unclear precisely
how classification could aid in the construction of
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theory.*•

Peirce, by retaining Bacon's emphasis on clas

sification and redefining Ramus’ emphasis on structure,
clarified the distinct methodological functions of induc
tion and hypothesis and rendered them both genuine
ingredients in a defensible logic of science.
Hypotheses, Peirce claimed, are really a means of
intellectual ordering -- "a subsumption of a case under a
class" which could generate the leading principles by which
science progressed.*0

Peirce admitted that "the mind is

forced by the very nature of inference itself to make use
of [both] induction and hypothesis.” Indeed, he claimed,
"the best inference, when all possible retrenchment has
been made, is the one which being inductive has the most
comprehensive subject and which being hypothetic has the
most extensive predicate."

Such composite inferences sup

plied "most of the theories of physics."

But "hypothesis

alone,” he claimed, "affords us any knowledge of causes and
forces, and enables us to see the why of things.”• 1
Moreover, the validity of induction, he reminded his
readers, derived from its self-corrective method.

The

validity of hypothesis, on the other hand, derived from its
reliance on the antecedent reality of that "predestinate
opinion" toward which induction tended.

"When we stretch

an induction quite beyond the limits of our observation,"
he explained, "the inference partakes of the nature of
hypothesis."

And since the principle of continuous reality
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stipulated that "there is no line to be drawn beyond which
we cannot push our inference," hypotheses thus formed could
reach out to those evolving lawB which Peirce had estab
lished as objective ingredients in nature.•'
Although the cumulative processes which governed their
construction rendered all hypotheses tentative, Peirce
maintained that, "they are none the less important for
that."

In fact, "the great triumph of the hypothesis comes

when it explains not only the formulae [of science], but
also the deviations from the formulae."

"In the current

language of the physicists,” he noted, "an hypothesis of
this importance is called a theory," since a lingering
"contempt... clings to the word hypothesis” -- a contempt
which he significantly attributed to "Lord Bacon."

But

unlike Bacon, who had denied hypotheses as valid while
smuggling them surreptitiously into his theories, Peirce
openly declared that "there is such a thing as hypothetic
inference" which was "guided by reasons" derived directly
from the cognitive processes he had described in his second
111 ustrati on.* 3
Significantly Peirce argued that "the utility and
value” of hie distinction between hypothesis and induction
lay in its ability to clarify an "important psychological
and physiological difference in the mode of apprehending
facts."

Unlike induction, he claimed, hypothetic inference

involved "a single harmonious disturbance which I call an
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emotion."

Since "every hypothetic inference involves the

formation of such an emotion," Peirce concluded, hypotheses
must represent "the sensuous element of thought."

Induc

tion, by contrast, expressed "the habitual element," while
deduction,

"as the logical formula for paying attention,”

manifested "the volitional element of thought."

Like

Edwards before him, Peirce thus drew an analogy between
hypothesis and emotion which became the ground of a
"scientific imagination" which generated discovery.

Indeed

like all his Ramean forebears, Peirce never lost a compell
ing sense of the priority of a directly experienced world
which led the mind through rational inquiry to an apprecia
tion of its aesthetic forms.*4
Both the rational and aesthetic power of hypothesis,
Peirce maintained, remained unintelligible only as long as
men ignored the evolutionary nature of thought.

His own

cognitive theory, through its emphasis on development,
could account for hypotheses as intellectual mutations
grounded in instinctive modes of response occurring at the
prereflective level of life.

Under Peirce’s model,

hypotheses developed naturally as conjectures arising from
the experiential passage from doubt to belief.

They

expressed rudimentary notions evolved under the impact of
environmental forces which coalesced in the mind as
explanatory inferences about the world.

Moreover, the

processive nature of inquiry accounted for the fact that,
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out of a multitude of possible constructs, the mind so
often struck on fruitful theories.

Thus the leading prin

ciples which governed science merely reflected cognitive
forms of the relatively fixed characters of experience.•*
But such principles, Peirce pointed out, could only be
expressed modally, as "conditional propositions concerning
conduct."

Since "the basis of Fact is hypothesis," he

reasoned, the substance of thought itself must lie "in a
conditional resolve."

In his later writings, Peirce would

extend this maxim to a comprehensive logical program,
claiming that pragmatism itself rested on "the principle
that every theoretical judgement expressible in a sentence
in the indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose
only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency to
enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a
conditional sentence having its apodosis in the imperative
mood."

In fact, he concluded, "conditional propositions,

with their hypothetical antecedents," expressed the
"ultimate nature of meaning."

But this was precisely the

principle upon which Ramean logic had turned!**
Peirce's endorsement of hypothesis brought his argument
full circle, tying the logic of science directly to that
organic metaboly of signs which had underwritten objective
truth in "The Fixation of Belief."

Through an analysis of

the evolution of logic, the Illustrations led Peirce back
to an appreciation of the logic of evolution.

By drawing
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on the cumulative aspects of developmental theory to
accomplish a crucial shift in metaphors, Peirce succeeded
in outlining a logical model which could accomodate the
increasingly time-dependent constructs of theoretical
science while still maintaining the characteristic bias of
American thought.

In fact, he used his methodological

critique as a litmus to test the viability of the realist
premise in the world of modern science.
In his assessment of the possibility of a logic of
science, Peirce clearly came down on the side of his Ramean
forebears.

Like them, he insisted on logic as the for

malized version of a native rationality embedded in the
very structures of the mind.

Under his revised model,

inquiry still described a process by which the mind fitted
finite data into appropriate "places" in probable state
ments which drew their force from "an inseparable connec
tion between rational cognition and rational purpose."*7
This inviolable covenant in turn rested on a continuous
reality which, reformulated as "unlimited community,"
became the logical analog of immortality, underwriting a
faith in the mind’s ability to make those postulational
leaps essential to the construction of theory.

The "great

principle of continuity” survived as a kind of meth
odological correlate of judicial review, establishing a
probative framework within which to assess those hypotheti
cal imperatives defined by Peirce as laws.*8

And logic
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became, once again, the path the pilgrim trod on his jour
ney toward a rational faith in the order and purpose of the
world.••

Indeed, Peirce’s Illustrations, shaded throughout

with the metaphors of the shared and organic elements of
human experience, expressed the very essence of the
American intellectual tradition -- a tradition with roots
sunk deep in a Ramean logical paradigm.
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CHAPTER NOTBS

1. The Illustrations appeared in Popular Science
Monthly between November 1877 and August 1878. They are
included in The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
ed. Hartshorn and Weiss (Cambridge, 1931-1958) as para
graphs 619-693 of volume II, paragraphs 358-410 of volume V
and paragraphs 395-427 of volume VI.
(All subsequent
references to this collection will be cited as CP, followed
by volume and paragraph number.) They appear sequentially
in The Writings of C. S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition,
ed. Max Fisch (Bloomington, 1982-1986) on pages 242-337 of
volume III.
(All subsequent references to this edition
will be cited as C E , followed by volume and page number.
2. Fisch calls the Illustrations "the 19th Century
Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason
and Searching for the Truth in the Sciences, and claims
that ” so far no 20th Century Discourse has superceded it”
(CE 3.xxxvi i ).
3.

CE3.245-246; CE 3.254.

4.

CE3.244-245.

See also CP 5.486; CP

2.148.

5.
Inhis later On the Algebra of Logic, Peirce reen
forcedthis analogy, claiming that "thinking, as cerebra
tion, is no doubt subject to the general laws of nervous
action” (CP 3.155, see also CP 3.157).
6.
CE3.247. Elsewhere Peirce described belief as
merely "a habit of which we are conscious" (CP 4.53), "a
cerebral habit of the highest kind, which will determine
what we will do in fancy as well as what we do in action"
(CP 3.160). Logic," he claimed, "takes its reason of
existence" from habits "considered as determining an
inference" (CP 3.161).
"All you can have any dealings
with,"
he warned, "are yourdoubts and beliefs. ...If your
terms
'truth' and 'falsity' are taken in such senses as to
be definable in terms of doubt and belief...well and
good... But if by truth and falsity you mean something not
definable in terms of doubt and belief in any way, then you
are talking of entities of whose existence you can know
nothing, and which Ockham's razor would clean shave off"
(CP 5.416) .
7.

CE 3.247; CP 1.175.

8.
CP 2.713; CP 2.316.
In inquiry "something... takes
place within the organism which is equivalent to the syl
logistic process," Peirce claimed (CP 5.268, see also CP
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6.465).
In 1883, Peirce even argued for precise
physiological analogues of inference (see A Theory of Prob
able Inference CP 2.694-754).
9. CB 3.244; CE 3.253; CE 3.251. The quest for truth,
Peirce argued elsewhere, echoing Bacon, unfolded "not as
the work of one man’s life, but as that of generation after
generation, indefinitely" (CP 5.589).
10. CE 3.253-254, CP 5.311.
Elsewhere Peirce defined
reality as "that which sooner or later information and
reasoning would finally result in, and which is therefore
independent of the vagaries of me and you (CP 5.311).
11. CE 3.251. Peirce’s objections to Cartesian doubt
were based on this issue of moral obligation.
For Peirce,
Michael Weinstein claims, "Cartesian doubt is not only
immoral because it is idle, but because it draws prac
titioners away from the community of inquirers, the task of
which is to resolve the real and living doubts that arise
in the course of everyday life" (The Wilderness and the
City (Amherst, 1982), 58).
12. CP 5.354.
"With the scientific method," Peirce
claimed, "the test...is not an immediate appeal to my feel
ings or purposes, but, on the contrary, itself involves the
application of the method" (CE 3.255).
13.

CP 1.491; CP 2.148; CP 5.462.

14.

CE 3.xxix.

15. Randall R. Dipert presents an interesting discus
sion of "Peirce’s Theory of the Dimensionality of Physical
Space,"
in which he argues that what distinguished
Peirce’s theory from those of his contemporaries was
precisely its temporal dimension, which allowed him to
argue precociously for a non-Euclidean approach to the
"space-time continuum" (JHP 16(1978):61-70) .
16.

CP 2.145, CP 2.650; CP 5.331.

17. Many pages have been written on the genealogy of
Peirce’s second Illustration, most focusing on the illusive
"metaphysical Club" to which Peirce himself refers (CP
5.12). For extended discussions see Kuklick, Rise, 47-54;
Max Fisch, CE, 3.xxix-xxxv and "Alexander Bain and the
Geneology of Pragmatism," JHI 15( 1954):413-444 ; Philip P
Wiener, "Peirce's Metaphysical Club and the Genesis of
Pragmatism," JHI 7(1946):218-233; Daniel D. O ’Connor,
"Peirce’s Debt to F. E. Abbot," JHI 25(1964):543-564.
While any of the sources investigated in these discussions
might well have been the proximate cause of Peirce’s maxim,
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however, the present argument would locate its "sufficient
reason" in that Ramean tradition which sought to purge
logic of its "commentitious" trappings.
18.

CE 3.260-261.

19. CE 3.261-262.
These elements emerge in Peirce’s
later semiotic as the "monadic" and "diadic" relations.
The third, or "triadic" relation, is treated in the sixth
Illustration as "abduction".
20.

CE 3.262-263.

21. CE 2.265-266. See also CP 575.
Feibleman
identifies seven different formulations of the pragmatic
maxim, of which the one quoted above is the first and most
familiar.
The remaining six he locates in CP 5.9, CP 5.18,
CP 5.467, CP 5.438, CP 6.490, CP 5.412.
It is interesting
in the present context that Peirce illustrates his maxim
with the concept of force.
Force in particular, he claims
is a "simple affair [which] has muddled men’s minds." But
under his theory, Peirce claimed, force was no "mysterious
entity", since "the idea which the word force excites in
our minds has no other function than to affect our actions.
...Consequently, if we know what the effects of force are,
we are acquainted with every fact which is implied in
saying that a force exists, and there is nothing more to
know" (CE 3.270).
So much for the "imponderables” !
22.

CE 3.271-273, CE 3.275.

23. CE 3.266-268.
Elsewhere Peirce argued that, since
"future contingency is as real as the present" (CP 6.368),
all existence was, in fact, "a matter of degree" (CP
1.175).
In some respects, Peirce’s arguments for con
tinuity recall Wolff's descriptions of the complementum
possibilitatis, which supplied the necessary conditions for
the reality of individual entities.
But where Wolff had
stressed the distance between possibility and reality,
Peirce bridged the gap with his "unlimited community."
24. CE 3.278-280.
Peirce had made an early argument
for his theory of mathematical probability in two of the
Lowell Lectures delivered in 1865 (CE 1.189-204, CE 1.205222). He reenforced his position in his Lectures on Prag
matism (CP 5.21).
25. In 1905, Peirce reformulated this statement mathe
matically: "When we say that a certain ratio will have a
certain value *in the long run', we refer to the
probability-limit of an endless succession of fractional
values; that is, to the only possible value from 0 to
infinity, inclusive, about which the values of the endless

427

succession will never cease to oscillate; so that, no mat
ter what place in the succession you may choose, there will
follow both values above the probability limit and values
below it" (CP 2.758). Again in 1910, he affirmed that "it
is plain that, if probability be the ratio of the ocurrences of the specific event to the occurrences of the gen
eric occasion, it is the ratio that there would be in the
long run" (CP 2.661).
In fact, as Carolyn Eisele points
out, Peirce consistently merges the concepts of infinity,
continuity and probability ("C. S. Peirce at the Smith
sonian," JHI 18( 1957):537-547) .
26. CE 3.284-285.
In later writings, Peirce tied this
idea of community back to his formulation of habit, claim
ing it to be "quite analogous to any habit that a man might
have" (CP 2.664) .
27. CE 3.303-304.
"The conception of probability here
set forth," Peirce had stated in "The Doctrine of Chances",
"is substantially that first developed by Mr. Venn in his
Logic of Chance. Of course, a vague apprehension of the
idea had always existed, but the problem was to make it
perfectly clear, and to him belongs the credit of first
doing this" (CE 3.281.n).
Peirce reviewed Venn’s Logic of
Chance in 1867 (North American Review 105( 1867 ):317-321 )
and substantially agreed with its representation of
probability as "a statistical fact" and "a ratio."
In "The
Doctrine of Chances," however, Peirce took exception to
Venn’s referring to the components of probability as
"events."
"Some of the worst and most persistent errors in
the use of the doctrine of chances," he claimed, "have
arisen from this vicious mode of expression." Peirce
preferred to describe probability as belonging "exclusively
to consequences,” declaring that "the probability of any
consequence is the number of times in which antecedent and
consequent both occur divided by the number of all the
times in which the antecedent occurs" (CE 3.290).
28.
"The conceptualist method of treating
probabilities," Peirce argued, "really amounts simply to
the deductive treatment of them" -- a treatment which led
only to "absolutely worthless" inferences carrying "an even
chance" (CE 2.304-307).
Elsewhere Peirce presented a math
ematical proof to refute the assertion that "ignorance is
denoted by the probability 1/2” (CP 2.747).
29.

CE 3.292, 3.296, 3.298, 3.301.

30.

CE 3.291-292.

31.
"Probability," Peirce oberved elsewhere, "depends
solely upon the relative frequency of a specific event... to
a generic event" (CP 3.19).
Thus it "never properly refers
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immediately to a single event, but exclusively to the hap
pening of a given kind of event on any occasion of a given
kind" (CP 2.661).
Peirce defined probability variously as
"the science of the laws of irregularities" (CP 2.769), "a
statistical ratio" (CP 5.21) and "a fraction whose
numerator is the frequency of a specific kind of event,
while its denominator is the frequency of a genus embracing
that species" (CP 2.747).
32.

CE 3.293-294.

33.

See CE 3.292-293, 3.298-303 for the proof.

34.

CE 3.293-294.

See also CP 2.677.

35. For the "Logic of Relatives Memoir, see CE 2.359429. See also CP 2.710 and CP 4.5 where Peirce defended
his position.
For a discussion of the memoir and its
importance see Merrill’s introductory essay "The 1870 Logic
of Relatives Memoir" in Fisch, CE 3.xlii-3.xlviii. See
also Feibleman’s chapter "The Logic of Relatives" in Intro
duction . 105-110.
36.

CE 2.xlii-2.xliii.

37. CE 3.295, 3.305.
Probability statements, Peirce
claimed, provided the only form of argument which gained
accuracy through repetition (CP 2.729). Hence their
validity depended on "a method which, if duly persisted in,
must in the very nature of things, lead to a result
indefinitely approximating to the truth in the long run"
(CP 2 .781 ).
38.

CP 5.436.

39.

CE 3.307-308.

40.

CE 3.308-311 .

41 .

CP 2.784, CP 5.431. See also CP 5.342.

CM

CE 3.315-316.

43. CE 3.311.
Goudge points out that, in his
of predesignation, Peirce is "indicating his dissent from
the view of scientific procedure which regards it as start
ing with the dispassionate collection of facts. His empha
sis on predesignation," Goudge claims, "is a reminder that
facts are always selected because of their relevance to a
particular problem at hand" (Thought. 163). Disinterested
inquiry, Peirce claimed, occurred only "at the very vanish
ing point of intelligence."
In fact, "the interest which
the uniformities of Nature have for an animal measures his
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place in the scale of intelligence" (CE 3.312). Peirce
defended this position in Lesson 15 of his "Lessons from
the History of Scientific Thought” .
44. CE 3.316-318.
Peirce develops this argument in
the context of a critique of Mills' contention that "induc
tion depends for its validity upon the uniformity of
Nature" (CE 3.314-316).
45.

CE 3.317-318.

46. CE 3.317-318.
Elsewhere, Peirce affirmed that
logicality itself "is the most useful quality an animal can
possess, and might, therefore, result from the action of
natural selection" (CP 5.366).
47. CE 3.244; CP 1.395.
See Philip Weiner, "The
Evolutionism and Pragmaticism of Peirce," JHI 7(1946): 321 —
354.
48. CP 1.7; CP 1.28; CP 1.121; CP 5.47.
For Peirce,
it always remained " somehow more than a figure of speech
to say that nature fecundates the mind of man with ideas,
which, when these ideas grow up, will resemble their
father, Nature" (CP 5.92).
For a fascinating discussion of
this aspect of Peirce's thought S. Morris Eames, Pragmatic
Naturalism: An Introduction (Carbondale, 1977). Eames
treats Peirce’s notions as "transactional analyses" of
experience.
The present argument would attribute them to a
predilection for structural correspondences grounded in a
persistent Ramean bias.
49. CE 3.319.
It is essential to note here that
Peirce’s view of evolution, as well as his "statistical
inductions," were transitional rather than transformative
and therefore dynamic and uni-directional. In the Lowell
Lectures, Peirce had argued that scientific inferences
occurred "in one determinate direction, which is not
reversed" (CE 1.471 emphasis his). Hence, Peirce’s view of
incremental inferences could accomodate the concepts of
irreversibility explicit in thermodynamics as well as those
implicit in evolution.
For discussion of some of the
scientific implications of Peirce’s view see Stephen 0.
Brush, "Irreversibility and Indeterminism: Fourier to
Heisenberg," JHI 37(1976):603-630.
50.

CP 6.296, CP 1.205, CP 1.269, CP 6.297.

51. CP 6.553, CP 6.100, CP 6.33, Peirce Ms dated Jan.
24, 1909 entitled "Why should the Doctrine of Chances raise
Science to a Higher Plane", p.16 quoted in Weiner,
"Peirce’s Evolutionism," 335.
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52. CP 6.60, CP 5.4.
metaphysics as "tychism."
found in CP 6.189-209.

Peirce extended this argument to
The principle references are

53. CP 6.91, CP 6.101, CP 6.262, Peirce Ms L107, p. 10
quoted in Fisch, "Peirce and Leibniz," 493. Peirce
developed this argument in "The Architecture of Theories",
where he attempted to "search out a natural history of laws
of nature."
"The only possible way of accounting for the
laws of nature and for uniformity in general," he argued,
"is to suppose them results of evolution" (CP 6.12).
For
discussions of Peirce’s view of natural law relative to
Hume see the "Letters to Samuel P. Langley, and 'Hume on
Miracles and Laws of Nature," in Weiner, Values. 275-321.
Peirce significantly identifies the difference between
their views as "a different conception of the function of
hypothesis and of the logic of hypothesis" (Ibid., 283).
54.

CE 3.323-3.235, CP 5.145.

55. Peirce held that the rule of inversion applied to
all syllogistic moods and figures (CP 2.512, CP 2.619). On
this view, deductive reasoning became the touchstone of
logic, a position which caused Peirce some difficulty as
his thought developed in the direction of indeterminism in
later years. Goudge points out that Peirce was forced to
revise this view as his relativistic sympathies matured
(Thought. 188-194).
In the present context,
Peirce’s
argument for an inverse relationship had important implica
tions for his ontology, since the "A-lessness, B-lessness
proof” quoted above supported his entire conception of law.
56.

CE 3.330, CE 3.333.

57.

CP 2.776, CE 3.332, CE 3.326, CE 3.335.

58. Peirce in fact illustrated his point with the same
kinetic theory of gasses described above as being so
"troublesome" (CE 3.334-3.335).
59. Deely makes an interesting observation in this
regard which has implications for the present argument.
"When induction was revised by Bacon," he points out, "it
was revived in such a way that the interrelation of certain
essential structures of the mind’s working were lost from
view, i.e., the developmental or historical aspects of the
mind’s construction of concepts."
In fact, all postBaconian studies, Deeley claims, ignored the basic dif
ferences between types of logical arguments, until Peirce
attempted to clarify the issue.
Fisch agrees that Peirce’s
"major single discovery was that what he at first called
hypothesis and later abduction or retroduction, is a dis
tinct kind of argument, different from both deduction and
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from induction." But Deely claims that Peirce’s theory was
merely a rediscovery of Poinsot’s theory of ascensus and
descensus, itself a survival of the summulist tradition.
The present argument would place the point of origin in a
more recent incarnation of the same tradition -- namely
that of Colonial Ramists.
See John Deely, Introducing
Semiotic. 72.
60.

CE 1.428, CP 1.470, CP 2.465, CP 2.769.

61. CP 5.145, CE 3.336, CP 5.171-172.
It is important
to note here the relationship between Peirce’s definition
of hypothesis as a subsumption under a class and his
insistence on inclusion as the fundamental logical rela
tion, discussed above.
"Leading principles" defined the
classes under which arguments were subsumed, and thereby
governed the relationship of inclusion which Peirce deemed
fundamental. Hypothesis, by extension became the source of
all knowledge (see CP 2.462, 2.465, 2.576, 2.588).
The
Ramean patrimony is clear.
For an interesting contrast on
the issue of hypothesis, see James Farr, "The Way of
Hypothesis: Locke on Method," JHI 48(1987): 51-72.
62. CE 3.336, CP 2.508-511. Gallie points out that
"although Peirce's writings on this issue are distressingly
scrappy, there can be no doubt that he did not wish the
scope of his pragmatism to be restricted to thoughts,
statements, or hypotheses concerning questions of empirical
fact. Pragmatism, he maintains, has an important relevance
to those parts of our knowledge which are commonly
described as purely formal, or apodictic" (Peirce and Prag
matism (Harmondworth, 1952), 161).
63.

CE 3.334.

64. CE 3.336-337; CE 2.229; CE 3.337-3.338; CP 1.4648.
"Peirce relied exclusively upon the claim that the
property of feeling is irreducible to a property of mat
ter," Robert Almeder points out ("The Idealism of Charles
S. Peirce," JHP 10(1972):484).
Conkin agrees. "True
belief, in the pragmatic sense," he points out, "involved
feeling as well as intellect, volition as well as verbal
symbols.
The experiential value, the attractiveness of
anything, including an idea, resides in the felt quality
that accompanies it. Thus the problem for... science is the
definition of the quality that gives vitality and life and
power to the idea of rationality" (Puritans and Prag
matists . 257). Weinstein concurs that "within the general
project of American classical philosophy... Peirce’s con
tribution is the most vitalistic, the closest to a prayer
to life. ...He has a direct appreciation of the
irreducibi1ity of the ’qualities of feeling', which he
gathered under his category of ’firstness’ and which kept

432

him from substituting general ideas for lived experiences
(Wilderness. 55).
65. CP 1.316. Weiner points out that "there is in a
Peirce a Schellingian tendency to regard the forms of
thought as constituting the forms of reality, and that
whatever is regulative of thought is bound to be trans
formative of things or events, for the latter embody feel
ings or ideas ("Evolutionism...," 347-348).
66. CP 5.535, CE 1.7, CP 5.499, CP 5.18, CP 5.453.
Boler places this observation in an interesting perspective
by tying Peirce's definition of conditional statements to
his definition of causation.
Since Peirce argues that a
single event cannot be a cause (CP 6.67, CP 6.600) and that
meaning derives from an expectation of future actualities
(see above), he can subsequently argue that composite rela
tions encompass causality.
"If there is any would-be at
all," Peirce observed, "there is more or less causation,
for that is all that I mean by causation" (CP 8.225, n.
10). Boler ties this argument to Peirce distinction of
"consequence" and "consequent," a distinction he claims
was insufficiently understood by the scholastics.
See
Boler, Real ism. 94-116.
67.

CP 5.412.

68. Fisch makes some tantalizing observations which,
if pursued, might have important implications for the cur
rent argument. More than half of the members of the famed
Metaphysical Club, he points out, were lawyers -- among
them, Nicholas St. John Green, who Peirce identified as the
"grandfather" of pragmatism.
Fisch describes "the lawdominated Metaphysical Club" as focusing on seminal
"predictive theories” fully "five and a half years before
logical pragmatism."
Indeed, he questions the common
assumption "that Peirce had little or no interest in law,
in the philosophy of law, or even in political and social
philosophy," noting that his wife Zina's activism
inevitably embroiled him in discussions relating to legal
theory and that his own family had as strong a background
in law as they had in mathematics and science.
Indeed,
when Peirce was elected a member of the American Academy of
Arts and Sciences in 1867, Fisch observes, he was assigned
to Class III, Moral and Political Sciences, Section I,
Philosophy and Jurisprudence, along with Green and Holmes,
rather than to Class I, Mathematical and Physical Sciences,
Section I, Mathematics, with Chauncy Wright (CE 3.xxxxxxv). While Fisch’s comments certainly do not constitute
evidence that Peirce consciously viewed legal constructs as
analogous to logical order as Colonial Ramists clearly had,
it does tend to support the link established in Chapter VII
between American political forms and Ramean logical meta-
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phors. Moreover, it suggests that the realist bias of
Peirce’s thought served to perpetuate the influence of
those Ramean metaphors across the generation of logical,
legal and scientific theorists who would build upon his
pragmatic maxim.
69.
Peirce makes this analogy explicit in "A Neglected
Argument for the Reality of God," Hibbert Journal
7( 1908 ):90-112 . For a discussion of the implications of
the analogy for science see Peter T. Turley, "Peirce’s Cos
mic ’Sheriff’," JHI 36(1975):717-720.

Chapter 11
PARADIGM LOST:
Instrumental Variations
on
A Theme from Peirce

Peirce’s unique cosmology drew its force from the for
tuitous convergence of a logic grounded in antecedent
structure and a science grounded in consequent function.
Rv subsuming the processive theories of modern science
under the Ramean bias of his intellectual heritage, Peirce
could argue for a rational appreciation of the logic of
life which Darwin’s evolutionary theories taught.

More

over, he could extend the logical outlines of his argument
to embrace the cosmic dimensions of an evolution conceived
as the progressive realization of rational purpose in the
world.

In short, he could reestablish inquiry as an

endeavor in which the vocations of Saint and scientist
merged.
Peirce labelled his cosmological synthesis agapiaa and
defined it as a pervasive doctrine of continuity.

In

agapistic evolution, Peirce maintained, the functional
processes of nature conformed to an overarching purpose
radiating from a cosmic rationality essentially indivisible
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into discrete thoughts or isolated personalities.

By

virtue of their participation in this cosmic whole, indi
vidual entities or events possessed no absolute finitude,
but existed rather as stages in an ongoing process of
reconciliation whereby the final goals of thought became
the ruling habits of things.

Inquiry, in turn, case to

embrace the total intellectual life of humanity and was
identified with the logical process itself, while reality
became an ideal state of complete information -- essen
tially knowable, but never fully known.
The ontological correlate of Peirce's model rested on
his categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness -modes of being which in their integral relations expressed
the continuous structure of reality.

Firstness, the mode

of pure potential, entailed "positive qualitative pos
sibility;” Secondness, the mode of existence, comprised
"the being of actual fact;” and Thirdness, the mode of gen
erality, encompassed "the laws which will govern facts in
the future."1

Inquiry, Peirce argued, in fact charted a

logical passage from Firstness to Thirdness -- and an anal
ogous ascent from the lawlessness of prerefelective events
to the perfect rationality of habit.
Firstness, Peirce tells us, affected consciousness as
"an actual passage at arms between the ego and the non
ego," but had no intellectual value.

It entailed no mental

occurrence, only a physical event which brutally forced
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itself upon the mind.
the reality.

Firstness, Peirce explained,

It is not in propositional fora."

had no psychological status.

"is

Hence it

Mental construction, he

argued, entered consciousness only at the level of Sec
ondness, where the mind formed perceptual judgements which
gave "the intellect’s description of the evidence of the
senses."

Secondness comprised the world of fact with which

reason dealt, thereby providing the cognitive ground for
Thirdness, the methodological analog of the principle of
continuity.

Thirdness -- or generality, or habit, or law

-- thus formed an ineluctable part of the cosmos which
"poured in on us through every avenue of sense."1

Without

it, Peirce claimed, inquiry at any level must fail.
Peirce’s entire cosmology depended on the ontological
status of Thirdness.

Without it as a regulative principle,

his pragmatic theory of meaning, along with his realist
reconstruction of science, simply could not stand against
the reductionism explicit in nominalist and positivist
logic.1

But ultimately, it was the inter-relatedness of

Peirce’s three categories which provided the strongest sup
port for his cosmology.

His assumption that a syn-

categorematic relation pertained between the organic func
tions of Firstness and the higher symbolic functions of
Thirdness served to break down the rigid dualism between
organism and environment on which both sensationalist
psychology and nominalist science had turned.

Under

437

Peirce’s model, the organism joined with its environment in
a transactional process governed by the relational matrix
of the categories.

Laws unfolded as the product of a

method whereby the mind explored a shared reality.

And

truth took on the aspect of a collective wisdom expressed
through conduct.
But Peirce’s methodological synthesis could not stand
against the centrifugal forces at work in American
intellectual life as the 19th century drew to a close.

As

the nation struggled to recover from the trauma of civil
war and reconstruction, rapid changes in its economic and
demographic base wrought an inversion and confusion of
values.

The absorption of vast numbers of immigrants from

increasingly disparate cultural backgrounds and the social
dislocations which came in the wake of progressive
urbanization tended to disrupt traditional ideologies.
While the Metaphysical Club met in Boston, the Tammany Club
met in New York.

While Emerson preached self-reliance in

Cambridge, enterprising citizens defrauded the Home of
Independence and Brotherly Love in Philadelphia.

The

Chicago Fire destroyed a thriving urban center, while ter
ritorial expansion destroyed a vast natural wilderness.
the national government struggled to adapt a federal
political system to an increasingly centralized economy,
American labor stumbled through the Homestead and Pullman
strikes.

And as widespread corruption tainted leadership

As
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at the local and national levels, Robber Barons
precipitated an actual and metaphoric restructuring of
values in the gold crisis and the Erie War.
1887 ushered in disastrous drought and the Interstate
Commerce Act.

1888 brought devastating blizzards and a new

interpretation of the 14th Ammendment.

1890 marked the

passage of landmark anti-trust legislation, yet 1892 still
saw bloodshed at Haymarket Square and the formulation of a
powerful Populist platform which described a nation
"brought to the verge of moral, political and material
ruin."4

1893 brought panic.

As all these tangible influences worked profound
changes in the fabric of American society, so the attempts
to construct a philosophic rationale for them signalled an
equally profound adjustment in the nation’s intellectual
life.9

The collapse of the Social Darwinian dream and the

disintegration of Unitarian ethics caused a noisy battle to
be joined between transcendental visionaries and
utilitarian die-hards who brought forth a flood of patent
remedies for the philosophic malaise which plagued the
nation.

But this embarrassment of speculative riches

itself inspired confusion and stimulated doubt.

Commager

claims that in fact it served to "atomize" America’s
philosophic response.

"The political readjustment of the

Revolutionary era," he explains, "had been prepared for by
generations of thought and training and a decade of high-
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minded discussion.

...[But] there was no comparable

philosophical preparation for the effort to come to terms
with the new world of science and technology that loomed up
over the horizon in the closing years of the 19th
century."*

And indeed, the single thread which seemed to

run through the nation's eclectic intellectual life at the
turn of the century appears in what Morton White has called
a consistent "revolt against formalism" -- a revolt against
precisely that synoptic impulse which had underwritten all
inquiry for Peirce.7
But the fate of American philosophy after 1890 can also
be characterized as a loss of continuity -- an analytical
fragmentation of that continuous reality which Peirce had
so laboriously constructed through his categories.

Indeed

James, Dewey and Royce -- the three philosophers who owed
the most to Peirce’s pragmatic insights -- each seemed
intent on breaking off a piece of Peirce’s organic whole
and elevating it to the status of an ultimate truth.

James

sinned againBt Firstness by confining the possibilities of
experience within the ambit of an individual mind; Dewey
betrayed Secondness by limiting human aspiration to the
social order; and Royce transgressed against Thirdness by
transforming the relational matrix of the categories into
an ideal consciousness.

Each, in his own characteristic

variation on Peirce’s theme of continuity, lost sight of
the essential inter-relatedness of Peirce’s categories and
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so lost touch with that continuous reality which they
underwrote.
William James was the worst offender -- if only by
virtue of his uncanny ability to mask his defection in a
vivid popular style which made it all the more palatable to
minds seeking respite from the rigors of formal analysis.
James departed radically from Peirce’s model in the
elaboration of his own pragmatism in the 1890’s.

Although

only three years younger than Peirce, James lagged far
behind him in philosophical development.

The 1860’s, which

found Peirce already immersed on his systematic critique of
Kant, Mill and Descartes, found James still "swamped in
empirical philosophy."*

In fact not until well into the

1880's, after Peirce had already drawn out the logical
implications of his Illustrations, did James "outgrow" his
attachment to empiricism and begin to elaborate his own
philosophical system -- for which he drew heavily on prin
ciples enunciated by Peirce.
But, as Ralph Barton Perry has observed, James played
havoc with many of Peirce’s central assumptions.

Indeed,

"perhaps it would be correct, and just to all parties," he
claims, "to say that the modern movement known as prag
matism is largely the result of James’ misunderstanding of
Peirce."*

James Feibleman goes somewhat farther, claiming

that "not even by the utmost exertion of tolerance and
sympathy can James' philosophy be said to be an extension
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or development of Peirce's, although no doubt certain
aspects of it...were suggested to James by Peirce."10
Peirce himself,

in later years, did what he could to dis

tance himself from James' formulation of pragmatism, his
clearest rejection of it appearing in the famous essay
"What Pragmatism Is."11

Peirce had intended his pragmatic

maxim as a theory of meaning -- that is, as a meth
odological guide to the logical process itself.

"Professor

James," Peirce complained in 1908, "remodelled the matter
and transmogrified it into a doctrine of philosophy, some
parts of which I highly approved, while other and more
prominent parts I regarded, and still regard, as opposed to
sound logic.”**
Ironically, Peirce himself had invited James' mis
construction by insisting as early as 1868 that "every sort
of modification of consciousness... is an inference" and
explicitly establishing a "striking analogy" between emo
tion and hypothesis.1*

Indeedn, "The Doctrine of Chances"

had identified three "sentiments" as the "indispensable
requirements of logic."

But Peirce's perception of the

"emotive" or "sensitive" aspects of logic had related
directly to his aesthetic vision of a continuous reality.
"When we consider,” he pointed out, "that logic depends on
a mere struggle to escape doubt, which, as it terminates in
action, must begin in emotion, and that, furthermore, the
only cause of our planting ourselves on reason is that
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other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the
social impulse, why should we wonder to find social senti
ment presupposed in reasoning?"1*

James, on the other

hand, took Peirce’s argument from "social sentiment,"
stripped it of all its logical attributes, and arrived at a
cognitive theory which pursued pragmatic meaning among the
purely psychological effects of sense experience.
Peirce had explicitly dismissed psychology as
irrelevant to the process of determining meaning.

In an

argument which would have served his Puritan ancestors well
in their continuing battle against "enthusiasm," he pointed
out that psychology could not supply self-validating predi
cates and therefore could not serve as a means to investi
gate truth.

Peirce, in fact, doubted that there was "any

such thing as psychology, apart from logic on the one hand
and physiology on the other."

Therefore, he invited inves

tigators to "adopt any theory that seems to you acceptable
as to the psychological operations by which perceptual
judgements are formed."

What mattered was the inferential

process itself, conceived as a function of the formal prop
erties of thought.

At the heart of inference, Peirce

argued, lay habit -- "the essence of the logical interpretant" -- and habit "is not an affectation of conscious
ness."

Perceptual judgements themselves thus occurred

entirely outside the realm of psychology in that region
defined and controlled by habit.18
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James, on the other hand, translated Peirce’s logical
maxim into the language of associationist psychology,
replacing "conceiveable" with "sensible" effects as the
controlling factors in inquiry.

Where for Peirce (as for

Ramus), judgement had provided a method for fixing meaning
at the level of argument, for James it became a method for
determining truth at the level of experience.

Under James’

analysis, judgement became a mere matter of "pointing" -- a
process which, in the tradition of Locke and Hume, "must
terminate in the world of orderly sensible experience."1*
"What science means by ’verification’,” James explained,
"is no more than this, that no object of conception shall
be believed which sooner or later has not some permanent
and vivid object of sensation for its term.

...Conceived

objects must show sensible effects or else be dis
believed."17

Truth, he maintained, denoted the satisfac

tory accomodation of one sense datum with another, not the
agreement of perceptual judgements with an antecedent
order.

In direct opposition to Peirce’s analysis of

probability, James declared truth "an event" which stood in
relation, not to a continuous or shared reality, but rather
to the history of an individual mind.*'
James stubbornly refused to submit his psychological
conception of truth to critical analysis, dismissing Kant’s
famous distinction between analytic and synthetic forms as
"one of his most unhappy legacies" where Peirce had found
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it one of his most fruitful.

The words "analytic" and

"synthetic" did not label intrinsic qualities of experience
for James or even cognitive modes.

They simply portrayed

ways in which the mind classified experience.

The clas

sification depended upon purpose, and the purpose depended
on the will.

"The analytic-synthetic debate," James

claimed, "is thus for us devoid of all significance." In
fact, in an ironic inversion of the Baconian ideal, James
declared the differentiation of these forms an "idol of the
tribe” and banished them from inquiry!1*
James arrived ultimately at the conviction that
synthetic and analytic processes were not only dynamically
continuous, but functionally indistinguishable.

"Life,

...concreteness, immediacy, use what word you will," he
claimed, encompassed both analysis and synthesis
inextricably fused in a flow of experience which "exceeds
our logic, overflows and surrounds it."

Experience so con

strued remained impervious to formal inquiry.

"For my own

part," James admitted, "I have finally found myself com
pelled to give up the logic, fairly, squarely, and
irrevocably."20

Logic, he maintained "stands to the

psychological relation... only as saltatory abstractness
stands to ambulatory concreteness.

Both relations need a

psychological vehicle; and the 'logical* one is simply the
'psychological' one disemboweled of its fullness and
reduced to a bare abstractional scheme.”

For Peirce, logic
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had been constitutive of a continuous reality.

For Janes

it became merely "a transformation which the flux of life
undergoes at our handB in the interest of theory."11
Peirce deplored James' lack of logical rigor and his
inclination to confound psychology with logic.

In his

review of the Principles of Psychology, he attacked James'
disregard for analytic/synthetic distinctions and charged
him with an "uncritical acceptance of data...[which] prac
tically amounts to a claim to a new kind of liberty of
thought."

"The notion that the natural sciences accept

their data uncritically we hold to be a serious mistake,"
Peirce objected.

On the contrary, he pointed out, the

first thing a physicist does is to subject his data "to
rigid criticism to find whether these phenomena are objec
tive or subjective."

Moreover, by refusing to give "any

exhaustive scrutiny of his new logic in its generality,"
Peirce warned, James displayed "an originality of the
destructive kind."11
In general, Peirce found James' Principles to be "a
large assortment of somewhat hetergeneous articles loosely
tied up in one bag, with tendencies toward sprawling" —
ironic assessment considering the source!

an

James, he

claimed, seemed prone to "subject to severe investigation
any doctrine whatever which smells of intelligibility" and
to rely rather on "the general incomprehensibility of
things" as an explanatory principle.

The book, he argued,
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"should have been preceded by an introduction discussing
the strange positions in logic upon which all its arguments
turn" —

the most alarming of which to Peirce was its

proposal to "banish from psychology" those ideas which com
prised "the direct data of consciousness.”
James propose,

Not only does

"by the simple expedient of declaring

certain inquiries extra-psychological, to reverse the con
clusions of the science on many important points," Peirce
complained, "but also by the same negative means to decide
upon the character of its data" in order to validate his
method.1 *
The argument between James and Peirce turned on their
respective definitions of perception.

Peirce, like a good

Ramean, had characterized perception as the logical opera
tion of judgement -- that is, as a mediate stage of
inference between the "firstness" of pure sensation and the
"thirdness" of habit.

James, on the other hand, vigorously

denied that perception required any "additional wheelwork
of the mind."

"To call perception unconscious reasoning,"

he argued, "is either a useless metaphor or a positively
misleading confusion between two different things."

"So

far," he maintained, "from perception being a species of
reasoning, properly so called, both it and reasoning are
coordinate varieties of that deeper sort of process known
psychologically as the association of ideas, and
physiologically as the law of habit in the brain.”14
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Peirce, predictably, protested and accused James of
"forgetting his logic” or, what was even worse, attempting
to subsume it under psychological categories.

All percep

tion, Peirce argued, "involves a conscious, though it may
be an indistinct, reference to a genus of arguments.”

"To

explain any process not understood," he maintained, "is
simply to show that it is a special case of a wider des
cription of process which is more intelligible."
tion thus "attains a virtual judgement.

Percep

...It subsumes

something under a class, and not only so, but virtually
attaches to the proposition the seal of assent.''19
James, he objected, ignored the logical structure of
composite statements (pace Ramus!), pointing out that "we
might suppose he had never heard of the modus ponens."* •
Rather he depended on "some ultra-Leibnizian unconscious
perception” to supply his middle terms.17

James, along

with other associationists, Peirce claimed, assumed that
"the proposition 'If A then B ’ is represented by the asso
ciation itself, which is not present to consciousness.”
But this telescoped the triadic process of reasoning into
an overly simplified diadic association -- in short, into
James’ process of "pointing".**

On the contrary, Peirce

maintained, since "unconscious inference does not...mean an
inference in which any proposition or term of the argument
is unconscious," but rather simply an "inference in which
the reasoner is not conscious of making an inference,” per-

448

ception did in fact entail a type of synthesis which
occurred, not at the level of psychology, but rather at
that formal level defined and controlled by logic.**
James always maintained a sort of surreptitious meth
odological dualism which allowed him to accept, for the
purposes of psychology, the existence of certain intrinsi
cally psychical or mental realities.

He never quite

escaped the legacy of Descartes and Locke.

Although the

distinction between thought and thing originated for him
within experience as a function of perception, the distinc
tion still pertained.

Peirce, on the other hand, could

portray matter as "mind hide-bound with habits,” since his
description of cognition rested on the inter-dependent
physiological states of doubt and resolution rather than on
some external relation between the mind and consciousness.
By dismissing, or perhaps just not comprehending, the logi
cal content of Peirce's argument, James effectively trans
formed his organically grounded perceptual judgements into
vehicles of causal rather than analytical consequence.
Where Peirce had made ideas clear by considering their
logical content and their general or habitual purport,
James made them clear by considering their psychological
and behavioral effects, giving them an actual causal
status.*0
Although James, like Peirce, accepted pure experience
as the irreducible ground of cognition, his associationist
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bias led him to view perception as a process of selective
abstraction which occurred within experience, rather than
as an integral part of a aanifold logical process.

Hence,

for James, Peirce's prereflective percepts and his mediate
judgements (the materia of Firstness and Secondness) both
collapsed into a pervasive "ontological emotion" which
became the existential cement binding the mind to its
objects.

Thirdness disappeared completely.

Where for

Peirce belief had comprised "the demi-cadence which closes
a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life,"
for James it became a "craving of the heart” which issued,
not in the rational assent of a perceptual judgement, but
in an emotional consent to feelings.

This consent

manifested itself through the will, which projected "our
inveterate propensity to choice" onto the world.*1
"The will,” James claimed, "mentally considered, is
consent to a fact of any kind."

Indeed, belief and will

not only controlled "inseparable functions,” they actually
denoted two names for the same psychological phenomenon of
subjective preference.**

By contrast, the associationists

had identified the will with a nervous discharge correlated
to a physical "feeling of effort."

But this "feeling of

effort” represented an externalization of the will which
James, drawing on Edwardsean metaphors, could not accept.
For James, the will projected an inward flowing sensation
which actually helped to shape its physical counterpart.
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Indeed, the feelings or actions precipitated by the will
becane irrelevant to the analysis of the intent itself,
which lay ultimately in the realm of psychology.

But this

"redirection" of the will, which allowed James to equate
its operation with belief, carried him a considerable dis
tance from Peirce’s original pragmatic insight.
"In every proposition," James argued, stepping defini
tively outside Peirce’s logical construct, "four elements
are to be distinguished, the subject, the predicate, and
their relation (of whatever sort it be), and finally the
psychic attitude in which our mind stands toward the
proposition taken as a whole.”

By introducing "psychic

attitude" as a fourth element in cognition, James effec
tively vitiated the constitutive force of Peirce's logical
categories and gave the will, as the vehicle of "selective
interest," a controlling role in inquiry.

"Without selec

tive interest," James claimed, "experience is an utter
chaos.”* *
James’ version of selective interest, however, bore
little or no resemblance to the "predesignation" described
by Peirce in his defense of statistical inductions.

Indeed

Peirce, like James, denied the efficacy or even the pos
sibility of totally disinterested inquiry.

But for Peirce,

the "predesignation of characters" had controlled a logical
"process of sampling” which determined the relative fre
quency of terms within a class.14

For James, on the other
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hand, selective interest actually conferred reality upon
individual sensation.

It manifested the propensity of the

will to direct the mind in the gratification of private
interests.

Thus, in a sense, James lifted Peirce’s

''predesignated characters" from within a manifold logical
process and relocated them in the stream of consciousness
of an individual mind.
James insisted that ’’the concept of 'being’ or 'fact’
is not wider than or prior to the concept of 'content of
experience’,” thereby tying all cognition to primary data
and confining it within the boundaries of Firstness.1*
This in turn ensured that the individual will would control
the results of inquiry.

The will, James claimed,

"determine[s ] what we notice; what we notice determines
what we do; and what we do determines what we experience."
Hence reality became "largely a matter of our own crea
tion."

Since "our own reality...is the ultimate of

ultimates for our belief," James concluded,

"the world of

living realities...[must be] anchored in the Ego, con
sidered as an active and emotional term."

No unlimited

community, but rather "the absolute, uncriticised reality
of the Self is the root of the whole matter."1*
James here approached a Nietzschean concept of the
Absolute Individual.

Only his scientific training -- and

perhaps a bit of his own "unconquerable subjectivity" -caused him to temper his psychological model with a
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philosophy of radical empiricism rather than developing it
into a full-blown existentialism.*7

And yet, by insisting

on the primacy of the person in his psychology and turning
the dynamics of analysis inward through his reliance on the
will, James clearly moved beyond the logical position of
Peirce into a purely philosophical stance curiously
reminiscent of Edwards.**

James’ radical empiricism

aspired to be more than a theory of inquiry.

It aimed

rather at an actual metaphysics of experience -- one which
would solve the problem of cognition by collapsing Peirce’s
categories into a "neutral monism” generated by the cona
tive rather than the cognitive dimensions of thought.
James’ radical empiricism, however, had the great dis
advantage of leaving moral issues definitively aside.**
His refusal to clarify, or even to acknowledge, a distinc
tion between analytic and synthetic propositions led to a
consequent lack of clarity on the nature of moral judge
ment.

This was precisely the problem which had plagued the

Cartesians, who had solved it through their "provisional
morality."

But although James at all points appears to

assume a moral dimension in the same way that Descartes
acquiesced to his authoritative ideal, he interpreted that
dimension, not as a commitment to community mediated by an
idea, as for Peirce, but rather as an effort at sympathy in
which individual experience encouraged human solidarity.
James believed in a moral universe.

But he had nothing to
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offer others except that they might participate in his own
acquiescence.40
ter of will.

"Morality," he declared, "is simply a mat

The moral idea, once selected, is sustained

by a resolute effort of attention and 'erelong succeeds in
calling up its own congeners and associates, and ends by
changing [a] man's consciousness altogether.
consciousness his action.

And with his

...The free will controversy is

thus extremely simple," he concluded.

"It relates solely

to the amount of effort of attention which we can at any
time put forth."41
For Peirce plurality had implied relativity and
relativity had implied community, supplying a logical
ground for moral action.

"Individualism and falsity,"

Peirce declared, "are one and the same."

He had therefore

worked tirelessly to "grind off the arbitrary and individu
alistic character of thought" through an investigation of
its formal structures.40

But for James plurality implied

variety and variety implied individuality, moving him much
closer to existentialism than Peirce ever got.4*

The risk

for James personally lay in having to contend with a kind
of Pascalian angst grounded in a realization of his own
finitude.

This sensation of cosmic isolation drove him to

his famous encounter with "panic fear” which led him
ultimately to develop his views on radical contingency as
consolation.

"Radical empiricism,” James himself pointed

out, "leads to the assumption of a collectivism of personal
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lives,

...variously cognitive of each other, variously con

ative and impulsive, genuinely evolving and changing by
effort and trial, and by their interaction and cumulative
achievements making up the world."4*
James’ opaque pragmatic morality thus grew directly out
of what Peirce perceived as his lack of logical rigor.

For

Peirce, pragmatism always remained the "logic of
hypothesis” expressed through modal forms and grounded in
the integration of means and ends.

But the intimate con

nection between moral and rational behavior for which
Peirce h—

argued rested, as it had for Ramus, on the cen

trality of hypotheticals in inquiry -- on the "ought” rela
tion expressed by composite constructions.

James, on the

other hand, had collapsed Peirce’s composite relations into
diadic associations, thereby transforming his "if...then"
statements into far leB8 stringent "either... or” statements
in order to allow for the operation of his uncriticized
Self.

He thereby destroyed the intrinsic Peircean/Ramean

connection between logic as rational inquiry and law as a
moral imperative.

James’ "either... or" relations, although

descriptive of atomic experience and prescriptive of per
sonal conduct, remained essentially non-referential and
thus had no apodictic force.

While this allowed James to

ignore the theory of practice which had been so central to
Peirce and to conceive of axiology rather as the study of
preferential behavior, it also led him by consequence to
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adopt an instrumental theory of value which lacked the
aesthetic qualities of Peirce’s theoretical vision.
In a sense, James’ retreat from hypotheticals amounted
to an acceptance of the principle of eupraxia and a
rejection of the supporting ars technologicae.

His commit

ment to the individual and to the maxim that "thought con
sists in acts” made practice, not truth, the sole aim of
inquiry.

Peirce, on the other hand, had argued that

thought was intended to "apply to...conceived action" and
claimed that in his own pragmatic maxim he had been "speak
ing in no other sense than that of intellectual purport.’’*s
Pragmatism, he warned, "is correct doctrine only in so far
as it is recognized that material action is the mere husk
of ideas.

...The end of thought is action only in so far as

the end of action is another thought."

Thus the goal of

inquiry is not practice but "conditional general resolu
tions to act...[which] by modifying the rules of selfcontrol modif[y] action, and so experience too."4*

Peirce

had relied on the force of these "conditional general
resolutions" to underwrite his moral vision of "social
sentiment" and an unlimited community.

But where Peirce’s

maxim called for selfless commitment to a continuous
reality, James’ called for "free enterprise in the moral
realm" and a license to enjoy post-rationalized "moral
holidays" into the bargain.47
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Pragnatism ultimately became the logic of self-control
for Peirce.

Under his model, the very conditions of

scientific inquiry had a presumed ethical bias.

The gener

ation of logical laws or habits necessarily entailed moral
considerations since logic itself required the application
of self-control in intellectual operations.

But this in

turn required some rule against which to measure method.
The logically good, Peirce concluded, must simply represent
a particular species of the morally good.

Peirce, in fact,

came increasingly to substitute the ethical term "control"
for the biological term "habit" in his writings, arriving
at length at the conclusion that the real test of any
hypothesis lay "in its value in the self-controlled growth
of man's conduct of life."4*

Through ethics -- "the study

of what ends of action we are deliberately prepared to
adopt” -- logic could construct "a sort of composite
photograph of the conscience of the members of the com
munity."

Self-control thus became a virtual prerequisite

for citizenship in the world of rational endeavor.4*
But Peirce’s ethical ideal could not survive James’
voluntaristic assault.

Pragmatism emerged from its

encounter with radical empiricism chastened and sobered,
having lost confidence in its own ability to function as a
normative science.

It was in this diminished state that

John Dewey found it when he embarked on his own project of
reconstruction near the turn of the Century.

Concerned

457

that the voluntaristic emphasis of James' psychology
obscured the ethical dimensions of pragmatism. Dewey
undertook to restore Peirce’s ideal of community, if only
for the limited purposes of social reform.
"The problem of restoring integration and cooperation
between man’s belief about the world in which he lives and
his beliefs about the values and purposes that should
direct his conduct," Dewey declared, "is the deepest prob
lem of modern life."80

He agreed with James that without

an experiential reference, no concept, however selfconsistent, could have any existential import.

But experi

ence, he argued, "is not a verb that shuts man off from
nature; it is a means of penetrating continually further
into the heart of nature."81

Hence the place to search for

those integrative factors which gave purpose and meaning to
life must be within the processive functions of experience
itself -- that is, within that sphere of interaction
between primary sensation and the mind which Peirce had
termed Secondness.

Dewey’s entire philosophical program

can in fact be seen as an attempt to reintegrate James’
"absolute, uncriticized Self" into a moral program recon
ceived as natural science -- all under the category of Sec
ondness made comprehensive and renamed simply Nature.
In an effort to avoid James’ existential dilemma, Dewey
offered a physiological, rather than a psychological, anal
ysis of judgement.

By establishing physiology as the
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matrix within which cognition occurred, Dewey could argue
for an empirical account of logic which subsumed all
inquiry, including its formal properties, under the rubrics
of adaptive behavior.

"All logical forms," Dewey declared,

"originate in operations of inquiry."*1 So construed, logic
became a function of life and judgement a shorthand trans
cription of the flow of experience which allowed for the
management of conduct.

These transcriptions indeed con

tributed to the construction of "habit systems".

But they

enjoyed no ontological status, serving merely to define the
"actual operative presence of connections in the subjectmatter of direct experience."**
Peirce had considered inferential judgements constitu
tive of a shared reality.

James had affirmed their crea

tive role but had confined their operation to the constitu
tion of a private world.

Dewey took a middle course, argu

ing that although inferential forms grew out of interactive
encounters with the environment, they were not necessarily
reducible to the conditions of individual response.

"Expe

rience," he pointed out, "reaches down into nature; it has
depth.
extent.

It also has breadth and to an indefinitely elastic
It stretches.

That stretch," he argued, "con

stitutes inference."**
Through this radical reduction of ontology to
epistemology, Dewey placed conscious activity in control of
logic, effectively subsuming it under Peirce's category of
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Secondness.* *

It was the process of drawing inferences,

Dewey argued, which conferred aeaning on experience, not
reference to an atonic nind or an extant reality -- that
is, reference back to Firstness or forward to Thirdness.
Indeed Dewey obviated the need for either Firstness or
Thirdness by portraying the "irritation of doubt" and its
resolution as conscious reactions to problematic situa
tions.

Inquiry, he claimed, "is the controlled or directed

transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that
is so determinate in its constituent distinction and rela
tions as to convert the elements of the original situation
into a unified whole.”**

Thus judgement became, not

rational assent as for Peirce, nor voluntary consent as for
James, but rather "an act" which projected purpose onto the
world.
This proved a far cry from Peirce's "sensation" of
doubting or James’ "sentiment" of belief.

Under Dewey’s

model knowledge in fact became "a product, mediated through
certain organic mechanisms of retention and habit [which]
presupposed prior experiences and mediated conclusions
drawn from them."

But this amounted in turn to a complete

objectification of Peirce’s category of Thirdness.

The

object of knowledge, Dewey claimed, is merely a situation
refashioned by conscious activity in order to solve a prob
lem.

The validity of an idea thus had nothing to do with

its conformity to an external reality.

Ideas had value
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only aa they proved capable of reconstructing the world.57
Through inference, Dewey claimed, the mind gave apposite
form to an extrinsic environment by "stretching" experience
into instrumental configurations which in turn controlled
conduct.

Thus all general propositions proved "strictly

normative in character, having as their sole excuse for
being, and their sole test of worth, their capacity to
regulate descriptions of individual cases...[and] operate
instrumentally in first-hand dealings with reality."5*
Peirce objected strongly to Dewey’s position, claiming
it tantamount to a reduction of logic to "a natural history
of thought."

Although the formal properties of thought

might develop within the context of experience, Peirce
argued, they were in fact antecedent to it and evolved only
according to an independent law itself evolving

-- a prin

ciple which he claimed was "stripped by Dewey of all
rational precision."

Dewey, Peirce complained, confused

proximate human purposes with the final goals of inquiry
and so reduced analysis to problem solving.

Thus, where

Dewey claimed to have established a "science of
intelligence," Peirce denied that he had even described an
intelligent science.**
But Dewey’8 instrumental logic did have the signal
advantage of maintaining an extrinsic reference for logical
forms -- something which James’ radical empiricism could
not do.

By making inferential judgement over into a con
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scious activity, Dewey removed it from James’ psychological
world and relocated it in public space, thus giving it an
ethical dimension.

"A continuous way of organized action,"

he protested against James, "is not a particular."
Although the formal properties of thought might originate
in individual reactions to stimuli, those reactions them
selves involved the projection of goals which in turn con
ditioned future response, thereby supplying a ground for
moral action.••

Dewey articulated his position in his

famous "reflex-arc" theory which, in a sense, threw a curve
at psycho-physical parallelism.

"So far a s ... judgement is

identified as an act," he claimed, "all a priori reason
disappears for drawing a line between the logic...of the
recognized sciences and that of conduct."*1

Thus James’

existential insecurity became a matter for depth psychology
and logic reentered the community as an instrument of
social purpose.
Ironically, it did so under the auspices of Peirce’s
own principle of continuity.

"There is a continuity of

inquiry," Dewey declared, "[in which] the conclusions
reached in one inquiry become means, material and proce
dural, of carrying on further inquiries.

1

Hence, the

logical process possessed an intrinsic social dimension.
Moreover, since the ends of inquiry conditioned its means,
instrumental values could in fact emerge from within the
data of primary experience through the application of
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reason.

Unlike Peirce, however, Dewey argued that although

the logical process resembled that of "entering into a con
tract [in that] it commits the enquirer to the observance
of certain conditions," those conditions did not extend to
the stipulation of ends, which rather issued from the
process itself.**

Hence, where James had relocated

Peirce's logical process in the individual stream of con
sciousness, Dewey relocated it in social interaction.
Dewey’s characteristic definition of judgement as "an
act" effectively refocused pragmatic inquiry on those
operational concepts which directed experience rather than
exploring its private contours or revealing its structure.
In a sense, Dewey became the ultimate Baconian, developing
his entire melioristic program from the aphorism: Knowledge
is Power.

Dewey in fact regarded Bacon as a prophet of

pragmatism because of his emphasis on knowledge as a means
of control.

But Dewey's concept of power bore little

resemblance to Peirce’s concept of self-control.

Science

"is not a force to invoke against impulse and habit," he
warned against Peirce.

Indeed it "is born of impulses"

whose "effectual organization into continuous dispositions
of inquiry" constituted method.

Thus where Peirce had

described moral behavior as that which imposed controls
over natural processes in the interests of formal struc
ture, Dewey described it as a means to effect a harmony
between natural processes in the interests of constructive
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interaction.•4
By thus making values immanent in n a t u r e ,

Dewey

rendered social intelligence the preeminent moral method,
creating a new role for education as an agent of change.
The mind, Dewev claimed,

is "an organ of service for the

control of the environment in relation to the ends of the
life process.”45

Since reason in its adaptive function had

constructive potential in both the moral and the physical
realms, it became imperative to direct that potential into
productive channels.

The "ought” relation, Dewey argued,

"does not descend out of the a priori blue or as an impera
tive from Mount Sinai."44

We learn what "ought" to be by

exploring experience -- that is, in the same way that we
acquire knowledge.

Thus all values are had in context and

so remain both objective and shared.

Moreover, if ethical

values in fact subsisted within experience, he argued,
education could provide a vehicle for expanding their mean
ing and enlisting them in the service of reform.

The pri

mary role given to education ultimately became the hallmark
of Dewey’s pragmatic program, setting him apart from both
Peirce and James in his emphasis on knowledge as a mode of
participation.
But Dewey’s reform ideology rested on a curious inver
sion of the nation’s millenial dream.

American ideologues

had consistently portrayed the existential order as a prac
tical means to a transcendent end -- eupraxia the means,
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technologia the end; politics the means, liberty the end;
benevolence the means, redemption the end; capitalism the
means, progress the end.

Peirce had perpetuated essen

tially the same vision in his scheme of agapistic evolu
tion.

Dewey, on the other hand, working in the context of

Jamesean psychology, dissipated the millenial thrust of
this characteristic ideology by relocating both the means
and the ends of his instrumental model in a perpetual pre
sent fully comprehended within the bounds of a
reconstructed society.

While he reintegrated James'

sovereign Self into Peirce’s organic community, he did so
under a charter which ignored its "unlimited" aspects.*7
Dewey's renovated Citty in fact rested exclusively on a
foundation of present experience.*•

Forsaking Peirce’s

millenial quest for perfect rationality as well as James’
existential plea for absolute assurance, Dewey simply
settled for a concrete though imperfect reality susceptible
of improvement.*•

He just wanted a better world -- and

devil take the Promised Land.

His community thus emerged

as a thoroughly domesticated and naturalized social unit
with its eyes fixed firmly on the present.
By eliminating the theoretic aspects of Peirce’s prin
ciple of continuity, Dewey succeeded in avoiding the angst
which had plagued James.

But his rendering of pragmatism,

having passed through the crucible of James’ critique, con
tained a note of resignation

-- a sense of something lost.
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By confining man’s aspirations within the social order,
Dewey effectively neutralized the central insight which had
energized the American intellectual tradition since it
emerged from the faith of the Fathers.

Although his axiol

ogy, grounded in an ambiguous ideal of shared imperfec
tions, allowed pragmatic values to be applied as a social
program, it presented a sort of plodding promise to minds
raised up in a millenial dream and trained to seek a per
fect wisdom.

It was this lack of transcendence, this loss

of dimension, which Josiah Royce protested as he witnessed
the steady dismantling of Peirce’s categorical structures.
But if James can be faulted for confining Peirce’s princi
ple of continuity to the individual mind and Dewey blamed
for restricting its operation to society, Josiah Royce must
stand accused of granting continuity an absolute existence
and dissolving it, to paraphrase James, in a sea of Thirdness.
Morton White has described Royce as "the logician of
the Oversoul," a borderline scholastic who marshalled
immense intellectual resources in defense of a metaphysics
which Emerson was content to convey in an epigram.70

Royce

himself recognized Peirce as a profound influence on the
development of his thought.

In letters to James, he dis

cussed his indebtedness to the Illustrations and to
Peirce's Boston lectures, while in both volumes of The
World and the Individual, he named Peirce as a source of
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inspiration.71

Peirce did not always prove grateful for

the attribution, however, feeling that Royce confused his
realism with an idealism of the Hegelian stripe -- a
metaphysics roundly rejected by Peirce in his Journal of
Speculative Philosophy articles and in his correspondence
with William Torrey Harris.7*

While he approved of some of

Royce’s logical positions, Peirce in fact tried to distance
himself as much as possible from most of Royce’s metaphysi
cal conclusions.7*
Like Peirce, Royce described a continuous reality
"which is present to an absolutely organized experience.”74
But unlike Peirce, who had characterized his model as a
logical possibility, Royce insisted on his as an ontologi
cal necessity.

By extending the metaphors of evolutionary

growth far beyond the boundaries of Peirce’s community of
inquiry, Royce arrived ultimately at an absolutist concep
tion of continuity which subsumed all logic under purely
mental categories and connected inquiry "in all the socalled realism of our prosaic modern research, with the
dreamers who dreamed [and] the fantastic poets who
failed."7*

For Peirce, truth had functioned as a regula

tive postulate, the continuous reality disclosed by inquiry
reflecting the logical process writ large.

But for Royce,

logic became a sample of the Absolute writ small, inquiry
merely driving the mind forward into ever more com
prehensive systems of order.
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Once again, the argument turned on the issue of judge
ment.

Royce, working like Dewey in the context of Jamesean

psychology, transformed Peirce's mediating perceptual
judgements into "partial functions of a self" which pro
jected purpose onto experience.

Judgement, he claimed, "is

a will seeking its own determination." It reflected a cog
nitive process "only in so far as it is, at the same time,
a voluntary process, an act, the partial fulfillment...of a
purpose."7*

Thus, although an idea "means to be true

[when] it intends a sort of correspondence with an object,"
Royce maintained,

"what correspondence it intends is

determined...solely by the purpose which the idea
embodies."7 7
Hence judgement, as a process whereby men clarified
their interests and intentions, described "an inner inter
pretation of our own attitude toward the world."7*

But

unlike James, who had confined the operation of "selective
interest" to individual experience, Royce expanded the
sphere of "interpretation" to encompass that "absolutely
organized experience" which served as ground for his
Absolute.

He described an infinite impersonal experience

to which truth could correspond, and then simply postulated
a hypothetical subject to comprehend it.

By so doing he

lifted the principle of continuity out of the social and
psychological contexts in which Dewey and James had respec
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tively lodged it and relocated it in an ideal consciousness
which comprehended an infinite meaning and purpose.
Peirce, of course, protested -- as he had against both
James and Dewey -- that judgement derived its validity from
the relational matrix in which it operated and not from the
exclusive jurisdiction of any one of its component parts.
Judgement indeed reflected purpose, he admitted.

But any

expression of purpose "refers to the future" and is there
fore necessarily a "more or less vague” conditional resolu
tion "to do a thing under certain circumstances.”

To

elevate such a conditional resolve to the status of a
transcendent Purpose, Peirce objected, would require the
actual fulfillment of all the conditions of possibi lity
entailed by the judgement, which would in turn require "no
less than the entire life of the thinker."

Royce’s trans

lation of conditional resolutions into intensive proposi
tions, he claimed, overstepped "the limits of admissible
interpretation" of his pragmatic maxim, leaving "no room
for possibility or any lower mode than actuality, among the
categories of being."7*
Peirce had maintained real possibility, or chance, as
an active category which provided shades of pragmatic mean
ing definable as ratios.

A similar notion of possibility

had presented James with occasions for personal reassurance
and Dewey with opportunities for social reconstruction.

By

contrast, by invoking Purpose as the controlling factor in
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"interpretation" and raising logical intension to a cosmic
plane, Royce foreclosed on the notion of real possibility
and offered simple inclusion as the ultimate form of
intelligibility.

But Royce’s cosmic principle of inclusion

bore no resemblance to Peirce’s more modest logical one,
which had operated as an affair of mediation rather than
definition.

Under the impact of Royce’s transcendent

"Interpretor" the tentative, self-corrective aspects of
Peirce’s method dissolved into an absolute dialectic
expressed in pseudo-pragmatic form.*0
By elevating Peirce’s composite "if...then" statements
to the status of inviolable dialectical relations, Royce
removed them from the objective realm and relocated them
under the operation of a "Theoretical Ought" which stipu
lated that finite or objective purposes merely gave frag
mentary expression to a wider truth.

The difference

emerged clearly in their respective treatments of "leading
ideas.”

Peirce’s leading ideas had functioned as

hypotheses which the inquirer tested by the application of
method -- that is, through observation and experience.

But

Royce’s leading ideas functioned as "guides" which remained
by definition impervious to inquiry.

They functioned

"despite, or even because, of the fact that evidence can
neither confirm nor refute them."*1

Royce’s theory of

science thus departed radically from Peirce’s regulative
and heuristic method.

Indeed the "conceivable effects"
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which controlled method for Peirce, having passed through
successive incarnations as James’ "sensible" and Dewey’s
"social” creatures, emerged ultimately in Royce as objec
tive manifestations of a transcendent point of view,**
Royce called his speculative model Absolute Pragmatism
-- a curious contradiction in philosophical terms which
must certainly have caused the careful Peirce, already dis
mayed over James’ abuse of his "bantling pragmatism", no
small distress.**

Royce offered his own variation on

Peirce’8 theme as a means whereby to invest the prag
matists’ call to action with a moral imperative.

Concerned

to bolster Dewey’s instrumental values with the apodictic
force of an absolute metaphysic, Royce simply made "inter
pretation" the ruling category of his logic and gave it, A
la Peirce, a social dimension.

"All search for truth,"

Royce agreed, "is a practical activity, with an ethical
purpose.

...A purely theoretical truth, such as should

guide no significant active process, is a barren absur
dity."

But to designate truth as expedient, he argued

against James, is simply to give "just a scrap of your per
sonal biography.”

Hence Royce claimed that James’ brand of

pragmatism failed as a conception of truth, since it failed
as a conception of ethics.**
In an attempt to reverse that error, Royce offered an
alternative conception of moral obligation which simply
subsumed all ethical considerations under the selective
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interest of an Absolute Will before which both Peirce’s
"unlimited community" and James’ "uncriticized Self" paled.
Royce’s definition of "interpretation" allowed him to
represent the Absolute itself as an extended individual
capable in its omniscience of determining final purpose and
thereby elevating pragmatic meaning to the level of
certainty.

Indeed, under Royce’s analysis, Peirce’s

unlimited community actually took on the psychological
aspects of James’ sovereign self and emerged as a selfinterpreting social mind which comprised the very essence
of morality.
Royce articulated his ethical program in a
phenomenological analysis of loyalty which declared the
community the primal core of the social self.

His argument

drew on a crucial shift of logical metaphors.

Royce dis

tinguished subsumption under a class from membership,
invoking the mathematical image of the infinite series as
justification.

The relation of the individual to the com

munity, he argued, described more than the relation of part
to whole since the community itself transfigured the indi
vidual and raised him to higher level of being.

Hence the

social aggregate emerged as "one conscious spiritual whole"
capable itself of interpreting.
"A community is not a mere collection of individuals,"
Royce maintained.

"It is a sort of live unit, that has

organs, as the body of an individual has organs.

...Not

472

only does the community live, it has a mind of its own -- a
mind whose psychology is not the same as the psychology of
an individual human being."**

This social mind interpreted

the ideas of all the members of the community to one
another.

Indeed "a genuinely and loyally united community

which lives a coherent life, is, in a perfectly literal
sense, a person.

...On the other hand, any human individual

person in a perfectly literal sense, is a communi ty."•«
By treating James’ behavioral manifestations as signs
and Dewey’8 interactive conduct as interpretation, Royce
could actually portray the social process as an infinitely
extended "determination of self."
pretation," Royce argued,

"A process of inter

"involves, of necessity, an

infinite sequence of acts of interpretation."

Moreover,

each time someone interpreted a second to a third, a tri
adic community of interpretation existed.

Interpretation

thus involved a process in which the mind interpreting and
the mind interpreted to achieved a unity and in a sense
became an individual.

This synthetic individual, as the

possessor of a mediating idea, projected an actual "spirit
of community" which itself took on the lineaments of an
interpreter capable of setting and achieving goals.
Through this process, society became in effect a "Communi ty
of Interpretation" which "unifie[d] all the social varie
ties and all the Bocial communities which, for any reason,
we know to be real in the empirical world."

Indeed "the
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history of the universe, the whole order of time, is the
history and the order and the expression of this Universal
Community" which commanded, by virtue of its very constitu
tion, the loyalty of man to Man.*7
Royce’8 philosophy of loyalty thus restored that trans
cendent dimension missing from James’ and Dewey’s
instrumental programs -- indeed, it restored it with a
vengeance.

In what Kuklick terms "a dramatic postulation

leap," Royce restated America’s characteristic millenial
dream as a function of formal mathematics and Darwinian
lore, describing the social-evolutionary emergence of the
species into a spiritual community.**

But as he leapt,

Royce let go that line which had kept Peirce securely
tethered in the objective world.

By sacrificing the rela

tional matrix of Peirce’s categories to an overarching
category of Being, Royce effectively abandonned the tenta
tive, self-corrective method which had underwritten
Peirce’s thought in favor of a dialectical certainty which
made James’ psychological assurance appear positively
anemic by comparison.
James, Dewey and Royce each enriched a portion of
Peirce’s encyclopedic thought -- James with his psychologi
cal critique, Dewey with his sociological program and Royce
with his ethical analysis.

But none of the three seemed to

appreciate the "principle of universal continuity" on which
Peirce had insisted.

In fact, each seemed intent on sub
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verting the relational matrix which Peirce had established
in favor of one or another of its component parts.

The

result in each case was a curiously monophonic refrain
which lacked the depth and symmetry of Peirce's "symphony
of intellectual life."

Peirce had attempted to offer a

comprehensive method for defining truth as well as
determining meaning and managing conduct.

The harmonic

support which each of his categories gave to the otherB
allowed him to extend that method across all disciplines
and claim universal jurisdiction for his logic of science.
James, Dewey and Royce, on the other hand, ended by playing
instrumental variations on discrete segments of Peirce’s
theme and missing its polyphonic structure.
Like a good Ramean, Peirce had developed his practics
within the boundaries of an encircling ars technologicae,
continually integrating the functional status of means and
ends in the construction of a continuous reality.

This was

the characteristic American visiu., which his successors
obscured -- some by excess, some by default.

This was the

faith of the Fathers, the platform of the politicians, the
agenda of the scientists which had underwritten the devel
opment of American ideology since the founding of the
Citty.

It would remain for a later generation of American

intellectuals, chastened by the trauma of World War and
domestic disaster, to restore the outlines of Peirce’s
synoptic thought and reestablish American logic in a
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trajectory which would ultimately reconnect it with its
Ramean roots.
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"If we admit," he pointed out, "that the
evolutionary process consists in a mutual determination of
the individual and his environment, ...moral necessity in
conduct is found in the very evolutionary situation."
(Movements of Thought in the 19th Century (Chicago, 1936),
168). Mead also drew heavily on semiotics for his theory
of self-hood, linking him in retrospect to Peirce.
But
unlike Peirce, Mead saw the mind as an emergent, not a gen
erative, force in semiosis. Hence he defined reality as a
complex of perspectives organized around the principle of
sociality.
In a sense, Mead’s "socialty" functioned, as
Thirdness had for Peirce, as a regulative principle.
62. Dewey, Logic. 8-9.
"So far as I know," Dewey
wrote, "Mr. Charles S. Peirce was the first to call atten
tion to this principle, and to insist upon its fundamental
logical import. ...Mr. Peirce states it as the principle of
continuity" (Logical Conditions of a Scientific Treatment
of Morality (Chicago, 1903), 14).
Ironically, however,
when Studies in Logical Theory appeared in Chicago under
Dewey's editorship, the preface noted a "pre-eminent
obligation ...to William James" but failed to acknowledge
any debt to Peirce.
63.

Ibid., 17.

64.
John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct (New York,
1922), 195-196.
65.
John Dewey, "The Interpretation of Savage Mind,"
Psychological Review 9(1902):219.
Dewey developed this
theme in his famous argument against the "spectator theory
of knowledge." Mind, he claimed, is no spectator observing
the world from without.
It is in the world as a part of
the process.
Similarly, intelligence is not something man
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brings to bear on nature.
It is nature itself creating and
preserving opportunities for a richer life.
66. John Dewey, The Theory of Valuation (Chicago,
1939), 32.
67. For a discussion of Dewey's concept of community
which has interesting echoes in the present context, see
Beth J. Singer, "Dewey’s Concept of Community: A Critique,"
JHP 23( 1985 ): 555-569.
Singer comments on the emphasis
which Dewey's model places on communication as a component
of community.
See also B. T. Wilkins, "James, Dewey, and
Hegelian Idealism," JHI 17( 1956):332-446.
Wilkins compares
James' and Dewey’s concepts of the individual in the con
text of a communal ideal.
68. Dewey's philosophy did not, however, lack for an
aesthetic dimension.
The qualities of primary experience,
he claimed, were all aesthetic.
They possessed a symmetry
and a balance (notice that he carefully avoids the word
order!) which, when transformed by the mind into substance,
constituted art. The arts in fact portrayed an intensified
form of experience which had the power to restore con
tinuity to men’s lives by putting them back in touch with
the source of their intellectual and institutional con
structs.
For Dewey, as for Emerson, art thus possessed a
redemptive power. This was essentially the aspect of
Dewey’s naturalism which Santayana developed.
Ethics and
aesthetics, Santayana claimed, were the product of
"imaginative impulses fortunately moral" (Winds of Doctrine
(New York, 1975) , 108).
69. This is where Dewey’s pragmatism spilled over into
Progressivism. The ambiguous program of progressive reforms
drew on precisely those "moral emotions" which Dewey had
validated through his logic.
For what Hofstadter calls
"The Current of Pragmatism" running through progressive
ideology, see Social Darwinism. 123-142. See also Alan
Cywar, "John Dewey: Toward Domestic Reconstruction, 1915—
1920," JHI 30(1961):385-400.
70.

Morton White, Science and Sentiment. 228, 299.

71.

Perry, Thought and Character. I, 788; II, 421.

72.

CE 2.162-309; CE 2.132-161.

73. See CP 1.343; 3.563 and Peirce’s review of "The
World and the Individual," The Nation 75(1902):94-96).
James was similarly ambiguous in his response to Royce’s
idealism, writing to him in 1900: "I lead a parasitic iife
upon you, for my highest flight of ambitious ideality is to
become your conqueror, and go down in history as such, you
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and I rolled in one another’s arms and silent (or rather
loquacious still) in one last death-grapple of an embrace"
(Letters. II, 136).
74. Josiah Royce, The Conception of God (New York
1898), 31.
75. Josiah Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy
(Boston, 1892), 281.
76. Josiah Royce, The World and the Individual (New
York, 1900), 325, 332. Royce’s argument was grounded in
the distinction between what he termed the Worlds of Des
cription and Appreciation, the one embodying objects or
external meaning, the other embodying purpose or internal
meaning. Royce maintained that since the World of Descrip
tion presupposed the World of Appreciation, the world of
objects must exist as a part of an infinite purpose viewed
from the perspective of an ideal mind. See Kuklick’s chap
ter "The
World and the Individual" in Josiah Royce: An
Intellectual Biography (Indianapolis, 1972), 99-118 for an
in depth discussion.
77.

Royce, World.I, 319-320.

78.
Josiah Royce, The Outlines ofPsychology (New
York, 1903), 164, 194-196. Kuklick describes Roycean
interpretation as "that form of cognition involved in the
knowledge of mind. When a man clarifies his own interests
and meanings and acquires knowledge of his self, he is
interpreting,” he explains, adding that "through inter
pretation we also learn of the social relations between man
and man, our knowledge of other minds" (Royce. 213). The
important thing to notice here is that Royce’s process of
interpretation is confined exclusively to the knowledge of
minds.
Using self-knowledge as the paradigmatic form of
interpretation Royce ultimately concluded that the whole
world process was mental (The Problem of Christianity
(Chicago, 1968), 245).
79. C.S. Peirce, review of "The World and The Individ
ual," The Nation 75(1903):94-96.
80.
"The whole clash of rationalistic and empirical
religion," James had pointed out, centered on "the validity
of possibility." James solved the problem with his charac
teristically apt discussion of "the possible chicken" and
"the actual egg" (See Perry, Thought and Character. 727728). But Royce attacked James' view on the status of pos
sible experience in The Absolute and the Individual, where
he concluded that valid possible experiences in fact merely
reflected part3 of the actual experience of the Absolute.
Royce thus went beyond the fallibilism which had tempered
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Peirce's tentative method to a dialectical argument in
which "The Possibility of Error" effectively transformed
James’ provisional "Will to Believe" into a palpable path
to truth. Royce in fact considered the possibility of
error to be the only escape from relativism and the
guarantor of absolute truth.
81. Royce*s Logical Essays, ed D. Robinson (Dubuque,
1951), 263-274 (emphasis his).
"While experience is always
the guide," Royce argued in the same passage, "the attitude
of the investigator towards experience is determined by
interests which have to be partially due to what I should
call the 'internal meaning’, that human interest in
rational theoretical construction which inspires the
scientific inquiry; ...[Thus] the theoretical constructions
which prevai1...are neither unbiased reports of the actual
constitution of an external reality, nor yet arbitrary con
structions of fancy."
82.
"The seeming," Royce argued, "is opposed to
reality only in so far as the chance experience of one
point of view gets contrasted with what would be, or might
be experienced from some larger more rationally permanent,
or more inclusive and uniting point of view" (The Concep
tion of God (New York, 1909), 30-31). Royce seems here to
be espousing Peirce’s ideal of an unlimited community of
inquiry.
"Yet there is a difference," Morton White points
out, "between Peirce's view...and Royce's view, because
where Peirce refers to a normal eye, Royce refers to a
larger, more organized and uniting experience; and thereby
hangs a tale that leads to Royce’s Absolute" (Science and
Sentiment , 221).
83.

CP 5.414.

84. Josiah Royce, Philosophy of Loyalty (New York,
1908), 324-348, 336-337.
85.

Royce, Problem of Christianity. 194 218, 80.

86. Letters of Josiah Royce. ed. John Clendenning
(Chicago, 1970), 646. Although Royce’s early arguments had
viewed inclusion as a simple relation of part to whole, his
later writings contain this more complex interpretation.
Kuklick attributes the shift in Royce’s argument to a
reciprocal influence between himself and James.
See chap
ters 2 and 4 in Royce. 25-48, 67-97. Schneider on the
other hand, attributes the shift to Peirce’s suggestion
that Royce investigate logic and formal mathematics.
See
History. 415-424.
87.
Royce, Problem of Christianity, 272-273.
Herbert
Schneider points out that "the type of community which
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Royce means is exhibited better in the church than in
science.
The true church, and here Royce’s idealism
reverts to Calvinism, is a community of memory and hope, a
unity of faith and redeeming grace. ...Ordinary political
society does not conform to this type of community, for it
breeds individualism, and individualism is 'the sin against
the Holy Ghost.’ To be a real individual, one must be a
loyal member, for only through God’s grace in the community
is salvation, self-hood, possible.
God is simply the
'spirit-of-the-community’, the essence of loyalty"
(History. 423-424).
88.
Kuklick notes that evolution became for Royce "the
form in which finite creatures, constrained to time and
space, must perceive the world-self." Evolutionary theory
merely described "how the temporal constantly yearned to
overreach itself; with the ever-increasing growth of con
sciousness, it strove for the eternal" (Rise. 157). Royce,
in fact, claimed that idealism was the only philosophy
which could grasp the underlying significance of Darwinian
thought.
See Kuklick’s chapter "The World of Description
and Philosophical Psychology" in Royce, 67-97.

EPILOGUE

In 1910 James died.

Two years later Santayana began

his retreat into intellectual exile.

Within another two

years Peirce had passed from the scene, leaving behind that
ragged assortment of articles, papers, notes, drafts, let
ters and scribblings which constitute his collected works.
By 1916 Royce had merged with his cherished Absolute, leav
ing the prolific and articulate Dewey as the "spokesman" of
American Pragmatism.

Dewey’s one-dimensional program

proved signally incapable of expressing the energizing
insights which had lain behind Peirce’s manifold thought.
And yet, his was the voice which preached pragmatism to the
generation of scholars and theorists who emerged from the
trauma of World War in search of a philosophic rationale.
Peirce’s papers remained in disarray for some twenty
years after his death -- indeed for those two crucial
decades during which Neo-Progressives, Neo-Liberals, NeoDemocrats, Neo-Conservatives, Neo-Romantics, Neo-Humanists,
Neo-Orthodoxy, Neo-just-about-everything vied for
preeminence of place in the reconstruction of the nation’s
ideology.

The economic instability of the 1920’s and the

resultant social dislocations merely served to deepen the
philosophic malaise consequent upon the war, encouraging a
bumper crop of Neo-Critics who presided over what Henry May
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has called "the end of American innocence."

Campaigning

under various reactionary banners -- anti-intellectualism,
anti-modernism, anti-urbanism, anti-positivism, anti
relativism -- these intellectual gad-flies unfortunately
proved more adept at dismantling their philosophic past
than at articulating a viable program for social regenera
tion.

Facilitated by social cynics and social visionaries

alike, the prevailing mood of disillusionment and decline
gradually degenerated into what T. Jackson Lears has
described as a kind of "cultural neuresthenia" which
betrayed the sorry state of the national consciousness.
Dewey’s pragmatism offered no solace.

Indeed, his

instrumentalism appeared as a kind of cruel caricature of
the millenial dream which had previously supported the
nation's intellectual life.

Frustrated by a lack of moral

rigor in American life and a concommitant lack of logical
rigor in American thought, a movement arose to widen the
philosophic debate.

Significantly, this movement reached

out, not to the psychologism of James, or the
instrumentalism of Dewey, or the idealism of Royce, but
rather to what Alfred Kazin has called "the instinctive
realism" of the American mind -- a realism integral to the
philosophic program of Peirce, but temporarily obscured by
the less stringent formulas of his successors.
Developed variously as an indigenous Neo-Realism, a
derivative Critical Realism, and through Structuralist and
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Semiotic analyses, this movement tended generally to accept
the objectivity of particular things, endorse the independ
ent reality of noetic structures, emphasize the centrality
of sign relations, and acknowledge the intimate connection
between knowledge and belief. Grounding their arguments in
the "existential realism of common use," this new gener
ation of realists revalidated that world of consensual
knowledge which had underwritten Peirce’s pragmatic vision
and prepared the way for a reassessment of his logical
program.

By 1935, supported by developments in mathemati

cal logic and refinements in the philosophy of science
articulated by figures such as Einstein, Russell, Whitehead
and Freud, they had created an intellectual climate in
which Peirce's theories could gain a sympathetic hearing.
Indeed, the publication of the early volumes of Peirce’s
Collected Papers in the late 1930’s instituted a revival of
interest in his thought which, far from dissipating itself
among the various scholarly perspectives it spawned, has
tended rather to gain force and direction, serving
ultimately to establish Peirce as a crucial figure in the
development of American thought.
From the vantage point of the 1990’s we read Royce with
nostalgia, James with sympathy and Dewey with forebearance.
But we read Peirce with recognition.

In his philosophical

program we recognize echoes of our intellectual past, solu
tions for our complex present and a justification for hope
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in a problematic future.

Indeed in Peirce we continue to

recognize a true spokesman of the American mind -- a voice
speaking with accents peculiar to our native Ramean
heri tage.
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